

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIERS OF INDIA.

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VOL. I.

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P A P E R S

REGARDING

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING TRIBES  
ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

OF

INDIA,

AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN  
AGAINST THEM DURING THE YEAR

1897-1898.

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Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

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
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UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA  
NEW DELHI

TO : THE DIRECTOR  
UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA  
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FROM : THE DIRECTOR  
UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA  
NEW DELHI

13873

# EAST INDIA.

## PART I.: WAZIRISTAN.

No.	Documents.	Page
1	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 10th July 1894 ... ..	1
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 24th March 1894, with Sub-Enclosure—	7
	A. Mr. Bruce's Letter, dated 28th February 1894 ( <i>Extract</i> )...	7
	B. Sir. D. Fitzpatrick's Note, dated 14th March 1894 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	13
	C. Petition from Banocha Khan, &c., 7th February 1894 ...	22
	(ii.) Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 16th June 1894 ... ..	24
	(iii.) Minute of Dissent by Sir C. Pritchard, Mr. J. Westland, and Sir A. Macdonnell, dated 6th July 1894 ... ..	25
2	Letter from Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated 24th August 1894 ... ..	30
3	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 11th September 1894 ... ..	31
4	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 3rd October 1894 ... ..	32
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 12th September 1894 ... ..	32
	(ii.) Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 24th September 1894 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	33
5	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 2nd January 1895... ..	34
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 29th November 1894, with Sub-Enclosure ... ..	38
	Draft Proclamation ... ..	38
	(ii.) Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 6th December 1894, with Sub-Enclosure ... ..	39
	Revised draft Proclamation ... ..	39
6	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 20th February 1895 ... ..	39
7	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 20th March 1895 ... ..	41
8	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 15th May 1895 ... ..	42
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Telegram from Mr. Anderson, dated 7th April 1895 ... ..	46
	(ii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 12th April 1895 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	46
9	Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy of India, 24th July 1895...	48
10	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27th July 1895 ... ..	48
11	Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 2nd August 1895... ..	49
12	Letter from Secretary of State to Government of India, dated 9th August 1895 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	49
13	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 1st January 1896... ..	50
13	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from the Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 12th October 1895 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	51
	(ii.) Letter from the Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 18th October 1895 ... ..	54

No.	Documents.	Page.
14	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 18th March 1896 ... ..	55
15	Letter from Secretary of State to Government of India, dated 8th May 1896 ... ..	58
16	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 19th May 1896 .. ...	59
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 28th January 1896 ... ..	60
	With enclosed Statements (2) ... ..	61 & 64
	(ii.) Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 2nd March 1896 ... ..	66
17	Letter from Secretary of State to Government of India, dated 19th June 1896 ... ..	66
18	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 9th June 1896 ... ..	66
19	Letter from the Secretary of State to Government of India, dated 23rd July 1896 ... ..	67
20	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 14th October 1896 ... ..	67
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 25th April 1896, with Sub-Enclosures—	67
	A. Brigadier-General Nicholson's letter, dated 9th March 1896 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	67
	B. Punjab Government's letter to Brigadier-General Nicholson, dated 25th April 1896 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	69
	(ii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 3rd June 1896, with Sub-Enclosures—	70
	A. Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 10th April 1896 ... ..	70
	B. Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 16th April 1896 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	74
	(iii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 6th August 1896 ... ..	75
	(iv.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 7th September 1896... ..	76
21	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 11th June 1897 ...	77
22	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 12th June 1897 ...	77
23	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 17th June 1897 ...	77
24	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 17th July 1897 ...	78
25	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st July 1897 ...	78
26	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 21st July 1897 ... ..	78
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 12th June 1897, with Sub-Enclosures—	80
	A. Telegram from Political Officer, Tochi, 11th June 1897 ... ..	81
	B. Telegram from Commissioner, Derajat, 11th June 1897 ... ..	81
	C. Telegram to Commissioner, Derajat, 12th June 1897 ... ..	81
	(ii.) Telegram Commissioner Derajat Division to Government of India, dated 16th June 1897 ... ..	82
	(iii.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 17th June 1897 ... ..	84
	(iv.) Telegram from Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, dated 17th June 1897 ... ..	84
	(v.) Telegram from Commissioner Derajat Division, dated 18th June 1897 ... ..	84
	(vi.) Telegram from Punjab Government to Commissioner Derajat Division, dated 19th June 1897 ... ..	86
	(vii.) Telegram from Commissioner Derajat Division to Government of India, dated 21st June 1897 ... ..	86

No.	Documents.	Page.
26 (cont.)	(viii.) Telegram from Commissioner Derajat Division to Government of India, dated 23rd June 1897 ... ..	87
	(ix.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government dated 25th June 1897, with Sub-Enclosure ... ..	87
	Draft Proclamation ... ..	87
	(x.) Telegram from Commissioner Derajat Division to Government of India, dated 25th June 1897 ... ..	88
	(xi.) Telegram from Commissioner Derajat Division to Government of India, dated 26th June 1897 ... ..	88
	(xii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 27th June 1897 ... ..	89
	(xiii.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 30th June 1897 ... ..	90
	(xiv.) Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 1st July 1897, with Sub-Enclosure ... ..	90
	Draft of Terms ... ..	92
	(xv.) Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 2nd July 1897, with Sub-Enclosures—	92
	A. Mr. Gee's letter, dated 19th June 1897 ... ..	93
	With annexure, Mr. Gee's letter, dated 15th June 1897 ... ..	99
	B. Letter from Punjab Government to Commissioner Derajat Division, dated 2nd July 1897 ... ..	101
	(xvi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 15th July 1897 ... ..	101
	(xvii.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 17th July 1897 ... ..	102
	(xviii.) Letter from Government of India to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 17th July 1897 ... ..	103
27	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st August 1897 ...	104
28	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th August 1897	104
29	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 18th August 1897 ... ..	104
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Telegram from Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, dated 19th July 1897 ... ..	106
	(ii.) List of Maliks ... ..	106
	(iii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 18th July 1897 ... ..	107
	(iv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 18th July 1897 ... ..	107
	(v.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 21st July 1897 ... ..	108
	(vi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 20th July 1897 ... ..	108
	(vii.) Letter from Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated 8th July 1897, with Sub-Enclosure letter from Mullas ... ..	108
	(viii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 21st July 1897 ... ..	109
	(ix.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 24th July 1897 ... ..	109
	(x.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 27th July 1897 ... ..	109
	(xi.) Telegram to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 29th July 1897 ... ..	110
	(xii.) Telegram from Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, dated 1st August 1897... ..	110
	(xiii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 1st August 1897 ... ..	110
	(xiv.) Letter from the British Agent at Kabul, dated 28th July 1897.	110
	(xv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 4th August 1897 ... ..	111
	(xvi.) Telegram to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 7th August 1897 ... ..	111
	(xvii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 6th August 1897 ... ..	111
	(xviii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 29th July 1897 ... ..	111
	With Sub-Enclosure, Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 20th July 1897 ... ..	112



No.	Documents.	Page.
29 (cont.)	(xix.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 10th August 1897 ... ..	112
	(xx.) Telegram from Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, dated 11th August 1897 ... ..	113
	(xxi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 11th August 1897 ... ..	113
	(xxii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 12th August 1897 ... ..	113
	(xxiii.) Telegram from Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, dated 13th August 1897 ... ..	113
	(xxiv.) Telegram to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 14th August 1897 ... ..	114
	(xxv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 14th August 1897 ... ..	114
30	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 1st September 1897 ... ..	114
31	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th September 1897.	114
32	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 15th September 1897.	114
33	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 30th September 1897 ... ..	115
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 17th August, 1897 ... ..	116
	(ii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 17th August 1897 ... ..	116
	(iii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 18th August 1897 ... ..	116
	(iv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 20th August 1897 ... ..	117
	(v.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 21st August 1897 ... ..	117
	(vi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 22nd August 1897 ... ..	117
	(vii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 22nd August 1897 ... ..	117
	(viii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 25th August 1897 ... ..	118
	(ix.) Telegram to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 26th August 1897 ... ..	118
	(x.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 26th August 1897 ... ..	118
	(xi.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 19th August 1897 ... ..	118
	(xii.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd August 1897 ... ..	120
	(xiii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 28th August 1897 ... ..	121
	(xiv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 31st August 1897 ... ..	121
	(xv.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 28th August 1897, with Sub-Enclosures—	121
	A. Letter from Maliks ... ..	122
	B. Letter to Maliks ... ..	122
	(xvi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 2nd September 1897 ... ..	123
	(xvii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 2nd September 1897 ... ..	123
	(xviii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 3rd September 1897 ... ..	123
	(xix.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 6th September 1897 ... ..	124
	(xx.) Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 7th September 1897... ..	124
	(xxi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 8th September 1897 ... ..	124
	(xxii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 10th September 1897 ... ..	124
	(xxiii.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 6th September 1897, with two Sub-Enclosures—	125
	Letters from Maliks ... ..	126

No.	Documents.	Page.
33 (cont.)	(xxiv.) Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 10th September 1897 ... ..	127
	(xxv.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 15th September 1897 ... ..	127
	(xxvi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 13th September 1897 ...	128
	(xxvii.) Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 14th September 1897 ... ..	128
	(xxviii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to the Government of India, dated 22nd September 1897 ... ..	129
34	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th October 1897 ...	129
35	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd November 1897	129
36	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 4th November 1897 ... ..	129
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd September 1897, with Sub- Enclosures:	131
	A. Letter from Khalifa Nur Muhammad ... ..	131
	B. Letter to Khalifa Nur Muhammad ... ..	132
	(ii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 26th September 1897 ...	132
	(iii.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 28th September 1897 ... ..	132
	(iv.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Com- manding Tochi Field Force, dated 3rd October 1897 ...	132
	(v.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 25th September 1897, with Sub- Enclosure—	132
	Account of Malik Sadda Khan ... ..	135
	(vi.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 27th September 1897 ... ..	138
	(vii.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 28th September 1897, with Sub- Enclosures—	138
	A. Letter from Khalifa Nur Muhammad ... ..	138
	B. Letter to Khalifa Nur Muhammad ... ..	139
	(viii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 2nd October 1897 ... ..	139
	(ix.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 14th October 1897, with Sub-Enclosure—	141
	Letter from Commissioner Derajat Division, dated 12th October 1897... ..	141
	(x.) Letter from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 13th October 1897 ... ..	141
	(xi.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force, dated 23rd October 1897 ... ..	144
	(xii.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 23rd October 1897 ... ..	145
	(xiii.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Com- manding Tochi Field Force, dated 23rd October 1897 ...	146
	(xiv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 24th October 1897 ...	146
	(xv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tochi Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 31st October 1897... ..	146
37	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 17th November 1897	146
38	Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 26th November 1897	146

## PART II.: KOHAT SALT.

No.	Documents.	Page.
1	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 30th September 1897 ... .. 148	148
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) From Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 19th May 1892 * ... .. 150	150
	(ii.) From Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 12th July 1895 with Sub-Enclosures ... .. 150	150
	A. Letter from Mr. Udny to Punjab Government, dated 9th December 1894 ( <i>Extract</i> ) with Annexure—	151
	Memo. by Captain Deane, dated 1st July 1892 ( <i>Extract</i> )	158
	With 2 Appendices relating to trade in Salt ... .. 166	166
	B. Letter from Financial Commissioner, Punjab, dated 14th March 1895 ... .. 167	167
	(iii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 13th September 1895, with Sub-Enclosure—	168
	Letter from Commissioner, Peshawar Division, dated 28th August 1895 ... .. 168	168
	(iv.) Letter from Punjab Government, to the Government of India, dated 23rd December 1895 ... .. 169	169
	(v.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 12th June 1896 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. 172	172
	(vi.) Notification by Government of India, dated 12th June 1896 ... .. 174	174
2	Letter from Secretary of State to Government of India, dated 25th November 1897 ... .. 175	175



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## PAPERS

REGARDING

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING TRIBES ON THE  
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF

## INDIA,

AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN AGAINST  
THEM DURING THE YEAR

1897-1898.

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### PART I. (WAZIRISTAN).

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No. 1.

*Letter from Government of India to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 10th July 1894. (Received 31st July 1894.)*

SIR,

HAVING received in your telegram, dated the 13th April, approval to the course which we proposed to follow in addressing the Amir of Afghanistan on the subject of the demarcation of the Afghan boundary in Waziristan, we caused a letter to be written to His Highness proposing that the work should be undertaken in the middle of October next by Joint-Commissioners who would meet at the junction of the Kundar and Gomal rivers. The Amir was told that, in order to avoid any risk of trouble among the Waziris, it was proposed to place a British force of about the strength of a brigade in or near the Spin valley, and a suggestion was made that His Highness might wish to place a reserve of troops on his side of the border. His Highness replied agreeing to these proposals, and his letter, which reproduces the communication made to him, is enclosed.

2. In order to prepare the tribes upon our side of the border for these operations, we have authorized the Punjab Government to cause an announcement to be forthwith made to them to the following effect:—That the Government of India have concluded a settlement with the Amir, and that the following line of boundary dividing Waziristan from the Afghan dominions has been agreed upon. From the hill marked Charkiaghar on the map illustrating the boundary agreement, the line descends to the Tochi stream, which it crosses at Machaguri. From this point it follows the crest of the ridge between the Birmal and Shawal valleys as far as the point marked Khwaja Khedar, so as to leave Birmal to Afghanistan. From Khwaja Khedar, the line passes to near Shakin, which is also left to Afghanistan. From Shakin it runs nearly due south to the crest of the range crossed by the Nazan Kotal, at a point about six miles south of the Kotal. Thence it follows the crest of the Spera range, to Domandi on the Gomal river. The tribesmen are also to be informed that Joint-Commissioners of the British and Afghan Governments will proceed in October next to mark off this line on the ground; and that in the meantime the British Government calls upon the tribes to respect it. They will further be told that the British Government has no desire to interfere in their affairs, but only to secure peace, and that in settling affairs for that end, the co-operation of the tribes will be invited and welcomed.

In the meantime the Punjab Government and military authorities will prepare in detail the necessary measures for carrying the demarcation into effect at the proper time.

3. In the Viceroy's telegram of the 7th April, it was represented that our future relations with the Waziris should be settled simultaneously with the demarcation. We have consequently had this important matter under our serious consideration.



4. We enclose a list of some of the offences committed by the Waziri tribe during the past year which shows the unsatisfactory condition of Waziristan and of our districts bordering upon it. This list does not profess to be nearly exhaustive, for many offences occur which are not at once reported to us. It shows, however, that we have information of 27 persons being killed, and as many wounded by Waziri raiders between January and June of this year. Some of the outrages which occurred this year show a peculiar boldness, such as the shooting of a sowar near the Zam Pass in Bhattanni country, and the attack on a baggage guard of regular troops near the Gwaleri Kotal, and, therefore, within the line of the Punjab posts. We believe, indeed, that the outrages committed in the first five months of this year exceed in number and importance any previously reported within a similar period. And out of the 31 outrages named in the enclosed list, partial reparation has been obtained in only seven, the remainder having gone entirely unpunished. In the seven cases above mentioned, the amount of punishment has been limited at the dictation of the Waziri Malik.

5. The raid which was carried out against the cattle belonging to Powindahs, who were encamped within a mile of the Kajuri Kach post, was one of the most daring attacks perpetrated upon these people. This case and the others mentioned in diaries received from Captain McMahon, C.I.E., the officer who is engaged upon the demarcation of the boundary between Afghanistan and the Baluchistan Agency territories, indicate how systematically the Waziris plunder the traders passing up to Afghanistan from India. So great is the oppression exercised on these trading caravans that the Powindahs have declared their intention of abandoning the Gomal route altogether and taking the naturally less convenient road further south through the Zao Pass and the Zhob Agency. We have received also repeated and urgent complaints from the Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan in regard to the state of insecurity existing in the Agency territories consequent upon the want of control over the movements of Waziri bands of marauders across the Gomal river. The last letter received from Sir James Browne on this subject forcibly describes the situation.

6. The arrangements, as at present existing, afford little protection against these raids and are not effectual in exacting punishment for them. In the Punjab Frontier Administration Report for 1891-92, it is mentioned in writing of the Mahsud Waziris that a large number of the offences committed by them in that year "was committed by the Abdur Rahman Khels, either alone or in conjunction with certain sections of the Darwesh Khels over whom we have little or no control. The thieves belonging to these tribes can, with impunity, return to their homes through Spin, after raiding in Zhob, our levies at Kajuri Kach being powerless to check them."

In 1892-93 special circumstances, connected with intrigues carried on among the Waziris by orders from Kabul, caused so unsatisfactory a state of affairs that the Punjab Government was obliged to advance troops to Kajuri Kach and Jandola, and to take measures for permanently strengthening the Bhattanni tribal service. The expense of keeping troops in those positions, and the unhealthiness of the posts led, however, to their number being reduced in March 1893; but in February last, owing to the murders in Bhattanni country, and near the Gwaleri Kotal, mentioned in paragraph 4, the Lieutenant-Governor again requisitioned for troops, and considerable reinforcements were sent, which were not withdrawn until the tribes had been induced to make some reparation. Up to the conclusion of our agreement with the Amir, the only means of exercising pressure were threats of punitive expeditions, institution of blockades, and imposition of fines. The first are especially to be avoided if we would cultivate friendly relations with the Waziris. A blockade only just falls short of a punitive expedition in its unhappy effect upon our relations of good neighbourhood, while fines fail to reach the guilty persons, being paid by the well disposed in order to avert the further calamity of an expedition. The papers which we have received with the Punjab Government's letter, dated the 7th June 1894, give some instances in which the local officers of the Punjab border have dealt with jirgas of the different sections of the Waziri tribe in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of some of the more daring of recent outrages. The letter itself shews that though the leading men among almost all sections of the Waziris are not unwilling to deal fairly with us, they are helpless to coerce the turbulent section of the tribe. If we are to bring about by peaceful means an improvement in respect to the conduct of the Waziris on our border, it is advisable to strengthen

the hands of the well disposed and influential men, and to show the tribesmen generally that their interest lies in co-operating with us in bringing offenders to justice.

7. Our new understanding with the Amir affords an opportunity for improvement in this respect which has never before been presented to us. It will be seen from the jirga proceedings that the tribesmen have realised that the Amir's interference in their country has now been brought to an end. Understanding, therefore, that we are now free to deal with them, and anticipating that we will not submit longer to the state of lawlessness which has until now been tolerated, they have acquiesced, in two cases, in measures of reparation by the surrender of offenders which mark a distinct advance upon our former means of exacting punishment. The same proceedings shew, however, how slight our hold is upon these tribesmen, and that the frontier officers are only able to obtain the partial reparation which has been made by consenting to deal leniently with the surrendered criminals, and by bargaining beforehand in a manner which is scarcely dignified. Even the limited measure of retribution which has in these cases been brought upon leaders of raids into British districts and murderers of British subjects could not be exacted in future cases of the same sort, if the tribes were to understand that we were going to take no steps to enforce our control when we had caused the Amir's to be withdrawn. No better terms could be obtained in the cases under notice without resorting to threats of punitive action.

8. We conceive that by reason of the agreement made in November 1893 between the Amir of Kabul and Sir Mortimer Durand, by which agreement His Highness has undertaken at no time to exercise interference in the territories lying beyond the boundary line on the side of India, we have assumed a measure of responsibility for the peace of the Afghan border which has not hitherto been ours, and which, under present arrangements, we have no adequate means of discharging. We understand that Her Majesty's Government concur in this view. Lord Kimberley writing on this subject approved of our statement of policy to the effect that, while we emphatically repudiated all intention of annexing tribal territory, we desired to bring the tribes whom this settlement concerns further within our influence.

9. We wish in this despatch to lay before you the manner in which we propose to carry out this policy ; and we bear in mind that Lord Kimberley added to the expression of his approval which we have just cited the caution that he trusted that, in carrying our policy into effect, we would carefully abstain from taking any steps to extend our influence which might "tend to bring about a collision with the tribesmen or to the establishment of fresh posts beyond the frontier which may require armed protection."

10. The proposals made in this respect by the local officers and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab are contained in Mr. Fanshawe's letter, dated the 24th March 1894. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's note which reviews the local proposals, and contains his own, was written before he knew that the Amir's wishes would be met in respect of the demarcation of the Waziri border. Much, therefore, of what His Honour writes with reference to the arguments for and against action in Waziristan is now beside the question. We would direct attention, however, to the following passages in his summing up—"the local officers are right in thinking that, unless we are prepared to make up our minds to some such scheme for the location of troops and the extension of tribal services as they propose, we should not attempt any detailed settlement of the new boundary on the ground, but should simply fix that boundary as far as we can on maps by reference to natural geographical features which are already known or can be discovered by enquiry ;" and, "in the event of our not adopting a scheme of the nature referred to, we shall have to consider a much more limited scheme of tribal service with a view to strengthening our present position in the Gomal."

11. The latter quotation refers to a scheme of granting some further allowances to the tribes whom we already subsidise to a certain extent, which had been prepared by the Commissioner of the Derajat before the question of demarcation arose. This scheme had, as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick states, been allowed to stand over only because the whole question of our position in Waziristan was under consideration. It appears, therefore, to be Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's opinion that, under any circumstances, a limited measure for strengthening our position would be necessary.

12. Mr. Bruce's report is that of an officer of long experience in dealing with frontier tribes, who is in a position to know what is deficient in our present arrangements ; the report embodying his views is therefore a valuable contribution to the consideration of this question. Mr. Bruce states his opinion that "to open up the belt of tribal country between the Gomal on the south and Kurram and Thal on the north, and to maintain in safety the main lines of communication traversing it efficiently, it will be necessary to station in the country a military force of two regiments of native infantry, one regiment of cavalry and one mountain battery." He recommends one strong head-quarters military station, with an outpost at the next most suitable position, and he indicates that probably Wano would be the best position for the head-quarters station, with the outpost in Upper Dawar or at Sheranna. Mr. Bruce further proposes to undertake from Wano negotiations with the tribes, the officer charged with the operations being given authority to spend on the entertainment of tribal levies and the allotment of service allowances to the leading headmen, up to the limit of a sanctioned amount which he calculates should be one lakh of rupees annually. The officer in question would be provided with a military escort of about half of the force above described, and the remainder would march up by the Tochi route to join him.

13. We are not prepared to recommend this scheme in its entirety. Our desire is to carry the tribes with us in whatever we may do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs, provided only that our obligations are discharged in protecting our borders and our posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes, who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve and without which they cannot maintain their position. It is a question whether the wishes and the necessities of the tribesmen in the Tochi and Lower Dawar will not require the establishment of what the Lieutenant-Governor calls "a regular system of Government." The circumstances there seem, as he says, to be altogether exceptional. The Darwesh Khel and Dawaris apparently desire and ask for our control as the only means of settling their own feuds and of protecting them from the Mahsuds. What the necessities of the situation in the Tochi and Lower Dawar really are will be ascertained by facts which will come out in the course of negotiating with the tribes, if our proposed negotiations are taken in hand.

14. It is right to notice the question, which has been raised and supported by high authority, that it is desirable that some form of tribute should be taken from the Waziri tribes within our sphere of influence. It must of course be understood that no one puts this forward on fiscal grounds ; we should in any case give back in service allowances and the like much more than we received. There can be no doubt that the Amir intends to draw revenue from the people in Birmal, and it might be politically expedient that the tribes on our side of the boundary should not consider their relations with us as fundamentally different from what the Amir demands. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Waziris do not like the idea of tribute, and our frontier officers do not recommend it. Taking these facts into consideration, and in view of the relations which, as we shall explain, we propose to establish with the Waziris, we are not, as at present advised, prepared to recommend that the payment of tribute should be insisted upon.

15. Looking to the whole tenor of the reports to which we have invited attention, we are of opinion that it is necessary to have some strong post so situated as to put an end to Waziri raiding not only into the Zhob Agency, but also upon Powindah Kafilas which use the Gomal route. Our responsibilities also require that our position shall be such as to show the tribes that we can prevent raiding on the Amir's frontier. We are impressed with the fact that the present weak posts, such as that at Kajuri Kuch, are inadequate to deal with the marauding bands of Waziris. They murder and raid under the eyes of that post. The point at which they most frequently cut the Gomal route is Toi Khula, between Gulkach and Kajuri Kach. The Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan has for nearly two years past been urging upon us the necessity of maintaining a post at this spot. No suitable site was to be found on the south side of the river within the Zhob Agency, and while our relations with the



Amir as to the withdrawal of His Highness's influence from the country on the north side remained undetermined, we hesitated to sanction any post on the north bank. We are now, as far as our relations with the Amir are concerned, free to make any arrangements we please for protecting the line of the Gomal from Waziri incursions. It is probable that the best means of doing this is not to place the necessary post on the river itself, but at a spot which is more suitably situated for dominating the paths by which the marauding bands approach the river. As long ago as 1890, Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner of the Derajat, advocated the establishment of a post at Spin. In 1891 he spoke of such a post as essential to the success of the Gomal arrangements, and added—"I think it is of the utmost importance that no time should be lost in establishing this post." In October 1891, the Punjab Government so far supported the opinions of the frontier officers, that they advocated the establishment of tribal posts in and about Spin. The frontier officers have never varied in their opinion that a post in Spin would be the best guarantee of order; but the Punjab Government has always spoken with an uncertain sound, their opinion being not against the establishment of posts in the Waziri country, but against occupation by regular troops, unless it was considered necessary upon military grounds.

During the past four years, the Punjab Government has had the opportunity of trying the policy of subsidies and tribal levies without any backing of regular troops, except when, as above stated, it has suddenly requisitioned them. It is true that the subsidies have been small, and that the tribal levies have been kept carefully out of the Waziri country itself; but, with these limitations, the policy has been tested, with the result that outrages, instead of diminishing, have increased; and we think the time has come when the policy so long advocated by our most experienced frontier officers should be tried. We are convinced that, unless the tribal levies, backed by regular troops, are employed in the position where they can intercept raiders in the Gomal, it will not be long before we shall be called upon for troops for an expedition against the Waziris; and it is with the object of preventing this risk, that we advocate the establishment of a military post at or near Spin, by the retention of some of the troops there when the Boundary Commission has completed its labours.

It may be found that the position from which watch and ward of the caravan road can best be undertaken is not actually in Spin itself. It may be in the country between Spin and Wano. That is a point of detail for subsequent settlement; Spin has been recommended by those best acquainted with the country on several grounds. It can scarcely be said to be in Waziristan, for it lies at the edge of the Zarmelan plain, which, though a fertile tract, has remained uninhabited, because of the raids of the tribes on one side or the other: it would be a considerable indirect advantage if, by the cultivation of this plain, supplies for the troops could be obtained without the present long carriage. It is also said that a position could here be obtained which would have a good water-supply, notoriously defective in the Gomal, and that in other respects it would be much more healthy than the positions now held by our troops. We ought to add that we do not contemplate any addition to the forces on the frontier, but to provide the garrison for the new post by a re-arrangement of the existing disposition.

16. While, however, we are of opinion that the necessary reinforcement of our posts will be best secured by establishing a post at or near Spin, we do not propose to make any formal announcement without further investigation. The troops for the protection of the Demarcation Commission will be posted in the district in October. We propose at the same time to depute a Political Officer to explain to the Waziris the nature of the relations which we intend to establish with them. It is in every way desirable that these negotiations should be carried on at a time when we are able to make a strong display of force. We are not without hopes that the consent of the tribesmen may be obtained to the establishment of the post proposed. If, however, it should appear that they entertained strong objections to the particular locality selected, we would be ready to consider how far it was possible to meet these objections consistently with securing the advantages which it is sought to gain. We are distinctly of opinion that something must be done to strengthen our



position: if we describe it as the establishment of a strong post at Spin on a permanent footing after the work for which the Commission's escort is provided has been brought to a conclusion, it is because that represents the best information at this moment available to us.

17. In making arrangements with the tribesmen, such as we contemplate, it will be necessary to give increased service allowances to the headmen and to enlist inferior men for service in levy posts. The Mahsuds live by plunder, and our proposals aim at depriving them of that means of livelihood. We do not doubt that, in time when they have abandoned their predatory habits, they will learn to live by peaceful means such as agriculture, rearing stock, and trading. At first, however, many will have no means of subsistence except through the service allowances and pay which we will afford them. Our proposals in this respect are that the officer who will be entrusted with the negotiations which are to be carried out with the tribes should be authorised to draw up a scheme for entertainment of levies and payment of service allowances.

18. Beyond, however, the payment of these levies, we think it unnecessary, for the present, to extend the arrangements already subsisting. We have already referred in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this despatch to the proceedings of the jirgas, and we desire to test fairly the working of this system as a means of dealing with offences which disturb the peace of the country, in the belief that, if successful, it would prevent any interference with the local independence of the tribes. We think there is some reason to hope that the tribes generally might be ready to accept the decision of an assembly of themselves come to with the assistance of a British Officer; and would see to the enforcement of that decision, and the carrying out of any punishment or restitution which it might involve. But while the jirgas might answer for the tribes as a whole, they would probably not be able to give any adequate assurance against the acts of turbulent individuals. To make the system work, we ought to be in a position to assure the jirgas that by proper police arrangements for the protection of our own territories and of the caravan routes we can and will prevent acts out of which constant and troublesome claims arise. It is evident that this is specially necessary in the Gomal district, and we venture to ask your sanction to our using our discretion as to the best means by which it can be done. We think we have said enough to show that, if we propose a new post, it is only because we wish effectively to carry out the policy defined by Lord Kimberley, *i.e.*, that, while we are to extend our influence over tribes beyond the frontier of British India, we are not to annex the country, but the frontier of British India and the sphere of the local administration of British officials are to remain unaltered.

19. We trust that the statement of policy which we have here laid before you will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government; and we shall be anxious to receive, by telegram if possible, a general approval to our proposals. The requisite preparations for bringing our arrangements into effect will take some time.

20. Our Honourable Colleagues Sir Charles Pritchard, Mr. Westland, and Sir Antony MacDonnell dissent from this despatch. Their joint minute of dissent will be found in enclosure (No. 3). It appears to the majority of us that they consider that the result of the policy which we support will be to make the Government of India responsible for the administration of the Waziri country, and to advance the frontier of British India in that quarter to the boundary of Afghanistan. The majority think it necessary to say that the adoption of the policy set forth in this despatch will not, in their opinion, lead to these results; and that they hold strongly that the policy of inactivity tempered by punitive expeditions advocated by the dissentients will inevitably bring about the annexation and administration which they desire to avoid.

We have, &c.,  
 (Signed) ELGIN,  
 G. S. WHITE,  
 A. E. MILLER,  
 H. BRACKENBURY,  
 C. B. PRITCHARD,  
 A. P. MACDONNELL.

## Enclosure No. 1.

*Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 24th March 1894.*

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, the papers marginally noted, which contain the proposals and opinions of the local officers of the Derajat Division in connection with the question of demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary in Waziristan and of our future relations with the Waziris.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor has fully expressed his views on the subject in his note\* of the 14th instant, summing up his conclusions at the end. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick regrets to have to trouble the Government of India with so lengthy a note, but he desires me to say that the importance of the subject must be his apology for doing so.

## Sub-Enclosure A.

*Extract of Letter from R. I. Bruce, Esq., C.I.E., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 28th February 1894.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 6th instant on the subject of demarcation of the boundary between India and Afghanistan which adjoins this division.

In this letter I am desired—

- (i) to state fully my reasons for thinking that it would be necessary for Government, in order to secure the objects in view, to take up a position on this frontier different from that which they have taken up in the Khyber ;
- (ii) to state what it would in my opinion be necessary to do in order to secure the objects which I consider we should attain in Waziristan ; and
- (iii) to furnish as full information as I can as to the present feeling of the different clans of the Waziri and other tribes in regard to the settlement recently made by Sir H. M. Durand with His Highness the Amir at Kabul.

I think, taking it all round, it is remarkable with what equanimity the settlement, so far as they are acquainted with it, is regarded by the tribes, and I believe the popular wish among all hill sections, including the Mahsuds, is that the boundary should be marked out, and that each should know who in future to look to as their suzerain and protector.

I do not for a moment say that the hill sections on the Tochi-Thall side are waiting to rush into our arms and say, "Mark out your boundary and our country ; its routes and resources are open to you and we are your submissive subjects." But I do say they are as willing—more willing even—to accept as reasonable terms for measures by which the country comprised within the new boundary would be pacified and opened up, than the Mahsuds and Wano Ahmadzais were for the pacification of the Gomal when they came to Sir Robert Sandeman and myself at Appozai in 1889.

Malik Mani Khan and his faction, for their own personal ends, and believing that they may thereby obtain more advantageous terms, exaggerate the difficulties caused by a portion of Birmal having been allotted to the Amir, and hold back the Waziri sections on that side from inviting our intervention as eagerly as the Wano Ahmadzais do.

The tribes themselves fully recognise that an essential part of the measures would be the establishment of a strong military station in or near Wano. The Jirga of the Ahmadzais of Wano and Shakai would no doubt eagerly welcome

the establishment of such a military post: the Mahsuds would do the same. The Dauris and hill Darwesh Khels on the Tochi-Thall side—subject to what I have said above about the terms they would expect—would do the same, as all are equally alive to the fact that nothing can prosper amongst themselves, and that they will be constantly in hot water with the British Government and with the Amir unless they are constrained by some controlling authority to maintain peace towards one another.

The Dauris are, I believe, as anxious to have a strong military station in their country as the Wano Ahmadzais are to have one in theirs. I doubt, however, if two such stations between Fort Sandeman and Kurram would be necessary. I think one strong head-quarters military station, either at Wano or Upper Daur or Sheranna, with an outpost at some suitable position under the same command, is all that would be necessary. I will refer to this again when treating of the details of the tribal and levy arrangements.

The Mahsuds, although some of the leading Maliks might not wish to see a military post established in their country, would all rejoice in a more efficient system of control which would afford them sufficient support to enable them to keep their bad characters of the tribe in hand. Thus, I believe they would co-operate in the establishment of a system similar to what exists in the Bozdar, Largha-Sherani and other hill tracts on this border and in the Marri-Bugti country in Baluchistan by which the main routes Shahur, Khaisara, and others would be opened up with levy posts of their own tribesmen established on them, and we should be able to traverse their country in safety. As matters at present stand, the headmen cannot forcibly coerce the bad characters of the tribe, as the support we can *from outside* afford them is not sufficient to protect them from retaliation. Even our Waziri levies, as has been frequently pointed out, for the same reasons naturally hesitate to act of themselves or even to assist the Maliks. On different occasions they did kill their tribesmen who came to plunder on the Gomal, and on every occasion the relations of the men killed retaliated, and we are powerless even to protect our own levies. The result is that any Waziri who kills a Waziri thief is from that moment an outlaw from his country and in daily peril of his life. The leading men who have the best interests of the tribe at heart are heartily sick and tired of such an arrangement. Being unable to effectually coerce their tribesmen in serious cases, they are obliged to come forward and volunteer to pay their fines; in fact to bear their punishments. Thus, last year they paid the greater part of the Rs. 10,000 fine for the Khaisarawals for offences committed in Zhob, while their allowances are now again stopped to the extent of some six thousand rupees owing to the misdoings of the Abdulrahman Khels. As they see no hope of an end to this, except in an increase of their influence through our support, which can only be attained by our making our control over the tribe more practical and effectual than it is at present, they are now in their own interests most anxious to bring this about.

In this connection the question of resigning their independence naturally comes to the front, and so far as their idea of independence means a title to be free of all wholesome controlling authority, with a general license to cut throats, maintaining a state of anarchy in the country, making it useless for all practical purposes and an actual source of danger and weakness in times of trouble, I believe that from the day the Mahsuds and Wano Ahmadzais came in and tendered their submission at Appozai, they completely reconciled themselves to giving up their independence in that sense. Subsequently, the object of opening up their country was steadily kept in view and progressing. Mr. Donald, accompanied by the Maliks, visited Marwatti and several parts of the Mahsud country, and had not our measures been interrupted by the crisis with the Amir, we would probably before now have been able to traverse all parts of it, and the Mahsud "*pardah*" would have been a thing of the past. The Waziris also looked on this as only an interruption, and now that the Amir is settled with, they expect that we will resume our action at the place where we left off; and if we neglect to do so, the evil-disposed amongst the tribe will quickly get the mischievous notion into their heads that we do not mean to proceed with our intention of doing away with the state of anarchy. They will again get inflated and out of hand, and what Government could now do under the most favourable circumstances, and comparatively little expense, they will have to do in the long run at ten times the trouble and cost.



The causes of irritation and unrest in connection with the recent settlement with the Amir are clearly illustrated in the petitions lately given in to Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, by the Dauris, Kabul Khels, Mahsuds, and Hassan Khels, as well as by the petition presented by the late Kabul faction of the Wano Ahmadzais (Banocha and his party). If these causes of irritation are not now composed, the result will be turmoil all along the new frontier line. The fair and square policy would obviously be for us to control our tribes and for the Amir to control his. The Jadran, Powindah, and other tribes in the Amir's territory adjacent to the new boundary line are not predatory in character like the Mahsuds, and as the Amir has during recent years greatly consolidated his authority over them, he would probably have little trouble in keeping them in order; while, if the proposals I have now made are carried out, I do not apprehend much difficulty would be experienced in controlling the tribes on our side of the line and in preventing them from raiding or plundering in the jurisdiction of His Highness.

The question then comes to this, What are the objects of Government and how can they be best attained? I assume the objects of the Government to be—

- 1st.—To bring the tribes into line with ourselves by the establishment of intimate and friendly relations, identifying their interests with ours, rendering the resources of the country available for our requirements, and thus making our border land and its tribesmen a factor of strength in the great scheme of imperial frontier defence, instead of a source of weakness, as it is while left in the normal condition of anarchy.
- 2nd.—The opening of the Tochi, Gumatti-Thall, and other routes, and the establishment of safe lateral communication between the Gomal and Kurram beyond the Mahsud hills. The latter may be said to be more particularly the local object and follows the first as a matter of course.
- 3rd.—The amelioration of the condition of the frontier tribes by the extension of humanising influences over them, redeeming them from their semi-barbarous condition, and putting them in the way of earning an honest livelihood.

My assumption that what I have described as the first object Government wish to secure is the declared policy of the Government of India, I gather from their letter, dated 17th August 1887, to the Punjab Government, and from the line of policy which has since been followed on this frontier. In that letter, when referring to the then mooted question of the opening of the Gomal Pass, they wrote as follows :—

“On the other hand, it appears to the Government of India that the time has arrived when it becomes of extreme importance that an effort be made to bring under our control, and, if possible, to organise, for purposes of defence against external aggression, the great belt of independent tribal territory which lies along our north-western frontier, and which has hitherto been allowed to remain a formidable barrier against ourselves. The opening up of the country can only be effected in two ways—either by the use of military force or by endeavouring to draw the tribes into close and friendly relations with ourselves. The first course would involve a great expenditure of men and means, and is in all respects to be deprecated. The second, although it presents many difficulties, seems to offer a fair prospect of success, and, as at present advised, the Government of India consider that it is well worth a trial. They would therefore propose to make a systematic effort in this direction, and on all accounts it seems desirable to begin by inducing the tribes to keep open, under the supervision of British officers, such important routes as the Gomal and Tochi. By raising paid bodies of armed men for the protection of such routes, we enlist in our favour the interest of the tribes concerned and familiarise them with the presence of our officers in their midst; and it is to be hoped that from the beginning thus made a general improvement in our relations with them may before long result.” In writing on the same subject Sir Frederick (now Lord) Roberts wrote as follows :

“At this time it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that there are strong



reasons for a fresh departure in our policy towards the frontier tribes, in order that, when the time arrives, they may identify themselves with us and assist us not only with supplies and transport, but by sharing in the maintenance of our lines of communication."

In regard to the third object, viz., the amelioration of the condition of the tribes, Her Majesty's Secretary of State in his despatch, dated 30th April 1866, when writing about the pacification of the frontier with reference to the Waziri tribe in particular, wrote as follows :

"When I consider the expense incurred in expeditions for the repression and punishment of tribes concerned in such depredations—a course which we have frequently been compelled to adopt during the last ten or fifteen years, and their unsatisfactory results,—I cannot but think that an experiment, even if, as you believe, of doubtful advantage, can be otherwise than a good application of the public money. The pacification of border tribes by persevering in the exercise of humanising influences is more likely to be permanent than their subjection by military force ; and I always shall therefore receive with satisfaction such proposals as that now before me, recommended by your officers on the spot, which afford a reasonable prospect of rendering the people on the frontier line between our territories and Afghanistan peaceful and friendly neighbours."

In order to secure the objects Government have in view, two alternative lines of policy have been suggested, namely,—

First, the extension of what may be described as the Sandeman policy over Waziristan ; or, secondly, the introduction of the Khyber system.

In my opinion the Khyber system is fundamentally unsuited to the situation, and not only would it be impossible to secure the objects I have assumed Government have in view, but I believe it would not be practicable under such a system even to open up and make safe the principal and important lines of communication which traverse this belt of tribal territory. This is because the surroundings as regards Waziristan differ in the most essential points from the Khyber surroundings. In the Khyber we have only one tribe to deal with, namely, the Afridis. They did not want and do not want us to interfere in feuds and quarrels amongst the various sections of their own tribe. Their interests therefore run in one direction. No other tribe vitally concerns the Khyber, and it has been found possible to identify their interests with our own policy—whether that is the best or not—and to carry them with us in the working of it.

On the other hand, we have in Waziristan on the Tochi-Thall side three tribes to deal with, viz., Darwesh Khels, Dauris, and Mahsuds, who are hereditary enemies, and whose interests are diametrically opposed and in conflict. It is as essential to the success of our Waziristan policy that we should carry these tribes with us as it is to our Khyber policy to carry the Afridis with us. The only price the former would accept for their co-operation is the securing of their own special and several interests. So far as the Darwesh Khels on the Tochi-Thall side are concerned, their main object is to obtain protection from Mahsud depredations.

The Dauris are at deadly feud and suffer severely at the hands both of Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels. If we want their co-operation we will have to secure them from these and establish direct relations with them.

The Mahsuds require no protection, but they realise that they can no longer play off the Amir against us ; that their livelihood from plunder will be in a great measure stopped, and that it is essential to the enjoyment of the service and other allowances they may receive as an alternative means of subsistence at our hands, and to the maintenance of their trade and intercourse with us, that the members of the tribe who have hitherto subsisted by plunder should be restrained and kept in hand. They find they have not the power to do this of themselves without more practical support from us, which, as I said before, we are unable to afford them from outside, and consequently they are prepared to allow the country to be opened up in such a way as will give us the necessary power of control, thereby increasing their own influence and authority over their refractory tribesmen.

This would enable an end being put to the crimes which have caused so much anxious trouble in Zhob and elsewhere, and which threaten to undermine the best efforts for the settlement of the frontier, and would sooner or later land Government in complications which costly military operations might fail to remedy.

The situation on the Gomal side is, as described by Mr. King, very similar to what it is on the Tochi-Thall side. The Wano Ahmadzais, as I said, eagerly invite our intervention, but, besides protection from Mahsud depredations, they require to be assured against the hostility of the Suleman Khels, Dotanis, Kharotis, and Nasirs.

It would be as hopeless a task to try and open the Tochi-Thall routes and establish safe lateral communication with the Gomal without maintaining peace between the Darwesh Khels, Mahsuds, and Dauris, as it would have been to attempt to open the Bolan Pass and the Harnai and Thal-Chotiali routes without preserving the peace between the Marris, Bugtis, Brahois, and Kakars.

Having dwelt so far on the general considerations, I will proceed to describe more in detail the military and tribal arrangements which would be necessary, what their cost would be, and how they can best be carried out. In this I will take the military first.

In my opinion to open up the belt of tribal country between the Gomal on the south and Kurram and Thal on the north and to maintain in safety the main lines of communication traversing it efficiently, it will be necessary to station in the country a military force consisting of

- 2 Regiments of Native Infantry.
- 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry.
- 1 Mountain Battery.

If a Waziri Levy Corps were to be raised as proposed in the correspondence Punjab Government letter, dated 11th December 1891, to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and enclosures. I have no data on which I could form an estimate as to what would be the cost of a levy corps as compared with regular troops. No doubt Government can do so by referring to the cost of the Khyber Rifles or the Zhob Levy Corps.

The whole of the troops required could, I believe, be spared from the present garrisons of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. If thought preferable not to take the whole from those two stations, a wing of cavalry might be spared from the forces at Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur. The following is a detail of the existing Derajat frontier garrisons :—

BANNU (EDWARDESABAD).	DERA ISMAIL KHAN.
2 Regiments Native Infantry.	2 Regiments Native Infantry.
A wing Native Cavalry.	1 Regiment Native Cavalry.
1 Mountain Battery (6 guns).	2 Mountain Batteries (6 guns each).
DERA GHAZI KHAN.	RAJANPUR.
1 Regiment Native Infantry.	A Regiment Native Cavalry.
1 Regiment Native Cavalry.	

If the force required can in this way be provided from existing garrisons, it would appear that the chief expense entailed on Government by the transfer of the troops would be on account of compensation for dearness of provisions and forage. I have made enquiries of Officers Commanding Regiments here, but have not succeeded in finding out what this would be likely to amount to.

As regards the location of the military force, as I said before, I believe one strong head-quarters military station with an outpost at the next most suitable position would eventually be the best and most advantageous disposition. In proposing this I assume that the Amir is friendly and responsible for the tribes under his own jurisdiction.

The three positions which from our present knowledge seem to offer the greatest advantages from which to select sites are Wano, Upper Daur, and Sheranna, but nothing definite should

It would also be the most advanced post with reference to existing railway connections for an advance westwards. be determined on until the country had been explored. There is, however, one consideration which would appear to give preference to Wano as the site for the head-quarters station, which is, that the Wano plain is situated on the lower slopes of the Marwatti Mountain, on which, no doubt, a very fine site for a sanitarium could be selected.

I will now describe the tribal arrangements which would, I believe, be necessary. The Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, Mr. Anderson, estimates service pay and allowances for the Darwesh Khels and Dauris on his side at Rs. 65,000 per annum,—*viz.*, Rs. 50,000 for the Darwesh Khels and Rs. 15,000 for the Dauris.

As you are aware, this agrees with the estimate I submitted to you in 1890, and, judged by the light of the additional experience which the working of the Gomal arrangements since then has thrown on it, I think it may be accepted as being as correct as it would be possible to make under the circumstances. I concur with Mr. Anderson in thinking that to attempt to give a more detailed division according to sections would be mere guess-work.

The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan estimates the cost of the tribal arrangements, which he believes essential on his side, at Rs. 20,340. This also is, I believe, as near the mark as it would be possible to fix it.

The total of both sums amounts to Rs. 85,340 per annum.

Additional charges will also have to be met on account of pay of munshis, shopkeepers, watermen, sweepers, uniform for levies, etc., which may be roughly estimated at Rs. 14,000 or Rs. 15,000 a year. This may appear a large sum to put down on this account, but in carrying out a large measure of this kind on the frontier, incidental charges are certain to crop up, which it is impossible to foresee and which must be provided for, as having frequently to apply for subsequent sanctions of Government for small amounts causes a great deal of inconvenience.

The permanent charges on account of tribal arrangements may therefore, I think, be safely calculated at a lakh of rupees a year. An estimate is already before the Government of India, amounting to Rs. 17,100 per annum for remedying certain serious flaws in the tribal arrangements on the Gomal. If it is intended to place the Gomal arrangements on a secure basis, this sum must be sanctioned, no matter whether the larger scheme is sanctioned or not. The amount would, however, be set off against the lakh of rupees, so the cost of the larger scheme may be put down at Rs. 82,900.

I heartily concur in what Mr. King has written as to the necessity for giving to the leading headmen increased allowances. Garrisons for any new levy posts found necessary can largely be supplied from the existing levies, but allowances must be fixed for the leading headmen commensurate with the status each respectively holds in his tribe. This is more than ever necessary since some of them have enjoyed such liberal allowances from the Amir. If, from the money now applied for, suitable allowances are fixed for the headmen, we shall be enabled to open up the Shahur, and in fact all the other routes, at our own convenience, without any additional cost to Government. I fully concur with Mr. King in the great importance of opening out these routes, especially the Shahur route.

I can only give a very rough estimate of the initial cost of the buildings, such as levy posts, serais, etc., that would be required. Probably it would amount to Rs. 50,000. About Rs. 35,000 have up to the present been spent on posts and serais at Kajuri Kach, Nili Kach, Spinkai Kach, Kashmir Kar, Murtaza, and Jandola.

I could not give an idea of what the cost of the military accommodation for the force I propose would amount to.

It remains to be considered what would be the best plan of operation to adopt, and this is a most important matter. Mr. Anderson now agrees in



what I have urged from the first, that negotiations could best be conducted from Wano. The whole scheme should, I think, be approved by Government and a Commission appointed to carry it out, the officer in charge of the Commission having authority to spend on the entertainment of tribal levies, and service allowances up to the sanctioned amount, as was done in the case of the pacification of the Gomal and Lower Zhob.

It would be necessary to tell the tribal leaders the general objects Government have in view, and that the officer in charge of the Commission had authority to treat with them for bringing these about. This would be done only in a general way, without giving them any precise figures or mentioning any particular time within which the negotiations would be completed. Thus, supposing negotiations were to be commenced immediately, it might be found expedient to confine them to Wano for the present season,—that is, before the great heat sets in,—and next cold season to extend them to the Tochi-Thall tract. It would, however, be essential that the Darwesh Khel and Dauri headmen should receive clear assurances that they are to be included; otherwise they would oppose any settlement, even on the Wano side.

I should therefore recommend that in the very first instance the Commission should proceed to Wano and take up its quarters there, and, for the reasons before given, the sooner this is done the better. The officer in charge of the Commission should be provided with a military escort consisting of

- 1 Regiment of infantry,
- 2 Squadrons of cavalry, and
- 4 guns

It would be most advisable that an agent of the Amir should join the Commission, and this would no doubt prevent any open opposition on the part of the Suleman Khels, Dotanis, Kharotis, or Nasirs, which they might otherwise be inclined to offer. I do not consider it would be expedient to formally summon the headmen of these tribes, especially as they are now admittedly the Amir's subjects. Where their interests are concerned they would appear of themselves as they did at the recent conference at Kajuri Kach. In this connection I may say I concur in the view expressed by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that there should be the least possible flourish of trumpets, such as the summoning of Jirgas and public proclamations. The aim of the officer in charge of the Commission should rather be to work out quietly in co-operation with the agent of His Highness the Amir the declared objects of Government. In this way it would probably be found practicable to complete all arrangements on the Gomal side and to demarcate the boundary as far as the limits of Wano without delay. Communications could simultaneously be opened up with the leading men on the Tochi side. A knowledge of the details of the requirements on that side would be acquired, and when the time for action appeared ripe, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu might march up through the Tochi and join the officer in charge of the Commission. He should be accompanied by Malik Mani Khan and the other leading men on his side and be provided with a military escort of

- A regiment of infantry,
- A squadron of cavalry, and
- 2 guns.

The final arrangements could then be completed.

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#### Sub-Enclosure B.

*Extract from note by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (Sir D. Fitzpatrick) on the demarcation of the Waziri boundary, dated March 14th, 1894.*

The question of the demarcation along the Waziri border differs entirely from the questions of the demarcation along the Kurram frontier and in the

immediate neighbourhood of the Khaibar with which we have just dealt. The latter questions are little more than questions of merely carrying out in detail an arrangement come to between us and the Amir ; whereas along the Waziri border we have to reckon with powerful tribes inhabiting a vast extent of territory, who are, as I anticipated they might be, not altogether happy at the way we have settled matters with the Amir, who are full of anxiety or expectation as to the consequences of our settlement with him, and whose claim to a hearing it would be folly to disregard.

There is, indeed, appended to Mr. Bruce's letter of the 28th ultimo a petition from Banocha, Gulsher and other Waziri Maliks of Wano, in which these men declare that they are anxious for a demarcation ; that they are prepared to see us advance into their country and arrange for its management, locating a military force there, and so forth ; and that they will be ready to support us. But it must be remembered that these men are the members of what is called the "Kabul faction," that is to say the faction which after accepting service from us and receiving our pay for some time deserted our service. This time twelve months they came down to meet Mr. Bruce and myself at Kajuri Kach and made overtures for reconciliation ; but, though we obtained the permission of the Government of India to take them back into our service, they thought better of the matter and returned to the Amir's side. Now that they have been thrown over by the Amir, they, as might be expected, come to us in a profoundly penitent mood and present a petition which, as I observed in writing to Mr. Bruce the other day, is manifestly written with the aid of some one who knows something of our discussions, and in which they say everything that it is supposed we would wish them to say. It may be that if we restore their allowances (as we doubtless shall) and accept them as leaders of their sections of the tribe, they will be ready to make good their offers of assistance ; but their petition can obviously not be accepted as any indication of the general feeling among the Waziris.

There are, I may further observe, certain passages in Mr. Bruce's letter which taken by themselves might lead one to imagine that the proposed demarcation, the location of a military force in the country, and other measures of the kind, would be so very popular with the Waziris that we might undertake them with a light heart, but this, as we all know, is merely Mr. Bruce's way of writing. He is an officer on whose judgment I have very great reliance, but he is a man of somewhat sanguine disposition, and when, as in the present instance, he proceeds to write at length about a great scheme the adoption of which he has long been urging, and of the efficiency of which he is absolutely convinced, he is apt here and there to be a little carried away. It will be observed that both in his present communication and in his previous letter dated 26th January 1894, when he comes deliberately to consider the question of the proposed demarcation, he says that we ought not to attempt anything of the kind without first coming to an arrangement with the tribes. This too is the view of the two Deputy Commissioners concerned, and there is in my opinion no doubt whatever that it is the correct view.

The position seems briefly to be this. The great bulk of the Waziris, though they may not be in all respects pleased with the way we have settled matters with the Amir, will be glad to escape falling under his rule, and, though they are very fond of independence, many of them would be prepared to see us set up a certain degree of control over the country so as to keep the peace between them and the Amir, and possibly establish some degree of internal order ; but if we want to avoid what might prove a troublesome collision, and to get the tribes as a whole to accept even the minimum of control from us, we must at starting take them into our councils to some extent and offer them some inducement in the way of service and allowances. If we were to proceed to settle the details of the boundary on the ground or to establish any sort of control over the country without doing this, the result might be that we should have large numbers of the tribesmen against us, and that a serious distrust of our intentions would be created in the minds even of those who might be disposed to accept a moderate measure of control.

Thus the understanding or arrangement which we must come to with the

Waziris if we desire to settle the proposed boundary on the ground or establish any sort of control over the country involves two things, namely—

1st. That we should make up our own mind as to the main lines on which we propose to deal with Waziristan and give the tribes some definite indication of them ; and

2ndly. That we should provide service for a certain number of the smaller men and allowances for the leading men.

The scheme proposed by the local officers includes the establishment of tribal services and allowances which will cost one lakh of rupees a year and the transfer from the stations of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu to the line between the Gomal and the Tochi beyond the Mahsud hills of—

- 2 Regiments of Native Infantry,
- 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry,
- 1 Battery of Mountain Artillery.

Of the lakh of rupees proposed for tribal services and allowances, Rs. 65,000 is the cost of the scheme for opening up the Tochi route and the Gumatti Thal route submitted to the Government of India by Sir James Lyall with Mr. Fanshawe's letter dated 28th October 1892, Rs. 20,000 is for certain additional service and allowances in the Mahsud country and in Spin and the Gomal neighbourhood now proposed by Mr. King, and the remaining Rs. 15,000 is intended to cover miscellaneous annual charges. As I shall have presently to explain, I think some further expenditure in tribal allowances will probably be necessary even if we restrict ourselves to our present position on the Gomal, and, without committing myself to any approval of details, I do not think the lakh of rupees proposed is in any way a high estimate if we are to establish any sort of control over Waziristan generally ; indeed, my apprehension is that we might have to spend more ; but I have sufficient confidence in Mr. Bruce and Messrs. King and Anderson to believe that we could establish a certain sort of control, the precise nature of which I will discuss further on, for the sums named by them.

As to the military force proposed, I should certainly think it the minimum with which, even with the best previous arrangements and understandings with the tribes, we could venture to go into the country to settle the boundary, or could maintain our position there in ordinary times after the boundary was settled. The only extra cost of these troops, as I understand, would be for free rations, but that would be a considerable sum. Then there would be certain initial expenditure for tribal posts, &c., which Mr. Bruce estimates at Rs. 50,000, and there would be the cost of accommodation for the regular troops which we are unable to estimate. There would, moreover, be a civil or political establishment of some sort, and there would be the cost of improving the communications, on which there is room for expenditure up to any amount which we can spare.

Now, looking at the matter only from a financial point of view, a proposal involving such heavy expenditure would call for careful consideration at any time, and with our finances in their present condition the mere question of finding the money is a very serious one. But this is not the only question involved. A proposal of such magnitude and entailing results in the future which it is most difficult to forecast has aspects far more important than any presented by purely financial considerations. Hence it is incumbent on us to consider most carefully the grounds upon which this scheme is recommended for adoption, and in doing this it is impossible to avoid going at some length into the general question of our position and policy with reference to Waziristan.

As I read the agreement between Sir M. Durand and the Amir, it does not necessarily impose upon us or upon the Amir any obligation to establish an efficient system of control over the tribal territory falling respectively at the Indian and Afghan sides of the boundary line.

In a note I wrote at the time Lord Roberts' proposed mission was being discussed I said, speaking of the boundary line then in contemplation : "I think it is of the highest importance that it should be simply understood to be a line



on our side of which the Amir's interference, except when we allow him to chastise a tribe, shall be absolutely excluded, that is to say, I would leave the question as to what our relations with the territory or tribes on our side of the line would be entirely open and untouched in our settlement or agreement with the Amir. I think if the agreement between us and the Amir were treated as amounting to anything like a partition of territory it would have a bad effect, and though I see it must practically involve something like a partition of what Mr. Tupper calls the 'sphere of influence,' I think it would be unwise to put it expressly in that way": and I gave as one of my reasons for saying this that "anything having the appearance of a partition of territory or of the sphere of influence or sphere of protection \* \* \* might at some points of the line cast on us obligations of a very onerous nature without any commensurate advantage."

Now, as I read Sir M. Durand's agreement, it avoids this danger. It is true it uses the expression "sphere of influence," which I would have preferred to avoid using, but it contains only the negative provision that the Amir shall not interfere on our side of the line or we on his. Hence I say the agreement imposes on us directly no obligation to establish any system of control over Waziristan, and if we are to establish any such system of control it must be either because we have some reason of our own for doing so, or because, as an indirect result of the convention, a state of things may arise in which we should find it difficult to avoid doing so.

Now, as to our having any object of our own to serve by establishing any control over Waziristan generally, I can conceive only one object, of really great importance, namely, the Imperial military object of the defence of our frontier against a foreign invader. It is possible that, having come up as far as the Gomal, we may find it necessary for the safety of our position on that river to establish some sort of control in addition to that which we now possess over some sections of the tribes immediately north of it. That is a small matter to which I shall have to return presently; but it would in my opinion be a complete mistake to suggest that, looking at the matter merely from the Provincial point of view, we should better our position by establishing ourselves along the line of the Tochi and along the line between the Tochi and the Gomal beyond the Mahsud country. It is quite true that establishing ourselves on the flanks and at the rear of a tribe is one of the most effectual means of bringing the tribe to its bearings, but our present difficulties along our true frontier, I mean the frontier of "British India" between the Gomal and Thal, are really very small, and it would be absurd to suggest that to diminish them (if indeed it would diminish them) we should undertake so formidable a task as the occupation of the two exterior lines to which I refer.

Therefore, I say that, if we have an object of our own to serve in establishing our control over Waziristan generally, it must be the Imperial military object.

Of the degree of importance attaching to that object I am not in a position to speak. It is a matter for the military authorities, but if, as I understand to be the case, they hold it to be of high importance for us to establish ourselves in Waziristan in a position such as that referred to, then I think that we should accept the general lines of Mr. Bruce's scheme and proceed to carry it out at once.

I would in this event proceed to carry it out *at once*, because I have sufficient confidence in the judgment of Messrs. Bruce, King and Anderson to accept their opinion that it could be carried out at this moment without any extraordinary difficulty, and it might not be so easy to carry it out some years hence if things went smoothly with the Waziris meanwhile, and they had got accustomed to be at the same time safe against the aggressions of the Amir and free from all control by us. It is, of course, possible that if we did nothing at present, simply letting things take their course for some years, and the Waziris then got into the troubles with the Amir's people across the border line which the local officers anticipate, and to which I shall presently have more particularly to refer, we might have the Waziris at our feet begging of us to assume control, but that could only come to pass after a great deal of trouble to us as well as to the Waziris, which it is desirable to avoid. I say, therefore,

that if from the military point of view the gain from the forward move is worth more than the cost of it, I would proceed on the lines of Mr. Bruce's proposals without further delay.

If, on the other hand, the military advantages of the forward move are less considerable than they have commonly been supposed to be, the question of such a move would require further consideration. The local officers are even in this event decidedly in favour of the forward move, and the chief reason they urge for it is that if we do not establish some sort of efficient control over Waziristan on our side of the new boundary line there will be continual raiding and counter-raiding across the line, which will involve us in serious difficulties both with the Amir, who would expect us to keep the Waziris at our side in order, and with those Waziris, all of whom would look to us for protection, and many of whom hold land in our districts and live there for a good part of the year.

Now, I do not for a moment doubt that this might prove a very serious difficulty. I fully admit that difficulties of the sort referred to may arise,—indeed, having regard to the present state of irritation of the Waziris against the Amir described in this correspondence, I may go further and say that I think they are likely to arise,—but it does not I think necessarily follow from this that we are bound at once to assume the control of Waziristan merely in order to prevent them arising. If there were no other reason for assuming control of the country but that, it might be a question whether we should not defer taking upon ourselves so troublesome and expensive a task until we had first tried other ways of meeting the difficulties in question.

It must be remembered in this connection that it has been most distinctly contemplated from the time the proposed mission of Lord Roberts was first discussed that, in the event of conflicts arising between tribes on the Amir's side and tribes on our side of the intended boundary line, we should in some cases allow the tribes to fight the matter out between them, and that in the event of the tribes on our side being the aggressors we might in some cases deal with the matter in the same way as we have dealt with similar matters in the case of the Afridis, that is to say by permitting the Amir to punish them on the understanding that he does not permanently occupy any portion of their country. This was expressly contemplated in the case of the Waziris in particular.

No doubt there might be cases in which it would be difficult for us to avoid interfering in the quarrel. But, on the other hand, if the difficulty were to present itself in the shape that Mr. Anderson seems most to apprehend, that is to say, if the Waziris on our side of the line were to be the aggressors, and in particular if they were to espouse the quarrels of their brethren in Birmal or of the Tanis or others living across the line with the Amir, I think the case would be clearly one in which we should be quite warranted in giving the Amir permission to punish them, and if Mani Khan or any one else came to me with a warning that his people were likely to be drawn on into taking the aggressive in any affair of that sort, I would not hesitate to tell him plainly that if they did we would allow the Amir to punish them. It is quite true, as Mr. Anderson says that the Amir's method of punishing these people would probably be indiscriminating and ruthless, but in that it would only resemble their style of attack on the Amir's people which it would be intended to punish, and I don't see what they would have to complain of. What we would say to them would be in effect this: "We prevent the Amir establishing his rule over your country. If he or his people are guilty of unprovoked aggression on you, we will interpose in such manner as seems to us best on your behalf; but if you choose to become aggressors after the warning we have given you we shall simply stand aside and leave the matter to be fought out between you and the Amir, only insisting that he shall not permanently occupy your country."

It is however obvious that we might at times have to encounter serious difficulties and much trouble in carrying out such a policy. There would, for example, be at times perplexing controversies as to who were the real aggressors, and so forth, and it might be that we should ultimately find ourselves

forced by all this to establish ourselves in Waziristan on the footing proposed by Mr. Bruce. The question is whether this would afford a sufficient reason for establishing ourselves on such a footing at once. That is a question on which I confess I find some difficulty in making up my mind. If the troubles that are likely to arise were merely troubles between the tribes on each side of the line I should not hesitate to reply in the negative ; but there is the danger of our being drawn into frequent and irritating disputes with the Amir, and it may well be argued that having regard to this we ought to take up our position at once. Of course if military opinion is really strong as it probably will be as to the military necessity for an advance, the question to which I am now referring will never arise ; but if it should arise I fear I cannot contribute more to its solution than is contained in the foregoing remarks.

I pass now to another point. It may be urged, indeed it seems to be urged, that apart from any imperial military reasons for establishing ourselves in Waziristan, and apart from any difficulties that might arise from raiding and counter-raiding across the new boundary line if we do not so establish ourselves, there are other reasons for the forward move—that our present position along the line of the Gomal is not a satisfactory one, that we are exposed there to have outrages committed upon our people, and that we must extend our sphere of influence if we want to remedy this.

Now, I am afraid there is a certain amount of truth in this. We have had a great deal of trouble in the Gomal and south of it. Most of it has been due to the perturbation caused by intrigues and to the want of caution shown in letting our men go about insufficiently protected ; but a certain amount of it is the natural consequence of our taking up such a position in a country like that, and may be expected to continue no matter how good our relations are with the Amir and no matter what precautions we take for the safety of our men. With proper arrangements, however, troubles of this sort may be so far reduced as to become endurable, and we have had before us for some time separate proposals put forward by Mr. Bruce for improving our position in the Gomal by granting certain further allowances to the tribes with which we are there concerned. These proposals, which are included in the more extensive scheme now submitted, were put forward by Mr. Bruce in his letter dated 23rd February 1893. They were of a limited nature, the total annual cost of carrying them out amounting only to Rs. 17,100, and they were allowed to stand over only because the whole question of our position in regard to Waziristan was under consideration. There might be some difficulty in adopting them as an isolated measure just at this moment, because our doing so might create an impression that we had yielded to the pressure put upon us by the recent outrages ; but they would be well worth considering after a little time if the larger scheme now put forward by Mr. Bruce is not at once carried out. On the other hand, it seems to me that it would be, as the people of this country say, almost like bringing out an elephant to kill a mouse if we were to undertake the very large scheme of operations now under consideration merely for the sake of getting over our difficulties in the Gomal.

In short, the view that I am inclined to take is that the answer to the question whether we should adopt a scheme of the sort I have described for establishing our control over Waziristan must depend mainly on the imperial military considerations to which I have referred. If with reference to those considerations it is held, as it probably will be, to be worth our while to adopt such a scheme, the other considerations which I have discussed would present additional grounds for adopting it, and we should proceed to carry it out at once, beginning with the delimitation of the boundary between us and the Amir. If, on the other hand, the imperial military considerations are not of the importance that they have commonly been assumed to be, it might be a question whether we should be wise in committing ourselves to so heavy and expensive an undertaking at this moment.

Up to this I have spoken of the scheme propounded by Mr. Bruce and the Deputy Commissioners as if it was merely a scheme for conciliating the tribes, locating certain military forces in the country, establishing certain tribal posts, opening certain roads, and keeping the peace along the border line between us



and the Amir. It will be seen, however, from the correspondence that these officers mean it to be a good deal more. They propose to undertake from the start to establish internal peace and settle the disputes between the numerous divisions and sub-divisions of the Waziri tribes, and indeed Mr. King in the last paragraph of his letter writes as if he hoped that we should before long come to settling disputes between man and man.

Now, it may be that in a portion of the Tochi Valley or Lower Daur we would naturally from the first go even further than that and establish a regular system of government. The circumstances there seem to be altogether exceptional, and if, as is stated, the people there are really anxious for us to do this, I don't see why, if we are to go into Waziristan at all, we should not do it. But elsewhere—generally throughout the country I have grave doubts as to whether in the event of our determining to establish our control we should deliberately take so much on ourselves.

I say "deliberately take" this on ourselves because I quite admit that we may by the force of circumstances be in time drawn on even against our will to undertake not only this, but a great deal more. Indeed, it seems to me that, though we would of course never "annex" the country in the technical sense, that is to say make it part of "British India" within the meaning of our legislative enactments, we might be drawn on into establishing a more or less complete system of government there.

I quite admit that tribal quarrels in the neighbourhood are apt at times to give rise to troubles on our lines of communication. If, for example, one of the contending factions is responsible for the safety of a certain section of our road, the opposite faction may, in order to get the former faction into a scrape, come down and commit a murder or robbery or cut a telegraph wire on that section of the road, and so on. But this after all is not a very serious matter. There is a risk of it in the Khaibar, but still we manage to get on there.\*

It is said the case of our roads in the Waziri country would be different from that of the Khaibar road because in the former case we should have a number of different tribes to deal with, whereas in the case of the Khaibar we have only the Afridis to deal with, and the Afridis are spoken of almost as if they were a sort of happy family compared with the Waziris. But as a matter of fact, though it is with the Afridis we have to deal chiefly in the Khaibar, we have to deal with other tribes as well, and the Afridis are broken up into numerous sections which are constantly raiding and counter-raiding upon each other. Notwithstanding this, there has not been, so far as I know, any trouble to the Khaibar road for a long time past except from Amin Khan, whose case is an altogether peculiar one. The reason of this is simply that it is completely understood that we merely desire to maintain our road; that we have no ulterior object, and in particular that we don't want to interfere in the concerns of the Afridis; that, though we are always willing to use our good offices to bring about an amicable settlement of their quarrels, we have no desire to interfere in those quarrels as long as they are not allowed to disturb the peace or affect the safety of the road; but that if any one attempts to carry his quarrel on to the road so as to break the peace or endanger the safety of travellers there, we will deal severely with him.

I don't see why we should despair of establishing a similar understanding regarding our proposed roads in Waziristan. When I visited Dera Ismail Khan two years ago and the subject of the "Toras" or hostile expeditions which are commonly undertaken every year in pursuance of the great feud between the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds was discussed, I found that the distinction between fighting off the Gomal route and fighting on it or using it for the purposes of a Tora was at once understood, and that, though what I said against Toras generally was not likely to have any effect, my warnings and threats against

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\* I may point to the Kohat Pass, too, as an instance of a route being kept open and so safe that an officer can ride through it with a single orderly, though we make no attempt to keep the peace in the country through which it lies. I may add, with reference to Mr. Anderson's observations, that the road there lies in many places right through the village lands. It must be admitted, however, that this is a very short pass between two of our own districts.

any infraction of the peace or neutrality of the Gomal route were accepted as most reasonable, and as a matter of fact, though our officers there have all along been urging that this great quarrel would effect the peace of the Gomal route, not one of the troubles we have of late had there has been, so far as I remember, attributed to it.

I quite admit that the difficulty of maintaining the position of isolation on our roads which I proposed in the note above quoted to take up is, though not different in kind, somewhat greater in degree in Waziristan than in the Khaibar. I further admit that, as a result of what I have myself seen and of the discussions that have taken place since that note was written, I feel somewhat less hopeful now of maintaining that position than I was in 1892; and I cannot of course pretend that my speculations on such a point are entitled to as much weight as those of officers who have served for many years on the frontier. All I mean to say is that the matter is mainly one of speculation, and that I am still far from being convinced that those officers are right on it; and that being so, I am altogether opposed to committing ourselves at this stage by any declaration of our intention to undertake so formidable a task as that of establishing the *pax Britannica* generally throughout the Waziri country.

I speak of this as a formidable task because it seems to me that to stop all the fighting and raiding, redress all the grievances and compose all the quarrels between the contending tribes and sub-divisions of tribes in a country like Waziristan would be a matter of immense difficulty, and one that would seriously tax our resources. I may observe that the difficulty is aggravated by the circumstance that we have here no powerful Tumandars or Maliks to utilize for the management of the tribes. The Waziri tribes are organised on a strongly democratic basis and their headmen seem to have comparatively little real power of control. During the last few weeks, while all the headmen have been sitting at Tank with our officers to settle the cases of previous outrages, fresh outrages have been committed by their tribesmen a little way off, apparently as a protest against the action of their headmen. Mr. Bruce himself in more than one passage of his present letter dwells on this point. He says, for example, that "As matters at present stand, the headmen cannot forcibly coerce the bad characters of the tribe, as the support we can from outside afford them is not sufficient to protect them from retaliation." Again he says: "Being unable to effectually coerce their tribesmen in serious cases, they (the headmen) are obliged to come forward and volunteer to pay their fines—in fact to bear their punishments."

I see Mr. Bruce in some passages in his letter speaks of the possibility of increasing the influence of these headmen by our support, and I am not quite sure what he means by this. If he means that by systematically treating these headmen as leaders of the tribe we can raise them above their present position, he may be right to some extent; but I scarcely venture to hope that we could do very much in that way. A really powerful headman of a tribe is a natural growth having its roots lying very deep, and if the tribe does not produce such a headman we can scarcely hope to make it produce one by any amount of top-dressing.

If Mr. Bruce means that we could strengthen the position of the headman by bringing physical force or threats of physical force to bear to support his authority, he is no doubt right. We can support a headman of a tribe in this way just as we can support one of our own Magistrates or policemen; but then what does this come to?

Suppose we issue a proclamation forbidding the Mahsuds to raid on the Darwesh Khels and the Darwesh Khels to raid on them by way of retaliation, and suppose in defiance of that proclamation the Mahsuds raid on the Darwesh Khels and then the Darwesh Khels appeal to us to redress their grievance. Suppose we assemble a jirga, and that jirga decides that the Mahsuds are to pay the Darwesh Khels five thousand rupees and the Mahsud headmen cannot realize the amount from the tribe, and having had to pay other large sums out of their own pockets on previous similar occasions are unable to make it good themselves. What are we to do?

We might perhaps, under certain circumstances, try blockades and reprisals, but what we would usually come to in the end would be a punitive expedition.

I put this case, which is one which would be pretty certain to occur from time to time in practice, to Mr. Bruce at our conference the other day, and asked him where we are to get the troops for such expeditions. He said we could carry out such an expedition with the force he proposes to keep in the country. But would we attempt to go into the Mahsud country to inflict punishment even with the whole of that force ?

I doubt it extremely. It might be possible to do it, but I doubt whether any Commander-in-Chief and Government of India nowadays would sanction our attempting it. They might, under the altered circumstances, think a much smaller force necessary than was employed in 1881 (*see pp. 544 and 548 of Paget and Mason*), but they would probably deem it necessary to send a considerable additional force to supplement\* the troops we would permanently keep upon our lines of communication. Now, I fear that even if we restrict ourselves to keeping open our lines of communication and maintaining the peace along the new boundary line between us and the Amir, we shall occasionally be compelled to undertake punitive expeditions, but why should we, unless we are actually forced by circumstances to do so, take upon ourselves a task which might entail on us, among other disadvantages, an additional number of such expeditions ?

No doubt if, as might be supposed to be the case on a perusal of some passages in this correspondence, the great bulk of the Waziris, Mahsuds as well as Darwesh Khels would gladly welcome, or at least willingly accept, our intervention for the pacification of the country, that might call for a considerable modification of what I have just said ; but we must be careful not to assume too hastily that that would be the case. On this side of India as on the Assam frontier, and I suppose it is the same wherever there are wild tribes distracted by internal feuds, there are always two sets of people pressing us to interfere, namely, the classes who are for the time being getting the worst of the struggle, and the classes who hope to profit by getting service under us in the event of our interfering. Further, it must be remembered that the leading men with whom chiefly we discuss matters may not be able to carry all their tribesmen with them, especially in a place like Waziristan, where, as already observed, the leaders are weak. Hence we must be careful not to mistake the voice of a small number of men for the voice of the country at large.

On the whole, my view on this question of undertaking the pacification of the whole country is briefly as follows. The local officers may be right in thinking, first, that it would be impossible to maintain a reasonable degree of peace and safety on the proposed lines of communication without pacifying the whole country, and, secondly, that in the work of pacification we should have the people with us to an extent which would make our task comparatively easy ; but, even if it can be said that the probabilities are to a great extent in favour of their being right on both these points, I don't see why we should at starting commit ourselves to the work of pacification by making an announcement from which it would be impossible to recede. If we introduce our military force into the positions proposed, open the lines of communication, and establish tribal posts along them, we shall be brought into much closer contact with the people than we have hitherto been, and will after a little time be in a much better position to judge of what is really necessary and what facilities there are for effecting it, and if we then find that the local officers are right, there will be, so far as I can judge, no greater difficulty in giving effect to their views than there would be on our first entering into the country. If, therefore, we are to establish ourselves in Waziristan I would start with the determination to maintain (except perhaps in a part of the Tochi Valley) the position of isolation to which I have referred, and would stick to that position until I was forced out

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\* This is, of course, assuming that it was resolved to undertake the expedition, but I should apprehend from all I have seen that it would in most cases be difficult to get the requisite consents to such an expedition. The truth is our Government has, owing to certain alterations in its position of late years, become less suited for carrying out rough work of this sort in the bold and thorough manner in which it needs to be carried out.



of it by circumstances or until it was clear that the mass of the people wished me to abandon it, and that it was for the advantage of all concerned that I should do so.

I have now given my opinion on the main points which present themselves for consideration. There will be doubtless many other subordinate points to be considered, especially if the Government of India should agree entirely with the local officers and should desire to interpose for the settlement of any of the internal affairs of the country. In this latter event there would, for example, be the question touched on in this correspondence, and which the Waziris would be sure to start, as to whether we would engage to abstain from levying land revenue from them; but it would be premature to discuss such matters at this stage.

It may be convenient that I should sum up the conclusions to which I am disposed to come regarding this very difficult and perplexing matter. They are as follows :—

- (1) That the local officers are right in thinking that, unless we are prepared to make up our minds to some such scheme for the location of troops and the extension of tribal services as they propose, we should not attempt any detailed settlement of the new boundary on the ground; but should simply fix that boundary as far as we can on maps by reference to natural geographical features which are already known or can be discovered by enquiry.
- (2) That whether it is worth our while to undertake such a scheme as that referred to must be determined mainly by imperial military considerations on which we civilians are not called upon to pronounce any opinion.
- (3) That, even if the military considerations just referred to were not found to be such as to call for our undertaking any such scheme, it might be a question whether, having regard to the difficulties which are likely to arise in the event of our not undertaking it and which might force us eventually to undertake it, we should not undertake it at once.
- (4) That if we do undertake such a scheme we should endeavour to confine ourselves to holding our military and tribal stations and posts, keeping our lines of communication open and safe, and maintaining peace along the new boundary line, and should not at starting undertake the responsibility of pacifying the whole country, even though we may see reason to apprehend that we shall be ultimately led by circumstances to attempt the pacification of the whole country.
- (5) That in the event of our not adopting a scheme of the nature referred to we shall have to consider a much more limited scheme of tribal service with a view to strengthening our present position in the Gomal.

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Sub-Enclosure C.

*Translation of a Petition from Banocha Khan, Gul Sher Khan, and other Zalle Khels and Maliks of the Kabul faction, dated the 17th February 1894.*

We, the Zalli Khel, Taji Khel, Sirki Khel, Gangi Khel, and Khanjal Khel, Maliks of Wano, who were at first in the service and pay of the British Government, and had been precluded from intercourse on account of having gone to Kabul last year in the month of February, appeared before R. I. Bruce, Esq., Commissioner, and expressed our wish to maintain, as before, communication with the Government. We, the Maliks of the above tribes, however, after this, again went to the Amir. There was at that time a reason for our going there: The British Government knows the nature of the Amir's orders, and we, hillmen, are also fully aware of it. He is guided by no law or book, but acting on the impulse of his heart, is apt, in state of indignation, to bring any one to

ruin. We through fear for ourselves went there, as there is no place where we can live for a single day in safety, being at enmity with the Mahsuds, who would not spare us. When we arrived at Kabul and found that the Amir had changed his views we returned to our country. The Amir had at first long conversations with us, which showed that he had determined to occupy our country at all costs; we therefore went to Kabul. We have now returned, and have heard that he has abandoned all claim to our country and has surrendered it to the Government. We have now agreed and beseech that our fault, which we admit and for which we are contrite, may be forgiven us. For the future we are ready to serve the Government from the bottom of our hearts and would make ourselves as before loyal servants of the Government. We beg to tender the following supplications and request favourable consideration of them :—

- (1) Though there was a general rumour at Wano that the settlement between the Amir and the British Government had been concluded, yet still some doubt is entertained there about it. Once or twice enquiries were made by letter from Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, who was at Wazha Khwah, but his reply was in brief and threw no light on the details of the settlement. Now having arrived in British territory we have learnt for certain that the boundary question between the British Government and the Amir has been settled. We are now convinced that our country is under the control of the Government and that the Amir has no longer any connection with it; we therefore present ourselves and request forgiveness for the faults committed by us, and if pardoned we shall act as desired by the Government.
- (2) We on coming here have assured ourselves that our country has come under the control of the Government, but the other people of our tribe are not aware of this, nor will they rest satisfied until some boundary marks are fixed. In this connection we wish to request that the Government should, in consultation with us, demarcate the boundary as soon as possible, so that our tribe may be satisfied, and that we may come under the protection of the Government. There are many tribes with whom we are at bitter enmity and with whom we constantly have disputes. This will at the same time be to the advantage of the Government, as it will secure good management for the future.
- (3) We are the residents at Wano, and our intercourse is on this side. Malik Mani Khan, Darwesh Kel, had invited us to Bannu, but we declined his invitation, not wishing to go there as we have no connection with him. We are in our own tribe Maliks and all-powerful and are prepared to give assurances to the Government in any way it may desire, and request that the Government should accept us and take us again under the protection, so that peace may be secured to us under the British rule, and that they may look upon us with favourable eye, that we may pray for the prosperity of the British rule.
- (4) If the Government wish to advance into our country and to adopt any measures for its management, we are prepared to carry them into effect in our respective tribes and boundaries, and shall be responsible for everything. Otherwise should the Government in addition to our responsibility bring its own military force and desire with their aid to make any arrangement, we will agree and raise no objection to it; it rests with the Government to do as it pleases. We submit this petition with the hope that it will be accepted, and after granting us forgiveness of our fault, we may be received into favour, that each point will be taken into due consideration.

We, the petitioners, are (sealed by) Banocha Khan, Gul Sher, Khalikdad, Sher Khan, Band Khan, Tar Khan (marked by), Ahmir Khan, Shoedad Khan, Said Akbar, Shahzada Hakim, Din Mahummad, Tor Muhammad, Aminuddin Sharki, Sahib Din, Badi Khan, Arsala Khan, Torak, Mir Ali, Pao Shah, Muhammad Afzal, Guladin, Karu, Darakhti Khan (sealed by Awal Khan,

marked by Rabab Gul), Mihar Jang, Gul Akmad, Shahi Khan, Sali Khan, Mehar Khan, Naga Muhammad Khan, Zimgi Khan, Topchi Khan (sealed by Mirza Gul, marked by Samadar Khan), Sorak Khan, and Sorawar Khan.

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Enclosure No. 2.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 16th June 1894.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 24th March 1894, on the subject of the demarcation of the Afghan-Waziri boundary.

2. From the correspondence forwarded with the Foreign Department endorsement, dated the 23rd of April, it will have been observed that the Government of India suggested to the Amir that the demarcation of this section of the

boundary should not be commenced until the 15th of October next, and the enclosed translation of his\* reply shows that His Highness has approved of this proposal.

3. The Governor-General in Council has given to the subject of your letter the the careful consideration which its importance deserves, and a separate communication will be made to you on the general question of our future relations with the Waziri tribe. Meanwhile, I am to convey to you the following instructions as to the action to be taken in regard to the preliminary arrangements for demarcation. I am in the first place to request that the Lieutenant-Governor will be good enough to cause the Waziri tribesmen to be informed forthwith that the Government of India have concluded a settlement with the Amir, and that the following line of boundary dividing Waziristan from the Afghan dominions has been agreed upon :—

From the hill marked Charkiaghar (*vide* map illustrating the boundary agreement), the line descends to the Tochi stream, which it crosses at Machaguri. From this point it follows the crest of the ridge between the Birmal and Shawal valleys as far as the point marked Khwaja Khedar, so as to leave Birmal to Afghanistan. From Khwaja Khedar, the line passes to near Shakin, which is also left to Afghanistan. From Shakin it runs nearly due south to the crest of the range crossed by the Nazan Kotal at a point about six miles south of the Kotal. Thence it follows the crest of the Spera range to Domandi on the Gomal river.

4. The tribesmen should also be informed that Joint-Commissioners of the British and Afghan Governments will proceed in October to mark off this line on the ground, and that in the meantime the British Government calls upon the tribes to respect this line. They should be told that the British Government has no desire to interfere in their affairs, but only to secure peace, and that in settling our arrangements for that end the co-operation of the tribes will be invited and welcomed. These announcements may be made in any manner which seems most suitable and convenient. There is no desire on the part of the Government of India to suggest darbars or other formalities.

5. In order to protect the commission party, a brigade of troops will be sent to the most advantageous position in Spin or Wano, as may be hereafter decided.

6. I am to request that detailed proposals for carrying out the demarcation, with an estimate of the expenditure, may be prepared for the consideration of the Government of India, with the least possible delay.

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\* Not printed.



## Enclosure No. 3.

*Minute of Dissent by Sir Charles Pritchard, Mr. J. Westland, and Sir Antony MacDonnell, dated 6th July 1894.*

We dissent from the despatch. It does not, in our opinion, express distinctly either approval or disapproval of proposals that have been put forward for the military occupation and direct control of the whole of Waziristan. It suggests a middle course, and in some respects, as we conceive, an uncertain course, between proposals for annexation and the policy of dissuasive restraint laid down in 1892 (see paragraph 7 below). But, while suggesting a middle course, the despatch expresses in its final paragraph a decided condemnation of the policy of 1892 that has hitherto been acted upon, and to that extent, we fear, implies a preference for the opposite policy. We advocate the continuance of the policy of 1892. It seems to us that no such middle course as the despatch suggests can be effective as a substantial solution of the question, or can operate otherwise than as a temporary expedient, prefacing annexation. In our judgment the real choice lies between, on the one hand, a policy that aims at resting on our present frontiers and influencing the Waziris from without; and, on the other hand, a policy that contemplates the assumption of complete responsibility for the administration of Waziristan and the independent tribal territory that intervenes between the present frontiers of British India and of the kingdom of Afghanistan.

We have therefore arrived at the parting of the ways as regards our policy in Waziristan, and the real issue involved in the present discussion is one of grave importance. The decision arrived at in this matter will reach further than Waziristan, and must affect materially the rest of the independent tribal country on the Afghan border and our treatment of it.

We recognize that the demarcation of the British and Afghan spheres of influence introduces a new factor into the consideration of questions connected with our frontier, and should, as time goes on, conduce to the simplification of our policy and its concentration on two objects, namely, the prevention of frontier raids and the weaning of the tribes from internal feuds. These are objects which, with patience and tact, may, we think, be gradually secured, to a substantial extent at all events, by peaceful means, and consistently with maintaining the independence of the Waziris and not projecting forward the existing frontier of British India. But if we push forward our military posts beyond the Gomal, make roads through Waziri territory, establish police arrangements within it, interfere in inter-tribal quarrels, levy tribute from the tribes, and undertake, from the beginning, to prevent the Waziris from raiding into Afghanistan, we shall destroy their independence and be practically assuming the administrative control of their country, in whatever terms we may choose to describe our action. We shall not be able eventually to stop short of establishing and maintaining a line of military posts, or of combined military and levy posts, along the whole length of the Waziri-Afghan border, the possibility of which indeed is foreshadowed in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the despatch. The cost of these operations will be enormous. In carrying them out we shall have to encounter and overcome much stubborn resistance; and when the new line of posts is established along the Afghan border, we shall find ourselves in contact with a fresh set of tribesmen who are likely to prove as troublesome neighbours in the future as the Waziris have proved in the past. Any attempt to subjugate the Waziris and hold their country by military force is eminently calculated to set the whole frontier in a blaze and to involve our ally the Amir as well as ourselves in very serious troubles. We must recognize the fact the Amir's authority is not yet completely established in some of the outlying border tracts that are included in Afghanistan under the recent Kabul agreement, and that he will have considerable difficulties to face in keeping under control the unruly tribesmen who inhabit the tracts within his sphere of influence.

A forward movement and a policy of the nature which inspires the despatch seems to us to transgress alike the declarations of policy made in our despatches to the Secretary of State and the instructions of that authority. On the 16th August 1892, the Government of India wrote as follows:—

“A question may be raised with regard to our relations with the Waziri

tribesmen in those districts from which we propose that the Amir's interference should be excluded. We do not, as we have already said, desire to annex the country. We wish them to regard us as their friends, and to assist us in keeping open and improving the Gomal Pass, which immediately adjoins their territory. In order to secure this object, it may be necessary at some future time to establish posts in the neighbourhood ; but \* \* \* we have decided to avoid, as far as may be possible, any exhibition of activity amongst them at the present time.

"Nor again are we prepared to say that because we have decided that the Amir should not be allowed to annex the independent Waziri tribes, it will be incumbent upon us to protect them upon all occasions, or whatever their conduct may be. It is likely that in a mountainous region inhabited by warlike tribes, such as that under discussion, there may for many years to come be inter-tribal conflicts, sometimes between one section of the Waziris and another, sometimes between the Waziris and the adjoining clans. Such occurrences are regarded as the natural incidents of frontier life ; and we do not contemplate that it need be our duty either to keep the Waziri tribesmen under strict control, or, if their conduct should invite reprisals, to shield them from the consequences of their own acts. The Waziri tribes might for the present be left in the same position as the Afridis, who, if they raid on the Amir's territory, are liable to be punished by the Amir. \* \* \* Such a state of things is no doubt far from ideally perfect, but it is that which obtains on other parts of the border, and it has been found to produce fairly good results.

"We do not, therefore, at present see any necessity for entering into engagements with the Waziris themselves which would bind us to protect them. What is, in our opinion, essential is that we should, subject to what we have said with regard to Wano, make it absolutely clear to the Amir, that we cannot allow him to encroach upon any part of Waziristan."

The Secretary of State's observations on the statement of policy just quoted run as follows :—

"The question of our own future action in regard to Waziristan remains to be considered. You state that your Government are prepared to assure the Amir that you do not regard Waziristan as British territory, and also to renew the assurance given in 1888 that you do not intend building a fort at Wano ; and though, in your opinion, it may be necessary to establish at some future time posts in the neighbourhood of the Gomal, you disclaim any desire to annex the country, and you have decided to avoid any exhibition of activity among the Waziris. The latter decision has my full concurrence. I should see with regret any steps which might lead to interference on our part with the independence of the Waziris, or which might tend to convert your political influence into direct administrative control over the tribe."

The above were the instructions on which Sir M. Durand proceeded in the conduct at Kabul of his negotiations concerning Waziristan. The agreement arrived at with the Amir defines the limits of the kingdom of Afghanistan and stipulates for the demarcation of a boundary line beyond which the Amir on the one side and the British Government on the other is not to advance territorial claims. It forbids the Amir from encroaching upon any portions of Waziristan, but it leaves the border tribes in the same independent position that they occupied before the settlement was made, and it does not impose on the Government of India any obligation in the matter of establishing a system of direct control over Waziristan or over other portions of independent tribal territory. The last-named question does not indeed appear to have been raised in the course of the negotiations.

In addressing the Secretary of State we wrote :—

"We wish it to be clearly understood that nothing is further from our intentions than the annexation of tribal country on our frontier. We believe, however, that without annexation, and without interference in the internal affairs of the tribes, it will be possible to bring them further within our influence, and to induce them to regard themselves as owing allegiance to us."

The Secretary of State's reply on this part of the subject runs as follows :—

"I trust that the tranquillity of the border, especially in the neighbourhood of the Gomal, will now be secured. I observe that your Government emphatically repudiates all intention of annexing tribal territory, but desires to bring the tribes whom this settlement concerns further within your influence. I approve generally of the policy thus described ; but I trust that in carrying it into effect your Government will carefully abstain from taking any steps to extend your influence, which may tend to bring about a collision with the tribesmen, or to the establishment of fresh posts beyond the frontier which may require armed protection."

The steps which the Secretary of State has thus on two occasions deprecated our taking seem to us to be those very steps which the despatch, from which we are dissenting, proposes that we should take.

The further correspondence with the Secretary of State relates to arrangements to be made for the delimitation of the boundary, and does not alter the position regarding the future treatment of Waziristan.

It will be seen then that neither our own declarations of policy, nor the agreement lately concluded with the Amir, nor the instructions of the Secretary of State, impose upon us an obligation to establish any system of direct control over Waziristan. The declarations of the Government of India and the instructions of the Secretary of State, on the contrary, demand that we should abstain, as far as possible, from advancing our military posts beyond the Gomal and from interference with the Waziris that is likely to provoke a collision with the tribes or to prejudice their independence. We strongly advise adherence to the lines indicated in the Government of India's despatch, viz., to restrict our military posts to the present line of the Gomal, to strengthen our position there by a scheme of tribal services, and to treat the Waziris generally in the same manner in which we treat the Afridis.

It must be remembered that any assumption of obligations under this engagement with the Amir to prevent tribes within our influence from raiding into Afghanistan could not be confined to the Waziris alone. If we now undertake responsibilities of that nature as regards the Waziri clans, on what grounds could we hereafter decline similar obligations with respect to the Mohmands and other tribesmen who inhabit the country farther north between British India and Afghanistan? If, in pursuance of the agreement concluded with the Amir, we undertake to control and keep the peace amongst the independent tribes on our side of one portion of the Afghan border, it seems to us that we shall be unable to avoid a recognition of similar responsibilities along the whole length of it. Any attempt to exercise active control amongst the border clansmen, who boast that they have never been subjugated by any foreign ruler and prize their independence above everything, would certainly involve us in long protracted warfare and the expenditure of many crores of rupees, and would land us in endless embarrassments.

We do not consider, as we have already stated, that Sir M. Durand's agreement provides in this connection for anything more than the demarcation of a boundary line beyond which neither the Amir nor the British Government is to encroach ; and we would not admit that it imposes upon us obligations to advance the frontier of British India, or by an exercise of military force to prevent from the outset raiding by the independent border tribes over which we have never pretended to exercise effective control. We should exercise our friendly influence to check raiding on the part of the tribesmen on the British side of the line, and be prepared, as hitherto, to punish them by sending expeditions into their country when they offend grievously. Moreover, there will be in the liberty which is left to the Amir to punish raids on his territory a further restraint on the tribes, which will operate in the direction of their good behaviour. That the Amir considers that he still possesses this liberty of protecting himself and punishing aggressors without the military intervention of the British Government is manifest from correspondence that has lately passed between the Government of India and the Amir. The



correspondence to which we refer relates to an attack made by Umra Khan of Jandol, since the conclusion of the Durand agreement, on certain villages of Afghan Kafirstan.

The proposal put forward in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the despatch to advance to a position in or near Spin, about 25 miles north-west of the existing frontier post at Kajuri Kach, and to locate a new cantonment there, the garrison of which is, we understand, to number about 2,000 men, has for its object the attainment of a good strategical position for overawing the Waziris, the protection of the Gomal caravan route, the prevention of raids into the Zhob district of Baluchistan, and the discharge of responsibilities which, it is stated, require that our position shall be such as to show the tribes that we can prevent raiding on the Amir's frontier. We doubt if the establishment of a single new military post in the extreme south of Waziristan is sufficient in itself for the attainment of all these objects, even admitting them to be necessary and legitimate.

Mention is made in paragraph 13 of the despatch of difficulties that have arisen on the Tochi and in Lower Dawar, which may necessitate the establishment of "a regular system of government in that quarter," or, in other words, may call for the military occupation of the north-eastern portion of Waziristan. The mere presence of a British force in Spin would not obviate those difficulties; nor would it suffice, so far as we can see, to prevent raids on the Amir's boundary to the west of Waziristan.

It cannot be reasonably expected that a force of 2,000 troops cantoned in the wilderness of Spin will remain there in idleness. Circumstances will surely arise that will necessitate the detachment of parties and the establishment of outposts beyond the new cantonment, and the probability is that our troops will soon find themselves embroiled in quarrels with sections of the tribes other than those which have lately been engaged in raids on the Gomal. Judging from what has happened in other similar cases, we cannot doubt that an advance to Spin would eventually be followed by a corresponding advance on the other side of Waziristan, from Bannu along the Tochi to Sheranna, or some other place in that neighbourhood, and would lead to the establishment of a line of posts along the Afghan border, between the positions in Spin and at Sheranna, as has in fact been proposed by Mr. Bruce and other frontier officers.

The Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan, who is the officer chiefly concerned in the protection against Waziri raids of the Zhob district and the Gomal caravan route, has urged the establishment of an additional post on the northern bank of the Gomal and the strengthening of the garrisons on that river and in the neighbourhood of the Gomal pass. We would support Sir James Browne's recommendations in this matter, and give them a fair trial before committing ourselves to an advance to Spin. We would further endeavour, as we have already observed, to strengthen our position on the Gomal by a scheme of tribal service, as suggested in the concluding paragraph of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's note of the 14th March 1894. It must not be forgotten that the situation now is very different from what it was before the Durand agreement had been effected. The main cause of the difficulties hitherto experienced in dealing with the Waziris, viz., the Amir's assertion of suzerain rights over part of their country and the disputes arising therefrom, has been removed by that agreement. This is a most important factor in the present situation to which we think the despatch attributes insufficient weight. It is not unreasonable to expect that the Waziris will, in consequence of the removal of this source of difficulty, become more amenable to the influence of our officers. Such military occupation of Waziristan as the despatch proposes will place all our future relations with the Waziris on a military basis, will be interpreted by them as an imminent threat of annexation, will furnish many causes of mutual irritation and quarrelling, and will make amicable approaches a matter of difficulty. If we abstain from show of permanent military occupation, our efforts to establish friendly influence will have a much greater chance of success. The recent proceedings of the Political officers afford much ground for encouragement in this direction.

We would communicate to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab a full explanation of the policy we intend to pursue for the present, and call upon him to submit a detailed scheme of tribal service to meet that policy. We would advise a trial of the scheme that may thus be determined on, and leave to the future the devising of other expedients if that scheme should prove a failure.

We would invite attention to two passages in Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's note of the 14th March 1894. In paragraph 9 he remarks :—

“ Our present difficulties along our true frontier, *i.e.*, between the Derajat and Waziristan, are really very small, and it would be absurd to suggest that to diminish them (if indeed it would diminish them) we should undertake to occupy the two exterior lines—along the Tochi and between the Tochi and the Gomal beyond the Mahsud country.

“ Therefore, I say that if we have an object of our own to serve in establishing our control over Waziristan, it must be the imperial military object.”

Again in paragraph 19 he says :—“ We have had a great deal of trouble in the Gomal and south of it. Most of it has been due to the perturbation caused by intrigues and to the want of caution shown in letting our men go about insufficiently protected ; but a certain amount of it is the natural consequence of our taking up such a position in a country like that, and may be expected to continue, no matter how good our relations with the Amir may be, and no matter what precautions we take for the safety of our men. With proper arrangements, however, troubles of this sort may be so reduced as to become endurable ; and we have had before us for some time separate proposals put forward by Mr. Bruce for improving our position by granting certain further allowances to the tribes with which we are there concerned.”

Mr. Bruce also makes reference to the absence of proper precautions in the neighbourhood of the Gomal.

It is noteworthy that almost all the Waziri offences enumerated in the list attached to the despatch were committed on or near the portion of the Waziristan border which marches with the Zhob district recently annexed to Baluchistan. If these offences may be regarded—and we think that, to some extent at all events, they may be reasonably regarded—as evidence of irritation felt by the Waziris at the advance of the British frontier in that direction, then the inference is that much greater irritation will be felt at the establishment of military posts inside Waziristan, and still more at an advance to the boundary of Afghanistan.

It is evident that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab does not anticipate any great difficulties if our establishments are kept within our present frontier line, and if, at the same time, due precautions are taken to prevent the provocation of collisions with the tribesmen and to moderate the ardour of those of our civil and military officers who are eager for an advance. To our reading Mr. Bruce's letter conveys the same lesson.

In conclusion, we would urge abstention from aggressive activity on our north-west frontier. We have at last arrived at a satisfactory understanding with the Amir ; we have thus and otherwise attained to a strong frontier position. This we should endeavour by all means to consolidate peacefully, and with it we should rest content as long as circumstances may permit. Many important questions of domestic politics now press on the attention of the Government of India, and we believe that conflicts and warfare with the border tribes would add greatly to the difficulties of the present situation. The need for a policy of unaggressive watchfulness on the frontiers is indicated as much by the feeling of unrest which is perceptible in India as by the overwhelming need for economy in all branches of expenditure. No expenditure would be more distasteful to the public in this country, or in our opinion more unjustifiable, than expenditure incurred in attempts to subjugate those independent frontier tribes. We believe that an advance to Spin and the location there of a permanent military cantonment is greatly calculated to lead to such expenditure, and for this, among other reasons, we are compelled to

oppose it. We oppose it with the less hesitation in that we believe there is a reasonable prospect that the legitimate end in view may be attained by more peaceful means.

(Signed) C. B. PRITCHARD,  
J. WESTLAND,  
A. P. MACDONNELL.

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No. 2.

*Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Governor General of India in Council,  
dated India Office, London, 24th August 1894.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE given very careful consideration to the Letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated 10th July 1894, regarding the arrangements to be made for the delimitation of the Amir's boundary on the Waziri frontier, and the consequent arrangements for the protection of our territory to the south of the Gomal from raids, for the safety of commerce and for establishing in the interests of peace a certain amount of control over the Waziri tribes.

2. Your letter dwells on the frequency of raids and outrages, especially during the first five months of the year, subsequent, that is to say, to the arrangement with the Amir, by which Waziristan was definitely brought within your sphere of influence; on the extreme difficulty you have had in obtaining any reparation for these outrages, and on the unsatisfactory and undignified conditions under which even this slight reparation has been obtained; on the necessity more than once imposed on you already of moving troops into the Gomal; and on the absolute inability of the Waziri headmen, in existing conditions, to coerce their recalcitrant tribesmen. You lay stress also on your responsibility, not only for protecting your own territory and the trading caravans that make use of it, but also, under the recent engagement with the Amir for preventing Waziri raids into His Highness's territory, you express your conviction that the policy of controlling these tribes entirely from without by means of tribal subsidies and levy posts without a military backing has failed, and you consider that the time has now come for substituting a policy of more effective protection and of closer relations with the headmen of the Waziri tribes.

3. The present time, you point out, is specially opportune, as the tribes are aware that the Amir has foregone all claim to their allegiance, and as there will be a considerable military force collected for the purpose of escorting the Delimitation Commission.

4. Your proposals, as I understand them, are that a portion of the military force collected for the protection of the delimitation Commission should be left as a permanent garrison either at Spin or in some other suitable locality; that this would not involve an addition to the force already on the frontier, but merely a redistribution of it; that as a preliminary a political officer should be sent to explain the measure to the headmen of the tribes and if possible obtain their consent; that no tribute should be exacted from the Waziris, who will be controlled as at present under a system of tribal *jirgas*, but that increased allowances should be given to headmen and service allowances to the tribes for the employment of levies, the object being, as explained in your 13th paragraph, to discharge your obligations in protecting your borders and posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes who have thrown in their lot with you by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and the punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve, and without which they cannot maintain their position.

5. I have likewise given very careful consideration to the minute recorded by the three members\* of your Council who dissent from the policy advocated in your Letter. They are of opinion that the measures proposed, while not going

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\* Sir C. Pritchard.  
Mr. Westland.  
Sir A. MacDonnell.



far enough to secure effective control, will inevitably lead to resistance and involve the ultimate destruction of Waziri independence and the assumption of administrative control. They deprecate the assumption of any responsibility towards the Amir to prevent raids across his border, as a consequence of the recent agreement with him, and are of opinion that the existing difficulties may be met by a continuance of the past policy of control from without, supplemented by strengthening our defensive arrangements on the Gomal, and punishing the tribes, when absolutely necessary, by means of hostile expeditions sent into their country. And finally, they draw a strong argument from the present state of the finances against incurring at the present time any avoidable expenditure.

6. I should certainly have preferred to adopt the apparently less costly and less extensive programme which their minute advocates, if it held out any hope, in my opinion, of enabling you adequately to fulfil your obligations in regard to your own territory and the trade routes which go through it, and to the Amir and to the well affected among the tribesmen themselves. But your Letter and the correspondence which it encloses convince me that this is not the case, and I concur with you that recourse to punitive expeditions from a distant base would in the long run prove far more expensive, and that, in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control over Waziristan.

7. I consent, therefore, to your adopting the policy of which your Excellency's Letter furnishes the outline. The principle which I desire to lay down for your guidance is that in the execution of this policy your proceedings should be directed exclusively towards the objects stated in paragraph 13 of your Letter and recapitulated in this Despatch, and should be strictly confined to such measures and operations as may be necessary to their fulfilment. I need hardly add that, since I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities, and any increase of the public expenditure, I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable. As soon as the details of your scheme can be formulated I shall be glad to learn from you what is to be the strength of the proposed post, and the arrangements for additional levy-posts, and to receive an estimate of the expenditure involved.

I have, &c.,  
HENRY H. FOWLER.

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No. 3.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 11th September 1894. (Received 1st October 1894.)*

SIR,

WE have the honour to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab lately informed us of the murder in the Mahsud hills of three Mahsud Waziri Maliks, in retaliation for the action taken by them in connection with the surrender of the Abdul Rahman Khel and the Abdullai prisoners, who were convicted, respectively, of the murder of Mr. Kelly on the Moghal Kot road, and of a sepoy in the Zam Pass.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor was of opinion that, having due regard to our own position, we could not abstain from taking up the quarrel commenced by these assassinations. His Honour accordingly recommended that a demand should at once be made for the surrender of the murderers of the three Maliks, combined with the threat of a punitive expedition at a date named, against the guilty sections of the tribe, unless meantime they surrendered the murderers of the Maliks, and of the four sepoys of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, who were killed near Gwaleri in February 1894.

3. We felt unable to authorise the threat of a punitive expedition. We

consider that the Government of India are bound by distinct obligations to the Amir to carry out the demarcation of the Waziristan section of the frontier in October next, our proposals concerning which were approved in your telegram ; and that the action proposed by the Punjab Government would preclude a peaceful settlement and delimitation of Waziristan. The Punjab Government was accordingly requested to instruct Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner of the Derajat, to continue his communications with the tribal jirgas with the object of procuring, if possible, the punishment of the murderers of the Maliks by the tribes themselves, or their surrender to us for punishment.

4. The Punjab Government was, at the same time, informed that the Political Officer with the force to be sent to Spin or Wano will be entrusted with the duty of making permanent arrangements in accordance with the proposals approved by you ; and that we shall then be better able to consider our position with regard to the recent murders, if it should become necessary to do so.

5. We also requested the Punjab Government to instruct Mr. Bruce to announce to the Waziris, without delay, that, by arrangement with the Amir, a British force will proceed to Spin or Wano in October, with the commission appointed for the demarcation of the frontier, and that, at the same time, a Political Officer will be deputed, who, in communication with the different sections of the tribes themselves, will propose a scheme for the entertainment of levies, the payment of service allowances, and for such other arrangements as may be necessary for establishing permanent relations, in the interests of peace and good order, between them and the Government of India.

6. Affairs in Waziristan are proceeding quietly, and no signs of any combined opposition have yet been manifested.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
A. E. MILLER,  
H. BRACKENBURY,  
C. B. PRITCHARD,  
J. WESTLAND,  
A. P. MACDONNELL.

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No. 4.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 3rd October 1894. (Received 22nd October 1894.)*

SIR,

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers showing the further measures taken in connection with the demarcation of the Afghan-Waziristan boundary and our future relations with the tribes.

We have, &c.,  
ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
A. E. MILLER,  
H. BRACKENBURY,  
C. B. PRITCHARD,  
J. WESTLAND,  
A. P. MACDONNELL.

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Enclosure 1.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 12th September 1894.*

I AM directed to convey the orders of the Government of India upon the proposals submitted with your letter of the 11th August, regarding the composition of the Commission for the delimitation of the Afghan-Waziristan boundary.

The Governor-General in Council approves of the Lieutenant-Governor's selection of Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., as the British Joint-Commissioner, and of his being accompanied by Messrs. King, Grant and Anderson and an office establishment costing, in the maximum, Rs. 300 a month. While employed on this duty, each of the officers above-named will receive the pay of his present appointment, *plus* a deputation allowance of 20 per cent. thereon. In addition, Messrs. Bruce and Grant may continue to draw, respectively, their fixed travelling and outpost allowances. It is understood that, as regards these two officers, the only extra charge entailed will be the deputation allowance of 20 per cent. upon their pay.

I am to observe, with reference to the fourth column of the estimate accompanying your letter, that deputation allowance does not come within the definition of salary, and that therefore exchange compensation allowance thereon is not admissible.

As to the proposed allotment of Rs. 35,000 for miscellaneous expenses connected with the demarcation, I am to say that before passing orders the Government of India will await the more detailed statement promised in your letter of the 11th August.

The question of medical and survey arrangements for the Commission and the military considerations referred to in your letter are being separately dealt with ; and a further communication will be made to you in due course. You will also be further addressed regarding the instructions to be issued defining the relations between the Commissioner for the demarcation and the Officer Commanding the troops.

#### Enclosure 2.

*Extract from Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 24th September 1894.*

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 12th September 1894, I am directed to address you regarding the financial arrangements connected with the future relations between the Government of India and the tribes in Waziristan.

I am in the first place to invite the attention of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to the Government of India's Despatch\* to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 10th July 1894, containing the following statements of their wishes and intentions regarding subsidies to the tribes :—

“Our desire is to carry the tribes with us in whatever we may do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs, provided only that our obligations are discharged in protecting our borders and our posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes, who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve, and without which they cannot maintain their position.

\* \* \* \* \*

“In making arrangements with the tribesmen, such as we contemplate, it will be necessary to give increased allowances to the headmen and to enlist inferior men for service in levy posts. \* \* \* \* \* Our proposals in this respect are that the officer who will be entrusted with the negotiations which are to be carried out with the tribes should be authorised to draw up a scheme for entertainment of levies and payment of service allowances.”

The Secretary of State's Despatch, dated the 24th August 1894, approved generally of the measures proposed by the Government of India, and agreed that, in our existing relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes concerned, it is essential that we should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, “an effective control over Waziristan.” The objects towards which our proceedings are to be exclusively directed are recapitulated in the Despatch.



The Government of India are therefore now in a position to consider the estimates of expenditure submitted with your letter, dated the 24th March last. These are understood to contemplate a total outlay of a lakh of rupees annually to be distributed in the following manner :—

- (a) Rs. 50,000 in allowances to the Darwesh Khel, exclusive of those already paid to the Wano sections for Gomal service and of those enjoyed by Maliks in British territory. This sum is intended
  - (i) for the control and maintenance of the Thal-Gumatti route,
  - (ii) to secure immunity from raids by the Darwesh Khel on the Dawaris of the Tochi, and (iii) as protective arrangements for the Darwesh Khel themselves.
- (b) Rs. 15,000 to the Dawaris for the protection of the Tochi route.
- (c) Rs. 20,000 to the Mahsuds, Bhittanis and Wano Darwesh Khel, in redistribution of existing allowances, and for new posts.
- (d) Rs. 15,000 on account of munshis, watermen, shop-keepers, sweepers, uniform for levies, and other incidental charges.

If the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied that, compatibly with the necessities of the case, the expenditure under these heads cannot be reduced, the Government of India will raise no objection to it. As to (b), however, the Governor-General in Council would ask His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to consider what payments are required for the Dawaris, if, as stated in Mr. Anderson's letter of the 25th February, "they are favourably disposed to welcome the arrangements proposed for bringing Waziristan under direct control." The opening up of the Tochi route has not yet been determined upon, and must depend on the negotiations with the tribes. As to (c), it is understood that the sum of Rs. 20,000 is intended to serve the two-fold purpose of removing the present discontent on account of inequalities in the Mahsud allowances, and of opening up communication between the Wano military post and Jandola on one side, and Kajuri Kach on the other. The opening up of the road from Wano to Jandola by the Shuhur valley is to "serve the treble purpose of pacifying the country as a whole, increasing the safety of the Gomal, and securing an alternative line of communication between Jandola and Wano." If the local authorities are able to show that the second of these objects will be attained, and can propose no equally effective and less expensive plan, it may be desirable to endeavour to obtain the consent of the tribes to the placing of posts along the Shuhur route, but here again it is essential to show that we have no intention to interfere in their internal affairs.

In view of the foregoing remarks, of the necessity for strict economy in all branches of expenditure, and of the restrictions imposed by the Secretary of State's despatch above referred to, I am to request that, before any definite decision as to the outlay to be incurred is given, the Government of India may be furnished with the advice of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to whether any modifications in the estimates submitted by the local authorities are practicable, it being remembered that the Government of India have not in all respects adopted the policy for which these estimates were framed.

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No. 5.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated, Fort William, 2nd January 1895. (Received 21st January 1895.)*

SIR,

WE have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the correspondence regarding the recent proceedings in Waziristan, which have led to the despatch of a punitive expedition into the Mahsud country, under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart.

2. Our despatches have informed you of the position of affairs up to the date of the march of the delimitation escort for Wano, while His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 20th of October announced the arrival of Mr. Bruce and the last detachment of the escort at Kajuri Kach on the 18th of that month. The attitude of the Wano Maliks was described as most friendly, and they

exhibited an eager desire for the British occupation of Wano and for service under Government. We had informed the Amir that our Delimitation Commissioner would probably arrive at Wano on the 25th of October, and had expressed a hope that His Highness's representative would be ready to begin demarcation on the 5th November. On the 19th of October, Mr. Bruce interviewed a very large jirga at Kajuri Kach. He informed them of the intended movements of the escort in view to carrying out the programme of delimitation agreed to by the Amir; he told them that troops would be permanently stationed in the country at Wano or Spin, or such position as Government might deem best; that Spin and Wano and the adjacent tracts, through which the Powindah trade routes run, would in future be considered protected areas; and that strict reparation would be exacted for offences calculated to endanger the safety and peace of the country. He also impressed on them that raids across the boundary into Afghan territory were forbidden, and that should the tribesmen have any complaint against the Amir's subjects, they must lay it before the British officers, and not take the law into their own hands. The jirga gave in a written paper fully acquiescing in the proposals of Government.

3. The escort reached Wano on the 25th of October unopposed. The Mahsuds, having begged to be summoned to Wano, met Mr. Bruce there on the day of his arrival. The attitude of both Mahsuds and Darwesh Kels continued to be generally friendly; but on the 28th of October, one Mullah Powindah was reported to have collected in the Khaisera Valley a thousand men belonging to the Shabi Khels and Abdullais who were discontented on account of the imprisonment of their relatives in connection with the murder of Mr. Kelly and other outrages. The Mullah disclaimed hostile intentions, but demanded the release of the prisoners. As a precautionary measure, an infantry battalion and two guns of the reserve brigade were moved up to Jandola to reinforce the post at that place. Mullah Powindah was advised to disperse his following, but made no attempt to do so, and while the question of despatching a flying column to Khaisera to break up the gathering was under consideration, the British Camp at Wano was attacked at 5.30 A.M. on the 3rd of November. The attacking force, estimated to have numbered from 1,200 to 2,000, consisted entirely of Mahsuds, chiefly Shabi Khels and Abdullais of Makin, with a few Abdul Rahman Khels. Owing to the nature of the ground they were able to approach the camp through ravines, emerging from which the main body rushed past the pickets on to the left flank of the camp. Others attacked the rear. Favoured by the darkness some of the enemy succeeded in effecting an entrance into the camp and did considerable damage. After stubborn hand-to-hand fighting the camp was cleared of the enemy, who fled in the direction of Khaisera and Shakai closely pursued by a force of cavalry, infantry, and guns. The casualties on the British side were 1 British officer, 2 native officers and 18 men killed: 6 British officers (one of whom has since died) and 38 native soldiers wounded. The followers also suffered severely, 23 being killed and 20 wounded. The enemy succeeded in carrying off 36 Martini rifles and carbines, 15 horses and 3,000 rupees in cash, besides killing and wounding numerous transport animals in the lines. The loss on the side of the tribesmen was very severe, being estimated as numbering from 300 to 400 men killed and over 100 wounded.

4. From time to time, since the 3rd of November, reports have been received of large bodies of men collecting to attack Jandola, Kajuri Kach, Wano and even Edwardesabad, but in spite of the efforts of the Mullah and his lieutenants, no fresh organized attacks have occurred. Several outrages by small bands of raiders, such as cutting and carrying away telegraph wire, attacking and looting convoys, firing on the postal horsemen, have, as was to be expected, been reported.

5. The leading Mahsud Maliks arrived at Khaisera the night after the attack on Wano, and sent a message to Mr. Bruce asking to be allowed to come in. Mr. Bruce replied that he could not receive them until the Mullah's gathering had completely dispersed. A few influential Maliks of the former Kabul faction were believed to have secretly aided the Mullah, but the majority were said to have no sympathy with him, and to have threatened to attack him if he continued his opposition.

6. General Turner's brigade was at once reinforced by a battalion of British infantry, but we impressed on our Commissioner that no aggressive movement was to be undertaken without the sanction of Government. He was informed that he must carry out the spirit of his former instructions, namely, that we had gone to Wano with peaceable intent, and had no wish to conquer or dominate the country, and he was instructed to reopen negotiations, if possible, on the footing that the Mullah's act was disapproved by the majority of the tribal Maliks. He was to demand the temporary banishment of Mullah Powindah, the surrender of certain leaders of the attack, the immediate return of every horse, rifle and rupee stolen, or five hundred rupees for each horse or rifle; and, if after a reasonable interval there was no sign of submission, he was authorised to name the 1st of December as the date after which Government would take action to enforce their demands. Meanwhile arrangements were made to strengthen the force at Dera Ismail Khan.

7. Nearly all the Mahsud Maliks came in on the 18th November to Mr. Bruce, who explained to them the Government demands, and gave them till the 26th November within which to comply. The jirga started back forthwith to the hills, promising, in writing, to do everything in their power to enforce the Government terms, and in the event of failure to return to Wano with a full jirga by the 26th, and to co-operate with Government in punishing rebellious sections or individuals. At their own request, the names of five men were added to the list of those whose surrender was to be demanded.

8. A very large meeting of Mahsuds was held in Kanigoram, Mullah Powindah being present: but his party and that of the Maliks were unable to agree. On the 24th November, the Mahsud deputation returned to Wano, and stated that they could see their way to obtaining restitution of all Government property stolen, but not the surrender of the men demanded, or the banishment of the Mullah. They asked that their hands might be strengthened by allowing them to take back with them to Kanigoram certain Suleiman Khel and Darwesh Khel Maliks who were with the Commissioner, and Mr. Bruce agreed to this, giving them time up to the 28th November within which to bring their final answer. Mullah Powindah now wrote to the Commissioner making overtures for peace, which he requested should be settled through him. Mr. Bruce replied that he could only treat with him through the Maliks, and advised him to disperse his hostile gathering. On the 28th of November, there were assembled at Torwam, in Khaisera, between 2,500 and 3,000 men, including Mullah Powindah and representatives of all factions. At the end of the month, the Government terms had not been complied with, but the Maliks represented that it had been impossible to secure compliance within the time allowed, and engaged to fulfil all demands, if Government would give them up to the 12th of December. This further extension was agreed to, but arrangements were completed for an advance into the Waziri country of the whole force under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart from three separate points, viz., Wano, Jandola and Bannu, should the terms be still uncomplied with on the date fixed. It was decided, also, that on the forces advancing, Wano should be held by a regiment of infantry, 2 guns and 20 cavalry.

9. During the early part of December, reports received from the British Commissioner indicated the probability of the Maliks being able to induce the tribesmen to accept the Government terms. The Mullah dispersed his following and retired to Kanigoram; and he was reported to be co-operating with the Maliks in obtaining fulfilment of the Government demands. The Abdul Rahman Khels restored a number of camels which they had looted from Powindahs in the Gomal during November. The Shakai jirga promised to bring in the prisoners and hostages demanded by Government from their section, and the Mahsud Maliks sent in frequent messages that they would return all stolen property and hostages by the time fixed. Up to the 10th of December it still seemed possible that the terms would be fulfilled: but the Maliks now sent in a letter asking for further time, and on this being refused, the friendly Maliks came in to Mr. Bruce and admitted their inability to coerce the recalcitrant sections. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab recommended that the advance should be no longer delayed, and we accordingly instructed Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart on the 15th of December



to assume the chief military and political charge, to punish those responsible for the attack on Wano, and to enforce the Government terms.

10. The force advancing into Waziristan under Lieutenant-General Lockhart's command is divided as follows :—

(1.) Wano brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Turner.	(2.) Jandola brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Symons.	(3.) Bannu column, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Egerton
1 squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry.	1 squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry.	3rd Punjab Cavalry.
No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.	1 2nd " " " "	No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.	No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.	1st Sikhs.
3rd Sikhs.	38th Dogras.	2nd Punjab Infantry.
1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.	4th Punjab Infantry.	6th " "
1st Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.	33rd " "	Rough total 2,700 men and 6 guns.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.	
Rough total 3,400 men and 6 guns.	No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	
	Rough total 3,400 men and 6 guns.	

The objectives of the three columns will be respectively Kanigoram, Makin and Razmak. Colonel Egerton's instructions, however, are to secure the concurrence and co-operation of the Darwesh Khels in his advance to the last named place.

11. On the 16th of December, Sir William Lockhart issued a proclamation (*vide* enclosures), announcing that he was authorised to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British camp at Wano, to enforce the conditions demanded by Government, and any other terms which renewed opposition might necessitate ; that it was his intention to secure the carrying out of the boundary demarcation ; and that resistance or non-compliance with his demands might compel him to stay in the country longer than the Government had any desire that he should stay.

12. The Bannu column advanced on the 17th and the Wano and Jandola columns on the 18th of December. Arrangements have been made for the safety of well-disposed persons and their belongings, and everything possible will be done to confine the operations to the offending sections, and to prevent the punitive expedition from developing into one against the whole tribe.

13. The commencement of delimitation having thus for a time been postponed, we have informed the Amir of the cause, and that, until recalcitrant sections have made complete submission, Mr. Bruce will not be able to take up the work. With reference to His Highness's decision to leave the demarcation to be carried out by a British officer alone, we have informed the Amir that we understand that the boundary line laid down by our Commissioner will be accepted by His Highness in the same complete way as that of other parts of the frontier upon which British and Afghan officers have worked conjointly.

14. We are glad to be able to report that the attitude of the Darwesh Khel section of the Waziris has been generally satisfactory throughout, and that the main body of the Dauris has remained quiet, although Mullah Powindah made great efforts to induce them to join him. We are uncertain what the attitude of the Kabul Khel of Birmal will be ; early in December, a party of them started to join the Mullah Powindah, but returned on finding his gathering dispersed.

15. In conclusion, we would desire to express our regret that the unprovoked attack by malcontent sections of the Mahsuds has forced upon us the necessity of sending a punitive expedition into their country ; but we trust that its operations will soon be brought to a conclusion, and that it may shortly be possible to commence delimitation and resume negotiations for settling our future relations with the Waziri tribe, an outline of which was sketched in our Despatch of the 10th July 1894, and accepted in your Despatch dated the 24th August last.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
A. E. MILLER,  
H. BRACKENBURY,  
C. B. PRITCHARD,  
J. WESTLAND,  
A. P. MACDONNELL.

## Enclosure 1.

*Letter from W. J. Cunningham, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 29th November 1894.*

In continuation of my letter dated 19th November 1894, I am directed to inform you that the position in Waziristan having received the careful consideration of the Governor-General in Council, he has decided as follows :—

- (1) If the Waziri tribes do not accept by the 1st December the terms explained to the jirga by Mr. Bruce, the political control as well as the military command will be placed in the hands of General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B.
- (2) General Lockhart's instructions will be that he is to enforce compliance with the terms already laid down and such additional terms as additional resistance may render necessary. On such a settlement being completed, the force will be withdrawn so soon as may be consistent with military safety, and so soon as the demarcation of the frontier with Afghanistan, which is the primary object of the Government of India in entering Waziristan, has been carried out.

2. I am to enclose a proclamation to be issued by General Sir William Lockhart in the event of the measures contemplated in this letter becoming necessary.

## Annexure.

## DRAFT PROCLAMATION.

Whereas Mr. Bruce, the British Commissioner for the delimitation of the border of the Afghan dominions on the side of Waziristan, advanced to Wano, in accordance with the proclamation which he issued to you in August last :

Whereas some evil-disposed persons of the Waziri tribe made an unprovoked attack upon the camp of the Commissioner at Wano, upon the 3rd November 1894, and plundered certain property therefrom :

Whereas the Sarkar is aware that the Maliks of the Mahsud Waziris did not sympathise with the objects of the evil-disposed persons aforesaid :

And whereas the Sarkar is desirous of living in friendship with its neighbours, the Waziri tribe, and wishes to show the sincerity of its pacific intentions :

Therefore Mr. Bruce called to himself a jirga of the said tribe, and explained to the Maliks who attended the said jirga that, notwithstanding the unprovoked aggression committed by the evil-disposed persons aforesaid, the Sarkar would not hold the tribe responsible nor inflict punishment upon the tribe generally, provided that, on a given date, the Maliks restored to the British Government every horse and every rifle and every rupee stolen from the British camp, or Rs. 500 instead for each rifle or horse, and also that certain persons named by him were surrendered to the British Government, and that the Mullah Powindah, the leader of the attack on the British camp, retired from the country until the matter was settled.

Now, the said date has passed, and the tribe aforesaid has failed to comply with the above terms : I therefore proclaim to all concerned that I am authorised by the Sarkar to enforce from the Waziri tribe the fulfilment of the terms and conditions which I have detailed above, and of any further terms and conditions which renewed opposition by the said tribe or by any section or individuals thereof may require the Sarkar to impose :

And I inform you that it is my intention to enforce the said conditions, and to occupy and remain in your country, until you have complied with those terms and conditions in every particular, and until the demarcation of the boundary, which the Sarkar has from the beginning intended to carry out, shall have been completed :

And I call upon all who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar and desire to possess their own country and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sarkar, to assist to the utmost of their abilities in the work of enforcing compliance with the said terms and conditions, by which means they will save the tribe from further punishment and the tribal country from further occupation.

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Enclosure 2.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 6th December 1894.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 30th November 1894, communicating the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the draft proclamation to be issued by General Sir William Lockhart to the Waziris, in the event of punitive measures becoming necessary.

2. In reply I am to forward, for substitution, a revised draft of the last three paragraphs of the proclamation which are based upon the suggestions made in your letter under reply.

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Sub-Enclosure.

*Revised draft of the last three paragraphs of the proclamation to be issued by General Sir W. Lockhart.*

Now, the said date has passed, and the tribe aforesaid has failed to comply with the above terms; I therefore proclaim to all concerned that I am authorised by the Sarkar to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British Camp as above said and all persons who assist or screen such sections, to enforce from the Waziri tribe the fulfilment of the terms and conditions which I have detailed above, and of any further terms and conditions which renewed opposition by the said tribe or by any section or individuals thereof, may require the Sarkar to impose.

And I inform you that it is my intention to secure the carrying out of the demarcation of the boundary which the Sarkar has from the beginning intended to carry out, to inflict chastisement for the unprovoked attack on the British Camp at Wano, and to enforce the conditions above said. I have no desire to stay in your country longer than is necessary for the attainment of these objects, but if you or any section of you resist me or do not comply with my demands, I may be compelled to remain longer than the Sarkar has any desire that I should stay.

And I call upon all, who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar and desire to possess their own country and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sarkar, to assist to the utmost of their abilities in facilitating the objects with which, as notified to you, I have been sent into your country, by which means they will save the tribe from further punishment, and the tribal country from further occupation.

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No. 6.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated, Fort William, the 20th February 1895. (Received 11th March, 1895.)*

SIR,

IN continuation of our Despatch, dated the second January 1895, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further correspondence regarding the progress of our relations with the Waziri tribe and the demarcation of the Amir's frontier in the Waziristan direction.



2. Our despatch above cited brought the account of our proceedings in Waziristan up to the middle of December, when the tribe having failed to submit to the terms demanded by Government, Sir William Lockhart advanced into the country to enforce them. We do not propose to follow in this letter the military movements of the force, of which you have been informed in the telegrams sent in our Military Department, but to deal with the progress of the political events. Since the attack on the British Camp at Wano, the Waziris have made no organized opposition in strength, and our troops have visited every part of the Mahsud country, even the least accessible valleys, have captured large numbers of cattle, sheep and goats, and have destroyed the towers and defences of hostile villages. We believe that the political settlement of our relations with the Waziris and the demarcation of the boundary have been greatly facilitated by showing the Mahsuds our power to punish, and their helplessness to resist.

3. Early in January, Sir William Lockhart reported the extent to which the  
 \* *Vide* paragraph 6 of our Despatch, terms\* originally demanded from the dated 2nd January 1895.

Waziris had been complied with. Mullah Powindah had left the Mahsud country, two out of eighteen hostages had been surrendered, four of the fifteen Government horses and 25 out of the 36 rifles looted at Wano had been returned. Sir William Lockhart proposed to insist on the surrender of the remaining hostages and stolen property, or, if this proved to be impracticable in any case, to substitute a money payment of a thousand rupees for each hostage, and five hundred rupees for each rifle or horse. Besides the above, in view of the opposition offered by the tribe and the delay in carrying out the Government conditions, he proposed to impose the following conditions: a fine of 50 breech-loading rifles, 200 matchlocks and 200 swords or knives; the actual payment of all outstanding fines amounting to nearly thirteen thousand rupees; the opening up of the Shahur route from Jandola to Wano; the payment of a nominal tribute; and the expulsion of Mullah Powindah until these terms had been carried out and demarcation completed. These proposals were generally approved except the levy of tribute, which the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab considered unwise and we rejected; in regard to the Shahur route, General Lockhart was instructed to impose on the Mahsuds the obligation of keeping it open, and we impressed on him that the establishment of a military post on the route was outside our declared policy. We also requested General Lockhart, when making any communication to the tribe, to avoid language committing us to the payment of tribal allowances to those persons from whom fines and penalties were being demanded. We agree with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in considering that the allowances granted to the Mahsuds some years ago must be held to have been cancelled by their recent behaviour, and that the whole question will now have to be reconsidered.

4. On the 21st of January Sir William Lockhart received the Mahsud jirga at Kundiwam. He announced to them the additional Government terms, and gave them to the first of March within which to comply with these, informing them that until they did comply, the troops would continue to occupy Mahsud country. On the 23rd, the Maliks presented a petition urging the impossibility of giving up fifty breech-loading rifles, and objecting to the term which demanded the opening up of the Shahur route. At Sir William Lockhart's suggestion we have agreed to three muzzle-loading rifles being accepted as equivalent to one breech-loader, if necessary. Sir William Lockhart considered the opening of the Shahur route essential for the pacification of the Mahsud country, but he was doubtful whether this could be effectually carried out with levy posts only. We have instructed him to tell the Mahsuds that, if they will establish tribal posts, we will pay them and see how the plan works; we have also authorised him, if, in the course of negotiations, argument is needed, to suggest that, if this plan does not succeed, we may find it necessary to establish military posts. We have, however, cautioned him not to use this as a threat requiring us to act on it if the Mahsuds either refuse to establish levy posts or fail to work them, and we have repeated to General Lockhart that we wish to make it clear beyond dispute to every one that we intend to act fully up to the terms of our proclamation, and do not wish to take possession of the Mahsud country.

5. At the end of January General Lockhart was able to report that considerable progress had been made. All the hostages demanded by Government, except three of minor importance, had been surrendered; Mullah Powindah had fled from Waziri country; almost all the rifles and Government horses and some of the money looted during the attack on Wano had been restored, and the tribesmen were bringing in arms in compliance with the terms demanded. The tribe continues to show every indication of complete submission, and it seems that a real effort is being made to comply with the terms before the date fixed.

6. Heavy snow on the passes rendered it impossible for delimitation to be carried on northwards from Domandi to Charkiaghar without the delimitation party crossing into Afghan limits; we therefore decided to divide the work of demarcation into two sections: (1) from Domandi northwards to Khwaja Khidr; and (2) from Charkiaghar southwards. We informed the Amir of our decision, and the plan is so far working well.

The delimitation of the first section was entrusted to Mr. King; the second will be undertaken by Mr. Anderson, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu.

7. Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, who is understood to have been entrusted with the duty of superintending, without actually taking part in, the demarcation of the southern portion of the Waziristan boundary, is still at Murgha Chaman, and there was at first some difficulty in getting the Afghan tribal Maliks to meet Mr. King on the border. After some correspondence, however, with Sardar Shirindil Khan and Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, and in spite of no little inconvenience caused by the intrigues of one Pahlwan, a leading Suleiman Khel Malik, Mr. King was able to begin demarcation on the 28th January in company with the Suleiman Khel and Kharoti Maliks. Fifteen days later he had the gratification of reporting that his section of the work had been completed; the Afghan representatives, including Darwesh Khel Waziri Maliks from Birmal, expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with the boundary, and Mr. King returned with his escort to Wano.

8. Sir William Lockhart is now preparing to move up the Tochi about the 25th of February with a force consisting of one squadron of cavalry, one mountain battery, a company of sappers, and six infantry regiments in order to commence the delimitation of the northern section. Mr. Anderson summoned the Darwesh Khel and Dawari jirgas to Bannu to explain to them the pacific nature of our intentions, and received agreements from them to provide supplies and render service. Sardar Shirindil Khan, the Amir's Governor of Khost, has been informed that Mr. Anderson will be ready to commence work at the beginning of March, and we trust that before the end of that month we shall be able to report the completion of the demarcation of the Waziristan boundary.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
A. E. MILLER,  
H. BRACKENBURY,  
C. B. PRITCHARD,  
J. WESTLAND,  
A. P. MACDONNELL.

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#### No. 7.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, the 20th March 1895. (Received 5th April 1895.)*

SIR,

IN continuation of our Despatch, dated the 20th February 1895, we have the honour to forward a copy of correspondence regarding the temporary establishment of a military post at Barwand in the Shahur Valley.

2. The Mahsud Waziris having complied with the terms imposed by us, as reported in His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 5th March 1895, Sir William Lockhart proposed to withdraw the bulk of the troops from their territory and to leave a wing of Native Infantry at Barwand until our negotiations with the Waziri tribes have been concluded.

3. It is essential that while the negotiations are being carried on, our lines of

communication should be efficiently protected. General Lockhart considers that Barwand affords an excellent position for this purpose, and he is of opinion that it would be impossible to keep the existing field telegraph line from Jandola to Wano intact, if the Shahur route were guarded by levy posts only.

4. In these circumstances we have authorised the temporary maintenance of a post at Barwand by a wing of Native Infantry, and have instructed General Lockhart to explain clearly to the tribe the temporary nature of this measure.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
A. E. MILLER,  
H. BRACKENBURY,  
C. B. PRITCHARD,  
J. WESTLAND,  
A. P. MACDONNELL.

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No. 8.

*Extract from Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 15th May 1895. (Received 4th June 1896.)*

Our Despatch, dated the 8th May 1895, informed you of the completion of the demarcation of the Waziristan frontier, and of the withdrawal of the bulk of the troops which constituted the Waziristan Field Force. We now have the honour to address you on the subject of the positions to be held by our troops in Waziristan.

In our Despatch, dated the 10th July 1894, in which we placed before Her Majesty's Government our proposals for improving our relations with the Waziri tribe, we wrote—

“Our desire is to carry the tribes with us in whatever we may do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs, provided only that our obligations are discharged in protecting our borders and our posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes, who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve and without which they cannot maintain their position.”

We had before us proposals from Mr. Bruce to establish one strong headquarters military station, probably at Wano, with an outpost in upper Dawar or Sheranna. We were unable to recommend Mr. Bruce's scheme in its entirety; and we set aside that part of it which involved the establishment of an outpost at Sheranna, advocating one post only, at Spin or Wano, for the special purpose of protecting the Gomal route.

But we added a special reservation in regard to the Tochi Valley. We were unacquainted with the geography of that part of the country, though we knew that it was inhabited by people different from their neighbours on both sides, and unable to adequately protect themselves. While, therefore, we declared our policy in regard to the Waziris to be one of securing their adhesion and good behaviour by a system of allowances and of non-interference with their local affairs, we felt some apprehension from what we knew of them that the circumstances of the Tochi might raise special difficulties, and that it might be impossible to do justice to the peaceful dwellers in the valley by the grant of allowances alone. We accordingly wrote—

“It is a question whether the wishes and the necessities of the tribesmen in the Tochi and lower Dawar will not require the establishment of what the Lieutenant-Governor calls ‘a regular system of government.’ The circumstances there seem, as he says, to be altogether exceptional. The Darwesh Khel and Dawaris apparently desire and ask for our control as the only means of settling their own feuds and of protecting them from the Mahsuds. What the necessities of the situation in the Tochi and lower Dawar really are will be ascertained by facts which will come out in the course of negotiating with the tribes, if our proposed negotiations are taken in hand.”



In signifying the acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of our proposals generally, you added that every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the tribes to the location of the military post in Spin or Wano, and towards keeping interference with them and expenditure within the narrowest limit possible, but that "in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control in Waziristan."

In communicating this decision to the Punjab Government, our Foreign Secretary wrote—

"I am to request that Mr. Bruce may be instructed to at once inform the Waziris that, by arrangement with the Amir, a British force will proceed to Spin or Wano in October with the Commission appointed for the demarcation of the frontier; and that, at the same time, a Political Officer will be deputed who will, in communication with the different sections of the tribes themselves, propose a scheme for entertainment of levies, payment of service allowances, and other arrangements for the permanent relations to be established between them and the Government of India for the preservation of order. It is particularly requested that there may be no delay in making this announcement to the tribes."

The proclamation, issued under the above orders regarding the entertainment of levies, payment of service allowances and other arrangements with both Waziris and Dawaris, was issued to all alike, and we are thus committed to some tribal settlement and to the payment of some tribal allowances in the Tochi. We indeed gave our fullest consent to some such arrangement, when in September and October last we sanctioned an annual outlay not exceeding Rs. 50,000 for (i) the control and maintenance of the Thal-Gumatti route; (ii) to secure immunity from raids by the Darwesh Khel on the Dawaris of the Tochi; and (iii) as protective arrangements for the Darwesh Khel themselves; and an annual outlay of Rs. 15,000 to the Dawaris for the protection of the Tochi route.

The instructions which were then issued for the guidance of Mr. Bruce in dealing with the tribes in the Tochi valley were that he should endeavour to organise the tribal service allowances and posts with a view to secure—as far as such means can secure—protection of the Dawaris from Waziri raids. There was no intention that he should go further; indeed Mr. Bruce was instructed to explain that the British Government did not engage to interfere between the tribes. At the same time it was stated that the arrangements should be so explained that we should not be precluded from taking further steps for the safety of the Tochi valley.

We desired, on the one hand, to abstain from assuming any avoidable responsibilities, and to guard the officers on the spot from committing us further than the sanction of Her Majesty's Government permitted; while we wished, on the other hand, not to be precluded from considering afresh the best way of dealing with the tribes in the Tochi if our anticipation that the circumstances of that locality should call for special treatment proved to be correct. We are of opinion that it has, and that it is desirable to extend military protection to the Tochi tribes. It is the unanimous opinion of all the officers who have had an opportunity of judging for themselves on the spot, that circumstances require a more decided measure of protection than could be afforded by militia or levy posts only, and indeed the tribes themselves appear to be of the same way of thinking.

\* Telegram from H. A. Anderson, Esq., dated 7th April 1895.

From enclosure\* of this despatch, it will be seen that the Dawar Maliks and many Mutabirs, in all 394 persons, and 142 Waziri Maliks and Mutabirs of the Tochi valley and other parts of Waziristan have submitted a written statement expressing their willingness to remain under the British Government. In consequence of their many feuds, and to obtain protection from the Mahsuds, they ask that service and allowances may be granted to them, and they propose certain conditions, which, while they show no mean capacity for looking after their own interests and preserving their autonomy, are only compatible with voluntary cession to the British Government of full power to protect the valley in the way which may seem best to them. We believe that this request for protection is a *bonâ fide* one from responsible men, who understand the nature of

the request they are making, and we are informed that it may be considered to be an expression of the wishes of all sections of the people in the Tochi valley.

We should not be prepared to regard this concurrence of opinion as decisive, if it stood alone, but there are other considerations which materially affect the case. In the first place, there is an essential difference in the present state of our whole relations to the Waziri tribe as compared with those relations a year ago. At that time the Waziris were comparatively little known, but a general impression undoubtedly prevailed that, while it was essential to maintain an effective control over them, any approach by us would be so greatly resented that the first object was to keep as far off from them as possible. It is clear that this judgment must now be considerably modified. With the recollection of the attack on Wano Camp in our minds, we cannot deny that the Waziris are capable of fierce outbursts of fanaticism, but there was no revival of the feeling subsequently, and they were usually quite friendly. On the other hand, the manner in which our troops traversed their whole country, explored their strongholds, and finally retired, in accordance with our promise, without ill-treating them, will, it may be hoped, have done something to alter the feelings of the people as a whole, towards the British, with whom their past relations had not been such as to inspire feelings of friendship. It is not possible to ignore these considerations which so materially affect the present position in regard to the Tochi tribes. We did not enter their valley, as we did the Mahsud country, as invaders or occupy it as conquerors. When it became necessary to advance our troops we did so under arrangement with the tribes, and with the exception of one small skirmish, which probably arose out of a misunderstanding, no collision occurred. The present moment, when our power and justice have alike been demonstrated, is pre-eminently a favourable opportunity for making satisfactory arrangements with all the Waziri tribes, not least with the Tochi tribes whose friendly relations may be said to be established.

In the second place, the knowledge of the country gained during Sir William Lockhart's recent campaign has put us in a far better position than before for selecting the best site for the posts which it will be desirable for us to hold in order to allow of our carrying out our declared policy of placing ourselves in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control in Waziristan.

In the light of the experience thus gained we have come to the conclusion that, although the establishment of a military post at Wano or in that neighbourhood is necessary in order to protect the Gomal and prevent Waziri raids into the Zhob, its importance is rather of a local character, and that a force in a fortified post or cantonment there would not exercise an effective control over the Waziri tribes as a whole. The road from Wano to Makin is exceedingly difficult, and although at Wano we are in a position to control the Ahmadzais of Wano itself, as well as the Shakaiwals, no sufficient influence could be exercised over the Darwesh Khel generally; the post at Wano is only reached by the route *viâ* the Gomal which is but sparsely furnished with supplies, and upon which the water-supply is very bad. On the other hand, a permanent military post in the Tochi is thoroughly accessible from Bannu through a gently sloping valley; supplies are more easily procurable, and if a permanent military post were established at or in the vicinity of Datta Khel, the Waziris, especially the Darwesh Khel, could be well controlled. In the event of its ever becoming necessary again to enter the Mahsud country, the Tochi Valley affords a better starting point than Wano. From it the Mahsuds and their chief town Makin can be reached with facility, as the road from Datta Khel to Makin is fairly easy and only about 35 miles in length.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Wano by itself would not be sufficient to exert a restraining influence over the Waziris generally, but with a small post at Wano, and a stronger one in upper Dawar, the distance between Wano and Datta Khel being only about four marches, we should be able to dominate effectively the whole of Waziristan, so as to prevent the disturbances which have characterised that part of our frontier for so many years, and fulfil any obligations which our arrangements with Afghanistan may impose upon us.

When we first considered the question of establishing a small cantonment at Wano, we proposed that a fortified post should be constructed for—

- 1 Squadron Native Cavalry,
- 4 Guns, Native Mountain Battery,
- 1 Battalion Native Infantry.

But the development of the situation since last year has led to a larger force being temporarily stationed at Wano, and for the present we may find it necessary to hold it as follows—

- 1 Squadron Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 1 Company Sappers and Miners,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry.

The fortified post was to have been completed at a cost of seven or eight lakhs, including civil buildings, for the smaller force above mentioned ; but on the advice of Sir William Lockhart, supported by the Commander-in-Chief, only a portion of the works has been put in hand, and it is probable that so large an expenditure as above indicated will not be necessary. We shall report on the question of the future permanent garrison of Wano hereafter.

For the present, and until the decision of Her Majesty's Government is received, we propose to keep the following garrison in the Tochi :—

- 1 Squadron Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 1 Company Sappers and Miners,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry,

so that the force now there can be reduced by one battalion of native infantry, the half company of Sappers being made up to a complete company. As at present advised, we think that the permanent garrison would probably be composed as follows :—

- 1 Squadron Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry,

with small connecting posts at Shinkai Kotal, Idak, and Muhammad Khel, but that these after a little time might be held by local levies. If this force be maintained in the Tochi valley, we consider that the force at Wano may be reduced to that originally contemplated by us, as above, *viz* :—

- 1 Squadron Native Cavalry,
- 4 Guns Native Mountain Battery,
- 1 Battalion Native Infantry.

With these two posts at Wano and in the Tochi, we believe that the Waziri tribes would be completely dominated, that our position on the frontier would be strengthened, the troops being furnished from our present frontier garrisons ; and that a far more healthy situation would be available for a portion of the garrison at Bannu, which is an insalubrious station.

As regards the financial effect of the measure we now advocate, we estimate that the extra cost of the post in the Tochi would be Rs. 4,40,000 annually on account of extra expenditure for the troops. If, however, we did not maintain a post in the Tochi, we should probably be obliged to keep up the larger force at present stationed at Wano, so that there would, even in that case, be considerable extra expenditure, and we should also have to provide a larger fortified cantonment. A number of frontier posts near Bannu and in the Gomal can, however, be reduced, and in this way the expense can be diminished. The extra cost of the troops at Kajuri Kach and Jandola is Rs. 1,22,000 per annum, and a great part of this would be saved. Further, there would be a considerable saving in reducing the number of troops at Wano, as practically most of the supplies have to be taken up from Dera Ismail Khan, while in the Tochi supplies are fairly procurable.

In respect to the expenditure on military works, the estimate for the fortified post or cantonment at Wano was, including civil buildings, about seven



or eight lakhs, and this was for the force of 1 Battalion Native Infantry 1 Squadron Native Cavalry, and 4 Mountain guns. If a larger force were to be stationed at Wano, the expenditure would be very much more. The establishment of a permanent post in the Tochi to contain a somewhat larger garrison will probably not cost as much as that for the Wano post, as the circumstances in the Tochi are more favourable. Against this extra expenditure there must be put the economy which will be effected by not having to renew the lines of the native infantry at Bannu, which would otherwise have to be maintained as usual by the State. The military importance of both Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu will be diminished, and the expenditure upon them must consequently be reduced. The proposed garrisons can be furnished without in any way increasing the force on the frontier.

It will be seen from the 2nd enclosure that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab does not anticipate that the political expenditure will be much, if at all, in excess of what has been sanctioned for less completely protective arrangements. If, as we hope, the measure which we now advocate will obviate the recurrence of punitive expeditions, the economy resulting from it, though difficult of expression in figures, must be great.

We trust that we have made it clear that our present proposals do not indicate any departure from our declared policy with regard to Waziristan, and should they meet with the approval of her Majesty's Government, we would ask that such approval may be communicated to us by telegraph.

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Enclosure 1.

*From H. A. Anderson, Esq., Delimitation Officer, Camp Idak, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 7th April 1895.*  
(Telegraphic.)

In a written statement signed at Miran Shah Camp, which I received yesterday, all Daur Maliks and many Mutabirs, in all 394 persons, and 142 Waziri Maliks and Mutabirs of the Tochi valley and other parts of Waziristan express their willingness to remain under the British Government. In consequence of their many feuds, and to obtain protection from Mahsuds, they ask that services and allowances should be granted to them; local rights and customs be respected; cases should be decided by Muhammadan law and jirga when possible; that they should be exempted from court fees; that revenue, if demanded, should be assessed once for all; their jungles and iron mines should remain in their possession; the jails for their prisoners should be local, and in the event of Powindahs using the Tochi route, Badragga rights and grazing fees should be paid to the people of the valley. These are simply in the form of requests which they ask the Government to consider. I believe that the other Waziri Maliks will readily sign this statement in Bannu. It may now be considered an expression of the wishes of all sections of the Tochi valley.

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Enclosure 2.

*Extract of letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 12th April 1895.*

I am directed to convey the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor on the question of the position we are to occupy with reference to the Tochi Valley.

To clear the ground His Honor considers that it is well to say at starting that, whatever there may be to be said in favour of or against taking up a strong position at Razmak as now proposed by Mr. Bruce, he will not enter upon any discussion of that point unless invited to do so by the Government of India, as Razmak lies some distance outside the Tochi Valley in the country of the Mahsuds, and the question of occupying it is one of considerable difficulty,

and which lies altogether outside any arrangements yet contemplated by the Government of India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick will accordingly confine himself to considering what our position is to be with reference to the Tochi Valley.

The question is whether we should in the Tochi Valley confine ourselves to giving allowances and establishing tribal posts as directed in your letter, dated 11th October 1894, or whether we should open and protect the Tochi route in the same manner that we have opened and protected the Gomal route, and perhaps (as it has been all along said we might be led as a consequence of this to do) take possession of, and establish some sort of government in, a strip of country on each side of that route.

The former course would have a certain effect in attaching the people to us and rendering them in some degree dependent on us, but the Lieutenant-Governor has always agreed with what he understands to be the view of Mr. Bruce and Mr. Anderson, namely, that it would not suffice if we desire to open the Tochi route and protect it in a really effectual manner. For this purpose His Honor agrees with Mr. Anderson that it would be absolutely essential to maintain a garrison of regular troops in the valley, and, as he has already said, if we were to set about doing this, we should probably be led immediately or almost immediately into taking possession of and establishing some sort of government over a certain strip of country at both sides of the road throughout a portion at least of its length. Now, this would of course cost money, and as our position along the road or along the narrow strip of country of which we should hold possession would be exposed to raids not merely like the Gomal on one side but on both, we should be prepared for having to face a certain amount of trouble.

The question is thus reduced to this, namely, whether the advantages to be gained by taking up the position described are such as to warrant our incurring the expenditure and facing the trouble which our taking up that position would entail. On this question it is unnecessary for Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick to trouble the Government of India with any lengthy discussion, as he has already on several occasions stated his views as to the considerations which should lead us to accept or reject proposals for forward movements of the sort now under consideration. It is enough for His Honor to say here that, unless our taking up the position in the Tochi Valley here referred to is of great importance with a view to meeting an advance upon India, he sees nothing to warrant our incurring the expense and facing the trouble it would involve. Whether our taking up such a position would be of great importance in that way is a point which depends chiefly on military considerations, and on which accordingly His Honor prefers to offer no opinion until it has been fully discussed by Military authorities.

One thing, however, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick may say without hesitation, and that is that if it is desirable that we should take up such a position in the Tochi Valley, he entirely agrees with those who think that we should not let slip the opportunity of obtaining it which now seems to be presented to us. It appears from Mr. Anderson's telegram, dated 7th instant, that the bulk of the leading men of the valley, representing as he says all sections of the tribes, actually desire that we should take possession of the country, and though it may be that they are influenced to a great extent by the prospect of getting allowances and high positions under us, and though, whatever their motives may be, it would be absurd to suggest that we should take such a heavy burthen upon ourselves merely because they ask us to do so unless we have some important object of our own to gain, still it is clear that if it should be decided that we have an object to gain the importance of which would be commensurate with the burthen we should have to bear, the fact that we could at this moment count on the voluntary submission of the bulk of the people and would not have to use force to gain our position is of high importance. It would, His Honor thinks, be by no means safe to reckon on those people being in the same mood a year or two hence. Something might happen to shake their confidence in us, or the Mullahs might work on their religious prejudices, or they might form some alliance with their neighbours which would make them secure without our aid. There is in fact no saying what might occur to change their feelings regarding this matter.

Another reason for facing this important question now and deciding it at once one way or the other is that, as Mr. Bruce rightly points out, we shall in any event have to arrange for giving the people of the Tochi Valley allowances before Mr. Anderson's present proceedings are brought to a close. It has been decided to do so even if we are only to take up the position with reference to the Tochi prescribed in your letter, dated 11th October 1894, above referred to; further, we have virtually pledged ourselves to give some allowances to these people, and though, if the advantages to be looked for from giving them and establishing tribal posts are likely to be as small as Mr. Anderson now seems to think, we might perhaps pitch them lower than the amounts previously named in official correspondence (no amounts have as yet been named to these tribes), still the annual payments which we should have to promise would doubtless be considerable. The promise of these payments or perhaps a little more would probably satisfy the claim for allowances which the tribal leaders put forward in return for the dominion they offer us over their country, and accordingly if we make up our minds at this moment to accept the offer they make us, we shall probably be able to settle the allowances at the sums already named or a little more; whereas if we postpone the consideration of the question of accepting that offer to some future occasion, we do not know what further allowances we might have to promise when we took it up.

For these reasons Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks that the whole question of the position we are to occupy with reference to the Tochi should be at once taken up and considered, and he agrees with the local officers that the troops should remain in the country until it is settled.

Until His Honor is in possession of the views of the Government of India on the main questions involved it is unnecessary for him to trouble them with the discussions of such details as the position of the military posts (if any) to be established or the conditions set forth in Mr. Anderson's telegram, dated 7th instant, as those on which the Maliks and Mu'atbars offer us dominion over their country.

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No. 9.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 24th July 1895.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Tochi. Can you make a temporary settlement with tribes, leaving question of cantonment open until you can send home full estimate of both proposed cantonments? My advisers are opposed to additional cantonment.

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No. 10.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27th July 1895.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Yours of 24th July.

Difficulties in course you propose twofold. Settlement with tribes depends largely on whether post is maintained, as they themselves request, for protection of weaker section. I deprecate temporary settlement, if that means withdrawal of the troops. If troops continue present occupation provisionally, distribution of allowances would be repeated, though this prevents tribes settling down.

Detailed estimates have not been prepared pending the selection of site for cantonments, and we have studiously avoided steps which must commit us still further with tribes. Financial result approximately stated in our Despatch. If more information required, please state specific points.

Am advised initial expenditure on Wano and Tochi together would probably not exceed that already authorised for Wano alone, and extra annual cost of troops largely reduced after first occupation. Reduction on existing posts would be considerable and frontier force not increased.

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No. 11.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 2nd August 1895.*  
(Telegraphic.)

I have considered your letter, of 15th May, and telegram of 27th July. On the clear understanding that expenditure on Wano and Tochi together will not exceed that already authorised on Wano alone, I sanction your proposals. No excess to be incurred without full estimate of total expenditure, and fresh sanction.

No. 12.

*Extract from Despatch from the Secretary of State (Lord George Hamilton) to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 9th August 1895.*

THE Letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 15th May 1895, has received my careful consideration.

I understand your recommendations to be that the permanent post already sanctioned for Wano should consist of—

- 1 squadron Native Cavalry,
- 4 guns Native Mountain Battery,
- 1 battalion Native Infantry ;

and in addition that there should be established in the Tochi valley, for the double purpose of more effectively controlling the Waziri tribes and securing a strategical position, an additional cantonment to be held by—

- 1 Squadron Native Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry.

The reasons which have led your Excellency's Government to make these recommendations are that Wano is not the best place from which to maintain effective control over the Waziris, that while it is useful and necessary as a post from which to secure the safety of the Gomal route and to control the tribes in its neighbourhood, it fails to give easy access to Makin and to the Darwesh Khel country, and it has moreover the disadvantages of being reached with difficulty, being expensive and badly supplied with water.

From another point of view your letter indicates that the military protection of the tribes in the Dawar and Lower Tochi Valley is necessary, and that this cannot be effected by tribal levies and allowances alone, that the tribes themselves are anxious that we should protect them by a military force, that you are committed to making some settlement with them, and that there is now an opportunity of making the settlement a complete and effective one.

Your letter left me in some doubt as to the financial effects of your proposals, and having regard to the fact that Sir Henry Fowler's sanction to your original proposals for dealing with the Waziri tribes was given on the understanding that your outlay of money on Waziristan would be kept within the narrowest limits that were practicable, I hesitated to sanction your present proposals without some satisfactory assurances on this point.

Your telegram of the 27th July, however, conveys the intimation that, in your opinion, "the initial expenditure on Wano and Tochi together would probably not exceed that already authorised for Wano alone, and the extra annual cost of the troops would be largely reduced after the first occupation ; the reduction on the existing posts would be considerable, and the frontier force not increased." On the clear understanding that expenditure on the Wano and Tochi posts together will not exceed that already authorized on Wano alone, I sanction your proposals, as already telegraphed to you on the 2nd instant. No excess is to be incurred without a full estimate of total expenditure and fresh sanction.

Your Lordship will, I trust, bear in mind the very great importance of keeping your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan within the narrowest limits that are possible, and I await a detailed statement

of the expenditure to be incurred on the two cantonments and of the political allowances and tribal levies which may be agreed upon in your negotiations with the tribes, alluded to in the 5th and 14th paragraphs of your letter under reply.

No. 13.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, the 1st January 1896. (Received 20th January 1896.)*

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship's Despatch of the 9th of August 1895 sanctioned, subject to certain reservations, our proposals for establishing a cantonment in the Tochi Valley, in addition to the one already sanctioned at Wano, and you requested us to submit a detailed statement of the expenditure to be incurred on the two cantonments and on the political allowances and tribal levies, which might be agreed upon in our negotiations with the tribes.

2. The question of the distribution of tribal allowances and the enlistment of levies has now been nearly completed. We await detailed proposals from the Punjab Government in regard to the entertainment of some additional men on the Shahur route between Jandola and Wano, and when these have been disposed of, we shall be able to lay before your Lordship a complete file of the correspondence on the subject. We also hope to be able to shortly furnish an accurate estimate of expenditure in connection with the cantonments in Wano and in the Tochi valley.

3. Meanwhile we forward, for your Lordship's information, correspondence showing the nature of the political arrangements to be adopted both in regard to the Darwesh Khel and the Dawar inhabitants of the Tochi Valley. The proposals of the Lieutenant-Governor, which have received our concurrence, are detailed in the first enclosure of this despatch. The offer of the Dawaris that their country should remain under the British Government has been accepted and a light revenue will be taken from them at once, in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter. A simple form of administration will be introduced in the country of the Dawaris, including any small Darwesh Khel patches that may be found within it. The Darwesh Khel country outside the Tochi will be subject only to the political control extended to Waziristan generally.

4. The distribution of allowances to both the Darwesh Khel and Dawaris has given general satisfaction, and the Dawaris by their readiness to meet the wishes of Government have shown that their offer to remain under the British Government was spontaneous and unanimous. The terms on which the allowances have been granted are in the case of the Darwesh Khel the same\* as those attached to the grant to the Mahsuds; and are subject to the further condition that they will refrain from and prevent raids and other offences across the Afghan frontier. The allowances of the Dawaris are subject to the condition of good behaviour on the part of the tribe and of all individual recipients.

5. On the Dawaris being informed of the decision to levy revenue, and that it was proposed to make a summary settlement with them in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter, the tribal jirga willingly offered to pay a lump sum of Rs. 6,000 a year for three years, after which they agreed to their lands being measured and the revenue assessed in kind at the rate of one-tenth of the gross produce. They further, of their own motion, offered to contribute an annual sum of two thousand rupees to provide remuneration to subordinates of the Maliks who will necessarily be employed in collecting the revenue and rendering village service. We have agreed to this proposal, which was supported by Mr. Anderson and the Lieutenant-Governor.

6. We consider that this settlement is highly satisfactory, and that much credit is due to Mr. Anderson for the manner in which he has brought it about.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
A. E. MILLER,  
H. BRACKENBURY,  
C. B. PRITCHARD,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN.

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Enclosure 1.

*Extract from a letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esquire, Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 12th October 1895.*

WITH reference to your letter of 12th August last, in which the views of the Lieutenant-Governor were sought regarding the political arrangements considered necessary in the Tochi Valley and the cost thereof, I am directed to convey the opinion of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, as follows :—

It will be convenient, the Lieutenant-Governor considers, to advert in the first place to the question as to the position we are to assume with reference to the tribes, both Dauri and Waziri.

It has been all along recognised that if we are to set about thoroughly opening and protecting the road through the Tochi, as it has now been determined to do, we should not improbably find it necessary to take possession of, and introduce something like a system of administration into, some portion of the country at each side of it, and from the reports received from the local officers from time to time, His Honour thinks it is clear that it will be expedient to adopt this course with reference to the tract of country along the road from Hyder Khel on the east up to Pai Khel near Kanirogha on the west, which is commonly known as Daur Upper and Lower. The road along this portion of its course runs through a compact, comparatively open and well-cultivated valley, occupied by the Dauris, a people who are much at the mercy of their Waziri neighbours, and the bulk of whom, it is reported, are consequently anxious to secure our protection, and are ready in return for our protection to accept our rule and pay us revenue. The circumstances are such that no matter what efforts we might make to isolate ourselves upon our road, as we can do in a narrow and uncultivated defile like the Khaibar, we should inevitably be driven in the very near future to assume the position the Dauris now offer us, and anxious as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick usually is to avoid taking possession of new territory and assuming fresh responsibilities, he thinks that in this particular instance it will simplify matters, and in the long run save trouble, if we at once accept the offer of the Dauris, take possession of their country, and establish some such simple form of administration as we have introduced in the Kurram, and after a year or two levy a light revenue.

To turn now to the five tracts of country occupied by the Darwesh Khel Waziris, it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor necessary to distinguish between the first of these tracts, viz., the valley of the Tochi west of Kanirogha through which our road will run, and the remaining four tracts.

These last four tracts lie outside the Tochi Valley and beyond the limits within which it has been contemplated in the correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State that we might have to assume possession and establish something in the way of administration. Over them accordingly, unless we are prepared to make an entirely fresh proposal, we must restrict ourselves to the exercise of what is commonly known as "political control." It is a difficult matter to define precisely at starting the nature or extent of the control which we should exercise over these tracts. That is a thing we can hope to do only gradually as we come to understand our position better.

Mr. Anderson says in effect that, though it would not be worth our while to take revenue in those tracts now, it might, having regard to the possibility



of large extensions of cultivation, be worth our while to do so later on ; that we ought not accordingly to tie our hands by any promise not to take revenue in the future ; and that we ought, therefore, to tell the Darwesh Khel of those tracts merely that we have no intention whatever of taking land revenue from them at present, and that should land revenue hereafter be taken, it will be assessed at a light rate, adding, however, that if they misbehave we shall be at liberty to cancel our promises and impose land revenue at once.

To Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick it seems that to say anything of this kind to these people is altogether inconsistent with the general position which we should take up towards them, and would be calculated to create misapprehension. We levy land revenue only on a country of which we have taken possession, and in which we establish some sort of administration. In the case of people like these, with whom we are only to have political relations, to levy land revenue is altogether out of the question. Hence to tell these people that, though we do not mean to levy land revenue from them at present, we may do so later on if we think fit, is virtually to say that though we do not mean to take possession of their country at present, we may do so later on, and that is a thing which, though we might be forced by the misbehaviour of the tribe to do it, the Lieutenant-Governor understands the Government of India have no desire to do, and which it is therefore unnecessary, and his Honour would say impolitic, to stipulate for a right to do.

And as to threatening that, in the event of the tribes misbehaving, we shall levy revenue from them, it seems to His Honour that the proper threat to utter is the more comprehensive and more intelligible one, viz., that if they misbehave, we may have to take possession of their country.

The Lieutenant-Governor thinks the proper thing to say to the inhabitants of these four tracts is what we have in effect already said to the inhabitants of Waziristan generally, namely : "We do not want to take possession of your country or interfere in your internal affairs, and so long as you behave yourselves and do not force us to do so, we shall not do so." If they should ask for an express promise that we should not levy revenue from them, His Honour would reply by saying, "How can we levy revenue from a country of which we do not take possession, and in the internal affairs of which we do not mean to interfere ? Of course, if you by your misconduct force us to take possession of your country, we must take revenue from it, but we repeat we do not wish to take possession of it."

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick has only to add in this connection that though if we are forced to take possession of any of these four tracts, as in all probability we shall in time be, we should as a matter of course collect what revenue we could from them, it would never be worth our while to take possession of them for the sake of the revenue they would yield, as the additional cost entailed by getting more and more mixed up with the affairs of these people would far exceed any revenue we could collect from them, and thus from any point of view there is no object in making any such reservation as Mr. Anderson proposes.

It remains to consider what our relations are to be with the Waziris occupying the valley of the Tochi from Kanirogha west, through whose country our road will run for about 16 or 17 miles, and this is the only point on which, as it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor, there can be any room for difference of opinion. There is no question of revenue here, the question is merely whether, as this patch of territory may be taken to be part of the strip in which it is contemplated by the correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State we might have to assume possession and establish some sort of administration, as the Maliks are well disposed towards us, we had not better, as in the case of the Dauri tract, arrange to take possession at once. Now there is something to be said in favour of this course, and there would be something more to be said in favour of it if the head-quarters of our Military force were to be located as far west as Datta Khel. His Honour thinks, notwithstanding what may be urged to the contrary, it is wiser to draw the line at the country of the Dauris. The inhabitants of this small fragment of the Waziri country which lies along our road may act in a friendly and loyal manner to us ; indeed they can hardly help doing so, for, as it is said in the East, "Those that live in the

river must make friends with the alligator ;" but the attitude of the great mass of the Waziris towards us is still somewhat doubtful. We have heard a good deal recently of the attempts of Mullah Powindah to establish peace between the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds, obviously with a view to creating difficulties for us, and though these attempts have succeeded only to a very small extent and the Mullah has not got anything that could be called a following, there has been a certain amount of trimming, and the Lieutenant-Governor thinks the mass of the tribes are still far from being inclined to view with satisfaction the prospect of our gradually establishing anything like a system of administrative control over Waziristan. If His Honour is right in this, it is clear that our taking possession of and establishing a system of administration over this small patch of Waziri territory might arouse suspicion and hostility in the minds of the tribes, and it is obviously desirable to avoid doing this just now.

Further, it must be remembered that while in Daur we shall have to deal with one small compact tribe entirely under our control and isolated from their neighbours, and may thus hope to avoid any very serious further entanglements, it might not be so easy to do this if we were to take possession of, and make ourselves fully responsible for the administration of, a small patch of territory like that here in question inhabited by Darwesh Khels, who would be much mixed up with other Darwesh Khels and involved in quarrels with the Mahsuds.

As regards the request made by the tribes, that we should "respect their rights over Hindus," the Lieutenant-Governor would observe that we are concerned with it only in that portion of the country in which we assume possession and become responsible for the administration, and in that portion of the country there would be much difficulty in assenting to a request of this kind made in such general terms ; but if, as His Honour understands from an unofficial communication received from Mr. Anderson, the rights claimed are only rights to levy customary dues on the occasions of marriages, deaths, sales of grain, &c., such as are levied in many or most parts of the Punjab by village proprietary bodies from shop-keepers, artisans and others who have settled in the village with their permission, His Honour sees no objection whatever to these dues being levied by the tribes as heretofore. The only thing the Lieutenant-Governor would insist on here, as in the case of the tax which has been substituted for the jezia in the Kurram, is that though these taxes might practically fall on Hindus only, they should not be imposed on any ground connected with difference of religion, but should be payable by persons of all denominations, in the same circumstances as they are payable by Hindus, if the Maliks thought fit to demand them.

As regards the proposal to open the Gumatti-Thal route or the alternative route from Lower Daur to Thal, His Honour would propose to say to the Darwesh Khels, regarding the two routes now referred to, what he before proposed to say to them regarding the Gumatti-Thal route alone, viz., that we may desire to open one or both of them, and that if we do, additional Service allowances will be given, but that the present Maliki allowances must be taken to cover any duties required from the leading men in regard to these routes. It may be that in the event of our resolving to open either of these routes we shall have to yield somewhat as regards this last point and give the Maliks something additional, but by making now the declaration His Honour proposes we shall at all events be able to keep it at a low figure. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think it will be altogether matter for regret if the opening of these routes is allowed to stand over for the present, for we shall for some little time to come have quite enough on our hands without it, and from what he has now seen of our negotiations with these tribes, His Honour does not apprehend that, with sums like Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 12,000 per annum to be earned, they will be unwilling to come to terms whenever we may think fit to take the matter up.

It will be seen from the above that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick is practically in accord with Mr. Anderson on all important points, and, subject to the modifications in minor points above suggested, he has no hesitation in recommending that officer's proposals to the Government of India as the best that can be made for giving effect to the policy that has been resolved on. His Honour does not mean to say that by adopting these proposals we shall be altogether secure against troubles in that neighbourhood. That is a thing which it would be

unreasonable to expect. Nor does he mean to say that these proposals carry with them anything in the way of finality. It is inevitable in such a case that as time goes on we should be drawn into advancing further and interfering more largely with the tribes. But the Lieutenant-Governor believes that the proposals now made are those best calculated to secure the largest measure of peace and stability attainable under the circumstances, and he submits that the thanks of the Government are due to Mr. Anderson for the great care, skill and knowledge of his subject which he has brought to bear in working them out.

For convenience of consideration Mr. Anderson's detailed proposals regarding the Maliki and Service allowances to be granted to the Darwesh Khels of the Tochi and its neighbourhood and to the people of Daur, and his recommendations regarding the establishment of levy posts, are treated separately. Mr. Anderson's views regarding the most suitable head-quarters for the military garrison in the Tochi have been forwarded to the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Punjab for his consideration.

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick will await the orders of the Government of India upon the present communication before submitting his views regarding the establishment necessary for the administration of the Tochi. I am to solicit orders on this letter at the earliest convenience of the Government of India, as it is inexpedient that the final settlement with these tribes should be longer delayed, and, moreover, it will not be possible to give effect to the wishes of the Government as to the reduction of the military force in the Tochi Valley until the posts are built and all our arrangements have been got into working order.

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Enclosure 2.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 18th October 1895.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 12th of October 1895, regarding the political arrangements which it is proposed should be adopted in the Tochi valley.

2. The Governor-General in Council accepts the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals for the political control of the Darwesh Khel Waziris, both those inhabiting the valley above Kanirogha and the sections in tracts outside the Tochi valley, and agrees with His Honour that the offer of the Dawaris made in their petition of the 6th April 1895, to remain under the British Government, should be at once accepted.

3. With regard to the question of taking revenue from the Dawaris, the Lieutenant-Governor supports the proposals of Mr. Anderson, and would demand no revenue for the first two years. The Governor-General in Council, however, considers that it is advisable to take some revenue at once in acceptance of the Dawaris' own offers, and I am to request that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick will consider whether a rough summary settlement might not be made in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter.

4. In the 17th paragraph of your letter under reply, it is stated that, until the Lieutenant-Governor receives the decision of the Government of India on the general question of policy, he will defer submitting his views regarding the proposals made by the Commissioner of the Derajat as to the establishment necessary for the administration of the Tochi. His Honour's views will be awaited; but I am to observe that Mr. Anderson's proposals seem to indicate an intention of exercising at once a larger interference and incurring a greater outlay than has been contemplated by the Government of India and sanctioned by the Secretary of State. The Governor-General in Council will trust the Lieutenant-Governor to propose no more elaborate machinery of administration than the position which has been accepted towards the Dawaris and the duties which that will entail must require.

5. Mr. Anderson has suggested the desirability that the Political Officer, North Waziristan, should have the exclusive political control and management of all the Darwesh Khel sections from Dawar to the border of Bannu, Kohat and the Kurram valley. This proposal which, in so far as it affects the Kohat district, has been referred by the Lieutenant-Governor for the consideration



of the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, commends itself to the Government of India; and, if supported by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, will be sanctioned.

6. Orders will be communicated to you as early as possible, regarding the grant of tribal allowances and the establishment of levy posts in the Tochi. Meanwhile I am to say that Mr. Anderson's proposal to open up a route direct from Lower Dawar to Thal appears to have much in its favour, especially if the arrangements suggested in the preceding paragraph are to be carried out; and the Governor-General in Council will be prepared to give the proposal his consideration whenever the Lieutenant-Governor thinks the time has arrived for carrying it out.

#### No. 14.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to The Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, 18th March 1896. (Received 4th April 1896.)*

MY LORD,

WE hope soon to be able to give Your Lordship the detailed statement for which you asked in the concluding words of Despatch, dated the 9th August 1895, of the political allowances and tribal levies which may be agreed upon in our negotiations with the tribes in Waziristan. There are still certain matters of detail to decide both in the case of the Mahsuds and of the Darwesh Khels. Meanwhile in the course of these negotiations, questions of so great political importance have arisen that we deem it right to lay them before Your Lordship for an expression of your views.

2. The immediate questions which have been referred to us by the Government of the Punjab are the line along which levy posts should be established for the purpose of keeping open what is known as the Shuhur route, and the retention of a military post on that route even after the levy posts have been established.

3. The Shuhur route, from the Jandola post up the stream of the Shuhur, affords the shortest means of communicating with Wano from the Punjab, and the importance of opening it up and rendering it secure was insisted on by the local officers, Messrs. Bruce and King, from the beginning of the discussions as to improving our relations with the Waziris. As explained at the time, however, we did not recommend Mr. Bruce's scheme in its entirety. Our desire was and has always been to carry the tribes with us in whatever we do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs. It was on this understanding that Sir Henry Fowler accorded sanction† to the policy adopted by us in Waziristan.

† Despatch, dated the 24th August 1894.

4. During the subsequent punitive operations which were undertaken against some sections of the Waziris by the force under command of Sir William Lockhart, the occupation of the Shuhur valley became necessary as a military operation, and Sir William Lockhart proposed that the opening up of the route through this valley should be one of the conditions of the settlement with the tribes at the close of the operations. But while authorising\* him to impose on the Mahsuds the obligation of keeping open the Shuhur route, we impressed on him that the establishment of a military post on the route was outside our declared policy.

\* Despatch, dated the 20th February 1895, and enclosures.

5. We subsequently reported‡ the temporary establishment of a military post at Barwand in the Shuhur valley, pending conclusion of negotiations, and although the allowances and service granted to the Mahsuds have now been fixed, we assented to the request of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that the troops should be retained until the levy posts were completed. The military post established in the first place at Barwand has for convenience been shifted to the neighbouring site at Sarwekai.

‡ Despatch, dated the 20th March 1895.

6. We have now received the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals for the location of the levy posts necessary for keeping open the Shuhur route, and they disclose divergence of opinion between His Honour and the local political officers in regard to the location of these posts between the site of the present military post of occupation at Sarwekai and Wano. The local political officers advocate the establishment of levy posts in the Khaisera valley in order to obtain a commanding influence within the country inhabited by the more unruly sections of the Mahsuds, and in order to back up well-disposed Maliks against malcontent factions. From Barwand or Sarwekai, the Lieutenant-Governor advocates the adoption of a line, turning to the left by Karabkot, which, in his opinion without establishing an internal control, will interpose a barrier between the Mahsud country on the one side and the Gomal and Wano on the other, and which will check raiding by the Mahsuds on the Gomal and the caravan routes through Wano.

7. In the meantime, the Lieutenant-Governor had been consulted on a proposed redistribution of the garrisons on the Punjab Frontier, and in the course of His Honour's reply upon that question (which is being dealt with generally in our Military Department), his opinion regarding the Barwand or Sarwekai post has been given in the following words :—"As regards the very strong opinion expressed by Mr. Bruce in favour of the retention of the military garrison (400 native infantry) at Barwand, I am to observe that, Mr. Bruce's desire has all along been to establish a close control over the whole of the Waziri country and to have our officers constantly visiting all parts of it, and so on, and one of the most obvious steps towards this is to substitute the Shuhur valley for the Gomal as the ordinary route. Hence he attaches the greatest possible importance to the retention of Barwand or Sarwekai as a military post. Speaking for himself, all His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor can say is that he is always glad to see tribal arrangements supported by as strong a backing as possible of regular troops ; that Barwand or Sarwekai is undoubtedly an important position ; that, so far as he can judge, there would be no difficulty raised by the mass of the tribes to our retaining the military garrison there permanently if we desire to do so, and that accordingly, if His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief can spare the troops and the Government of India are prepared to reconsider their decision, he would think it a decided advantage to have Barwand or Sarwekai made a permanent military post."

8. It appears to us that the two questions which are now before us, namely, the location of the levy posts inside or outside the Khaisera valley, and the retention or abolition of a military post in the Shuhur, involve the same question of principle, and should each be decided on the same considerations. We have not been able to agree with Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in the view which he has consistently held and frequently expressed that the establishment of posts in tribal country necessarily involves the establishment of something like an administration. It should in our opinion be possible in Waziristan, as it has been found to be possible in tribal country elsewhere, to establish political control, and even to keep military garrisons, without interfering with the customs of the country and its administration by jirgas. Doubtless the ultimate power, and with it the ultimate authority, rest in such cases in the British Government, but the fact that the ultimate power and authority are acknowledged to be so vested is in itself sufficient to uphold the actual tribal administrative customs. The jirga if judiciously handled need never really appeal to physical support. The possibility of doing so is moral support enough to render such appeal unnecessary.

9. Such being the facts and conditions we are ourselves not unanimous as to the best means of dealing with the Lieutenant-Governor's recommendations. There are two points of view from which this question may be approached. On the one hand it is the opinion of some of us that we are bound by the declaration of policy made by us in our despatch of 10th July 1894, and sanctioned by the Secretary of State in his despatch of the 24th August 1894 : and that the policy of strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of the tribes, and the regulation of our dealings with them in the manner particularly set forth in the first despatch above referred to, have not yet been given a fair trial. Owing to

various circumstances, more especially to the attack on the Wano Camp and the consequent military occupation of the country, it has of necessity followed that ever since our policy was formulated we have exercised a greater measure of control in Waziristan than was then contemplated. But we have done so avowedly as a temporary measure to be continued only while the fortified posts were being constructed, and other arrangements, including those for the enrolment and payment of levies, were being completed : and we have so informed the tribes. The decision in the case of the military post at Barwand is therefore important, because not only is its permanent retention a modification of the military position as now sanctioned, but it is in the view of the case above explained, advocated in order that the policy also may be modified, and a closer control over the turbulent sections of the tribes may be established. The question therefore comes to be whether the reasons which led the Government of India to propose that, so far as external coercion was concerned, the interference with the Mahsud Waziris should be limited to the establishment of one additional military post at or about Spin, are or are not valid now ; and whether anything has occurred to induce us to abandon our preference for the continuance of tribal customs and tribal methods of administration with the minimum of interference from our officers. Some of us desire to abide by the policy originally adopted, and hold that it is premature to garrison Barwand permanently, before it has been demonstrated that the tribal arrangements, which are now only being initiated, will not work, as similar arrangements have done elsewhere, without any addition to the military force already authorised.

10. Some of us on the other hand think that Sarwekai may be maintained as a military post without violating any of the principles we have professed in our dealings with the Waziris and which have received the sanction of the Secretary of State. To those of us who hold this view it seems most desirable to retain troops in Sarwekai as that gives a necessary hold over the sections of the Waziris who took the leading part in committing those outrages which forced us into the occupation of Waziristan and who have been our most active opponents since. We have desired to carry the tribes with us in whatever we do, and the continued occupation of Sarwekai is in accordance with the expressed wish of the law-abiding tribesmen who have petitioned us to retain the military garrison there. We wish to interfere as little as possible with the internal government of the tribes, and the occupation of Sarwekai by a military force is the only sure way of avoiding more direct administration of the internal affairs of Waziristan. Our policy was initiated with the object of protecting our own territories and lines of communication and to afford protection to those sections and leading men of the tribes who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and without which protection they cannot maintain their position. The continued occupation of Sarwekai is the true military disposition to cover our territories and lines of communication and to afford the protection just described. In this view of the case indeed to abandon Sarwekai would be a violation of the principles which have guided our policy because it is in opposition to the expressed wish of the people, calculated to paralyze autonomy, and it would decrease the power which we now possess of protecting our territory and communications and withdraw support from the leading men who have told us that without our protection their position is in peril. Lastly we have been warned that it will probably give a base of operations to Mullah Powindah, who is the one man who can unite the turbulent sections of all the Khel against us.

11. We have endeavoured to place before Your Lordship all the considerations which bear upon the points at issue. A material question of policy is involved which cannot be determined without reference to Your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government. If our relations with Waziristan are to continue to be governed by the principles which are recounted in the 9th paragraph, and our interference with the tribes is to be kept within the strictest limits, then the post at Barwand should now cease to be held by British Indian troops. If, on the contrary, it should appear to Your Lordship that the permanent garrisoning of Barwand or Sarwekai in the Shuhur valley, and the location of levy posts in the Khaisera, do not involve an abandonment of any of the essentials of our



policy, or are necessary to give greater chance of success in the protection of our posts and of the caravan routes, we are prepared to make arrangements accordingly.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
A. E. MILLER,  
H. BRACKENBURY,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
A. CADELL.

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No. 15.

*Despatch from Secretary of State to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 8th May 1896.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE considered your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department, dated the 18th March 1896, submitting your remarks upon two questions which have been referred to you by the Government of the Punjab. One of these is the retention of a military post at Barwand or Sarwekai on the Shuhur route in Waziristan, and the other is the location of levy posts inside or outside the Khaisera valley.

2. As regards the first of these questions, I observe that on the 20th March 1895, your Excellency's Government authorised the temporary maintenance of a post at Barwand, in order that your communications with Wano might be efficiently protected during the conduct of negotiations with the Mahsud Waziris. It is now reported that the well disposed tribesmen generally desire to have the military garrison retained, and that his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor anticipates that there would be no difficulty raised by the mass of the tribes to the permanent retention of our garrison there if we desired to retain it. Moreover, although the allowances of the Waziri tribes have been re-distributed, there are still several questions which have yet to be settled. As to whether the garrison should be permanently retained in the Shuhur valley on political rather than military grounds, your Excellency has described at length, in paragraphs 9 and 10 of your Letter, the different views entertained by your Government. But it appears that so long as a garrison is maintained at Wano the communications with it must be efficiently protected, and further information must be awaited as to the efficiency of the levy posts which are to be established. Until, then, the levy posts have been established, and the arrangements tested by sufficient experience, I am content to leave it to your Government to decide whether the post at Sarwekai should be retained until further orders.

3. As regards the location of the posts either in the Khaisera valley or to the south-west of Sarwekai by Karabkhot, I am disposed to agree with the Lieutenant-Governor in thinking that the principal object aimed at, namely, the protection of the Gomal route and of communications with Wano, will be sufficiently secured without garrisoning the Khaisera valley and thus incurring the risk of political interference with the more troublesome sections of the Mahsuds which the establishments of posts at Narai Raghza or Torwam might involve.

4. At the same time, I would observe that the financial effect of your proposals is not stated, and I desire to receive a report, when your arrangements are completed, of the total cost of the cantonments in Wano, and in the Tochi valley, and of the military post in the Shuhur valley, together with an account of the expenditure on tribal posts and allowances incurred for the purpose of controlling the Waziri tribes. I shall be glad to receive, at the same time, a statement of your conclusions on the question whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure, and the larger issues of policy raised in your Letter can then be determined.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

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No. 16.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to The Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 19th May 1896. (Received 8th June 1896.)*

MY LORD,

WITH reference to the first paragraph of our Despatch dated the 18th March 1896, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of papers regarding the allowances granted to the Darwesh Khel Waziris and the Dauris, and the arrangements made for the construction of levy posts in Wano and that neighbourhood, and in the Tochi valley.

2. The following is a brief summary of the additional political expenditure incurred annually on account of these allowances, and those for the Mahsud Waziris, details of which were given in the enclosures of our Despatch above cited :—

	Rs.
(1) Additional Mahsud service... ..	10,320
(2) Additional Wano Ahmadzai service ... ..	6,840
(3) Shakai and Badar service ... ..	3,612
(4) Tochi service ... ..	63,736
(5) Additional miscellaneous expenditure in the Mahsud country and Wano. ... ..	840
(6) Miscellaneous expenditure in the Tochi, including munshis and menial establishments at the principal posts. ... ..	3,480

TOTAL ... 88,828

3. This expenditure will be met from the provision of one lakh of rupees a year which it was anticipated would be needed for carrying out, in regard to the Waziristan tribes, the policy approved in Sir Henry Fowler's Despatch dated the 24th August 1894. We have not yet received from the Punjab Government any proposals for the adjustment of the allowances of the Bhattannis, which it was estimated would cost about Rs. 4,500 a year; and, in the event of Her Majesty's Government deciding that the military garrison occupying the Sarwekai (or Barwand) post on the Shahur route should be withdrawn, it would probably be necessary to incur further expenditure, not exceeding Rs. 7,500 a year, on giving service to additional Mahsud levies for the efficient protection of this route. These two last mentioned items would absorb the lakh of rupees within which we proposed to limit our expenditure.

It will be observed that in the distribution of the allowances, as shown above, no provision has been made for the opening of the Thal-Gumatti route from Kurram to Bannu, the cost of which we had hoped to have included

† Enclosure in our Despatch dated the 1st January 1896.

within the lakh of rupees. In the letter† from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab dated the 12th October 1895, the Lieutenant-Governor submitted a proposal by Mr. Anderson to open up a direct route from Lower Daur to Thal in preference to the Thal-Gumatti route. We are shortly expecting Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's detailed recommendations on this subject, and will then address Your Lordship. The expenditure involved is not expected to exceed Rs. 12,000 a year.

5. We trust that the arrangements made for the distribution of tribal allowances will meet with Your Lordship's approval.

6. A statement of the expenditure to be incurred on the cantonments in Wano and the Tochi valley will be furnished to Your Lordship, as soon as possible.

We have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.

## Enclosure No. 1.

*Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 28th January 1896.*

I AM directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for formal sanction, two proposition statements showing the financial results of the proposals affecting the tribal arrangements in Southern Waziristan which were approved by the Government of India.

2. There is, it will be observed, an increase of Rs. 38,254 in Imperial Expenditure (statement I) accompanied by a decrease of Rs. 15,168 in Provincial Expenditure on the Border Military Police (statement II), the net increase being Rs. 23,086. The Punjab Government understands that the Provincial Assignment of Land Revenue will be reduced by the amount of the Provincial decrease.

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[Chargeable to Imperial Revenue.]

61

ORDER SANCTIONING PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT.		NATURE OF CHARGES.										PROPOSITION.				Local Government's recom- mendation.					
		PRESENT SCALE.					PROPOSED SCALE.					PERMANENT.		TEMPORARY.			Grounds of proposition.				
		No.	Designation.	Pay.			Average Cost.	No.	Designation.	Pay.			Average Cost.	Increase per month.	Amount.			Period.	Amount.	Period.	Decrease per month.
				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.									
No. 1178-E., dated 11th June 1890. Punjab Government No. 325, dated 7th July 1890.	..	7	AHMADZAIS OF WANO.	Rs. 210 0 0	..	Rs. 210 0 0	Rs. a. p.	3	Jemadars at Rs. 30 each.	90 0 0	..	Rs. a. p.	90 0 0	Rs. a. p.	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	..	10	Sowars at Rs. 20 each	200 0 0	..	200 0 0	400 0 0	20	Sowars at Rs. 20 each	400 0 0	..	400 0 0	400 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	..	1	Footman ..	10 0 0	..	10 0 0	36 0 0	3	Havildars at Rs. 12 each.	36 0 0	..	36 0 0	36 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	..	25	Sowars at Rs. 20 each	500 0 0	..	500 0 0	916 0 0	39	Footmen at Rs. 10 each.	390 0 0	..	390 0 0	390 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
No. 1937-F., dated 7th August 1893. No. 1275-E., dated 22nd June 1891. No. 219-F., dated 21st January 1895.	..	..	Total per mensem	920 0 0	..	920 0 0	1,485 0 0	..	Total per mensem	1,485 0 0	..	1,485 0 0	1,485 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	..	..	Total per annum	11,040 0 0	..	11,040 0 0	17,820 0 0	..	Total per annum ..	17,820 0 0	..	17,820 0 0	17,820 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	..	..	Total Darwesh Khel per annum.	11,040 0 0	..	11,040 0 0	301 0 0	..	Total per mensem	301 0 0	..	301 0 0	301 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	..	..	Moharirs and shop- keepers Gomala.	215 0 0	..	215 0 0	3,612 0 0	..	Total Darwesh Khel per annum.	3,612 0 0	..	3,612 0 0	3,612 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		..	..	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0														





II.  
Statement of Proposition for Revision of Establishment.  
[Chargeable to Provincial Revenues.]

ORDER SANCTIONING PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT.		Office to which the Proposi- tion refers.	NATURE OF CHARGES.										PROPOSITION.										Grounds of proposition.	Local Government's recom- mendation.	
			PRESENT SCALE.					PROPOSED SCALE.					PERMANENT.					TEMPORARY.							
			No.	Designation.	Pay.			Average Cost.	No.	Designation.	Pay.			Average Cost.	Amount.	Increase per month.	Decrease per month.	Period.	Amount.	Increase per month.	Decrease per month.	Period.			
					Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.												
Number and Date.		...	3	OLD MASHUD SER- VICE. Jemadars at Rs. 30 each.	90 0 0	...	90 0 0	90 0 0	...	3	.....	...	...	...	Rs. a. p.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of India, No. 1081-F., dated the 8th July 1889.		...	3	Duffadars at Rs. 25 each.	75 0 0	...	75 0 0	75 0 0	...	3	.....	...	...	...	Rs. a. p.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of Pun- jab, No. 4224.		...	54	Sowars at Rs. 20 each	1,080 0 0	...	1,080 0 0	1,080 0 0	...	54	.....	...	...	...	Rs. a. p.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of India, No. 819-F., dated the 12th May 1892, and Government of Pun- jab, No. 1-C., dated the 8th August 1892.		...	1	Sowar . . . . .	19 0 0	...	19 0 0	19 0 0	...	1	.....	...	...	...	Rs. a. p.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of India, No. 819-F., dated the 12th May 1892.		...	...	Total per mensem .	1,264 0 0	...	1,264 0 0	1,264 0 0	...	...	Included in the Im- perial proposition statement.	...	...	...	Rs. a. p.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of India, No. 819-F., dated the 12th January 1894.		...	...	Total per annum .	15,168 0 0	...	15,168 0 0	15,168 0 0	...	...	.....	...	...	...	Rs. a. p.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of India, No. 819-F., dated the 12th May 1892.		...	...	Border Military Police establishment proper including special posts.	3,996 0 0	...	3,996 0 0	3,996 0 0	...	...	Border Military Police	3,996 0 0	...	3,996 0 0	Rs. a. p.	...	3,996 0 0	3,996 0 0	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of India, No. 819-F., dated the 12th May 1892.		...	...	Bhitanni Service .	1,017 0 0	...	1,017 0 0	1,017 0 0	...	...	Bhitanni Service	1,017 0 0	...	1,017 0 0	Rs. a. p.	...	1,017 0 0	1,017 0 0	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
Government of India, No. 819-F., dated the 12th May 1892.		...	...	Shirani at Charwash- kai.	75 0 0	...	75 0 0	75 0 0	...	...	Shirani at Charwash- kai.	75 0 0	...	75 0 0	Rs. a. p.	...	75 0 0	75 0 0	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...
		...	...	Carried over .	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	5,088 0 0	...	...	Carried over	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	Rs. a. p.	...	5,088 0 0	5,088 0 0	Rs.	...	...	...	Rs.	...	...

		Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.
	OLD MAHSUD SER- VICE—contd.																		
	Brought forward	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...
	Vehoa Pass post	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...
	Total per mensem	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...
	Total per annum	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...
	Uniform allowances	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...
	Compensation for dearness of pro- vision.	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...
	GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...
	OLD MAHSUD SER- VICE—contd.																		
	Brought forward	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...	5,088 0 0	...
	Vehoa Pass post	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...	119 0 0	...
	Total per mensem	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...	5,207 0 0	...
	Total per annum	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	...
	Uniform allowances	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	...
	Compensation for dearness of pro- vision.	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	...
	GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...	82,568 9 0	...
	GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...	67,400 9 0	...
	GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	15,168	...	15,168	...	15,168	...	15,168	...	15,168	...	15,168	...	15,168	...	15,168	...	15,168	...

Government of Pun-  
jab, No. 662, dated  
the 11th August  
1892.

Government of India,  
No. 819-F., dated  
the 12th May 1892.

Government of India,  
No. 819-F., dated  
the 12th May 1892.

Government of Pun-  
jab, No. 25, dated  
the 12th January  
1894.

Government of Pun-  
jab, No. 284, dated  
the 22nd April 1893.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN, }  
The 5th December 1895.

Certified that the entries in the column "Present scale" have been checked and found correct.  
LAHORE,  
The 4th December 1895.

(Sd.) R. I. BRUCE,  
Commissioner and Superintendent.

(Sd.) R. E. HAMILTON,  
Accountant-General, Punjab.

## Enclosure 2.

*Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. C. Talbot, K.C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, dated Fort William, the 2nd March 1896.*

I am directed to reply to your letter, dated the 28th January 1896, forwarding two proposition statements showing financial results of the proposals affecting the tribal arrangements in Southern Waziristan.

2. I am to convey formal sanction to the expenditure detailed in the proposition statements, and to say that the Provincial Assignment of Land Revenue will be reduced in proportion to the amount by which provincial expenditure has been decreased in consequence of these arrangements.

## No. 17.

*Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 19th June 1896.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE considered the correspondence forwarded with the letter of your Excellency's Government, in the Foreign Department, dated the 19th May 1896, regarding the allowances granted to the Darwesh Khel Waziris and the Dauris, and the arrangements made for the construction of levy posts in Wano and its neighbourhood, and in the Tochi Valley.

2. The total amount sanctioned, viz., Rs. 88,828, will be met from the provision of one lakh of rupees a year, which it was anticipated would be required for carrying out the policy in respect of Waziristan, approved in my predecessor's Despatch of the 24th August 1894.

3. With regard to your observations on the Sarawekai (or Barwand) post on the Shuhur route, you will have learnt, from my Despatch of the 8th May last, that, until levy posts have been established and their efficiency tested by experience, it will rest with your Government to decide whether the post at Sarawekai should be retained.

4. I understand that the expenditure, not exceeding Rs. 45,000, sanctioned for the construction of 13 levy posts in the Tochi valley is in addition to the above specified lakh of rupees.

5. These arrangements have my approval.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

## No. 18.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 9th June 1896. (Received 29th June 1896.)*

MY LORD,

THE papers described in the accompanying list give details of the arrangements made for the political control of the Gomal, the Southern Waziri country, and the Tochi valley. The annual expenditure involved is Rs. 69,707, which includes the salaries of the Political officers in Wano and the Tochi valley, and of the establishments employed under them.

2. Pending the introduction of the permanent medical arrangements, we authorised the grant, with effect from the 1st April 1895, of an allowance of Rs. 100 a month to the Medical officer with the troops in Wano for attendance on the civil officials, public followers, tribal levies and others. We trust that our proceedings will be approved and confirmed.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.



## No. 19.

*Despatch from the Secretary of State to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 23rd July 1896.*

MY LORD,

IN your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department, of the 9th June, you report that you have sanctioned establishments for the political managements for the political management of the Gomal and Southern Waziristan country at a total annual cost of Rs. 38,681.

2. You also state that you have sanctioned a political establishment for the Tochi valley, involving a political expenditure of Rs. 31,026 a year.

3. On the understanding that a complete report, including all charges of this kind, will be shortly submitted to me in accordance with the instructions already conveyed to you, I give my provisional assent to these proceedings.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

## No. 20.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 14th October 1896. (Received 3rd November 1896.)*

MY LORD,

THE enclosed papers relate to the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi valley; to the disturbances which occurred among the Madda Khel Waziris in February 1896; and to subsequent events, resulting in the murder of the muharrir of the Sheranna post.

2. On account of this murder and the riotous behaviour of the Madda Khel in February last, we have sanctioned the imposition of fines amounting to Rs. 3,000. We trust that the establishment of the head-quarters of the troops at Datta Khel will have the effect of restoring order in the Tochi valley.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.

## Enclosure No. 1.

*Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 25th April 1896.*

I AM directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of correspondence on the subject of the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi Valley, and to say that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick trusts that the views, in which all local authorities agree, will commend themselves to the Government of India.

## Sub-enclosure A.

*Extract from Letter from Brigadier-General W. G. Nicholson, Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Rawalpindi, 9th March 1896.*

I am directed by the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces to forward, for the consideration of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, and for the favour of an expression of His Honour's opinion, certain proposals for the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi Valley.

The distribution of those posts that is recommended by the Lieutenant-General Commanding is as follows :—

—	Guns.	Sabres.	Rifles.	Remarks.
Datta Khel ... ..	4 Guns... 2 Maxims.	20	500(a)	(a) <i>i.e.</i> , one battalion at war strength not to be allowed to fall below the minimum strength of 500.
Boya ... ..	—	20	100	
Miran Shah ... ..	2 Maxims	40	300(b)	(b) Head-quarters and wing of a battalion at war strength. Minimum to be 300.
Idak ... ..	—	20	40	
Saidgi ... ..	—	20	60	
Total ... ..	4 Guns* 4 Maxims.	120*	1,000*	* <i>i.e.</i> the sanctioned garrison of— 1 Squadron ; 4 Guns Mountain Artillery ; 4 Maxims (2 Maxims not yet sanctioned) ; 2 Battalions.

In this distribution the strength of each of the two battalions has been calculated at 500 rifles as it has been found on the frontier that this is practically the number of efficient soldiers who can be maintained throughout the year on permanent outpost garrison duty.

It is necessary to enter into some details to explain the reasons which have led the Lieutenant-General Commanding to decide upon his present recommendations.

A Special Committee, of which the Acting Commissioner of the Derajat (Mr. Anderson) and the Political Officer on duty in the Tochi Valley (Mr. Casson) were members, assembled in September 1895 at Miran Shah for the purpose of formulating proposals regarding distribution of the permanent posts and their garrisons.

This Committee recommended that the main post should be at Miran Shah, with minor military posts at—

Datta Khel,  
Boya,  
Idak,  
Saidgi.

It also recommended that levy posts should be established at—

Muhammad Khel,  
Kanirogha,  
Sheranni,  
Bibi Algad,

and to this distribution of the levy posts the Lieutenant-General has no objection to offer.

In selecting Miran Shah as the principal military post, the Special Committee appears to have been influenced by a belief in the importance of that place as a trading centre, and in the consequent possibility of its eventual expansion into a considerable market and cantonment.

In the recommendations of the Committee the Lieutenant-General concurred provisionally, though his final decision was held in abeyance until the time when a further report on the water-supply at Miran Shah should be received, as the result of that report would, it was anticipated, materially affect the location of the main post of the valley.

The report on the experiments in connection with this water-supply has not yet been received by the Lieutenant-General Commanding from the Public Works Department of the Punjab Government, but recent events have meanwhile led him to decide against the distribution of posts and garrisons recommended by the Committee, so that the question of the water-supply

on the plain  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile north of Miran Shah becomes a secondary one, and further delay in forwarding the Lieutenant-General's recommendation is unnecessary.

The hostile attitude displayed by a section of the Madda Khels at the western end of the valley, as reported to you by the Political Officer in the Tochi, and the probability of further attempts at creating a condition of unrest and discontent, worked by local agitators, or by some agency from outside our sphere of influence, have convinced the Lieutenant-General Commanding that we shall never properly control the Upper Dauris, and tribes up to our border, until we hold the Tochi Valley sufficiently strongly at a convenient site near that border; and as Datta Khel is, in his opinion, the site that will best fulfil these requirements, he considers that the main post should be there.

He is not under any circumstances prepared to recommend that large fortified posts should be built on any site, but that small posts capable of holding 100 men be provided for the larger garrisons of Datta Khel and Miran Shah, the remainder of the garrison in each case being accommodated in an entrenched enclosure adjoining the post, the latter acting as the keep, into which all that remain would move in the event of a flying column being sent out for any purpose.

The distribution of posts in the Tochi Valley, which is now recommended by the Lieutenant-General Commanding, affects the site of the Miran Shah post, which should now, in his opinion, be built on the site of the present entrenched camp, and not on the plain  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile north of Miran Shah, where the Committee recommended that the Miran Shah post should be, and where water-boring experiments have been lately carried out.

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#### Sub-Enclosure B.

*Extract from Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command, dated Lahore, 25th April 1896.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 9th March 1896, forwarding certain proposals for the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi Valley, and in reply to convey the following observations of the Lieutenant-Governor thereon.

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick accepts the view of the local officers that the political and military head-quarters of the Tochi should be at Datta Khel. His Honour observes, however, that we shall lose certain advantages in removing the political head-quarters from Miran Shah, but the Political Officer and the Commanding Officer ought, he thinks, to be together, and as the latter ought clearly to be at Datta Khel, the former must be located there also.

As to the strength of the garrison in the valley, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick is of opinion that there should be at least 1,500 rifles in the Tochi, of which about 900 should be at Datta Khel. When the garrison was fixed at two regiments it was understood that the regiments would be at full strength, leave being stopped during the short time a regiment would be quartered there. In these circumstances the Lieutenant-Governor would urge that the two Infantry regiments in the Tochi be kept up to their full strength, and that for the present all leave be stopped. We cannot, His Honour considers, afford to run any risks in the Tochi, which we should be doing if the strength of the rifles was less than that recommended by him, because a disturbance there would probably mean a general rising of the tribes all round.

I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor endorses Mr. Anderson's suggestion that the post at Boya should be made as strongly defensive as possible.

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## Enclosure No. 2.

*Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 3rd June 1896.*

SIR,

In continuation of my letter dated 26th February 1896, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of papers containing a full report by Mr. Anderson on the recent Madda Khel agitation in the upper part of the Tochi Valley, and to say that there is still a certain haziness over the whole affair, but that His Honour agrees with Mr. Anderson that it is of no great importance.

There is, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks, from all that has come before him since Government set about settling the Tochi, a certain amount of opposition from some quarters to our advance up the valley towards Sherani, but the demonstration of last February seems to His Honour to have been due chiefly to the natural desire to get as much money out of Government as possible, and to Sadda Khan's hope that by exaggerating the agitation, if indeed he did not start it, he would induce us to move up the valley under his auspices and thus strengthen his hands against his rivals. It may be hoped that the death of Ayub Khan will diminish the chance of such things occurring in future.

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Sub-enclosure A.

*Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., Political Officer, Tochi Valley, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Miranshah, 10th April 1896.*

In continuation of Mr. Casson's, dated 11th March 1896, regarding the tribal agitation and demonstrations which occurred in the month of February last among the Madda Khels, Khidder Khels, and Manzar Khels of the upper part of the Tochi Valley, I have the honour to submit a further report regarding these events and some occurrences of a similar nature reported in the month of March at the time of the Id festival.

2. The Madda Khels, who are the people chiefly concerned in the occurrences under report, are a large section of the Darwesh Khel, numbering about 1,600 fighting men. Their settlements lie first along the Tochi River, from the neighbourhood of Sheranni westward to the Afghan boundary as recently demarcated, and, secondly, along the Kazha River, which joins the Tochi at Paki Killa and its various tributaries. The former are known collectively as Gor or Ger and the latter as Kazha. The distinction between the two, however, is not one of descent as the same sub-sections are to be found in Kazha as in Gor. By tribal custom Gor and Kazha share equally. Both recognize Sadda Khán as the head Malik and his family as the head family of the Madda Khel.

3. The Madda Khels by tribal custom share equally with the Tori Khels, but of their half share the Manzar Khels take one-third share. In the distribution of allowances and services recently made the Madda Khels, for the reasons which need not here be given, were given a share equal to the Tori Khels and a separate allotment was made for the Manzar Khels. Thus the Madda Khels receive considerably more than they were entitled to receive by tribal custom, and they have no just cause of complaint as to the share allotted to them. In the internal distribution of the allowances 27 Maliks were given allowances for service. A large Sirdári allowance was assigned to Sadda Khán and the Sillahdári of 23 footmen was assigned to Sadda Khán and his uncle, Ayúb Khán, on the distinct understanding that they were to divide it among minor Maliks for whom no provision has otherwise been made. At the time when the circumstances under report occurred these two Maliks had not distributed the Sillahdári and are responsible for the consequences.

4. Sadda Khán, to whom reference has been made, takes by descent the first rank among the Darwesh Khels of independent territory. At the time, however, of our entry in the Tochi Valley his uncle, Ayub, was certainly the most capable and popular Malik in the section. There was considerable rivalry between the two. Sadda Khán's position was weakened, and, being naturally

of an intriguing and designing character, he has frequently adopted crooked courses and particularly so in connection with the intrigues which followed the distribution of the allowances.

5. The Khidder Khels are a weak sub-section of the Mohmit Khels, who as a section occupy the Waziri country to the east of Miranshah. The Khidder Khels, being detached from the main body of their section and being settled near the powerful Madda Khels, have fallen very completely under the influence of the latter. Their main settlements are the group of villages in the neighbourhood of Datta Khel. For this reason they were to some extent drawn into the agitation raised by the Madda Khels, but I don't think that they were very actively concerned.

6. The Manzar Khels, the third section concerned, are allied in descent to the Madda Khels. Kanirogha, Paki Killa and Drewasta at the junction of the Kazha and the Tochi are their three villages. They not only took no active part in the agitation, but refused to join in any demonstrations when invited by the Madda Khels.

7. The first distribution of allowances was made to the Madda Khels on 5th November 1895. All the Maliks accepted their allowances gratefully and returned to their homes. Some of them joined in the large jirga which assembled at Miranshah in November and December 1895, proceedings of which were reported to you in Mr. Casson's, dated 13th December 1895. They quietly dispersed to their homes after receiving their allowances on the 11th December 1895. In January the Surveyor of the Amír appeared in the Kazha and his proceedings were duly reported by Mr. Casson. It was also reported that the Afghan officials were intriguing with the Madda Khels and that the latter had become excited and agitated. The Maliks made the most of this incident and represented that the excitement was serious.

8. The first riotous demonstration of the Madda Khels occurred on the 9th February. On that date there was a gathering for the purpose of consultation at Sheranni of about 100 Madda Khels, chiefly from the Maisara Valley and the Mastoi and Tochi above their junction at Dotai. The discussion referred to the question of allowances. The leaders were minor Maliks, to whom allowances have not been allotted, but who would have had little cause for discontent had Sadda Khán and Ayúb satisfied them in the manner stated in paragraph 3. Excitement followed the discussions, and some of the more turbulent spirits threatened to turn the Munshi out of the temporary Sheranni post and also threatened some of the levies. I concur generally with what Mr. Casson has written in paragraph 3 of his letter as to the ringleaders and other persons concerned in the riot. It is difficult, however, to ascertain exactly what part was played by the ringleaders. The Munshi himself gives a very confused statement, stating that it was impossible to identify the rioters and those who assisted him. Sadda Khán states that Piyal and Núr Muhammad were leaders in the discussions which preceded the riot, but that they, together with Sarláí, Jibraíl and Rája, assisted the Munshi and restrained the mob. I am disposed to believe this story. I believe that the ringleaders did not contemplate violence and assisted in restraining the mob, which dispersed within an hour without doing harm to anybody. It seems to be a reasonable belief that the Munshi writing his first report in the excitement following the riot considerably exaggerated the facts. At the same time it cannot be doubted that the mob behaved in a riotous way and uttered threats regarding the levy posts.

9. The next indication of the agitation is the letter signed by Malik Núr Muhammad and other malcontents, copy of which accompanied Mr. Casson's, dated 14th February 1895. This letter was written by one Jasim Shah, a Gurbaz religious student. It appears to have been dropped into the Political Officer's petition box on the 12th or 13th February. When search was made for the person who brought it he could not be found. It is a significant fact that its arrival coincided with the arrival of Shadam Khán, brother of Sadda Khán, and Jamadár of Sheranni post, where the riot of the 9th February occurred. Some doubts have been entertained as to the genuineness of this letter, but it seems to me probable that the letter was written on behalf of some of the men whose names appear in it. I have no doubt, however, that the extremely aggressive tone of the letter and the character of the demands made

in it may be rightly attributed to the inspiration of the fanatical writer. In my opinion the object of the senders of this letter was to draw attention to the fact that they had not received allowances and to impress the Government with their importance and the advantage of according them allowances also.

10. On the 14th of February the men who had taken part in the previous agitation collected together and went to Kanirogha of the Manzar Khels with the object of inducing the latter to join in the agitation. The Manzar Khels, however, refused to have anything to do with them. A quarrel ensued, one of the Madda Khels was killed, and they returned to their homes. From this time to the date of the Id, the 16th of March, there was no further demonstration though the Maliks represented that a certain amount of agitation prevailed.

11. Before passing to the Id demonstration it is desirable to notice the action taken by Sadda Khan and other Maliks in the events narrated above. Sadda Khan was absent at Miranshah from the 9th to the 16th February. He in the first instance ascribed the demonstrations to be due to insufficient and incorrectly distributed allowances, and he stated that agitation was caused by the Amir's surveyor and by our not assisting the Madda Khels in their quarrels with the Amir's subjects. At a later date he again assigned the first and second reasons for the demonstrations, and what is most significant of all, he persistently represented that the agitation had grown beyond his control, and he asked that troops should be sent up the valley to assist him in suppressing it. Shadam Khan from the first took the same line, and I think that I am not wrong in saying that the leading Khidder Khel Maliks adopted the same course. I believe that the demonstrations were made exclusively by men of Gor; the Kazha Madda Khels stood aloof. On the 23rd of February all their chief men stated that all was quiet in Kazha, and they repudiated any connection with the agitation. Early in March independent messengers sent into the Madda Khel country returned with the report that the agitation was raised by those who have not received allowances in order to put pressure on Government and did not indicate hostility to Government.

12. The festival of Id Fitr was held this year on the 16th of March, and in accordance with the usual custom the Madda Khels and Khidder Khels assembled in large numbers at the ancestral tombs of Malik Shadam Khan's family near Sheranni. Owing to the death of Ayub Khan, who has been mentioned before, the assembly was larger than usual, and a number of malcontents and some of the Mullahs and religious students seized the opportunity of raising an agitation. They attempted to draw the Kazha Madda Khels into their plan, but failed, though certain Kazha Madda Khel Mullahs are said to have joined the agitation. The Maliks represented that the Mullahs attempted to stir the people up against them, charging them with bringing British troops into their country. Sadda Khan and other leading Maliks took oath that they were not bringing British troops into the county, but at the same time they declared that if the troops did come into the country they not only would not oppose them, but would render every assistance. After this the people dispersed to their homes. Various alarmist reports at this time were received from the Muharrirs, but I attach little credit to them, because it was obvious that the Muharrirs were being utilized by the intriguing Maliks for their own ends, and because Sadda Khan assured me by means of a confidential messenger that these reports should not be believed, and that though the tribesmen were holding discussions there was nothing to be feared and he would break up the assembly.

13. On receipt of the reports regarding the assemblages at Id I at once sent orders to the Maliks warning them that they would be held strictly responsible for preservation of order and for the suppression of the agitation. I made no secret of my belief that the Maliks themselves were at the bottom of the agitation, and while I endeavoured not to make too much of the occurrences, I warned them that the Government would take serious notice if orders were not obeyed. Any representations which the Maliks might wish to make should be made to me. I believe that the Maliks acted in accordance with these orders.

14. On the last day of March the leading Madda Khel and Khidder Khel Maliks came in to see me, and I also interviewed them again on the 7th and 8th April. The Maliks undertake full responsibility of levy posts, dak arrangements and for their sections. They understand at length that as



regards the allowances their sections have been well treated and the allowances will not be increased. They entered into an agreement to settle certain disputes regarding the present distribution—the main one arising from the claim that Kazha should share equally with Gor in the tribal allowances other than Sirdari. Sadda Khan undertook to satisfy the dissatisfied from his own sillahdari, and he asks that he may be allowed to make the necessary arrangements quietly during the next month in order that additional claimants might not be encouraged. I personally paid all the Madda Khel, Khidder Khel and Manzar Khel levies and distributed the allowances to the Maliks. The Maliks, however, unanimously pressed me to obtain for them some written assurance for the satisfaction of their tribesmen that the Government will not take revenue from them; they will be exempt from Court Fees; their jungle and grazing grounds will not be interfered with; that their mines will remain their own; that cases regarding women will be decided according to their own customs and offenders will be confined in jails in the Tochi. The question of granting sanads is under discussion in a separate reference, and I will only say with reference to this demand that the Maliks lay great stress on the necessity of their being provided with some written assurance regarding these matters. They would be satisfied with vernacular parwanahs signed by the Political Officer.

15. I note here that Sadda Khan gave me on the 31st March the following explanation of the agitation described above. He states that in the first place there is discontent because allowances were given to Ahmadzais who have no lands in the Tochi; secondly, the proceedings of the Amir's surveyor raised suspicion that the boundary line fixed in 1895 would not remain, and that a considerable portion of Madda Khel lands will fall on the Afghan side. Lastly, the determination of Government not to take possession and full control of the Waziri country had stimulated a feeling of independence and had excited the tribesmen to throw off the control even of their Maliks.

16. It would be unreasonable I think not to attach some weight to these causes of the agitation of the past assigned by the leading Maliks. On the other hand, if it be true that the Maliks themselves instigated that agitation, one may be justified in accepting their explanations with some doubt and suspicion. My own belief is that the chief motive—in fact the only strong motive at work—was the desire of Maliks and tribesmen alike to bring pressure to bear upon Government to make a substantial increase to the allowances.

17. I take the case of Sadda Khan as that of the leading man of the tribe. There is direct evidence against him. The Kazha Maliks openly stated in Jirga that he instigated the agitation for his own ends and to serve the interests of his section. This belief is shared by leading Maliks of Upper Dawar whom I have consulted and by that shrewd and well-informed observer Gholam Muhammad Khan, Assistant District Superintendent, Police. It is in no way improbable that Sadda Khan should seek to increase his own influence in his section by obtaining large allowances for it, and his neglect to distribute his sillahdari, which was purposely given to him for distribution, demonstrates beyond all doubt that he wished to save his own pocket, and he thought the best way to do this was to induce the Government to grant additional sillahdari while he retained his own. In the beginning he represented that the agitation was beyond his control, and he asked for troops, and it is not until a later stage when he had failed to obtain this assistance that he took the opposite tack, and gave the assurance that the alarmist reports were not to be credited and that he was able single-handed to suppress the agitation. The judgment formed regarding Sadda Khan's participation in the agitation applies to other members of his family and the Khidder Khel Maliks, Salihdin and Gul Samid, who acted for the Khidder Khels on the same lines as Sadda Khan acted for the Madda Khel.

18. A satisfactory feature of the events under report is that the agitation was practically confined to one-half only of the Madda Khels, those of Gor, and to a few only of the Khidder Khels. None of the other Utmanzai sections, such as Tori Khels and Mohmit Khels, have shown any disposition to side with the agitators.

19. The question remains as to what measures should be adopted to prevent the recurrence of similar agitation and demonstrations. There seem to me

to be three courses open. First, to establish permanently a strong Military post at Datta Khel ; secondly, march troops through the Madda Khel country to punish the offenders and to prove to the Madda Khels that we will not permit them to resort to show of violence to obtain their own ends ; lastly, to treat the occurrence as a matter of no great importance, to hold the Maliks responsible that such agitation should not occur, and to keep matters going on as they are until Government has finally decided the question of the distribution of the troops in the Tochi Valley.

20. I am not in favour of the second plan. No doubt it might be politic to inflict some punishment on the offenders and to demonstrate our strength to the section. On the other hand, the demonstrations were not of a very serious character ; their object was to obtain concessions and not to demonstrate hostility, and though threats were used and a show of violence was made, no actual injury was caused to any one. The great argument against a temporary movement of troops for punitive purposes, however, is that the people always look upon the withdrawal as a sign of weakness, forget the punishment inflicted, and take credit to themselves that troops are unable to remain permanently. These remarks of course do not include a visit paid by a Political Officer with Military escort to choose a site for posts and the like.

21. As regards the last proposal, as far as I can judge it will be possible to maintain the same amount of control that has hitherto been maintained. I see no difficulty in maintaining the levy posts and dak service as before, provided that the Maliks carry out their promises and pressure is maintained on them to do so. The events, however, of the past two months demonstrate that this arrangement cannot be permanent. The Maliks require more support, and owing mainly to the reduction of garrison in the Tochi there are difficulties in the way of assisting them with troops. The only permanent solution of the difficulties is to build a strong post which will dominate the country of the Madda Khels and Khidder Khels. I believe that the Maliks and the majority of the tribe will welcome the establishment of such a post.

22. I will add in conclusion that although I have shown, as I believe, that Malik Sadda Khan and other leading Maliks were engaged in the intrigue which caused agitation and objectionable demonstrations I do not for a moment question their loyalty as a body and individually to their promises made to Government. I do not doubt that Sadda Khan in asking for troops really wishes the support of troops to strengthen his authority over his section. In his last conversation with me he showed his good-will by recommending that a levy post should be built at Dotai, pointing out that the further west we had our post the better control we should have of the Maisarwals and other sub-sections who took prominent part in the demonstrations of the past. There can be no question that the Manzar Khels, Khidder Khels and Kazha Maliks are anxious to have their levy posts built, and have taken or will take contracts for the supply of wood and labour.

23. A copy of this is sent direct to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab for information.

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#### Sub-Enclosure B.

*Extract from letter from R. I. Bruce, Esquire, C. I. E., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to The Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Tank, 16th April 1896.*

IN continuation of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 10th instant, to my address, copy of which has been sent to you direct on the subject of the tribal agitation and demonstration which occurred at Sherrani in February last, I have the honor to forward copy of Mr. Casson's letter,\* dated 11th ultimo.

I concur with Mr. Anderson in believing, as I suspected from the first that the agitation was not without the connivance of the leading Maliks. Mr. Anderson now finds out that some of the minor Maliks who had received no allowances or only small in amount had a real grievance, and leading Maliks like Sadda Khan, who was made responsible to satisfy them out of

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\* Not printed.

the share which was allotted to him for the minor Maliks, had not given them anything. The consequence was that they all clamoured for additional allowances. The encouragement of this agitation by the leading Maliks gave them a *pardah* (screen) with the minor Maliks. Sadda Khan at the same time I think did not really believe that additional allowances would be granted for these men simply on account of the agitation, but he judged that if perchance it might be, all the better, as it would save his pocket. His real object was, I believe, to get the troops up the Tochi again. He knew that he was suspected by his own clansmen, and calculated that if the troops were there it would afford him such support as would enable him to keep what he had got. The explanation which he gave to Mr. Anderson on the 31st ultimo, as given in paragraph 15 of his letter under reference, simply confirms this view.

Even now I venture to doubt that Sadda Khan will willingly surrender much to the minor Maliks as these men are very loath even to give up anything they have once got.

Moreover, I consider Sadda Khan calculated, and rightly I believe, that the presence of troops in the Upper Tochi would save his people from the vexatious interference of Khalifa Nur Muhammad and others of the Amir's officials and also future trouble about their lands.

Notwithstanding the above, I fully concur with Mr. Anderson in his remarks about the loyalty of Sadda Khan and other Maliks who engaged in intrigues which caused an agitation. They did not intend serious hostile opposition to the authority of Government. I have reason to believe that there was a good deal of exaggeration in what was reported to us.

The best course in my opinion is that suggested by Mr. Anderson, namely, to establish permanently a strong military post at Datta Khel, which has, I believe, been already recommended by Government on strong military and political grounds. Sadda Khan is a shrewd man, and the warning conveyed to him and other leading Maliks by Mr. Anderson will, I hope, be sufficient to prevent a recurrence of the agitation.

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Enclosure No. 3.

*Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esquire, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 6th August 1896.*

I AM directed to forward, for the information and orders of the Government of India, a copy of correspondence regarding the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir of the Sheranna Post, and the general situation in the Upper Tochi Valley, and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor desires me to send these papers in continuation of my letter, dated 3rd June 1896, and to do so without delay, because they indicate a recrudescence of the difficulties which, as was stated in that letter, it was hoped might pass away, and because they show the necessity for coming to the earliest possible decision on the proposal for the establishment of the military and political head-quarters of the Tochi in the vicinity of Datta Khel submitted in the correspondence ending with my letter, dated 12th June last, to the Government of India.

2. It seems clear from these papers and from the papers relating to the Mullah Powindah which are being submitted with a separate letter that we are destined both in the Darwesh Khel and the Mahsud country to experience greater difficulties as time goes on from the weakness of the Waziri Maliks. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick referred to the difference in this respect between the Waziri tribes and some of the tribes further south in his note of the 14th March 1894 on the demarcation of the Waziri boundary submitted to the Government of India with this office letter, dated 24th March 1894, and we have had many illustrations of it since. These Waziri tribes, like some of the tribes further north, are organized, in so far as they can be said to have any organization, on an extremely democratic basis; they in their natural state, at least in ordinary times, will submit themselves to their leading members only to a very limited extent, and we can add little to the authority of their natural leaders by giving them the



position we do under us—indeed in some cases it would seem that by becoming our men whatever little influence they would otherwise have had with the tribe is weakened. Even within our own border we find tribes with a similar tendency to resent any artificial enhancement of the position of their most prominent men. In some parts of the Peshawar District we have had to abandon the idea of appointing zaildars, because if we picked out the biggest men as zaildars the men next in degree would resent it and quarrels would arise, and within the last few days the Lieutenant-Governor has had a case before him in which the Commissioner of Peshawar said it would be unsafe to appoint even a lambardar in the Mohmand village of Panjpao as he would probably be murdered.

3. His Honour himself suspects that the Tochi Maliks referred to in this correspondence and the Mahsud Maliks referred to in the other are purposely exaggerating the difficulties arising from this cause. In both cases they are a very numerous body, and he believes that in selecting them our officers have left out no man of real importance. Moreover, our service allowances are given not only to them, but also to very large numbers of their dependents. They ought not therefore, even making full allowance for the democratic constitution of the tribes, to be so weak as they pretend to be, and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick believes that their exaggeration of their helplessness is due to the facts that some of them shrink from the unpopularity attaching to the performance of the task we set them, and that others—the biggest men—are anxious to lead us to assume a complete dominion in which they reckon on having a considerable share. The Lieutenant-Governor has sometimes felt doubts as to the genuineness of the invitations which have from time to time been put before us asking us to locate a military force in the heart of some tribal tract and assume complete control, but he has no doubt that the invitations now before us both from the Tochi side and the Gomal side express the wishes of considerable numbers of the leading men. What proportion of the general body of the tribe is with these leading men in either case it would not be easy to ascertain, but that these leading men really desire us to go in and take control is, His Honour thinks, beyond doubt, and that in order to induce us to do so they exaggerate the difficulties of the present position is, he thinks, almost equally certain.

4. It must not be supposed from what the Lieutenant-Governor says above that he means to make light of those difficulties: on the contrary, he believes they are very real and very serious, and that they will force us before long to do much more than we desire to do. In the case of the Mahsud country, if the question were to arise in an acute form, it might prove a very perplexing one, as we cannot afford to lock up another military force there, but, as will be seen from the correspondence relating to it, there is room to hope that it will not so present itself for some time. In the Tochi, on the contrary, the question is much simpler. We already have there a sufficient force to support us in the exercise of any degree of control that we might be called upon to assume, and it may be that the mere fact of the head-quarters being established in the vicinity of Datta Khel as proposed would in itself set everything right.

5. What Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick would therefore suggest is that sanction be at once given to the proposal to establish the head-quarters in the vicinity of Datta Khel. There is, it must be remembered, nothing new in this proposal. It will be seen from this office letter, dated 12th October 1895 and its enclosures, that it was a question whether the head-quarters should be established there or lower down the valley, and the point has not since been settled.

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#### Enclosure 4.

*Letter from Captain H. Daly, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 7th September, 1896.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 6th August 1896, forwarding a copy of correspondence, regarding the murder of Honda Ram, muharrir of the Sheranna post, and the general situation in the Upper Tochi Valley, and recommending that sanction be at once given to establish the headquarters of the Tochi force in the vicinity of Datta Khel.

2. The state of affairs disclosed in the correspondence is not satisfactory. The local officers, however, believe that the location of troops in the vicinity of Datta Khel will have the effect of restoring order, and of strengthening the hands of the Maliks, who have themselves requested that troops may be advanced to that place. Orders have, accordingly, been issued for the establishment of the headquarters of the force at, or in the neighbourhood of Datta Khel.

3. The Government of India approve the fine of Rs. 2,000 on the Madda Khels, which the Lieutenant-Governor has authorised on account of the murder of Honda Ram. As regards the fine of Rs. 1,000 inflicted on account of the Sheranna agitation of February last, the Government of India agree with His Honour that as Mr. Gee announced the fine to the Maliks, who have accepted and distributed it, his action need not be interfered with. The Government of India also agree that it is not expedient to demand the surrender of Waris Khan, the murderer of Honda Ram, who has fled to Afghan territory.

No. 21.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th June, 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram has been received from Gee, Political Officer in Tochi, dated 10th June:—"I visited Sheranna and Maizar to-day, with escort of 300 rifles, two guns, and 12 cavalry, for the purpose of fixing site for post and realization of fines. About two p.m. we were suddenly attacked while resting under the trees at Maizar, in a most cowardly and treacherous manner. Casualties known at present are Captain Browne, R.A., Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.A., Colonel Bunny, 1st Sikhs, killed; Lieutenant Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant Higginson, 1st Sikhs, Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 1st Sikhs, wounded severely. Exact number of native officers and sepoy killed and wounded not known at present. We were pursued for about four miles, until reinforced from Datta Khel. I advocate immediate retaliatory measures on Madda Khel. I will send more particulars to-morrow.

No. 22.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12th June, 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Gee's visit to Maizar had been pre-arranged, and two Maliks were sent ahead. One of them brought food for British officers and the Mahomedans; then suddenly fire was opened, without warning, from all sides, and all British officers except Gee himself hit almost immediately. Escort retired over hills to Sheranna, reaching Datta Khel past eleven. Enemy estimated at 500 at first, increasing to 1,000. Supposed to be tribesmen of Sheranna, Maizar and up to Dotoi. Guns brought in; nine rifles, twenty-four mules missing. Estimated Waziri loss, fifty killed and a large number of wounded.

No. 23.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th June, 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

We have authorised the despatch of two brigades to Maizar to destroy the fortified Kots and to remain there for the present. No signs of hostile combination at Maizar or Sheranna, both of which places are said to be deserted. Commissioner believes the outbreak fanatical. Until the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has advised, we will not decide terms.

No. 24.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th July, 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Following is summary of terms we are instructing General Bird to impose on Madda Khels :—(1), tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all Malikis and other ringleaders in attack whom General, after inquiry, thinks fit to demand ; (2), all stolen property to be restored, or its value in default ; (3), fine of Rs. 1,200 for murder of Sheranna Levy Mohurir to be paid ; (4), a fine of Rs. 10,000 in cash or arms, or by furnishing labour on work approved by Government. Allowances hitherto enjoyed by Madda Khels are forfeited. We leave full discretion to Bird as to manner in which terms should be communicated, suggesting for his consideration assembly of Jirgahs as was done by Bruce and Lockhart in 1895.

No. 25.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 21st July, 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Bird occupied Sheranni on the 20th July, and found the village deserted. On pushing a reconnaissance to Maizar he found that place to be also empty.

No. 26.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to The Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 21st July 1897. (Received 9th August, 1897.)*

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship has been briefly advised by telegram of the attack made on the 10th June last at Maizar, upon the escort of Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in the Tochi valley, and of the action we have decided to take in the matter. We have now the honour to forward copies of papers which furnish detailed information on the subject.

2. Mr. Gee's escort consisted of two guns, twelve sabres, and 300 rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs ; his objects were, firstly, to finally determine the site for a levy post which was to be established between Sheranna and Maizar at the head of the Tochi valley, and, secondly,

\* See Despatch, dated the 14th October 1896. The fine was reduced to Rs. 1,200 in May last.

to settle details in connection with an outstanding fine imposed\* in September last for the murder of the moharrir of the Sheranna levy post. Mr. Gee's

visit was originally fixed for the 9th June, but was postponed till the following day in consequence of rain. His intentions were known to all the Sheranna and Maizar Malikis. On arrival at Maizar, Mr. Gee proceeded to Dotoi with some of the Malikis and the cavalry, leaving Sadda Khan and Alambe, two of the most influential of the Sheranna Malikis, with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, the infantry and guns at Maizar. On Mr. Gee's return, Sadda Khan produced food for the Muhammadans of the party and the British officers. About 2 p.m., without the slightest warning, fire was opened from the buildings close by. The six British military officers were almost immediately hit, and the force withdrew over the hills to Sheranna, followed by a gathering of tribesmen which rapidly increased to over 1,000. The retirement was made with the greatest deliberation and in excellent order. On the arrival of reinforcements from Datta Khel, the tribesmen were finally beaten off. Our casualties were Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs, Captain J. F. Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant H. A. Cruickshank, R.A., killed ; Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson and Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cassidy, of the 1st Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant C. L. S. Seton-Browne, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, wounded. Dr. Cassidy has died of his wound. One native officer and 21 rank and file were killed, and 24 rank and file wounded. Several horses and mules were also killed and wounded. The



losses of the tribesmen are estimated at about one hundred killed, including some leading Maliks, and many wounded. The Madda Khels fled to the hills, leaving Sheranna and Maizar deserted. The attack seems clearly to have been pre-arranged, but we are not yet in a position to apportion the responsibility for the plot.

3. At the time of the outbreak the troops in the Tochi Valley were distributed as follows :—

Miran Shah ...	...	{	2 Maxim guns.
		{	40 Sabres.
		{	368 Rifles.
Datta Khel ...	...	{	4 Mountain guns.
		{	2 Maxim guns.
		{	20 Sabres.
		{	924 Rifles.
Boya ...	...	{	20 Sabres
		{	92 Rifles.
Idak... ..	...	{	20 Sabres.
		{	40 Rifles.
Saidgai ...	...	{	20 Sabres.
		{	52 Rifles.

Steps were immediately taken to strengthen the posts in the Tochi and on the Shahur and Gumal lines, though there then seemed little risk of the

*\*1st Brigade.*

2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

1st Regiment, Sikh Infantry.

1st Regiment, Punjab Infantry.

33rd Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

1 Squadron, 1st Regiment, Punjab Cavalry.

No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery.

No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

*2nd Brigade.*

3rd Battalion, the Rifle Brigade.

14th Sikh Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

6th Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

25th Punjab Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry.

4 Guns, No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.

but was unfortunately unable to carry on his duties, as his health broke down. Mr. Younghusband, Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, has been appointed in his stead, and Messrs. Lorimer and Kettlewell have been attached as Political Officers to the 1st and 2nd Brigades respectively.

4. On the 13th July Major-General Bird issued a Proclamation announcing his intention to advance to Maizar and destroy the fortified buildings in Maizar and Sheranna, to remain there, or in that neighbourhood, as long as may seem desirable, and to compel obedience to the orders of Government. The Proclamation promised that the terms to be imposed on those responsible for, or concerned in, the affair of the 10th June would be announced in due course, and concluded by warning all others who wished to live in peace with Government to refrain from obstructing the Force, as any further unfriendly acts would be severely dealt with.

5. The following are the terms which we have decided to impose on the Madda Khel :—

- (1) The Madda Khel tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all Maliks and other ringleaders in the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897, whom, after such enquiry as Major-General Bird thinks fit, he may declare must be surrendered ; and all persons surrendered will be dealt with in such way, and be subject to such punishment, as the Government of India may determine.
- (2) All stolen property must be restored in good condition, or, in default, the value, as determined by Government, must be paid.

- (3) Payment of the fine of Rs. 1,200 outstanding on account of the murder of Honda Ram, moharrir of the Sheranna levy post, must be made good.
- (4) Payment will be required of a fine of ten thousand rupees in cash or arms, on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe. This fine may, with the sanction of the British Government, instead of being levied as above, be discharged, in whole or in part, by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranna post, or of any other work approved by Government without payment, or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

The Madda Khels have, by their misconduct, forfeited the allowances which they received from Government, and this will be made known to them. Whether the allowances should be hereafter regranted will to a great extent depend upon how far they prove amenable in regard to the terms now imposed. No announcement will be made to them on this subject at the present stage.

6. Subject to one exception and to certain slight modifications, the terms are those recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. We have not been able to approve His Honour's proposal to demand land revenue from the Madda Khels. So far as the tribes are concerned, we might be within our rights in demanding revenue, but in taking such a step we should be departing from the policy, approved by Her Majesty's Government, of not undertaking the administration of the Tochi Valley, except in the tract inhabited by the Dauris. Our reasons for not accepting the Lieutenant-Governor's recommendation in this respect have been explained to him in our Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 17th July 1897.

7. There is no reason to suppose that Mulla Powindah was concerned in the attack at Maizar, or that he was even aware it was impending. The Madda Khel, who were the principal offenders, sent a messenger to invite the Mulla's help after the occurrence, and it is rumoured that they also informed the Amir's Governor at Urgan. On the 20th June, the Native Assistant Political Officer at Wano received a letter from the Mulla, in which he offered to arrange peace with the Madda Khels, and asked what terms were to be demanded. No answer has been sent to him. He has since been apparently endeavouring to excite the tribes generally against us, but the reports are of so conflicting a nature that it is impossible to predict at present what opposition is likely to be offered to General Bird's Force. The attitude of the Dauris is satisfactory, and their Maliks have offered every assistance in keeping order in their country; but some cases of firing into camps, attacking convoys, and cutting telegraph wires have occurred within their limits.

8. It was General Bird's intention to advance from Datta Khel on the 20th July.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.

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Enclosure 1.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 12th June 1897.*

With reference to your letter, dated the 11th June 1897, regarding the treacherous attack made by the Madda Khels upon the escort of the Political Officer, Tochi, at Maizar on the 10th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of further telegrams received from Mr. Gee and the Commissioner, Derajat Division, on the subject and my reply thereto.

## Sub-Enclosure A.

*From the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 11th June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Main facts as follows : As stated in my demi-official, I had originally intended to go to Maizar on 9th, and Sadda Khan and Alambe were sent on the day before to arrange for payment of fine in Honda Ram's case. Our visit was postponed till 10th owing to rain. The attack was undoubtedly planned beforehand, and all Maizar and Sheranna Maliks knew of it, even if they did not plan it. On arrival at Maizar, I visited Dotoi with some Maliks and cavalry, leaving Sadda Khan and Alambe with Colonel Bunny, and infantry and guns at Maizar. On my return Sadda Khan produced food for all Musalman sepoys and for us. About 2 P.M., when we had finished tiffin, without the slightest warning, fire was opened from all the Kots round on the British officers, all of whom except myself were hit almost at once. We were fired at from all sides and had to retire over the hills towards Sheranna. One Subedar and 22 men were killed and 25 men wounded ; nine rifles and 24 mules missing. Enemy numbered possibly 500 at first, but increased to over 1,000 by the time we were opposite Sheranna. All tribesmen of Sheranna, Maizar, and I think up to Dotoi were concerned. Later a number of men arrived from Kazha over the hills, but we had then been re-inforced from Datta Khel. We did not reach camp till past eleven. Gathering was I think partly fanatical, but arranged by Maliks ; only thing in favour of latter is that they saved Ghulam Muhammad's life by taking him down to a tower across the Tochi, but none of them attempted to stop the attack. Waziri loss put down at 50 killed, including Sheranna Mulla, 3 Akhunds, and Malik Pyall, and large number wounded. Sheranna and all Maizar Kots deserted ; they should be razed to the ground when reinforcements arrive. General has wired direct to me about this and I have asked for rest of 1st Punjab Infantry to be sent up here. No Maliks in at present. I will detain any that appear in custody. We had absolutely no warning of any kind, and a regular trap seems to have been laid.

## Sub-Enclosure B.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 11th June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

I am starting now for Bannu, which I reach to-morrow morning. So far as I can judge from reports received and from experience of part taken by local Mullas in Sheranna agitation of 1896, the attack was inspired by fanaticism ; the action now to be taken will largely depend on the present attitude of the sections concerned, as regards which I am not yet in possession of full details. In any case I consider it is most essential to occupy Maizar with troops for the present, both to maintain prestige in that country and to facilitate compliance with any terms we may demand hereafter. I am enquiring from Political Officer, Tochi, and Commanding Officer, Tochi, as to what strength of garrison will be required with reference to the attitude of tribes, and whether in view to the occupation of Maizar any additional troops will be required.

## Sub-Enclosure C.

*From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Simla, to the Commissioner, Derajat, dated 12th June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Very early information is required on the following matters :—

First. Can you account for outbreak ? Has it anything to do with coincidence of visit with Mohurram, or with plans of Mulla Powindah and his presence in Shaktu, as reported in Grant's telegrams. Has visit of Sadda Khan to Urgan, as reported in Tochi Diaries, any bearing on the subject ?



Second. Do you agree with Gee in considering all the Madda Khels, including Kazha sections, implicated, and have you any reason at present for thinking other tribes implicated?

Third. Is it possible to ascribe origin of outrage to unpremeditated attack on the British officers by a few fanatics, or do you think with Gee that it was a piece of organized treachery and entirely opposed to Pathan code of honour?

Fourth. You should consider possibility of settlement by demand for immediate and unconditional surrender of all Maliks and ringleaders of sections implicated.

Fifth. If Maizar is occupied at once, as proposed by you and Gee, to what extent do you consider tribal combination against us probable? Estimate of strength of such opposition and of force required to meet it should be given. Will it be necessary to strengthen Shahur and Gumal lines in view of possible complications with Mahsuds?

Sixth. You should give your matured opinion with reference to above considerations, whether advance to Maizar or other position in Upper Tochi should be at once undertaken, or whether it will be necessary to wait for reinforcements.

Seventh. You will no doubt consider what retaliatory measures are called for, and report as soon as possible.

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Enclosure No. 2.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 16th June 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Your telegram of 12th June. I deal with enquiries made therein *seriatim*:—

First.—Outbreak was, in my opinion, inspired by fanaticism. Mullas tried to stir up people on Id, but without much success; they took advantage of Moharram to rouse fanatical feelings, and unpalatable demand of the fine in Honda Ram's case gave them desired opportunity of stirring up resistance, and bringing about fanatical outbreak. So far enquiries show Mulla Powindah had nothing to do with present case. While at Bannu, Malik Mani Khan visited me, and on being questioned as to cause of the outbreak, at once expressed his suspicion of instigation by Sardar Gul Muhammad to Sadda Khan on occasion of recent visit. I have heard nothing further on this point since, but considering what happened after the Sardar's visit to Wano and Jandola in 1892-93, the suspicion has very probably foundation.

Second.—I do not consider Madda Khels of Kazha are concerned as a section in this outrage. They have no doubt previously shown fanatical tendencies, as reported in Gee's diaries of March, but since Gee's visit to Kazha they appear to have suppressed these. Gee has changed his opinion in regard to them. He, in his telegram of 14th, says:—"I am satisfied now the Kazhawals were not in it as a tribe; one Kazhawal was killed, Kazhawals came over in the evening and took away his body, but I cannot find out at present that they came over with the intention of fighting. Nur Shah's case appears isolated." I concur in above. Nur Shah, Kazhawal, is a fanatic. If Kazhawals wished to join Maizarwals, there was nothing to prevent them from doing so, and they would have joined at the time. Nur Shah, one of their section, joined. I consider only the Ger Madda Khel of Maizar, Sheranna, and probably hamlets lying west of Sheranna to Dotoi are responsible for the outbreak, and no other sections.

Third.—It is represented by one or two Waziri Maliks here that outbreak was unpremeditated and arose suddenly in consequence of irritation caused by demand of fines due; but I do not credit this, and believe that it was planned for about 24 hours beforehand. In any case, the Maliks present at the time may have taken no active part, but they are guilty at least of connivance. It is impossible to believe that they were unacquainted with the attitude of their section or the preparations which must have necessarily been made beforehand. They gave no intimation whatever to the Political Officer, nor assisted in stopping the outbreak. It was an act of pure treachery, and is looked upon by every friendly person in the valley as opposed to the code of Afghan honour.

Fourth. Gee stated in his telegram that he had received a letter from Sadda Khan and other Ger Maliks on night 11th, asking whether they should come in. Letter was sealed by Sadda Khan, Alambe and two others, names illegible. They simply enquired whether Government wished them to come in on 12th. My proposal for dealing with case is that Maizar should be occupied with troops as soon as possible, and its fortified Kots demolished. The large fortified village of Sheranna with its 30 towers should be levelled. Following terms to be given to be complied with within a fixed time :—(1) All Maliks concerned, Mulla Ghain-ud-din, who headed Sheranna party, and ringleaders, viz., Namwar, Madi, Shahpi, Azim, Gulbadin, Sayadwali, Khangai, Nur Shah to be surrendered unconditionally. Following ringleaders, Piyall, Butt, Shingai and Wali were killed in the fight. (2) Stolen property to be restored or 500 Government rupees to be paid for each rifle or horse not restored. (3) Consent to be given to payment of land revenue to be fixed for three years now, and assessed afterwards at one-half of the owner's share according to areas. (4) Fine should be imposed. In event of failure to comply with terms, country of offending sections to be under temporary military occupation preventing return of refractory sections to their homes.

Fifth. There is, at present, no combination of any other tribes against us. The Madda Khels are aware of the heinousness of their offence and anticipate certain punishment. They have despatched messengers to ask assistance of Mulla Powindah, Turi Khels, and Mohmit Khels, who are now at Razmak and elsewhere in their summer quarters. There is little chance of their assisting the Madda Khels as sections, but it is yet too early to give a positive opinion. All Waziris are now in their summer quarters in hills, and to reduce the chances of failure to nil I concur with Commanding Officer, Tochi, that not less than a brigade, with another brigade in reserve, will be required to occupy Maizar, and to move about safely with a view to enforce compliance with terms. There is, however, an alternative proposal. Term No. 1 to be slightly modified, and only Sadda Khan with Mulla Ghain-ud-din and ringleaders of the assailing party to be demanded. Sadda Khan and Ghain-ud-din to be kept as hostages during the pleasure of Government, and the ringleaders to stand their trial; and other Maliks to be allowed to come in and make submission, on condition of their making an unreserved and clear statement of all the events connected with the outrage. Statement implicating any of the Maliks so allowed to come in not to be used against him if he makes a true statement. By other Maliks I mean Aki Khan's son, Khan Alam, Ware, Shirin, Khan Habid, Mozamal Khan, &c. They are all minor Ger Maliks. The justification for this proposal lies in the fact that hitherto we dealt with the offending section through Sadda Khan alone, and considered him absolutely responsible for the section; he has misbehaved and may be rightly held responsible for the whole occurrence. The advantage of the policy to single out Sadda Khan is that the Ger Madda Khels will be split and chance for combination will be minimised, and the compliance with terms will become comparatively easier. Sadda Khan is the wealthiest hill Darwesh Khel and has large landed property. All this might be confiscated if he escapes to the Amir's territory, and prospect confiscation may induce him to surrender himself. If we demand the surrender of all the Maliks, the tribe will go with them, and they will all escape to the Amir's territory, obtain asylum with Birmal Kabul Khels, Zadrans and Tanis, become outlaws, and will always be troubling us. This state of things may, I think, be avoided if Sadda Khan alone is selected out of all the Maliks, not being ringleaders in actual attack, as the only responsible person. This alternative proposal can, I think, safely be carried out by sending to the Tochi one additional regiment of infantry, second mountain battery, besides two regiments in reserve in Bannu and the 33rd Punjab Infantry, which has already been ordered to Tochi, and 250 rifles of which have already arrived, and taken over charge of Saidgi, Idak, and Miran Shah. Maizar is only 11 miles from Datta Khel and the valley between is open and treeless. I consider the attitude of the Dauris satisfactory. Their Maliks have expressed to me their contentment with our administration, and have offered every assistance in keeping order in their country. From Kanirogha the farthest end of the Upper Daur to Maizar is a distance of about 17 miles; the Khiddar Khels, who surround the Datta Khel position, are

showing themselves friendly. In view of the above considerations, the force I have proposed will be quite sufficient to maintain their position, hold posts and communications. The present is the worst time for making an advance north of Tochi and undertaking punitive operations. All the Waziris are in their summer quarters, and a comparatively large force will be required to guard against possible combinations. Moreover, our hold on them at this time of the year is not so strong as in winter, and the Waziris, if pursued in their summer quarters, can easily cross the border to the Amir's territory without being put to much inconvenience or suffering from inclemency of weather. Punitive action can be most conveniently and effectively taken in October or November, when return to winter quarters takes place. The reinforcement of the Shahur communicated with your 129 F. is sufficient for present.

Sixth. Included in above.

Seventh. As to the retaliatory measures that may be necessary I have explained under head four.

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Enclosure No. 3.

*Letter from W. J. Cunningham, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 17th June 1897.*

WITH reference to the correspondence regarding the attack by Madda Khels on a party of British officers and troops at Maizar, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council decided to-day at a meeting of Council, which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor had been invited to attend, that an advance shall be made to Maizar in order to destroy the Kots as recommended by the Commissioner of the Derajat Division in his telegram of the 16th June 1897.

2. The advance will be in sufficient force to remain at Maizar, or in a convenient place near to it, and hold its own against any possible combination that can be brought against it. On the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, the strength of the force will be two brigades, and the composition will be left to His Excellency.

3. As regards the terms to be offered to the tribes, the Governor-General in Council will await a communication from the Lieutenant-Governor.

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Enclosure No. 4.

*From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sarwakai, the 17th June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

ON 16th Saiad Akbar Shah wrote from Kaniguram that Mulla Powindah with some Sheikhs arrived Kaniguram afternoon sixteenth, and in spite of protests of Saiyids had drums beaten for ghaza, that he has summoned all Mahsuds who should be collected at Kaniguram by nineteenth, when Saiad Akbar Shah thinks it possible Mulla may lead lashkar to do mischief in some direction. I do not think he will be able to induce any considerable number of Mahsuds to give trouble. He is also believed to have sent secret messengers to Wano Ahmadzais to join him, but their decided refusal may be anticipated.

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Enclosure No. 5.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 18th June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 16th. Gee wires :—"Your telegram. I am submitting my detailed report as to causes of outbreak in a day or two. I do not, however, attribute actual outbreak to preaching of Mullas, as I think we should have heard of such preaching beforehand. I have obtained no information at present as to whether Gul Muhammad was concerned,



but it is quite possible. All Ger sections appear concerned, except perhaps Machas of Shawal Tangi. Colonel Gray and myself strongly recommend the immediate demolition of Sheranna and Maizar Kots, believing that, if this part of the punishment was postponed till the cold weather, it would lose half its force and would be interpreted as a sign of weakness on our part, but in order to do this, we are of opinion that the two brigades originally mentioned by Colonel Gray are indispensable, first, for the separate occupation of Maizar for so long as may be deemed necessary, and because the smaller force mentioned in your alternative proposals would not be sufficient to enable us to camp out at Maizar or to demolish the kots in the face of any serious opposition. I agree generally with your modification of the first proposal, viz., to keep Sadda Khan and Ghain-ud-Din as hostages, leaving some of the smaller Maliks to make their submission; but what would you do in the case of men like Dande, Alambe and Zarmakhmad, son of Ayub, all of whom are said to have joined in? Khan Habib took no active share in the attack. Reference to second condition. We would insist on return of rifles in any case, and as regards mules and miscellaneous property, of which there is a good deal missing, we recommend that tribe be ordered to restore, all in good condition, or, failing this, to pay whatever we may fix. Colonel Gray suggests double value for everything else and ten-fold for ammunition, of which four boxes are lost. I concur in condition 3. As regards condition 4, we would tell the tribe that they will not be permitted to return to the Tochi till all terms are complied with. We would not accept a fine in lieu of compliance, except as in condition 2. After having occupied Maizar for the purpose of demolishing villages, the Brigade might be kept on there as long as was deemed advisable, Colonel Gray recommending that during this period the Ger country should be under martial law; subsequently the Brigade might be withdrawn to Datta Khel and reduced to the force mentioned in your alternative proposal, viz., one squadron, three infantry battalions, and two mountain batteries. This force would probably be sufficient to keep the Madda Khels quiet and prevent them re-occupying country without permission. We recommend as additional terms the surrender of 50 breech-loaders, including Sadda Khan's Winchester which was used in the fight, also that no kots or towers are to be built without our permission for the future. Colonel Gray also recommends realisation of blood-money, but I am doubtful of their ability to pay this in addition to other terms. The whole terms should be made applicable to all villages that may be proved to have taken part as a whole in the affair. Cases of individuals joining from other tribes, such as Khidder Khels, Khojai Khels or Dauris can be dealt with separately on their merits." Gee would appear to differ from me as to immediate cause of outbreak. In his of 11th, he stated that gathering was partly fanatical: what I have stated in my No. 161 is that Madda Khels have strong fanatical tendencies which displayed themselves on several occasions in the last one and a half years. I have not attributed outbreak to any particular preaching by Mullas. During Moharram Waziris kill sheep, distribute food and hold meetings, and consider the period as most auspicious for martyrdom. I have no doubt that, though no special information may have reached Gee, there was at this time a strong fanatical feeling excited in Maizar, and this was to be expected. I see no reason to change my opinion at present; I however await Gee's detailed report which he has promised to send in a day or two. As regards instigation by Gul Muhammad, I have received following telegram from a well-to-do Saiyid of Bannu, Saiyid Mubarak Shah, who has relations in Urgun:—"Kindly ask Sadda Khan the conversation he had with Gul Muhammad when he went Urgun and got separate tent." I am making enquiries about this. I have not proposed in my 161 that demolition of kots, &c., should be deferred until cold weather. My proposal is that Maizar should be occupied as soon as we have got sufficient troops to do so, and its kots should then be demolished at once; the terms should then be announced. If Sheranna continues to remain deserted by inhabitants as at present, it might possibly be occupied by us as strongly defensive position, or if it be decided it is not required for above purpose, it may be necessary, as a military precaution, to destroy it at once, otherwise this might be carried out gradually and used as a means of pressure for enforcing early

compliance with terms. There would be no object in fixing too early a date for compliance with terms; rather time should be left for inducing compliance. This will enable movements and action necessary in event of non-compliance to be conducted at the most suitable season. In the meanwhile country of offending sections would remain under condition of military occupation. In event of non-compliance with terms demanded, and when we are ready to move troops north of Tochi, I would add to terms some penalties, such as surrender of a number of arms, &c., which I have intentionally reserved for future use. My telegram 166 covers cases of Dande, &c., named by Gee. I have not yet received list of property lost or carried off, and made my proposal in regard to recovery of property, &c., in general terms for sanction of Government. I concur with Colonel Gray in regard to demanding the values suggested by him of ammunition and other property. Fine proposed in term 4 is not intended to be in lieu of compliance with any term, but it will be imposed substantively on account of this and outstanding cases, &c. I do not agree to withdrawal troops from advanced position which will now be occupied at any time before all the terms are complied with to the letter; withdrawal will make tribes doubt our intention to punish them in event of non-compliance, encourage them and delay acceptance of terms.

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Enclosure No. 6.

*From the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, to the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated the 19th June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams dated 16th and 18th June. Your alternative proposal is understood by the Lieutenant-Governor to be framed with object of securing partial satisfaction without despatch of large force. You have been informed in my telegram of 17th June that force, sufficient to hold Upper Tochi against any possible combination, is being sent. There is, therefore, no need for framing terms so as to avoid extensive operations, and Lieutenant-Governor is prepared to consider terms formulated by you under head four, though the terms finally settled will be enforced by military occupation and without any corresponding pledges on part of Government. Alternative proposal would in any case have been impossible as precluding the trial of Sadda Khan whose treachery is *primâ facie* conspicuous and constituting him sole hostage for tribe, whereas his influence is understood to be less than Alambe's. Your final proposals as to British demand should now be submitted as soon as possible. Other parts of your telegram will be separately treated.

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Enclosure No. 7.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 21st June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 19th. Alternative under head four, was suggested partly for object you mention and partly for other reasons, one being the consideration that, if we deprive tribe of all Maliks, we must undertake direct administration ourselves, involving lengthened control of country by military force and other departures from previous policy. However, as expediency is not to be considered, I have nothing more to urge, and propose that, in addition to other terms recommended, unconditional surrender of every Malik of the sections concerned, and every ringleader should be demanded. I have accordingly called from Gee exhaustive list persons concerned, and will submit on receipt. Gee's report received and goes Simla to-day. He arrives as regards Sadda Khan at following conclusion:—"The charge of direct complicity against Malik Sadda Khan must, I think, be held not proved, but it is impossible to acquit him, if not of guilty knowledge, at least of gross neglect of his duty towards Government."

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## Enclosure No. 8.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 23rd June 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

It is reported that Mulla Powindah has summoned Turi Khel and other Waziri and Mahsud Maliks, with a view of holding meeting for discussing the attitude towards Government. Ekhlās, his Sheikh, is said to have stated at Momiragha four days ago that Mulla would not interfere so long as troops remained at Datta Khel. No section or tribe is known to have resolved on making combinations against Government up to this time.

## Enclosure No. 9.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 25th June 1897.*

WITH reference to the scheme of operations for the punishment of the sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris implicated in the attack at Maizar on the 10th June 1897 on the escort of the Political Officer in the Tochi, I am directed to inform you that Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., the Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force, will be vested with supreme political control from the date of his entering the Tochi valley ; and I am to request that the Lieutenant-Governor will be good enough to submit the name of the Punjab Political officer or officers whom His Honour would propose to depute with the force.

2. Major-General Bird will report direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department on all political questions, and will be requested to repeat all telegrams to the Government of the Punjab.

3. I am to forward, for the concurrence of the Lieutenant-Governor or for any observations which His Honour may wish to offer, a draft of a proclamation which it is proposed should be issued by the General Officer Commanding the Field Force ; it might be issued either when Major-General Bird takes over charge—or when he advances from Datta Khel ; the Governor-General in Council is inclined to prefer the earlier date.

## PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, on the 10th of June 1897, Mr. Gee, Political Officer in the Tochi, with a small escort of British Indian troops, after friendly pre-arrangement with the Maliks concerned, visited Sheranna and Maizar, for the purpose of selecting a site for a post, and for realizing a fine which had been inflicted on the Madda Khels for the murder of Honda Ram, the Mohurrir of the Sheranna post ;

And whereas, while the British party, after receiving hospitality at the hands of Sadda Khan, one of the principal Maliks, were resting under the shade of the trees at Maizar, they were attacked in a most treacherous and cowardly manner by a large body of tribesmen, and several officers and men were killed and wounded ;

Now, I proclaim to all concerned that I am ordered by the Sarkar to proceed to Maizar with a force sufficiently strong to hold its own against all comers and to compel obedience to the orders of the Sarkar.

And I inform you that it is my intention to destroy all the fortified kots in Maizar and Sheranna, whether resistance be shown or otherwise, and that I shall remain at Maizar or some convenient spot near to it, for so long as seems to me and the Government of India desirable.

And I further inform you that I shall in due course announce the terms of punishment which the Sarkar may decide to inflict on all those who were in any way responsible for, or who took part in, the treacherous attack on the British troops ; with whom alone it is my business to deal.

And I warn all others who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar to refrain from obstructing my force, for, depend upon it, any further unfriendly acts will be severely dealt with.



## Enclosure No. 10.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 25th June 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

On 23rd, with view of ascertaining intentions of Government, Kippal, the leading Tori Khels, and Ilyas, leading Tori Khel Malik, went to Gee. They represented that if Government intends troops to punish Madda Khels, they were afraid the bad characters of other sections would join against Government, and thus implicate all Waziri sections. They, therefore, recommended settlement case through agency of tribal Maliks Ahmedzai and Abuwuzi. They reported things were quite quiet at Razmak, and Mulla was making no attempt to collect a large gathering. Maizar still continues to remain deserted, except by a few labourers. Tazhorwals sent message that they all agreed to have nothing to do with Gerwals, would present themselves if summoned, and give assistance. A few Saifalis are said to have gone to Kazipa and informed Maliks that Birmal subjects of Khalifa Nur Muhammad were ready to assist them secretly. Babrak, Amir's representative among Zadrans, has ordered them not to interfere with Madda Khels if they sought asylum in their country.

## Enclosure No. 11.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 26th June 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of my telegram 21st June. Gee reports Maizar ringleaders are—

- |                             |                                    |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Mohar.                   | 37. Landak.                        |
| 2. Madai.                   | 38. Sekandar, Bakhshi Khels,       |
| 3. Miani Khan.              | besides about—                     |
| 4. Azam Din.                | 39. Salo Macha of a village above  |
| 5. Sarwar Khan.             | junction Tochi and Shawal          |
| 6. Lazim.                   | Algad.                             |
| 7. Pyall.                   | 40. Botan, Khoji Khel and          |
| 8. Nur Muhammad.            | 41. Mohabhat Sardi Khel, Bakka     |
| 9. Ghazi.                   | Khel, a Talib living at            |
| 10. Shinkai.                | Maizar.                            |
| 11. Salim.                  | 42. Nur Shah of Kazha.             |
| 12. Lut.                    | Maliks of five sections of She-    |
| 13. Wati Dreplaris and      | ramma and outlying hamlets         |
| 14. But.                    | concerned are—                     |
| 15. Mir Hassan.             | 43. Sadda Khan.                    |
| 16. Botai.                  | 44. Alambe.                        |
| 17. Namwar.                 | 45. Zer Muhammad.                  |
| 18. Kalandar.               | 46. Khan Habib, Khizar Khels.      |
| 19. Amin Shah.              | 47. Mulla Ghain-ud-din.            |
| 20. Marghat.                | 48. Sheikh Nur.                    |
| 21. Shah Morad.             | 49. Sayad Wali, Ali Khan Khels.    |
| 22. Kar.                    | 50. Gula Khan, Bakshi Khel.        |
| 23. Shah Waz.               | 51. Pimbal.                        |
| 24. Awezand.                | 52. Walaiz.                        |
| 25. Buhadar.                | 53. Guri Dreplaris.                |
| 26. Ikhtiyar, Khoji Khels.  | 54. Mate Macha.                    |
| 27. Azim.                   | 55. Alam, Nazar Khel.              |
| 28. Shahper.                | 56. Jandar, Khoji Khel of Kamkai   |
| 29. Guldin.                 | Sheranna.                          |
| 30. Gul Ahmad.              | 57. Khunijan of Kotku ; Khunijan,  |
| 31. Sadgul, Ali Khan Khels. | also a ringleader.                 |
| 32. Ware Khan.              | 58. Nur Muhammad.                  |
| 33. Mir Badshah.            | 59. Nasir.                         |
| 34. Sabil.                  | 60. Kazgul.                        |
| 35. Shahpir.                | 61. Kulamban.                      |
| 36. Mirbad, Machas.         | 62. Mad Wali ; all five of Turmor. |
|                             | 63. Bandai of O. Shira (?)         |

With exception of Nos. 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 28, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, each ringleader possesses his own Kot, named after him, and is a Motabir or Malik in section. Gee adds degree of guilt of Nos. 43 to 46 dealt with in paragraph 14 of his letter dated 19th instant; there is no special information against Nos. 44 to 56 and 58 to 62; latter five belonging to Turmor, in which Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan took refuge, but their station should be held equally guilty of the attack during retreat.

I concur in above and consider 63 men as ringleaders, Maliks and Motabirs of sections concerned of whom Nos. 7, 10, 13 and 14 were killed during action.

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Enclosure No. 12.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 27th June 1897.*

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 25th instant, with which you forward, for the concurrence of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, or such observations as he may desire to make, a draft proclamation which it is proposed should be issued by the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force, who will be vested with supreme political control from the date of his entering the Tochi Valley, and also ask that the names of the Punjab Political Officers who are to be deputed with the force should be submitted.

2. In reply, I am to state that Sir Mackworth Young accepts the draft proclamation as it stands and has no remarks to offer on it. It is, indeed, very similar to a draft which he has had under consideration. His Honour also considers that it is desirable that the proclamation should be issued at as early a date as possible after Major General Bird has taken over charge.

3. With reference to the deputation of Political Officers, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that, as the Field Force consists of two brigades, it will be necessary to appoint one experienced Chief Political Officer and Political Assistant to the General Officer Commanding, and two junior Assistant Political Officers to work with the two Brigadier-Generals. He therefore proposes to depute Mr. Gee as Chief Political Officer and Political Assistant to Major-General Corrie Bird. Mr. Gee has now been in the Tochi for 14 months, and knows the valley and the clans well. He has, moreover, managed the tribes with tact and skill, at any rate up to the unfortunate occurrence of 10th June, when the treacherous hospitality of the Maliks evidently threw the officers and men off their guard. The Lieutenant-Governor, in short, recommends him on account of his experience, and because he has hitherto carried out the orders of Government in regard to our dealings with the tribes with marked success and ability.

4. As Assistant Political Officer with Brigadier-General Egerton, the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to depute Mr. Lorimer, who has served in Bannu and Kohat, and is now in charge of the Yusufzai sub-division. He is an Assistant Commissioner of six years' standing, has passed the High Proficiency Examination in Persian and the Higher Standard in Arabic, is an excellent Pashtu scholar and knows Pathans well.

For the 2nd Brigade Mr. Kettlewell, an Assistant Commissioner of five years' standing, most of which has been passed on the frontier, will be sent. He has held charge of a frontier district and is now District Judge at Peshawar, and is accustomed to deal with Pathan tribesmen.

I am also to intimate that, in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Gee may well be left to select, subject to the approval of the General Officer Commanding, such subordinate agents as he may consider necessary, as he will be responsible for their conduct and efficiency.

## Enclosure No. 13.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 30th June 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 27th June 1897, regarding the Political Officers to be attached to the Tochi Field Force, and the proclamation to be issued by the General Officer Commanding.

2. Instructions will be sent to Major-General Corrie Bird to issue the proclamation at as early a date as he considers suitable.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor's nominations of Political Officers\* are approved,

\* Chief Political Officer and Political Assistant to the General Officer Commanding : Mr. H. W. Gee, C.S.

Assistant Political Officer with Brigadier-General Egerton : Mr. J. G. Lorimer, C.S.

Assistant Political Officer with Brigadier-General Symons : Mr. A. B. Kettlewell, C.S.

and I am to request that orders may be issued accordingly. The selection of subordinate agents for political work may be left to Mr. Gee, subject to the approval of the General Officer Commanding.

## Enclosure No. 14.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 1st July 1897.*

IN continuation of my letter, dated 27th ultimo, I am directed to forward, for the approval of the Government of India, a draft of the terms of punishment of the Madda Khel or such sub-sections of the tribe as may be proved to have been implicated in the recent treacherous outbreak at Maizar, and of the conditions on which they should be allowed to reoccupy their lands and houses. These terms have been referred to Mr. Anderson, Commissioner of the Derajat Division, for opinion, and, as will appear from the copies of the telegrams marginally noted, he has  
Dated 26th June 1897. no further suggestions to make in

regard to them except as regards the exclusion of the Kazhawals.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that it would be advisable at this stage to exculpate expressly the Kazhawals by confining our demand for the surrender of the Maliks to those of the Ger section. The words in the first term "found to have been directly or indirectly implicated, &c.," leave ample scope for inquiry, and it would, Sir Mackworth Young thinks, be a mistake to exclude the Kazhawals, even though it seemed probable that only one Malik were involved. But besides this Mr. Gee at first distinctly stated in his telegram of 11th ultimo that they came down to join in the attack which, owing to the distance at which their villages lie from Maizar, they could hardly have done had there not been some previous concert. It would therefore not be justifiable at present to assume their innocence, and some further inquiries seem to be necessary before we can exonerate the Kazhawals from complicity in the attack. Moreover, their past misconduct in connection with outrages on the road and fanatical gatherings of a hostile character renders it suitable that a portion of the fine should be recovered from them, while it is obviously desirable that, as regards payment of revenue, &c., the tribe should be dealt with as a whole, more especially as it controls in the Tochi and the Kazha the two main routes to Urgun and Ghazni.

3. For similar reasons the Lieutenant-Governor considers that it will be best not to cite the names of the ringleaders and Maliks implicated, as these can best be determined by General Bird on the spot, though the list given by Mr. Gee in Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated 26th ultimo, probably gives a good idea of the number of persons whose surrender we are likely to require. In the event of any of the persons demanded not being given up, it will probably be necessary to impose a fine in lieu, but the Lieutenant-Governor does not think



it desirable to announce this in the terms, and it is of course possible that some of these persons may betake themselves over the border, in which case confiscation of their land may be the only method of realization.

4. The value to be set upon the stolen property not restored in good condition can, His Honor thinks, be best determined by General Bird after full consideration of the case. As regards the tribunal for the trial of the ringleaders and Maliks if surrendered, and the law to be administered, the Government of India will no doubt issue orders. At present no substantive law or procedure has been laid down for the observance of the Political Officer in the Tochi.

5. As to the third term, I am to say that His Honour has given the subject his most anxious consideration lest by making a demand for revenue, or, in other words, placing the Madda Khel country on the same footing as Daur, we may even in appearance be held to have violated any pledge given to the tribes. The history of our dealings with the Tochi Darwesh Khel, and especially with the Madda Khel section of that clan, is detailed in the précis attached, and I am to point out that, in the first instance, the invitation to us to assume control of their country was made by the Darwesh Khel and Dauris in identical terms on 6th April 1895, that the Darwesh Khel, and especially the Madda Khel as represented by their headmen, have repeatedly invited Government to occupy their country, and have offered to pay revenue, that no pledge has ever been given to them that no revenue would be levied from them, and that finally the conduct of the Madda Khel at any rate of late has rendered it necessary, if we are to retain a proper measure of control over the Tochi route, and to prevent trouble across the Durand Line, that we should, as has always been indicated as a probable consequence of the misconduct of any of the tribes, assume direct control of their country and establish some rough form of administration such as has been satisfactorily constituted in the adjoining tract of Daur.

6. If the grievances of the Madda Khel arising out of the distribution of the service allowances or the demarcation of the Durand Line have any real foundation,—and, even allowing for the sudden gusts of feeling to which Pathans are only too prone, it is certainly curious that the attitude of the tribe should have suddenly changed from one of marked cordiality to one of sullen hostility after November 1895 when the allowances were given out—these grievances can be inquired into and remedied, but it does not appear to be desirable after once tightening our hold over this strong tribe, which holds so important a position on the border, to allow our control to relax and the administration of Upper Tochi to again fall into disorder.

7. In regard to the fourth term, I am to say that it is, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, obvious that we must recover the fine of Rs. 1,200 for the murder of Honda Ram after our failure to do so on the 10th June.

8. The Government of India will observe that Mr. Anderson raises no objection to the amount of the fine which it is proposed in the fifth term should be imposed on the whole Madda Khel tribe as a punishment for their recent misconduct, or to the method of realizing this which has been suggested in the event of the clan not being able to pay in cash or arms. If we can succeed in securing the construction by the people themselves of the post, wherever it may be decided after full examination of the country to locate it, this will, Sir Mackworth Young thinks, be indeed an appropriate manner of marking the treacherous conduct of the clan and a standing warning to them in the future of the retribution which must follow on such misdeeds. Whether wages are to be paid or not, and the amount of these, must depend upon the opinion of the General Officer Commanding with reference to the resources of the tribe and the character of the labourers employed upon the work. I am to add that the amount of the fine has been pitched at a reasonable figure, because it is only part of the punishment proposed, and also because it is inadvisable to drive the tribe to desperation and make them permanently forsake their lands. Besides this portion of the penalty will fall upon the subordinate members of the tribe, whose responsibility is far less than that of their leaders.

## Sub-enclosure.

*Draft of Terms of Punishment of the Madda Khel or such sub-sections of the tribe as may be proved to have been implicated in the attack at Maizar and of the conditions on which they should be allowed to reoccupy their lands and houses.*

1. All Maliks of the Madda Khel found to have been directly or indirectly implicated in the attack on the escort at Maizar on 10th June 1897 must be surrendered unconditionally, as well as any ringleaders of that attack who may be demanded by the Government. All persons so surrendered will be tried in such way as Government may determine.

2. All stolen property must be restored in good condition, or in default the value determined by Government must be paid.

3. The tribe must now agree to pay such land revenue as Government may demand, not exceeding half the net profits derived from the land.

4. Payment of the outstanding fine of Rs. 1,200 on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Moharrir.

5. Payment of a fine of Rs. 10,000 (ten thousand) on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe, which may, with the sanction of the British Government, be discharged in whole or in part by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranna post or of any other work approved by Government without payment or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

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Enclosure No. 15.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd July 1897.*

In continuation of my letter, dated 1st instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a detailed report by Mr. Gee of the events connected with the Madda Khel outbreak at Maizar on the 10th ultimo. A copy of my letter to the Commissioner calling for further particulars in regard to the position and movements of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad, the Native Assistant Political Officer, during the occurrence is also enclosed.

2. I am to say that on the information before him the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that Mr. Gee's opinion as to the causes of the outbreak is a correct one. Mr. Gee does not mention the Muharram as having affected the question, and there is, His Honour believes, no reason for thinking that it had anything to do with the outbreak. This view is confirmed by Mr. Grant's Wana Diary of the 21st to 24th June, last sentence—copy enclosed. This diary also supports generally Mr. Gee's view of the causes of the outbreak. But His Honour considers that further and fuller enquiry will be necessary before the causes are completely established and the share of responsibility for the outbreak duly apportioned. It is, Sir Mackworth Young thinks, very probable that some of those who pose as quite innocent of any plan for attacking the escort may be more involved than as yet appears, for the workings of the minds of Pathan Maliks are subtle, and it is quite conceivable that Sadda Khan may have connived at, or even arranged, the attack, finding his authority with the tribe weak, and hoping that a display of force by the troops would strengthen his position, provided only he could himself show a loyal front and escape suspicion. Instances of such conduct are not unfrequently to be found in the history of our dealings with frontier tribes—and there are some circumstances which seem specially to point to the probability of a deep-laid plot in the present case.

3. I am to add that Sir Mackworth Young cannot refrain from an expression of admiration at the steadiness and courage displayed by the native officers after their English officers had all been killed or disabled.

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## Sub Enclosure A.

*Extract from Letter from H. W. Gee, Esquire, Political Officer, Tochi Valley, to the Commissioner Derajat Division, dated 19th June 1897.*

IN reply to your telegram dated 16th instant, I have the honour to submit a report on the recent attack on my military escort at Maizar which took place on the 10th instant.

Maizar is the name given to a group of Madda Khel villages situated above the junction of the Shawal Algad and the Tochi, and not the name of one single village as shown on the map. It consists of a number of broad cultivated terraces sloping down to the stream, and is occupied by Drepilari, Khoji Khel, Ali Khan Khel and Macha sections of the Ger portion of the Madda Khel tribe. It lies two miles beyond the village of Sheranna, and is about eleven miles distant from Datta Khel camp.

The main road to Birmal and Ghazni, which the tribe is under agreement to keep open, runs through it, and it forms part of that tract of the Upper Tochi in which a more extended influence was contemplated as compared with the hill tracts of Darwesh Khel country. As long ago as September 1896 I had visited Sheranna and Maizar with the view of examining possible sites for the Sheranna levy post, and you had concurred generally with me that the post should be somewhere between Sheranna and Maizar.

My chief object in making the present visit was to select a final site for this post, as the building season was already far advanced and the sanctioned plan and estimate were expected back from the Public Works Department, and if possible to establish a temporary post there for the Sheranna levies, who since our occupation of Datta Khel have been kept close to camp. I had asked Colonel Bunny to accompany me in order that he might give me his advice in the final selection of the site. In my letter dated 15th June 1897, I have explained the circumstances connected with the realization of the fine in Honda Ram's case, and my intention of discussing the details of distribution with all the Maliks concerned on my visit to Maizar.

This was an additional reason for going up the Valley, though the fact that I asked the jirga to meet me at Maizar was merely due to my intention to halt there as being the most convenient place.

Under ordinary circumstances, with the Valley quite peaceful, as we believed it to be, an escort of sowars and Maliks would have sufficed to visit Maizar, as the road lies through open country, and the Kotal above Maizar is visible from Datta Khel camp. I asked Colonel Bunny if he would mind taking out the same number of men as were employed on my recent visit to the Kazha. That visit had an excellent effect on the Kazhawals, and as I had not visited Maizar for some time, I was of opinion that the sight of a large escort would have a good effect there too, especially in view of the early commencement there of the Levy post. Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny agreed to my proposal.

The following is the detail of the escort that accompanied me :—

200 rifles 1st Sikhs with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny and Lieutenant Higginson.

100 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Seton Browne.

2 guns No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery under Captain Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.A.

12 sabres 1st (P.A.V.O.) Punjab Cavalry.

Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 1st Sikhs.

The 9th was originally fixed for the visit, but owing to rain it was postponed till the 10th. Sadda Khan and Alambe had been sent on one day in advance to make what preparations were required and collect the local Maliks for the purpose of discussing the distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's case.

A start was made from Datta Khel at 5 A.M. and Maizar was reached at 9.30. I was accompanied from Datta Khel by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer. Maliks Nabbi Khan, Sabil and his son Dande and Khanadin of the Kazha, Shadam Khan, brother of Malik Sadda Khan, Mozammil Khan, his nephew, at present officiating as Levy Jamadar, and Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel. At Ziarat village I was joined by



the Khiddar Khel Maliks Salehdin, Gul Samid, Syad Khan and Khan Wazir, and at Sheranna by the Madda Khel Maliks Khan Habib and Zer Makhmad. Sadda Khan and Alambe were already at Maizar and met me there.

Sadda Khan showed me the place where he wanted the troops to camp and where a number of charpoys had been placed in readiness. This, as will be seen from the sketch which accompanies this report, was under some trees on the topmost terrace, close to a threshing floor and not far from the Drepilari Kot of Modai, a small Malik. I showed the place to Colonel Bunny and the troops were halted there.

I went on at once with most of the Maliks, who had come with me, and the cavalry so as to inspect Dotoi and come back before it was very hot.

Before going, however, I and the Assistant Political Officer saw some of the Maizar Maliks, and they were told with reference to the fine in Honda Ram's case that I would have them all up and discuss the matter on my return. Sadda Khan and Alambe stayed in camp by my order.

Captain Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant Higginson accompanied me towards Dotoi and we returned to camp at 11.30, when we all had breakfast.

The people of the villages round at that time appeared perfectly friendly, and talked freely to the Pathan sepoy.

Everything required in the way of grass and wood had been supplied; and about mid-day food which had been cooked in one of the Maizar Kots was brought down for the sepoy, and a special point was made of the British officers partaking of some of it.

I then made enquiries as to whether the local jirga which had been sitting under some trees near for some time were ready to come and see me, and I was told by the Assistant Political Officer that they had come to an amicable agreement by themselves and that all that was necessary was that they should come up later and make a formal statement before me. This was what Malik Sadda Khan had led Ghulam Muhammad Khan to believe; but, if the evidence available is to be trusted, Sadda Khan's statement was a deliberate lie, for at that very time the Maizarwals had refused, as they had the day before, to be bound by Sadda Khan's proposals and must have been preparing for the outbreak.

Had Sadda Khan given us the slightest information of this attitude on the part of the Maizarwals, which he as well as the other Madda Khel Maliks, who had been there all day, must have been perfectly well aware of, there would have been plenty of time to prepare for an attack.

The attack actually did not take place till a little while after this, about 2 P.M. when we had just finished lunch.

I was preparing to go round with Captain Browne and look at sites for the post.

The pipes had begun to play at the request of the Maliks for the villagers to listen to, and the sepoy and ourselves were seated under the trees as shown in the sketch. The pipes played one tune and had just commenced a second when suddenly all the villagers cleared off towards the Drepilari Kot. It was seen that something was wrong, and the order to fall in was given, but at the same moment a signal shot was fired which was followed by an irregular volley apparently aimed at the officers under the tree. Lieutenant Seton Browne was hit in the thigh at the second or third shot, and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy carried him to a place of comparative safety by a small bhusa stack and tied up his wound. Colonel Bunny and myself had meanwhile gone towards the trees where the men were, but the Colonel was mortally wounded in the stomach just as he got there, and Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the left arm almost at the same minute. The firing had now become general from all the Kots round.

The guns then opened fire with case and did great execution among a body of men who had come out of the Drepilari Kot and attempted to charge them. As they were not protected by any cover, the two Royal Artillery officers afforded an easy mark for the men who were shooting from towers round, and Captain Browne was hit in the arm at about the fifth round from the battery, and Lieutenant Cruickshank was shot very soon after, first in the arm and then in the chest, the second wound being fatal. It is much to be regretted that no medical aid was available for Captain Browne. The bullet had severed the

artery, and had a proper tourniquet been applied, his life would have been saved, but Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was shot in the knee while going towards the Kotal and so could give no assistance.

After about five minutes from the commencement of the attack, the guns having expended all their ammunition, limbered up, and Colonel Bunny gave orders for a general retirement towards the Kotal. This was effected along the lane shown in the sketch, which had low walls on either side of it. As far as the Kotal we were exposed to fire on both sides, and practically all the casualties occurred before the Kotal was reached.

A fine stand was made at the corner of the garden by the lane (see sketch) with the result that the battery and the wounded men were all safely over the Kotal before the position was evacuated. It was here that the greatest loss in men occurred, including Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, and many individual acts of gallantry were performed, which will be duly brought to the notice of Government by the Officer Commanding Tochi Valley. The retirement was then continued across the six ridges which extend from the Kotal above Maizar to the sloping plain above Sheranna, which is a part of the Tsirai plain. A position was taken up on each ridge in succession, and the retirement was conducted in an orderly manner, time being given for all the wounded to get safely out on the plain, a distance of about two miles. Directly Maizar itself was evacuated the tribesmen came on in large numbers, which were constantly being increased by reinforcements from every village round including Sheranna.

They followed up the force closely and persistently and also occupied all the heights they could along the line of retirement. They were unable to do much damage owing to the steady behaviour of the rear-guard, and they must have lost a good many men themselves. Lieutenant Higginson had the misfortune to be shot again in the left arm while crossing the hills.

The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from the last ridge at 5.30 P.M., and waited there for reinforcements from Datta Khel, which arrived at 6.15 P.M. under Lieutenant DeBrett, R. A. Some sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry had been despatched as soon as possible to fetch them and warn the camp.

These reinforcements covered a distance of nine miles in one-and-half hours. They consisted of two companies of the 1st Sikhs and extra gun and rifle ammunition.

The tribesmen meanwhile, whose numbers had probably increased to well over 1,000, had been kept thoroughly in check, and as soon as the gun was got to work (the second gun had lost its wheels) the gathering began to disperse. The heights all round, which had been crowded with men, were shelled, and then Sheranna village, from which I had myself seen large parties issuing to intercept our retirement.

This was continued until I received a message from Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, who had escaped *via* the Tochi with a few Maliks, to the effect that he had arrived close to the village and was in danger of being hit.

No further opposition was met with. The Khidder Khels of Ziarat village gave us great assistance in bringing out water for the men and charpoys for the wounded, and though a few of them undoubtedly joined the Madda Khels, the Maliks who had gone straight back from Maizar when the attack began were entirely successful in preventing the tribe from joining.

Captain Browne, R. A., had by this time died from loss of blood, and Colonel Bunny did not live to reach camp. The rear-guard reached camp at 12.30 P. M.

Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan also came in the same night.

It appears that when the outbreak occurred Sadda Khan had just come over to him from the jirga with Kotan Khan and stated that the fine had been arranged for and would be paid up in five days, and almost directly afterwards the firing began. Ghulam Muhammad Khan had just gone down to a lower terrace to perform his ablutions, and he was at once joined by Nabbi Khan, Khangai Macha, Alimad Madda Khel, Wadin Saidgi and the Khidder Khel levies and Border Police. His munshi and clerk were also with him. This party was afterwards joined at different times by Sadda Khan, Shadam Khan, Dande his brother, Khan Habib, Zerim and Mozammil Khan, and they went down the

Shawal Algad to the Tochi and took refuge on the other side of the Tochi in Tarmori Kila, the inhabitants of which were just preparing to join the fight. From there Sadda Khan was despatched to Sheranna to keep the people quiet, and he returned after two hours saying he had dispersed the lashkar and the road was clear. Nothing could have been further from the truth. In consequence of what he stated, Ghulam Muhammad Khan started down the Tochi and as already stated, arrived at Sheranna when it was being shelled. Mozammil Khan and Alam Shah, the Madda Khel Daffadar of Kazha, were the only Ger Madda Khels who came on with the Assistant Political Officer to camp.

The next day I called the Khidder Khel Maliks in and asked them to arrange to bring in the dead, and this they eventually did with the assistance of Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, and I think great credit is due to them for the performance of this service, especially as the bodies were much mutilated, Mussalmans and Sikhs alike.

The following is the list of casualties on our side :—

3 British officers killed.

3 Ditto wounded.

Native ranks killed—1 Subadar and 7 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry.  
12 men and a Kahar of 1st Sikhs.

1 Havildar and 1 driver No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.

It is a significant fact that out of the above total 17 were Sikhs, though the force was composed of nearly an equal number of Sikhs and Mussalmans.

Wounded.—1st Punjab Infantry, 2 men severely.

2 men slightly.

1st Punjab Cavalry, 1 man slightly.

1st Sikhs, 12 men severely.

1 mule driver dangerously.

8 men slightly.

No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 2 men severely.

1 man slightly.

1 Kahar slightly.

*N.B.*—(Seven of the above were not included in the telegraphic report as the wounds were very slight and not known of at the time.)

The Waziri loss in killed has been put at 100 by the Maliks, from whom enquiries have been made, and as it is probable that a good many have died since of their wounds probably a total of 100 is not very wide of the mark.

This is also the opinion of Native officers who had the best means of judging. A large number (some 30 or 40) are said to have been killed outside the Drepilari Kot by the case shot, and very nearly as many were killed at the corner of the garden where the stand was made. All along the line of retirement the tribesmen pressed close, and a number of them were shot down. The names of those known at present to have been killed are as follows.\*

Grand Total: 100.

The women, I may add, joined in the fight, throwing stones, and I believe firing guns also.

The list of killed is probably not complete. Many men are said to be severely wounded, and will probably die of their wounds. It is possible that there are members of other tribes, such as Khojal Khels, whose presence in the neighbourhood was an accident and who joined in afterwards. The number of wounded I have not yet been able to ascertain, but it is said to be large.

A list of the property (Government and private) which was lost is attached to this report.

The fact that the mules stampeded when the firing began accounts for the large number of articles lost, there being no means of bringing anything away. Some of the mules missing are still alive and in the hands of the Madda Khels, so it is probable that they will eventually be recovered.

I come now to the possible reasons for this act of gross treachery, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel in frontier history, and which was contrary to all the recognized principles of Pathan honour.

\* Omitted.



The first reason which has been mentioned in this connection was the alleged dissatisfaction of the Maizarwals and Ali Khan Khels at Sadda Khan's distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's murder case. In my letter, dated 15th June 1897, I have already given a history of this fine and a copy of evidence recorded bearing on the question is already before you. It is clear from the evidence of Alam Shah, the Madda Khel Havildar, a resident of Urgun, that on the 9th and the morning of the 10th the matter was discussed in Sadda Khan's presence, and that the Maizar Maliks were extremely dissatisfied with Sadda Khan and had used threatening language towards him.

It appears to me, however, quite impossible that this was the sole cause of the outbreak, for this reason that the Maizar Maliks knew perfectly well that I wanted to discuss the matter with them, and therefore all they had to do was to come to the Assistant Political Officer or myself and state their objections. Further, it must be remembered that a short time before, these very Maliks had been present at Datta Khel when the proposed distribution was put before me in jirga, and on that occasion they had made no protest whatever.

It is probable, however, that Sadda Khan's procedure in this matter aggravated the feeling against him already existing in this portion of the tribe and made them ripe for mischief.

There is a second cause, which has since come to light, which accounts in a great measure for the active part taken by Syad Wali and other Ali Khan Khels, and that is the fact that Mozammil Khan, nephew of Sadda Khan, had recently been caught out in an intrigue with Syad Wali's wife, and that his object in taking up the Jamadarship of Sheranna levies at Datta Khel was to get out of Syad Wali's way.

Malik Salehdin, Khidder Khel, is inclined to give this as the main reason, and it is certain that the Ali Khan Khels took a prominent part in the fight. If this was the main reason, however, it is rather difficult to understand why Pyall and Namwar Khan should have made common cause with them, because the larger the share of the Ali Khan Khels in the fine the smaller their own share would be.

General dissatisfaction at Sadda Khan's management of the tribe may, however, have induced them to combine, and it is possible that there was an element of fanaticism also in existence, which though it did not openly show itself was ready to break out.

Once the attack was commenced, it became a matter of ghaza in which everyone except a few of the Maliks joined.

There has, however, been none of this fanatical spirit apparent in the Upper Tochi since our advance to Datta Khel, and the fact that Mullah Ghain-ud-din and his talibs, who were suspected in the murder of Honda Ram, the Sheranna Muharrir, had recently come in voluntarily and submitted to an enquiry into their conduct led me to believe that we should have no more trouble from that quarter. There had been some signs of fanaticism at Inzar Kach in the Kazha during the 'Id, but when I recently visited the Kazha with a large escort all this appeared to have quieted down.

The reasons I have given appear quite inadequate to account for this treachery, but no other explanation is forthcoming at present, and unless fresh facts come to light later I can only conclude that it was a combination of all these causes that culminated in the outbreak. That it was planned beforehand, I think, there can be little doubt, and all the circumstances of its commencement point to this, and most of the Maliks whose evidence I have recorded admit that this must have been the case. All the Military officers are also strongly of this opinion. It is impossible to explain how such a well-directed fire broke out on all sides, if we suppose that the affair began accidentally. It would not be then possible to explain why such a number of men at once appeared from all parts of the Valley. Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan states that as he was going down the Shawal Algad to the Tochi he saw a band of armed Waziris coming down from the hills in the Dotoi direction, and though they seem to have been halted for the time at the instance of Sadda Khan and Ghulam Muhammad, there is little doubt that they went on again after the party had passed out of sight.

These men could not possibly have collected in so short a time from their villages, which lie some way up the Tochi, unless they had been warned beforehand to be waiting in the hills close by.

It has been suggested that Malik Sadda Khan's recent visit to Urgun in connection with the return of the Kabul Khel refugees may have had some connection with the outbreak.

Sadda Khan had only just returned from Urgun, and I have not had at present any opportunity of finding out what took place there. It is known, however, that the Maizarwals sent messages to Khalifa Nur Muhammad in Birmal, announcing what they had done and asking for help. So far, however, whether Afghan intrigues had anything to do with the case is a matter of conjecture.

I have enquired as far as possible into the cases of individual Maliks who are under suspicion of having been concerned, but it is not easy to get reliable evidence against individuals. The ringleaders, as already reported in my telegram, dated 15th instant, appear to have been Pyall, Shingai and Wati, Drepilaris, and But, Khoji Khel, who were killed, and Namwar and Shawas

*Note.*—Shawas Khan is a Malik and cousin of Namwar. His name was omitted in the telegram.

H. W. G.

Khan, Khoji Khels; Madai, Drepilari; Shahpir and Azim, brothers, Ali Khan Khels of Maizar; Gul Din (not Gulbadin, as originally reported) Sayad Wali and Khani Jan, Ali Khan Khels of Sheranna, who have escaped.

To these might be added Salo, Macha, resident of Maizar, who recently bought a rifle in Wana, and who is said to have been one of the first to open fire on us.

No doubt in time the names of other men who began the firing from the towers and kots round will come to light.

Other Maliks of any importance who are accused of actually joining in the fight are Malik Nur Shah of the Kazha and his son Pyounir, Dande, the brother of Malik Sadda Khan, Alambe and Zar Mokhammad, son of the late Malik Ayub Khan, but the evidence against them would not be sufficient for a judicial conviction.

To make the position clearer it should be noted that Nur Shah, Sabil and Nabbi Khan, Kazha Maliks, belong to Ayub's faction, which is now represented by his brothers Alambe, as do also all the Ali Khan Khels who were engaged in the attack. Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, whose knowledge of Tochi tribal intrigues is unrivalled, is inclined to the view that Alambe and his faction are more concerned in the matter than would at first appear. For some time past the breach between Sadda Khan and Alambe had been widening, and in the matter of the fine, in Honda Ram's case especially, Alambe had been opposed to Sadda Khan all along and was taking the part of the Ali Khan Khels. Alambe's conduct at the time of the outbreak is also suspicious. When the firing began he is said to have been in the Drepilari Kot of Modai (the village most deeply concerned), and he went straight off over the hills to Sheranna where his presence appears to have had the effect of causing the village to rise against us.

Afterwards, when Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan was proceeding down the Tochi to Sheranna, he saw Alambe going off up the Tochi with his household goods, and, when he sent for him, Alambe took no notice and refused to stop.

On the other hand, it may be said that Pyall, who was the leading Malik in Maizar and one of the ringleaders, belonged to Sadda Khan's faction.

The charge of direct complicity against Malik Sadda Khan must, I think, be held not proven, but it is impossible to acquit him of gross neglect of his duty towards Government, if not of guilty knowledge. It must be remembered that the Maizarwals are not separate from the Sheranna people, and that the same sub-sections are found in both places. Any deliberate plot therefore made in Maizar to attack the troops would almost certainly have been known in Sheranna, and it is difficult to conceive how the matter should not have reached the ears of Sadda Khan. The open threats uttered by the Maizarwals, on the 9th, should have put him on his guard, and the very least he could do was to have given us some warning of the attitude of the Maizarwals, in which case a surprise could not have occurred.

Instead of this he led Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan to believe that the distribution of the fine had been amicably settled, when at that very moment the tribesmen were preparing for the attack.

The evidence of Alam Shah, who is Sadda Khan's own Levy Havildar, a Warguni by caste and an old soldier of the Amir's army, seems to me to be given in an unprejudiced way, and there is probably a good deal of truth in it, and it proves clearly that Sadda Khan knew perfectly well what the temper of the tribe was.

It has been alleged that the first two shots were fired at Sadda Khan himself when he went back towards the jirga from the place where the Assistant Political Officer was sitting.

He, no doubt, said so to Ghulam Muhammad Khan afterwards, but the only witness to this effect is Alam Khan, a relation of his, Duffadar of the Kazha levies, who says that Saiyad Wali, the Ali Khan Khel ringleader, fired at Sadda Khan, and Khanijan, another Ali Khan Khel of Sheranna, fired at Shadam Khan.

My own opinion is that he was not fired at. The signal shot was fired close to the village and was fired in the air, and the irregular volley which followed was aimed at the British officers under the trees.

Khan Habib, who belongs to Alambe's faction, does not appear to be deeply implicated. He accompanied us from Sheranna to Maizar, and when the outbreak occurred he and his brother joined the Assistant Political Officer and remained with him until Sheranna was reached.

The case against Dande, brother of Sadda Khan, who is said to have used the Winchester repeater given by Mr. Bruce to Sadda Khan, is perhaps not very strong, though the evidence of Surgeon-Captain Ozzard, who certifies to the best of his ability that one sepoy was wounded by an explosive bullet, and of Surgeon-Captain Cassidy who speaks to hearing the sound of a Winchester rifle, goes to prove that this rifle was used, as there is not another rifle like it in that part of the Tochi Valley.

As regards Maizar itself, Sherin, Khoji Khel, whose tower is on the top of the Kotal, is the only Malik who is known not to have joined. It was in his kot that the food for the sepoys was prepared, and when the attack commenced, no shots were fired from his tower, but, on the contrary, he was anxious that we should use his kot as a temporary place of refuge.

The Machas of the Shawal tangi above Maizar are also said to have taken no part in attack, and the Machas who were killed all belong to Maizar itself. The Ali Khan Khel Shekhs and talibs both of Maizar and of Sheranna undoubtedly took a leading part and deserve the severest punishment.

#### Annexure.

*Letter from H. W. Gee, Esquire, Political Officer, Tochi, to The Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated 15th June 1897.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 14th June 1897, on the subject of the causes of the Maizar outbreak, and to reply as follows.

As I have already reported, my chief reason for visiting Maizar was to select finally a site for the Sheranna levy post. A site close to Maizar had been already generally approved of by you, and as the building season was already well advanced I was anxious to settle the matter before the arrival of the sanctioned plan from the Public Works Department.

As it was a good opportunity to discuss the distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's case with the whole of the Ger section, I told the Maliks I would hold a jirga there and hear all objections. The history of the distribution of this fine is as follows :—

When it was originally recommended the Maliks themselves made up a "bach" which was based on the tribal shares of the whole of the Ger Madda Khels.



When the Mullah of Sheranna and other suspects were brought in, and a recommendation for a reduction of the fine to Rs. 1,200 Kabuli was made by me the Madda Khel jirga produced a new "bach" which was as follows :

					Rs.
Ali Khan Khels	...	...	...	...	180 Kabuli.
Nazr Khels	}	...	...	...	120 "
Khizzar Khels					
Drepilare	...	...	...	...	300 "
Khoji Khel	...	...	...	...	300 "
Macha	...	...	...	...	300 "

This distribution was only tentative, as I could not formally sanction it until the fine was reduced, but no objection was then made to it. Only one matter was postponed for further consideration, and that was the share that Mirdad, Ali Khan Khel, cousin of Waris Khan, should be called on to pay personally. It was agreed that he ought to pay Rs. 300 (Kabuli) out of the Drepilare and Khoji Khel shares, because these two sections were not personally to blame in the matter. No decision was come to on this point.

After formal sanction had been received to the reduction of the fine, as there was still a dispute about Mirdad's personal share, I told the Maliks that I would take the opportunity of my visit to Maizar to discuss the matter with the whole of the Gerwals and arrange an amicable distribution.

3. Sadda Khan and Alambe Khan went to Maizar on the 8th and remained there till the 10th, when I reached Maizar, and during those two days the question was freely discussed, and, if the evidence collected is true, the Maizarwals told Sadda Khan plainly that they would not be bullied by him into paying a larger share than they were bound to by custom or Shariyat, and that if he attempted anything unjust they would rather fight and abandon their homes. Not a word of this reached the ears of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan or myself.

4. On our arrival at Maizar we saw Sadda Khan, Alambe Khan and Namwar Khan ; and the Assistant Political Officer also had a talk with Sheikh Nur (Ali Khan Khel Malik) and Pyall Khan, Maizar Malik. With reference to the fine Sheikh Nur said, "I am ready to pay my tribal share, but I object to Sadda Khan's demanding more than this." Both Maliks were told that the whole matter would be discussed before me on my return from Dotoi.

On our return about 12 o'clock Sadda Khan, Alambe Khan and Kotan went to Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan and said, "We have held a maraqqa and the Maliks say that they will pay up the fine in five days, as some of the tribe are away in the hills." The question of distribution was not mentioned, and from what the Maliks said it would be naturally implied that they had arranged the distribution amicably.

I may here mention that Kotan Khan went with me to Dotoi and knew nothing personally of the matter. It appears that the question was discussed again while I was away, and, according to Alam Shah, Warguni, the Madda Khel Levy Havildar, the Maizarwals took their stand on Shariyat and said that under no circumstances would they pay more than they were bound to under Shariyat.

If this evidence is correct, and as far as the investigation has gone at present I believe there is a considerable amount of truth in it, it follows that Sadda Khan deliberately misrepresented the matter. According to another story he went further than this and deliberately told the Maizarwals that if they did not pay up Government would realize the money forcibly.

This in the face of what they had said in jirga the day before was a direct incitement to the Maizarwals to break out.

As I already noted in my telegram, the weak point in this evidence is the fact that the Maizarwals had been told by the Assistant Political Officer that I wanted to discuss the question with them, and therefore all they had to do was to come and make their objections.

There is also no doubt from the circumstances of the outbreak that the attack was planned beforehand, and it is my belief at present that the Maizarwals must have decided on it the day before, as the Khidder Khels and Nabbi Khan who came with us from Datta Khel originally stated.

## Sub-enclosure B.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab to the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, dated Simla, 2nd July 1897.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 21st June 1897, submitting a detailed report by Mr. Gee of the events connected with the attack made on his escort by the Madda Khels at Maizar on the 10th June.

2. In reply, I am to say that whatever other causes, such as discontent at the distribution of the tribal allowances, the existence of a feud arising out of an intrigue between a relative of Sadda Khan and a woman of the Ali Khan Khel, or mere fanaticism, may have contributed to this unfortunate occurrence, it appears clear that it was mainly and immediately due to the bitter feeling engendered between several of the Maliks and sections of the Madda Khel by the distribution of the fine leviable from them on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir, which had been proposed by the jirga at Datta Khel on 28th February 1897 and was apparently insisted upon by Malik Sadda Khan, before it had finally been approved by the Political Officer. The Political Officer, Mr. Gee, and his Assistant, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad, were equally unaware of this feeling. While this is much to be regretted Sir Mackworth Young is glad to recognise that Mr. Gee appears to have acted throughout the engagement with great coolness and self-possession.

3. The part played by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad may have been unavoidable, but it seems necessary to call upon him to explain why from the time of the outbreak he was to be found in the company of Madda Khel and other Maliks instead of being with the Political Officer and the escort. He has left this matter untouched in his own statements, and it is one which demands full explanation. For the space of several hours he was in the company of Sadda Khan, his two brothers Shadam Khan and Dande, and his nephew Muzammil Khan, and under these circumstances one would expect to know what his relations were during that time with these doubtful personages. Regarding this his only remark is: "We were in the hands of the Maliks and were obliged to do what they wanted." But, on the other hand, he states that he sent Sadda Khan and Dande to Sheranna when firing in that direction was heard, which looks as if he still had some control over them. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that it will throw some light upon the position if Ghulam Muhammad's statement is fully recorded regarding this matter and regarding his movements until he rejoined at Datta Khel. Was he treated by these Maliks as a prisoner or as an honored official? Had he no means of making up his mind whether any of them had connived at or joined in the attack? What was the precise time and place at which he was joined by Sadda Khan and his brothers and nephew? Did they communicate nothing to him? Did he form any opinion as to whether Dande Khan had used the Winchester rifle which he had with him when he joined him? I am to request that he may be examined on these and any other points which seem material, and the result reported at an early date, with Mr. Gee's and your opinion. It must be realized that the position and movements of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad during the afternoon and evening of the 10th June require to be fully elucidated.

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Enclosure No. 16.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Datta Khel, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 15th July 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Proclamation referred to in your 1866 F. has been published 13th, and is being circulated as widely and as quickly as possible.

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## Enclosure No. 17.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 17th July 1897.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters marked on the  
 Dated the 1st July 1897. margin, regarding the Madda Khel out-  
 " 2nd " " break at Maizar on the 10th June 1897,  
 and the terms of punishment which the Lieutenant-Governor recommends should  
 be imposed.

2. With the exception of the proposal to demand land revenue, the Governor-General in Council approves with slight modifications of the terms proposed by Sir Mackworth Young, and I am to enclose, for His Honour's information, a

Dated the 17th July 1897. copy of a letter which has been to-day  
 addressed to the General Officer Com-  
 manding the Tochi Field Force, conveying the orders of the Government of India on the subject. It has been pointed out to Major-General Corrie Bird that the Madda Khels have by their conduct forfeited the allowances and service arrangements already made with them, and that these will have to be settled afresh, after their punishment has been completed and their submission received.

3. Upon the question whether land revenue in any form should be demanded from the Madda Khel, the Governor-General in Council does not deny that, so far as the tribes are concerned, the Government of India might be within their rights, as His Honour contends, in demanding revenue, but in taking such a step they would be departing from the policy which they advocated and Her Majesty's Secretary of State accepted, *viz.*, not to undertake the administration of the Tochi Valley, except the fertile part inhabited by the Dauris. Such a change of policy, as would be involved in demanding revenue from the Madda Khels, could certainly not be adopted without His Lordship's approval, and to justify the proposal it would be necessary to show that some distinct advantage was to be gained.

4. As a fiscal measure the imposition of land revenue on this section of the  
 Enclosure of Mr. Fanshawe's letter, dated the 12th October 1895. Darwesh Khels could not for a moment be supported. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated the 6th September 1895, to your predecessor's address, seem to show clearly that little if any revenue could be obtained, and that the whole condition of things in regard to the Darwesh Khels at the head of the Tochi Valley is very different to the condition obtaining in Daur.

The Governor-General in Council agrees with the opinion expressed by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in Mr. Fanshawe's letter cited in the margin above, that the British Government cannot take revenue from a country unless they first take possession of it, and if circumstances compelled the Government to take possession of the whole or a part of the Madda Khel country, it is anticipated that the regular assessment of land revenue as such would cost more than any income to be obtained would justify. It is true that this objection as to expense could be got over by levying a summarily assessed lump sum, or accepting an amount settled in agreement with the tribes themselves; but there would be obvious disadvantage in enforcing any payment of the kind, whether called land revenue or tribute from an isolated tract of territory inhabited by one section of the Darwesh Khel, while the lands of sections all round them remained untaxed. As matters now stand it would be impossible to extend the demand to other sections of the Darwesh Khel, far less to the Waziris generally, and the Governor-General in Council does not, therefore, propose to ask sanction of the Secretary of State to the imposition on the Madda Khel of liability to pay either land revenue or tribute.



## Enclosure No. 18.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to Major-General Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated Simla, 17th July 1897.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram reporting that you had issued a proclamation announcing the intention of your advance to Maizar, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council has decided to impose the following terms on the Madda Khel for their treacherous attack upon the escort of the Political Officer in the Tochi Valley on the 10th of June last :—

- (1) The Madda Khel tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all Maliks and other ringleaders in the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897, whom, after such enquiry as you think fit, you may declare must be surrendered, and all persons surrendered will be dealt with in such way, and be subject to such punishment, as the Government of India may determine.
- (2) All stolen property must be restored in good condition, or, in default, the value, as determined by the Government, must be paid.
- (3) Payment of the fine of Rs. 1,200 outstanding on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Moharrir of the Sheranna Levy Post, must be made good.
- (4) Payment will be required of a fine of ten thousand rupees, in cash or arms, on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe. This fine may, with the sanction of the British Government, instead of being levied as above, be discharged, in whole or in part, by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranna Post, or of any other work approved by Government without payment, or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

The Madda Khels have forfeited by their misconduct the allowances which they received from Government, and it is important that they should be made to realise this fact. Whether the allowances should be hereafter regranted will to a great extent depend upon how far the Madda Khels are amenable in regard to the terms now imposed, but there is no occasion to make any announcement to them on this subject at the present stage.

2. The Governor-General in Council desires to leave you full discretion as to the manner in which the terms should be communicated to the sections concerned. After the attack on the British camp at Wano on the 3rd November 1894, both Mr. Bruce and Sir William Lockhart assembled jirgas to hear the Government demands, and there are doubtless many advantages in following this course. The Kazhawals, who maintain that they were not implicated in the attack on the British party, might come in, as might other sections, if in the first place you merely summoned the tribal Maliks to attend in token of submission, and in order to hear the terms which the Government is ready to grant. The Government of India would not object to your offering a safe conduct to those who respond to this summons, and to your promising them, that after hearing the terms they would be free to depart unmolested. These, however, are merely suggestions for your consideration : the question will have to be decided with due regard to the circumstances of the hour, and the Governor-General in Council has no wish to fetter your judgment in regard to it.

3. You will observe that the fine may be levied in cash or arms. The Government of India attach some importance to disarming the tribesmen who have attacked our troops, and they considered the question of imposing a fine of a definite number of arms in addition to the money fine. On the whole, it has been decided that the amount of the fine assessed at ten thousand rupees is sufficient, but that this opportunity may at the same time be taken to introduce to some degree a policy of partial disarmament. It is, therefore, left to you to fix the value of each description of arm which can be obtained in the valley, and to either demand a definite part of the fine in arms, or to allow arms to be given instead of cash at the valuation fixed.

4. I am to enclose, for your information, copy of the letters cited on the margin, forwarding, with an expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's views, correspondence regarding the outbreak at Maizar and the terms of punishment to be demanded. From a perusal of Mr. Gee's letter, dated the 15th June 1897,

From the Punjab Government, dated the 1st July 1897.

From the Punjab Government, dated the 2nd July 1897 and enclosures.

you will see that there is reason to believe that the Maizarwals considered they had a real grievance in regard to the terms of Sadda Khan's distribution of the fine of Rs. 1,200 on account of

the murder of Honda Ram. There can be no question of further reducing this fine, but if upon enquiry you are satisfied that the distribution which was ordered presses unduly on any particular section or sections, you are authorized to alter the incidence in any way which you think appropriate.

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No. 27.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 21st August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Bird announced to the tribes in Darbar, 17th August, terms of punishment fixed for the Madda Khels, and gave them ten days within which to make their submission.

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No. 28.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 24th August, 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of my telegram of 21st, I have to report that the Madda Khels sent indecisive answer. Bird has warned them to make complete submission by 27th, in their own interests.

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No. 29.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 18th August 1897. (Received 4th September 1897.)*

MY LORD,

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 21st July 1897, we have the honour to forward copies of further correspondence regarding the progress of affairs in Waziristan, since the advance of the Tochi Field Force.

2. On the 20th July, all preparations having been completed, the Force marched unopposed to Sheranni, which was found deserted. The cavalry reconnoitred to Maizar, which, save for a few watchmen, who fled to the hills on the approach of the troops, was also deserted. The demolition of the fortified buildings in Sheranni was completed by the 23rd July; those at Maizar by the 5th August. The Madda Khels are reported to have all moved to Lwara. General Bird disbanded their levies on arriving at Datta Khel.

3. On the night of the 19th July, information from what appeared a reliable source was received to the effect that Mulla Powindah had collected 7,000 men near Razani to attack Datta Khel, and every precaution was taken against surprise. The gathering, however, was largely exaggerated, and dispersed the following day. The Tori Khel and Mohmit Khel Maliks, who were present, say that the Mulla urged them to join him in an attack on either Datta Khel or Boya, and that they refused to do so. A letter has since been received from the Mulla by the Political Officer in Southern Waziristan to the effect that, when he moves about in Mahsud or Darwesh Khel country, he does so to benefit Musalmans and to prevent them robbing one another, that if Government builds new posts war will ensue between the Waziris and Government, and that if peace be made and guarantees given to him, it will be of advantage to all tribal Maliks. He has also written to the Commissioner

of the Derajat, offering to mediate between Government and the Madda Khels, adding that up to the present he has had no hostile intentions, and has none now. No answer has been sent to either letter, nor to any of his previous communications offering to mediate between the Government and the Madda Khels. The Mulla's movements have not been without suspicion, but he has not yet been proved to have done any hostile act.

4. Several acts of violence and robbery have been committed on the line of communication ; firing into camp at night has been of frequent occurrence, and the telegraph wire has been cut almost nightly.

5. On the 7th July an unfortunate fracas occurred at Saidgai, in which two Bakka Khel Waziri levies were killed and fourteen wounded by the troops. It appears that about 40 levies, seeing a convoy from Idak taking a short cut through some fields close to the post, rushed in a body and attacked the camel-drivers with sticks and stones. The officer in command at Saidgai turned out with a party of Sikhs and dismounted Sowars and ordered his men to arrest the assailants, but not to fire ; much unnecessary force was, however, used, the troops not realizing that the Waziris were levies. We have sanctioned the payment of compensation to the injured levies and to the families of those who were killed.

6. Reports that Afghan agents are secretly helping the Madda Khels have been received, but cannot be trusted. It is certain that Tanis, Khostwals and other Afghan subjects have taken part in different raids into the Tochi valley, and that looted camels have been taken across the Durand line into Afghan territory. It is reported, however, that Sardar Sherindil Khan has collected some of the raided camels, and has written to the Amir for orders whether they should be restored or not, and that he has threatened to fine the Tanis if they again raid across the British border. An asylum is said to have been offered to the Madda Khels by the Tanis of Zadran.

7. Full discretion was given to General Bird as to the manner in which the terms of punishment decided upon by Government should be communicated to the sections concerned, but it was suggested to him that there were many advantages in assembling jirgas to hear the Government demands as was done by both Mr. Bruce and Sir William Lockhart after the attack on the British Camp at Wano in November 1894.

On the 5th August, General Bird sent out messengers with a notice to summon the representative Maliks of the whole Madda Khel clan, with the promise of a safe conduct, to appear before him on the 12th August, and hear the orders of Government. The messengers returned with letters from the leading Ger Maliks stating that they did not wish to send in a large jirga, and asking that the terms might be announced to Shadan, the brother, and Mozammil, a nephew of Sadda Khan. The Kazha Maliks sent no reply : one of them who accompanied the General's messengers, stated that the message had been received, but that the Maliks did not think it applied to them, as they were innocent in the matter of the Maizar attack. To avoid risk of misunderstanding, General Bird has sent for certain leading men and will in their presence announce the terms to Shadan and Mozammil, and send them all to the Madda Khel country to explain the Government demands to all concerned. He reported that, after examining the list of persons whose surrender was to be demanded, he proposed reducing it to seventeen.

8. We await the result of his negotiations. Meanwhile the Field Force has met with no organized opposition, and the recent fighting at the Malakand and Shabkaddar has not apparently had any exciting effect in Waziristan.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.



## Enclosure No. 1.

*From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, Sarwakai, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 19th July 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

On sixteenth Malik Babar, Saifalli, arrived in Wano from Birmal with verbal message from Sadda Khan, saying Madda Khels were in great straits and asking Maliks Banocha, Gulshez, Zorawar, Samandar, Dawe, Zalli Khels, and Maliks Topchi, Sher, Tori, Taji Khels of Wano, to obtain permission from Political Officer, Wano, to visit Madda Khels and act as mediators between them and Government in Tochi. The principal Zalli Khel and Taji Khel Maliks came to Naib Tahsildar, Wano, on seventeenth and informed him of this message, and some Zalli Khels asked permission to go accordingly. Banocha and Taji Khels do not want to go. I directed Naib Tahsildar to inform them that Wano Ahmadzais had no connection with Tochi affairs and should not mix themselves up in them; also that Government would in due course announce in the Tochi the terms it imposes in settlement Maizar outbreak, while no tribal negotiations could be entertained in the matter.

## Enclosure No. 2.

*List of Maliks to whom the proclamation has been sent.*

Serial No.	Names of Maliks to whom proclamation sent.	Section and village of the Malik.	Through whom sent.	Date of sending.
1	Sadda Khan and Alambe Khan.	Khizzer Khels of Sheranna ...	Malik Nabbi Khan of Kazha.	15th July 1897.
2	Sheikh Nur and Saidwali ...	Ali Khan Khels of Sheranna ...	Ditto.	
3	Macai, Lazam, Nir Muhammad and Azam Din, &c.	Drepilaris of Maizar ...	Ditto.	
4	Namwar, Jebrael, Marmat, Kor and Shah Murad.	Khoji Khels of Maizar ...	Ditto.	
5	Azim and Gul Ahmad ...	Ali Khan Khel of Maizar ...	Ditto.	
6	Nur Shah and Nabbi Khan ...	Nazar Khels of Kazha ...	Ditto.	
7	Khadam ...	Ditto ...	Ditto.	
8	Sabil and Umar Khan ...	Khizzer Khels of Kazha ...	Ditto.	
9	Wureshmin ...	Tani of Kazha ...	Ditto.	
10	Made ...	Ali Khan Khel of Kazha ...	Ditto.	
11	Mirza Shah, Shamnai and Khangai.	Macha of Kazha ...	Ditto.	
12	Umar ...	Bahadur Khel of Khaza ...	Ditto.	
13	Zarband and Nazar Khan ...	Ismail Khel of Kazha ...	Ditto.	
14	Sanam Shah and Juma Khan	Saidgis of Zowe ...	Malik Saleh Din, Khidder Khel.	
15	Lal Khan and Shah Kamran	Saifali and Paipali, Kabul Khel	Ditto.	
16	Sur Kamand and Shandi Bagh	Miyama's of Shawal ...	Ditto.	
17	Marota and Piao Khan ...	Malikshahis of Shawal ...	Ditto.	
18	Gulmir ...	Bakka Khel of Shawal ...	Ditto.	
19	Khan Sahib and Sayad ...	Gurbuz Saidgis of Shawal ...	Ditto.	
20	Mirbaz ...	Achar of Kazha ...	Malik Nabbi Khan of Kazha.	
21	Khalidad ...	Kharsin of Bahramand ...	Duffadar Mukhtiyar of Kanirogha levies.	
22	Agha Mir ...	Saidgi of Dawagar ...	Assistant Political Officer, Miran Shah.	
23	Baz Muhammad ...	Manzar Khel of Kanirogha ...	Duffadar Mukhtiyar of Kanirogha.	
24	Bahram, Kabul and Muhammad Ayar.	Manzar Khel of Mamirogha ...	Malik Adamzai, Mohmit Khel.	
25	Kotan ...	Kabul Khel ...	Tarnai, his brother.	
26	Daulat and Mianji Khan ...	Muhammad Khels at Tut Narai	Malik Daulat Khan, Muhammad Khel.	
27	Amin Khan ...	Khojal Khel Tut Narai ...	Jamadar, Muhammad Khel Levy post.	
28	Kahn Muhammad ...	Muhammad Khel Daur, now at Tut Narai.	Ditto.	
29	Kippat Khan ...	Mohmit Khel of Razmak ...	Adamzai, Mohmit Khel	
30	Niaz Gul, Zalmir, Juma Khan and Kaloni.	Dosallis of Khysore ..	Ditto	
31	Saleh Din, Khidder Khel ...	Khidder Khel, Zirat Kala ...	Self.	
32	Nur Muhammad ...	Haider Khel, Khidder Khel of Daguri Kala.	Saleh Din, Khidder Khel	
33	Manguli and Rahim Shah ...	Madkhoja of Chasmi ...	Ditto.	
34	Sadrai and Garrai ...	Bar Khoja of Chasmi ...	Ditto.	
35	Pimbal ...	Datta Khel ...	Ditto.	
36	Gul Sahib and Sahib Din ...	Drewasta ...	Ditto.	
37	Piao and Zarmalik, &c.	Hassan Khels ...	Assistant Political Officer, Miran Shah.	

*List of Maliks—continued.*

Serial No.	Name of Maliks to whom proclamation sent.	Section and village of the Malik.	Through whom sent.	Date of sending.
38	Ilyas, Khoni and Pir Hassan	Tori Khels of Razmak ...	Adamzai, Mohmit Khel	15th July 1897.
39	Muhammad Akbar, Mian Din, Gulaim, Firoz and Mian Dad.	Tori Khels of Sham ...	Ditto.	
40	Pirmal and Gulfaraz ...	Umarzais at Sharki near Sham	Ditto.	
41	Mulla Lukman Shah ...	Bakka Khel of Razmak ...	Ditto.	
42	Khan Badshah and other Bakka Khel Maliks.	Bakka Khels of Bannu ...	Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.	
43	Mian Gul, son of the late Mulla Gulab Din.	Sirki Khel of Dosalli ...	Adamzai, Mohmit Khel.	
44	Zarghon Shah ...	Jani Khels of Bannu ...	Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.	
45	Gulabat ...	Miyamai of Kurrum ...	Assistant Commissioner, Thal.	
46	Samand and Lalo Khan, &c.	Lar Daur ...	Naib Tahsildar Idak.	
47	The Maliks of Miran Shah, Darpa Khel, Naggar, Rasul Khel, Tal, Tol Khel and Amzoni.	Upper Daur ...	Assistant Political Officer, Miran Shah.	

Memo., dated Datta Khel, 15th July 1897.

Submitted for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

(Sd.) G. CORRIE BIRD, *Major-General,*  
*Commanding, Tochi Field Force.*

Enclosure No. 3.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 18th July 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

To day I have been informed purpose of Sadda Khan's journey south of Tochi is to prevent conflict with Government by removing remaining Khoji Khels from Shawal, and urging Bakka Khels and Miamis there to stand aloof. Madda Khels of Kazha said to be migrating from Dadam to Tani country, merely to escape from neighbourhood of operations. Maizar and Sheranna continue to be reported almost empty.

Enclosure No. 4.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 18th July 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I propose on 20th to march to Sheranna and to proceed forthwith, in accordance with proclamation, to destroy all fortified kots there and at Maizar. I cannot say at present how long this will take. If no opposition is offered, no further military operations appear admissible, until terms of punishment are imposed on Madda Khels and a reasonable time for compliance has expired. Those terms might, perhaps, now be settled and published. I see little prospect of eliciting further information regarding ringleaders and Maliks implicated. Gee got his list of names from the chief Madda Khel Mulla, and all Ger Madda Khels have now fled. Gee is convinced that Kazhawals were not implicated as a tribe, and that he was mistaken in his first statement to that effect, and is satisfied that the hostile gathering to which he alludes was not composed of Kazhawals. I therefore consider we should demand unconditional surrender of all Maliks and ringleaders now living, who were named in Commissioner's telegram of 26th June, except that the names of Pial Nur, son of Shah Nur, Kazhawal, and Dande, brother of Sadda Khan, and Juma Nur, son of Modai Drepilari, should be added to the list. It might be added that Government reserve the right of demanding the surrender of any person not already mentioned, who may hereafter appear to have been implicated. The value of the stolen property not restored in good condition can be determined later and added to the other fines. I may mention that the fine due in Honda Ram's case is rupees twelve hundred Kabuli. In addition to the terms already

proposed by the Punjab Government in No. 740 of 1st July addressed to Foreign, I would advocate insisting on return of all rifles captured, and demanding surrender of 50 more, and would add a clause that until all the terms are complied with none of the Madda Khels will be permitted to return to the Tochi.

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Enclosure No. 5.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, through Datta Khel, dated the 21st July 1897. (Telegraphic.)*

Most points raised in your telegram, July 18th, are disposed of in the instructions posted 17th July, summary of which was telegraphed to you on same date. Government of India cannot approve clause forbidding return of any Madda Khels to Tochi until all terms are complied with. If after reading instructions you still require orders on any point, please telegraph again. My letter, 17th July, leaves you wide discretion, but Government of India are disposed to consider serious difficulties would be created by publishing an exceptionally long list of offenders to be surrendered, and that we should defeat our own object if we made our terms so severe that the whole tribe would be likely to abscond. If your first demand were for the chief offenders, you could, of course, specifically reserve option of adding others later, and there are very diverse degrees of guilt ascribed to the men named in the Commissioner's telegram of 26th June.

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Enclosure No. 6.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, the 20th July 1897. (Telegraphic.)*

Occupied Sheranni to-day and found it deserted. Its destruction commences to-morrow. Cavalry reconnoitred to Maizar, a few chowkidars flying to hills on approach of troops; one captured. A few rice fields found under cultivation at Sheranni, but no rice at Maizar, and no autumn crops appear to have been sown.

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Enclosure No. 7.

*Letter from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab dated the 8th July 1897.*

I have the honour to forward, in original, a letter from Mallas Powindah and Hamzullah to my address, together with a translation in English.

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Sub-enclosure.

*Translation of a Letter from Mallas Powindah and Hamzullah, to H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent Derajat, Division, dated 1st Safar-ul-Muzaffar, 1315 H. (3rd July 1897).*

We, humble servants, beg to bring to the notice of the Commissioner, may he be safe, that if it please you that peace be effected between the Waziri tribe and the Government in a manner unquestionably honourable to Government, we shall, with your permission, hold a consultation with the leading men in the Waziri tribe. We hope that they will comply with the wishes of Government, if this is within their power.

We hope that Government will be kind and not fix too heavy a fine and too hard conditions of peace; and give to them terms which are fair and which it is in their power to comply with, so that the burden and burdened or the spit and roasted meat may not both end in destruction. Let it be known to Government that we have no intention whatever of doing mischief and carrying on



destruction. We shall, therefore, discuss at Razmak with the Madda Khel Waziris, &c., in regard to the wished for and desired peace. If it is accepted by the Waziris, well and good; if not, your servants shall, with straightforwardness, communicate to you the proceedings of the Waziri jirga. But there is one matter which is talked about by the people, both tribesmen and Maliks, and this is that General Lockhart had acted deceitfully with the Mahsuds and the Mulla of the Mahsuds; we feel, therefore, somewhat suspicious. If, however, there be no deception and breach of promise, we heartily accept the duty.

Let it be known to the Commissioner, that up to this time we have had no intention of giving trouble, nor have we any intention now. Had I anything to do with the affair, I would not have sat quiet, but I would have decided on one thing.

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Enclosure No. 8.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 21st July 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday afternoon I received information that Mulla Powindah's gathering had increased to 1,000 or 1,500 men, and included Ilyas and Muhammad Akbar, Tori Khel Maliks, and Kippat, Niaz Gul and Wazir, Momit Khels. Mulla said that, if injury was done to Sheranni, he would attack Datta Khel. Maliks dissuaded him and said do not fight Government until it injures Madda Khels. Drums heard beating at Zargar and neighbouring villages as far as Razmak. Chief Political Officer reports this morning from Datta Khel that Malik Shadamir, Tori Khel, and Kotan, Kabul Khel, have arrived there, and say Darwesh Khel tribes have definitely refused to help Mulla, who has returned to Razmak.

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Enclosure No. 9.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Edwardesabad, 24th July 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

The Political Officer's report of intention of Mulla Powindah to return home, confirmed by information from two independent sources. He returned to either Makin or Marobi on 22nd, with a following of Talibs estimated to number 100. Information received from Shawal and Zowe that proclamation delivered to Saidgai, Gurbuz and Kabul Khel Maliks there. Kabul Khels profess loyalty. Ger Madda Khels reported to be assembling at Lwara. When all are assembled there, it is said they propose moving to neighbourhood of Gyan in Afghanistan. Tarmor Maliks are moving their property on bullocks from Torsar on Tochi above Dotoi to Maramuli in Afghanistan. Khalifa Nur Muhammad instigating Paipalis and Saifalis to assist Madda Khels secretly if they mean fighting. Babrak Khan of Zadran has ordered Zadranis to assemble at Spalgin and build a post. All the towers of Sheranni itself were blown up yesterday; this completes the demolition of its defences. Maizar and Kots of Sheranni hamlets remain to be dealt with.

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Enclosure No. 10.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 27th July 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

I respectfully ask re-consideration of Government's decision, referred to in your telegram of 21 July disapproving proposal to forbid return of Madda Khels to their villages until terms are complied with. I am examining all existing records and making fresh enquiries, in order to reduce number of ringleaders to be surrendered, but in any case it will be matter of extreme

difficulty to obtain surrender of ringleaders, and the difficulty will be enormously increased, unless we can enforce our demands in some such way as I have proposed by keeping Madda Khels out of valley until their surrender is complied with. If later on they could show that they had honestly done their best to surrender ringleaders, and had failed in producing all demanded, question might be further considered of allowing them to return to country.

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Enclosure No. 11.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, dated 29th July 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram July 27th. There is no objection to your enforcing the condition for the present as far as possible, and, as part of your enquiry into the circumstances, provided you make no general announcement, the objection to which is that it will tie our own hands and compel us to maintain a control over the country indefinitely, which would be difficult and very expensive. Any words that would make this necessary must be carefully avoided.

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Enclosure No. 12.

*From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Wano, 1st August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

It is expected that Mulla Powindah will visit Kaniguram to-morrow, proceeding thence to Shakai with small lashkar to coerce Malik Lalo, Khonia Khel, in connection with his feud with Umar Kham, Sperkai, who has sought Mulla's assistance. Mulla started three days ago for Kaniguram with same object, but turned back.

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Enclosure No. 13.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated the 1st August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Reported by Assistant Political Officer that about 11.30 A.M., on 31st July, camel-grazing guard had been attacked 5 miles from post, by about 400 Khostwals. Two Sarawans killed; 3 of the raiders were killed and 2 taken prisoners. Further report from Officer Commanding, Miran Shah, and General Officer Commanding, 2nd Brigade, states that 258 out of 299 camels were carried off. News of this raid reached Miran Shah at 12.30 P.M., when all available Cavalry and 2 Companies Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, immediately started in pursuit, but were unable to recover the camels, which were taken in a northerly direction and are believed to be across the border. It was reported to-day from Miran Shah that men from Garbuz, Tani, Khostwal, Jadran, Saidgai, Buk and Ghilzat tribes, living on the Afghan border, were coming down to-day or to-morrow to raid or to attack Miran Shah. As a measure of precaution, Miran Shah ordered to be reinforced by 4 Companies, and No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery to return to Miran Shah; these movements to be completed by Monday evening. Enquiry being conducted into loss of camels at Miran Shah.

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Enclosure No. 14.

*Letter from the British Agent at Kabul, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Kabul, 28th July 1897.*

With reference to news published in the "Pioneer Mail" of the 15th instant to the effect that Umra Khan of Jandol had fled with 50 horsemen towards Waziristan, and that His Highness the Amir had connived at his escape, I beg to say that the news is totally untrue, and that Umra Khan is still here and is living in the village of Chardeh.

I have also heard that a large number of Waziris with their families, who had taken part in the recent disasters at Maizar, have fled towards Ghazni to hide themselves in the hilly places.

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Enclosure No. 15.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 4th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

I shall complete destruction of fortified kots of Sheranni and Maizar to-day, I am sending a notice to summon representative Maliks of the whole Madda Khel clan on safe conduct for 12th instant. On their arrival I will communicate to them the orders of the Government of India, and direct them to explain them to their fellow-tribesmen and to return on a fixed date, and report whether they will obey the order of Government or not. I have carefully examined list of persons whose surrender is to be demanded, and propose reduction of number to 17. Should the tribe accept the terms and surrender these men, the appointment of a Court of Tribunal to try them will be a matter for consideration of Government. As regards the second of the terms to be imposed, it would be impossible to ascertain accurately present value of all articles lost at Maizar without inordinate delay. An estimate of what it would cost to replace them amounts to rupees twenty thousand; I fear it would be hopeless to expect Madda Khels to pay this sum in addition to the fine of rupees ten thousand. I propose to reduce the sum to be demanded on this account to ten thousand rupees, exclusive of fire-arms and ammunition, for which full market value should be demanded if not returned, and to make a further reduction on account of the present actual value of any articles returned in good condition. Some articles may be returned, but the great majority must have been either destroyed or much spoiled.

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Enclosure No. 16.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, through Datta Khel, dated the 7th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, August 4th. Full market value across the border for any lost arms not returned should certainly be demanded, but as a matter of procedure it would be better to tell the Maliks when you get them in what the lost property consists of, and how long time they are given within which to return the articles lost or to make good the loss, but not to fix the price in place of what is not restored until that period is expired. There seems risk that an immediate threat of a possible supplementary fine of Rs. 10,000 might decide tribe against compliance.

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Enclosure No. 17.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 6th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Sherindil Khan and Jahandil Khan are reported to have been presented with some camels looted by the Khostwals from us. Definite reports have reached me that Sherindil Khan has now ordered all the camel-looters on the 31st July to be brought in to him.

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Enclosure No. 18.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary of the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 29th July 1897.*

WITH reference to paragraph 1 of my letter, dated 2nd July 1897, I am directed to submit for the information of the Government of India a copy of a letter from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated 20th July 1897, and of its enclosures containing a statement by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad, Native



Assistant Political Officer in the Tochi, in which he supplies the further particulars called for as to his movements during the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar, and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor suggests that these papers be forwarded to the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force.

2. Sir Mackworth Young considers that Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad has given a satisfactory reply to his enquiries in paragraph 3 of my letter, dated 2nd instant, to the address of the Commissioner, Derajat Division; and His Honour sees no reason for not accepting his version of the affair.

3. As regards the attitude of Sadda Khan, Alambe and the relatives of the former, Ghulam Muhammad's present account confirms the conclusion previously arrived at that Sadda Khan misrepresented the attitude of the Maizarwals to the Political Officers, and throws some light upon his conduct and that of the others mentioned which may be useful in forming conclusions. The Lieutenant-Governor does not consider that there is anything in these papers which confirms the suspicion of a deep-laid plot on the part of Sadda Khan, to which His Honour alluded in paragraph 2 of my letter, dated 2nd instant.

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Sub-Enclosure.

*Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esquire, C.S.I., Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Shekh Budin, 20th July 1897.*

With reference to your letter dated 2nd instant, I have the honour to forward copy of Mr. Gee's letter\*, dated 13th instant, and of the statements of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, and Subadar Nawab Khan of the 1st Sikhs received therewith.

The statement of Ghulam Muhammad Khan is detailed, and explains how he, with his clerk, Mr. Gee's muharrir, and others, was separated from the main body and how he found it impossible to rejoin the Political Officer during the retreat. From what I heard while at Miran Shah, I have no doubt that the clerks, Ahmad Hussain and Muhammad Hayat and others who accompanied him during the retreat and were with him before and during the outbreak, will corroborate his statement fully.

I may mention that Nabi Khan, Khangai, Ali Muhammad are men who are on very friendly terms with Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, and when they guided him down the Maizar Valley towards the Tochi they were animated by feelings of pure good-will towards him and wished to get him out of certain danger. These men, though Madda Khels, had nothing whatever to do with the attack on the escort.

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Enclosure No. 19.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 10th August 1897. (Telegraphic.)*

To-day messengers sent to summon Madda Khel jirga returned with letters in which leading Ger Maliks state that they do not wish to send a large jirga, and ask that the terms may be announced to Shadan, brother, and Mozammil, nephew, of Sadda Khan. The jirga had been promised a safe conduct, but apparently they feared a trap. Kazha Maliks sent no reply. One of them, who accompanied my messengers, states that they received message, but thought that it did not apply to them as they were innocent of the Maizar affair. I consider that, if terms were announced to two men only, it is possible that they might not be properly explained to all members of tribe concerned. I therefore propose to send for Kippat Khan, Mohmit Khel, Muhammad Akbar, Tori Khel, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, and two or three leading Kazha Maliks, and announce terms to Shadan and Mozammil Khan in their presence, and to send them all to Madda Khel country to explain terms.

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\* Not printed.

## Enclosure No. 20.

*From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Wano, 11th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

A contractor, well known to me, came in this morning. He reports Mulla Powindah started from Badar yesterday after *namaz peshin*, and reached Shakai before dusk with about one thousand men, others having been left behind in Badar, &c. Mira Khan accompanied Mulla's party to Shakai. On the way he heard some men with rifles, whom he did not recognise, propose to Mulla to knock down Narai Oba post at night. Mulla forbade them, as it would lead to him and them being severely punished. Mulla spent night in kot of Namwar, Sathi Khel, is expected to settle case to-day, and may leave Shakai this evening or to-morrow. Yesterday morning Lalo and two of Umar Khan's brothers went to Badar by invitation to see Mulla Powindah. Lalo asked him to settle case in Badar, but Umar Khan's brothers insisted on his seeing disputed land, and Lalo afterwards agreed to his coming to Shakai. Baharam, a nephew of Gulbat, Miyamai, with some following is also present, at Umar Khan's request, to support him. The above information, including rumour of proposed attack on Narai Oba post, which Mulla discountenanced, is corroborated by Wano levy sowar, whom I posted at Narai Oba.

## Enclosure No. 21.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 11th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Have received confirmation of previous report of visit of Nur Shah and other Madda Khels to Urgan. Fattah Muhammad Khan, Commandant of Tondai Kila, is said to have taken them to Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, who also summoned Khalifa Nur Muhammad Khan. Informant reports that Mulla Powindah received two Martini rifles and a mule-load of ammunition from Kabul ten days ago. With reference to news from Wano, arrangements are being made to watch the Mulla's movements.

## Enclosure No. 22.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 12th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic)

Reported that the camels stolen from Miran Shah have been divided by the thieves, but are now all at Lalazai, 16 miles south of Matudi, and that Sherindil Khan has ordered them not to be sold until he hears from the Amir to whom he has referred for orders. News was received at Boya late last night of a gathering in Dargai of 350 Ismail Khel Dargai and Mamgal Khostwals who were trying to induce Tanis of Dargai to join them in raid on Government camels or convoys, but precautions have been taken, and reconnaissance made under General Symons' order.

## Enclosure No. 23.

*From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Wano, 13th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Lalo still states willingness to settle with Umar Khan by Shariat. Malik Shahniwas, Badin Khel, came in from Shakai, reports Mulla Powindah left Shakai for Badar yesterday afternoon. Khonia Khel, Shadikai, Badin Khel, Miyamai, Khoja Khel absolutely refused to give food to him and his lashkar, and they went without food one evening, eleventh, and morning, twelfth.

## Enclosure No. 24.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, dated 14th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram August 4th. It appears doubtful at present whether the appointment of any special tribunal will be necessary. Younghusband and his Assistants can probably investigate all cases under your orders, at any rate in preliminary stages. Much will depend on what men and how many are surrendered, and what evidence seems likely to be forthcoming. Government of India prefer to wait till prospects are clearer.

## Enclosure No. 25.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 14th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Report confirmed that Sherindil Khan has collected the camels taken in the raid of 31st July. He is said to have written to the Amir for orders whether they should be restored or not, and that he has threatened to fine the Tanis if they raid again. Wire was cut last night between Idak and Miran Shah, and three shots were fired at a convoy near Isha Pass this morning.

## No. 30.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 1st September 1897. (Received 30th September 1897.)*

MY LORD,

IN pursuance of the instructions contained in paragraph 4 of Your Lordship's despatch, dated the 8th May 1896, we have had under consideration the question whether the maintenance of the Wano Cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure incurred upon it.

2. Owing to the present position of affairs in Waziristan, we desire to postpone our recommendations on the subject.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.

## No. 31.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 5th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

The Ger Madda Khels have definitely refused to accept the terms imposed.

## No. 32.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 15th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Tochi. General Officer Commanding reports General Symons with 900 men paid surprise visit to Ger Madda Khel at Dadam, captured 200 cattle and large quantity of arms. Main body halted near Madda Khel.



*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 30th September 1897. (Received 18th October 1897.)*

MY LORD,

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 18th August 1897, we have the honour to forward copies of further correspondence regarding affairs in Waziristan.

2. On the 21st August, the messengers whom General Bird had sent\* to the Madda Khel country, to explain to all concerned the terms demanded by Government, returned with an indecisive answer. General Bird sent them back with a warning to the Madda Khels in their own interests to make complete submission by the 27th. The messengers again brought back an indecisive reply on the 24th August; they stated that Sadda Khan and others were anxious to come in on safe conduct to represent their case, and General Corrie Bird agreed to receive them on the 31st August. They did not come in, however, and, on the 3rd September, the Ger Madda Khel Maliks sent in letters to General Bird definitely refusing to do so. The pretext for the refusal was that the Maliks could not trust the safe conduct offered to them. General Bird concludes that the tribesmen have been deluded by promises and hopes held out to them by the Afghan officials. Sardar Sherindil Khan is said to be in constant communication with the Madda Khels and to have promised to make them assignments of land in Khost. The Kabul Khels of Birmal are also offering them shelter during the coming winter. A few Machas from Shawal above the junction of the Khina and one Malik with four Machas from a village above Dotoi came in to the camp, but probably only in the hope of saving their autumn crops. General Bird was instructed to deal with the Madda Khel as a whole, and not to treat separately with the Machas. He had, however, accepted the submission of the Kazha Madda Khels, conditionally on the surrender of Nur Shah and Pyal Nur, two of the seventeen men demanded for complicity in the outrage at Maizar. The men not having been surrendered up to the 26th of September, their kots were destroyed and their crops cut on that date. We are considering what further action should be taken. Meanwhile the troops are moving about freely in the Kazha valley, Dotoi and the neighbourhood of Charmina; and, except for the non-submission of the Madda Khels, there is no trouble of any kind in the Upper Tochi. The Madda Khels are said to be feeling the pressure of banishment from their country and to have asked the Kabul Khels to intercede for them with Government.

3. A report is current that Sardar Sherindil Khan, after receiving a letter from the Amir, has informed the Tanis that they need not restore the camels\* raided in the Tochi. This report may not improbably have some foundation, for, in reply to a request made by the Viceroy for the restoration of the looted camels, His Highness writes that the camels were stolen by Waziri thieves and sold by them to the inhabitants of Khost, that Sardar Sherindil Khan has ordered the purchasers of the camels to keep them safe, and that if His Excellency considers they should be restored, then the price current in the country should be given to the Khostwals, "so that they may not suffer loss."

4. A letter was received by the Political Officer in the Tochi on the 13th August from Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, asking that the Waziris might be restrained from committing raids on Afghan subjects, and that the question of the demarcation of the boundary might be taken up when the military expedition had completed its work. General Bird replied that Mr. Anderson had already informed the Sardar that the boundary question could not be re-opened by any officer serving under the Government of India, and that as regards the settlement of complaints made by Afghan subjects against Waziris living on the British side of the border, our officers had already suggested a meeting between the officials and Maliks of both sides to adjust the claims of

both parties, and that no doubt, when the present expedition had brought its work to a close, the officer who might then be in charge of the Tochi valley would be ready to meet the Sardar and settle all outstanding disputes.

5. The fanatical outbursts on other parts of the border have apparently not spread to Waziristan. Several offences by individuals and small gangs of raiders have been committed, but there have been no large gatherings or attacks in strength on British posts either in the Tochi or in Mahsud territory.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure No. 1.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 17th August 1897.  
(Telegraphic.)*

Reported that Mulla Powindah left Shakai on 14th and arrived Kaniguram 15th. Heavy floods in the Tochi. The ekka carrying the down mail was swept away by the river above Saidgai early this morning, and one mail bag was lost. A search party has been sent to look for it. A party of the 1st Punjab Cavalry riding up Shawal river yesterday was fired upon from Parsha and Suram hamlets of Maizar. Fire was returned by cavalry at long range, enemy having retreated up hill. No casualties on either side. Deputation of Madda Khels will be received in Darbar this afternoon, and terms of punishment announced. Following Maliks have arrived: *Ger Madda Khels*, Mozammil Khan and Shadan, Khaizar Khels; Sherim, Khoji Khel; *Khazha Madda Khels*, Sahib Khan, Nabi Khan and 17 others; also Muhammad Akbar and two other Tori Khel Maliks; Kotan, Kabul Khel; Amir Khan, Khojal Khel; Fazldin, Muhammad Khel.

Enclosure No. 2.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 17th August 1897.  
(Telegraphic.)*

Owing to Tochi being in flood road interrupted between Saidgai and Idak. General Symons and staff leave Miran Shah to-morrow *en route* to Datta Khel, where they will remain for a few days. Boya reports to-day that Sherindil Khan, Governor of Khost, has called in leaders of parties that started from Zangohrn who have dispersed. While 42 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, were proceeding up the Shawal yesterday in search of raiders, they had six volleys fired at them. Three small columns went out early this morning to capture men who fired on cavalry yesterday evening, but saw nothing.

Enclosure No. 3.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 18th August 1897.  
(Telegraphic.)*

In Darbar yesterday I announced the terms of punishments imposed on the Madda Khels to the Maliks mentioned in yesterday's telegram, and instructed them to convey the terms to the whole clan. Bakka Khel and Jani Khel Maliks from the Shawal were also present. Ten days have been allowed to the Madda Khels within which to come and make their submission. Detachment of

cavalry sent out from Boya before daylight on 18th to prevent wire cutting captured and brought in a prisoner, resident of Pai Khel village, who was aiming at a sowar with a matchlock. Similar party from Datta Khel also brought in a prisoner, who was only on a thieving expedition. Reconnoitring party from Sheranni also brought in a prisoner yesterday. He was wearing the belt of a sepoy who was killed at Maizar. He was found with seven donkeys, believed to be stolen from Dawar, and fired upon our party.

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Enclosure No. 4.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 20th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Two mail ekkas were stopped near Lak Ghundi between Idak and Miran Shah yesterday by gang, said to consist of 70 men, well armed with rifles. Two sepoy sitting in ekkas as escort were killed; both coachmen and a telegraph signaller were wounded; ekka ponies were killed; mail bags reported safe. Party sent out in pursuit found no trace of gang. Donald, Assistant Political Officer, has gone with military officers to investigate case on spot.

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Enclosure No. 5.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 21st August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Reported that 2 parties of Mahsuds, 60 men each, have crossed north side of Tochi. One party has gone to hills north side of Saidgai and the other to Isha. About 30 raiders attacked 2 bunnias yesterday at 8 p.m. about 2 miles Bannu side of Saidgai. Jemadar of Saidgai levies, who was near at the time, fired at the raiders, but was shot dead himself. The Jemadar's rifle and horse and one bag of atta were carried off by raiders. Cavalry and levies of Saidgai on receipt of news went in pursuit, but owing to darkness were unable to track marauders. Saidgai reports that 10 camels strayed from that post yesterday. According to report from Miran Shah the scene of the recent raid on mail ekkas is in full view of Hukunda and Suzkana levy posts, and the ekkas were fired on from a nullah 62 yards distant from road. Eleven Martini-Henry and Snider cartridges dropped by raiders were found. A/2 British Field Hospital arrived at Miran Shah from base yesterday, and remains there as general hospital. I accompany a column proceeding to Kazha valley next Monday, returning about Saturday, 29th instant. Column will be accompanied by Kazha Maliks.

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Enclosure No. 6.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni through Datta Khel, 22nd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Last night messengers returned from Madda Khel country with indecisive answer. They have been sent back with message warning Madda Khels in their own interests to make complete submission by 27th. Sherindil Khan still intriguing with Madda Khels.

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Enclosure No. 7.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 22nd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Up convoy detained at Miran Shah yesterday owing to heavy rain. An armed Wazari, suspected of camel stealing, was captured by Datta Khel grazing



guard among the camels on 20th. Officer Commanding, Boya, has been informed that news of the Malakand attack has reached Mulla Powindah, who attempted to raise a gathering, but was unsuccessful. General Symons yesterday reconnoitred a path for  $10\frac{1}{2}$  miles, said to lead from Datta Khel due south to Makin, *viâ* the Spina Wunga Malai, which is doubtful. Mules could travel it if a little improved.

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Enclosure No. 8.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Inzar Kach, through Datta Khel, 25th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Messengers sent to Madda Khel returned last night with Shadam and Kahn Habib, Khizar Khels ; Sherim, Khoji Khel ; and Mian Khan, Dreplari. The answer is still indecisive, but the messengers say that Sadda Khan and others are now anxious to come in on safe conduct and represent their case. I have accordingly given permission to Sadda Khan and as many other Maliks as wish to come to the Sheranni camp, on 31st. and represent their case. Column will march to-morrow to a camping ground between the Sortoi and Duga streams.

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Enclosure No. 9.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, through Datta Khel, dated 26th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram, August 14th. In case of any Maliks or other ringleaders, who may be surrendered as implicated in treacherous attack at Maizar, all that is necessary is to observe principles of natural justice and to secure accused fair trial. If necessity arises, a special tribunal may be convened under your orders upon the authority of the Governor-General in Council hereby conveyed for this purpose. The tribunal might conveniently be composed of three officers, of whom one should be a Political Officer. The proceedings of the tribunal should be submitted with your recommendations for the orders of the Governor-General in Council. If you have reason to desire a court differently constituted, please submit suggestions.

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Enclosure No. 10.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp, through Datta Khel, 26th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

To-day column marched from Inzar Kach to camp between Surtoi and Duga streams. Road easy the whole way. I went round with detachment of cavalry and infantry down the Kazha to its junction with Surtoi and then up the Surtoi. We march to-morrow down the Duga Algad to the Kazha. This march through the Kazha country has had a most beneficial effect on the Kazha Maliks.

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Enclosure No. 11.

*Letter from Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, 19th August 1897.*

In continuation of my telegram, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that I held a Darbar on the 17th instant at Sheranni, at which the Maliks, shown in the annexed list, were present, and I announced the terms of punishment imposed by Government upon the Madda Khels for the treacherous attack on British troops at Maizar.

2. As I have already reported by telegram, the Madda Khels, in reply to my invitation to send a representative jirga to hear the terms, wrote to say that they wished the terms to be communicated to Shadam and Mozammil Khan. I considered it desirable, in order to prevent the risk of any possible misunderstanding in regard to the terms, that they should be conveyed to the Madda Khel clan by a larger number of persons than two. I, therefore, sent for Maliks Kippat Khan, Mohmit Khel, Muhammad Akbar, Tori Khel, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, Amin Khan, Khojal Khel, and Fazaldin, Muhammad Khel. All these attended with the exception of Kippat Khan, who was detained by private business. I also summoned the Kazha Maliks who had not replied to my first invitation. I desired all these Maliks to convey the orders of Government to the whole Madda Khel clan: this they promised to do. Ten copies of the terms were given them for distribution.

3. In announcing the terms of the punishment, I told the assembled Maliks that the Madda Khels were allowed ten days in which to come in and make their submission and undertake to carry out the orders of Government. I added that, if they did not come in within the time specified and make their submission, they would be considered the enemies of Government, which would then be at liberty to adopt any other measures it should think fit.

4. I have allowed the Madda Khels 20 days within which to collect and restore the property lost at Maizar, and told them that full value will be charged for any articles not restored in good condition within that time.

5. The orders requiring prompt payment of the balance of the fine due in Honda Ram's case, and imposing the new fine of Rs. 10,000, were also announced. If the Madda Khels ask for the help of myself or my officers in distributing the balance of the fine in Honda Ram's case, we will take the matter up, but I submit that it would not be desirable to re-open this question except on the application of the Madda Khels.

6. I have carefully considered the question whether the Kazha division of the tribe can be held responsible for the attack at Maizar. It seems to me impossible to hold the Kazhawals *as a section* guilty of this outrage, although there is no doubt that at least two individuals of this section were present at Maizar. I have, therefore, told the Kazhawals that, before they can be considered to be exonerated from complicity in the offence, they must surrender Mir Shah and his son, Pyall Nur. If they fail to surrender these two men, it will be a question for consideration whether they should not be required to pay a share of the fine. I took the opportunity to warn the Kazha Maliks that there are certain cases outstanding against that section of the tribe which they will be expected to settle promptly. They have invited us to visit their country, and I told them that I hoped to take advantage of their invitation shortly.

7. The surrender of the following persons was demanded:—

Sadda Khan, Khizr Khel of Sheranni.

Dande ditto ditto.

Alambe ditto ditto.

Sheikh Nur, Ali Khan Khel of ditto.

Saiyad Wali ditto ditto.

Khanijan ditto ditto.

Modai, Dreplare of Maizar.

Namwar, Khoji Khel of Maizar.

Marghat ditto ditto.

Bohtan ditto ditto.

Azim, Ali Khan Khel ditto (Parsha).

Ware Khan, Macha of ditto (Suram).

Mir Badshah ditto ditto.

Mohabbat Khan, Bakka Khel, hamsaya of Shawwaz, Khoji Khel.

Salo, Dreplare.

Nur Shah, Macha of the Kazha.

Pyall Nur, son of Nur Shah, Macha.

8. The Government of India will observe that the number of persons whose surrender has been demanded is much smaller than the number mentioned in Mr. Gee's letter of the 23rd June and in Mr. Anderson's telegram dated the 26th June. In deference to the opinion of Government, communicated in your telegram dated the 21st July 1897, that serious difficulties would be created by publishing an exceptionally long list of offenders to be surrendered, I have selected 15 names out of the 59 originally proposed. To these I have added two more names, *viz.*, those of Dande (brother of Shadam Khan) and Pyall Nur, son of Nur Shah of the Kazha, against whom there is sufficient evidence to make it desirable that they should be put on their trial. It would have been impossible to enforce the surrender of all the Maliks who took part in the attack, and in making my selection I have been guided partly by the prominent position of some of the persons selected in the tribe or in their own sections, partly by the part which they took in the discussions which ended in the attack on our troops, and partly by the part which they took in the fight itself. The Maliks, whose surrender has not been demanded, will be severely punished by the destruction of their kots and by the heavy fine which has been imposed upon the tribe.

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*List of Maliks present at the Darbar held by the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force at Sheranni on 17th August 1897.*

Shadam Khan, Khizr Khel ...	...	}	Ger Madda Khels.
Mozammil Khan, Khizr Khel ...	...		
Sherin, Khoji Khel ...	...		
Sabil Khan, Khizr Khel ...	...	}	Kazha Madda Khels.
Mirza Shah, Macha ...	...		
Nabi Khan, Nazr Khel and 15 others	...		
Muhammad Akbar Khan ...	...	}	Tori Khels.
Gulaim ...	...		
Miandin ...	...		
Kotan Khan...	...	...	Kabul Khel.
Amin Khan ...	...	...	Khojal Khel.
Fazldin ...	...	...	Muhammad Khel (Dawar).
Mohabbat Khan ...	...	}	Bakka Khels.
Akhmadin and 2 others ...	...		
Sheikh Majid ...	...	}	Jani Khels.
Mir Bayand ...	...		
Khan Sahib...	...	}	Gurbuz of the Shawal.
Paidal ...	...		

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Enclosure No. 12.

*Letter from Major-General G.C. Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, 22nd August 1897.*

In continuation of my letter, dated the 19th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that Maliks Muhammad Akbar Khan, Gulaim and Miandin, Tori Khels, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, Amin Khan, Khojal Khel. and Fazaldin, Muhammad Khel, returned to Sheranni yesterday with an indecisive answer from the Madda Khel Maliks, who wrote to say that they had been hardly treated, and asked to have their case reconsidered. The messengers were sent back and told to urge the Madda Khels for their own sakes to think the matter carefully over and to make their submission to Government within the stipulated time.

2. The Maliks (Muhammad Akbar Khan, &c.) also reported that Maliks Alambe and Ware Khan (Macha) were absent in Khost, having been sent for by Sardar Sherindil Khan, who had promised to give the Madda Khels permission to buy grain in Khost. They further stated that, while they were in the Madda



Khel country, five messengers arrived from Babrak Khan of Zadran, and had a private interview with Sadda Khan, who afterwards said that Sherindil Khan had sent for Madda Khel jirga. It is, of course, to be noticed that this is only the account given by Sadda Khan of the message sent to him.

3. The Maliks also reported that Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan had summoned a jirga of Murgha, Birmal, Zadran, and Ghilzai Maliks, and that Khalifa Nur Muhammad, Muhammad Akbar Khan, Chief of Murgha, and Fattah Muhammad Khan, Commandant of Tande Kila, had gone to Urgan to meet him.

4. The news of the attack on the Malakand has reached the Madda Khel Kirris in a garbled form. The report is that a Mulla has collected an army of 40,000 to attack our troops in Chitral and on the Malakand. There does not appear to be any excitement among the Waziris over the news.

Enclosure No. 13.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 28th August 1897.  
(Telegraphic.)*

Column returned to-day to Sheranni. Our march through their country has had a very good effect on the Kazha Madda Khels. According to a recent report by Malik Shahib Khan, Idal Khel Dawar, the conscription in Khost is one man in eight houses, not one man in twenty houses as formerly reported. Zadrans have complied with this demand, but Tanis, Gurbaz and Khostwals are raising objections. Sherindil Khan has summoned all these Maliks to Gabar. There are no regular troops in Matun now, only 100 levies. Sherindil Khan has taken all his property to Gabar. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this report.

Enclosure No. 14.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 31st August 1897.  
(Telegraphic.)*

I have extended the time for attendance of Sadda Khan and other Madda Khel Maliks till to-morrow evening, at the request of Mangal, Din Muhammad and other Maliks of Miran Shah, who are on friendly terms with Madda Khels and are confident of their influence over Sadda Khan.

Enclosure No. 15.

*Letter from Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, 28th August 1897.*

In continuation of my letter, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report that my messengers, Muhammad Akbar Khan, Gulaim, and Miandin, Tori Khels, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, Amin Khan, Khojal Khel, and Fazaldin, Muhammad Khel, came to me at Inzar Kach on the 24th instant with four envoys from Sadda Khan and other Ger Madda Khels, namely, Shadam and Khan Habib, Khizr Khels, Sherin, Khoji Khel, and Mian Khan, Dreplare.

2. They brought a letter (a translation of which I enclose for information), in which Sadda Khan asks to be allowed to plead his cause either before Messrs. Anderson and Gee or before a jirga of Maliks. Although I am not wholly satisfied that these representations are not made with the view of gaining time, still it seems to me possible that Sadda Khan thinks that he has been judged and condemned unheard, and though he neglected to make use of the previous opportunities which were given him of coming to see me, I have decided to give him one more chance of coming in. I have accordingly replied that I

will permit Sadda Khan and any other Maliks who may wish to accompany him to come to Sheranni on the 31st instant, and make any representation they may wish to make and go away again on safe conduct. I gave Shadam Khan a written reply to this effect, a translation of which is attached to this letter.

3. It is to be regretted that these negotiations of necessity cause some delay in our proceedings, but it has all along been anticipated that considerable difficulty will be found in obtaining compliance with the demand for the surrender of certain persons, and I believe that I am acting in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India in endeavouring to induce the Madda Khels to comply with the terms and in removing any obstacles which seem to prevent them from doing so.

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Sub-Enclosure A.

*Translation of a letter from the Madda Khel Maliks, to Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated 23rd Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H.*

After due compliments we beg to state that the jirga, consisting of Maliks Kotan Khan, Muhammad Akbar, Fazaldin, Amin Khan, Gulaim Khan, Miandin Khan and Sheikh Jamal sent by the British Government, held a meeting on the 23rd Rabiul-Awal with all the Madda Khel Maliks and young and old of the tribe, except Alambe Khan and Ware Khan who had gone to Khost, at Zari in the Babar country. We beg to state that we had expressed our desire and asked you in several letters to send for the old officers who had laid down terms with us in the beginning of the delimitation operations, and who were present in the fight—in which I (Sadda Khan) am charged with a treacherous invitation. It is necessary to send for those officers, so that we may lay and prove our case against them before you. If you are not kind enough to send for those officers, then please send for a jirga of the Ahmadzai and Utmanzai Darwesh Khels, consisting of Maliks Mani Khan, Khan Badshah, Khazan Khan, Zarghon Shah, Niazgul Dosalli, Salehdin, Khidder Khel, Ilyas, Tori Khel, Din Muhammad, Miran Shah Dawari, Yusaf Khan, Tapphi, Lalo, Haider Khel, so that they may assist the Madda Khel tribe in paying up the fine imposed on them by the Government, as the Madda Khels are unable to pay up the fine, owing to their crops, other property (and families) all having been destroyed. We send four Maliks to present themselves before you to make submission to Government for peace. All the Madda Khel Maliks have agreed to send these four Maliks as their representatives. They will converse about the whole matter with you.

Scaled by

SADDA KHAN.  
KHAN HABIB.

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Sub-Enclosure B.

*Translation of a letter from the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force to the Madda Khel Maliks, dated 25th August 1897.*

I have read your letter. I have already twice invited the Madda Khels to send a representative jirga on safe conduct to hear the orders of Government. On the first occasion you sent two men. The second time you have sent three and now you have sent four. I will now give you one more opportunity. As many of you as wish to come may come in on safe conduct on Tuesday, the 31st August, and I will hear all that you have to say, and will allow you to depart on safe conduct. If you (Sadda Khan) have any petition to make, come and make it verbally, and bring as many Maliks of your own tribe as you wish. It is better that you should say what you wish to say instead of writing letters. I will hear all you have to say, but under present conditions I am not prepared to call a jirga of the Darwesh Khels.

I notice that the Machas of the Shawal Tangi have not associated themselves with you in your deliberations. I have directed them to come also on the 31st. One answer should be given by the whole tribe.

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## Enclosure No. 16.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 2nd September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

As separately reported no Madda Khel except Machas and Janbi Khels have come in yet to make submission. A column moved out to Landi Khel yesterday for a few days. A dozen shots were fired into the Landi Khel's camp last night without doing damage. Inquiries being made. Offenders supposed to be Machas of Dotoi.

## Enclosure No. 17.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 2nd September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

No Madda Khel representatives have arrived except 17 Machas from Shawal above the junction of the Khina, and one Malik with four Machas from Petarkila, a village above Dotoi. These Machas do not seem to have been seriously involved in the Maizar attack, and none of them are included in my list of Maliks and ringleaders demanded in terms, nor have I destroyed their kots. It therefore appears possible that this portion of the Machas' section of the Madda Khels is ready to make submission, possibly with the view of saving their autumn crops from destruction, from inability to cut and gather them. There appears but little prospect of the other Madda Khel sections, who have already lost their autumn crops from want of water, &c., coming in in the immediate present. I propose to inform all those who have not taken advantage of the safe conduct offered that they cannot now be received until they are prepared to make complete submission to Government, and that for the present all Ger Madda Khels found in the Tochi valley below Dotoi or in the Shawal valley below junction of Khina will be treated as enemies; but assuming that my surmise as to the submission of the Machas of the Shawal and above Dotoi proves correct, am I authorized by Government to treat with them separately? If so, I would propose to direct them to, firstly, send in five Maliks to be detained as hostages for their good behaviour; secondly, deposit as security, pending distribution of the fine imposed by Government on the whole tribe, Rs. 2,000, or any lesser sum that may seem necessary; thirdly, refrain from all hostilities and from harbouring any Machas or other Madda Khels not belonging to their villages; fourthly, restore all Government property in their possession; fifthly, not come below Dotoi or Khina without permission; sixthly, furnish supplies and guides to any column that may visit their country for the purpose of surveying, &c. I would further propose to inform them that, if they refuse these terms, they will be liable to be treated as enemies to Government and to have their defences destroyed or be punished otherwise.

## Enclosure No. 18.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 3rd September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

My telegram of yesterday. Mangal and other Miranshah Maliks having returned from Ger Madda Khels to-day with definite refusal to come in, I further propose to move troops about the Kazha and later to Dotoi country and Charmina to ensure Ger Madda Khels are not harboured by other sections. Should Government have any special line of action it is considered desirable I should pursue, I beg same may be communicated to me.



## Enclosure No. 19.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, dated 6th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams, September 2nd and 3rd. It would perhaps be better to refrain from dealing with Madda Khels otherwise than as a whole, and not to treat separately with Machas until you receive instructions on the line to be taken with the Madda Khel generally. No objection to your moving troops as suggested.

## Enclosure No. 20.

*Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 7th September 1897.*

I am directed to refer to the papers marked in the margin, regarding the refusal of the Ger Madda Khel Maliks to avail themselves of the permission granted to them to come in on safe conduct to Sheranni and represent their case.

Telegrams from the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated respectively, the 2nd and 3rd September 1897.

2. I am to forward a copy of a telegram which has been addressed to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, on the subject, and to request that the Government of India may be favoured with the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the action to be taken in dealing with the Madda Khels.

Dated the 6th September 1897.

## Enclosure No. 21.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 8th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I moved to-day to Datta Khel where a column is to be formed to visit Kazha. There is a report that Mulla Powindah visited Shakta, east of Makin, at the beginning of month to settle cross cases between Waziris and Məhsuds. He appears to have been at home at Marobi on night 2nd September. There is an unconfirmed report that he left on 3rd with Kabul Khel escort *via* Makin for unknown destination, possibly Birmal.

## Enclosure No. 22.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Datta Khel, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 10th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

There is a report that Sherindil Khan, after receiving a letter from the Amir, has informed the Tanis that they need not restore the camels raided near Miran Shah. There are said to be lands belonging to the State in three places in Khost from which Sherindil Khan could make assignments to the Madda Khels as it is said he promises to do. Mullah Powindah appears to have reached Darra on the 5th, and to have remained there till 7th. When Bakka Khel and Jani Khel informers left he was trying to settle a dispute between the Bibizai and Haibat Khel Mahsuds about land at Bujam, and it seemed in a fair way for settlement. The Mulla is offended with Hamzulla, Waziri Mulla, because latter did not support him in the Sperkai case.

## Enclosure No. 23.

*Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, the 6th September 1897.*

In continuation of my previous telegrams and letters, I regret to have to report that all my attempts to induce the Ger Madda Khels to make their submission and accept the terms offered by the Government of India have so far failed to attain the desired object.

2. The time allowed them within which to make their submission expired on the 27th August, but, as already reported, I was induced by a deputation from the Madda Khels to believe that Sadda Khan and other Maliks were anxious to come in and make some representation to me. I accordingly replied that, if they chose to come in on safe conduct on or before the 31st August, I would hear what they had to say, and subsequently (see paragraph 1 of my diary for the period ending the 31st August), on the application of Mangul, Din Muhammad, and certain other Maliks from Miran Shah, I extended the time to the 1st September. Mangul and the other Miran Shah Maliks returned from the Madda Khels on the 3rd September with two letters, one from Sadda Khan himself and sealed by him, the other bearing no seal, but purporting to be from the Madda Khel Maliks generally. I enclose a translation of these letters for the information of Government. In both letters the refusal to come in is based on the allegation that my safe conduct cannot be trusted.

3. I am unable to believe that want of trust in our good faith can be the real reason for the attitude of the Madda Khels; their messengers, Shadam Khan, Khan Habib, Sherin Khan and Miandin, came boldly to my camp at Inzar Kach without any formal promise of safe conduct; they came as messengers, were received as such, and were allowed to depart unmolested. So it is idle for the Madda Khels to pretend that they do not consider my formal promise of safe conduct a sufficient guarantee. The only conclusion to which I can come is that they have been deluded by promises and hopes held out to them by Afghan officials. We know that while Kotan Khan and our other messengers were with the Madda Khels (see my letter, dated the 22nd August 1897) messengers arrived from Babrak Khan, and further Sadda Khan himself told them that he had just received a message from Sardar Sherindil Khan. At that time also Maliks Alambe Khan and Ware Khan were on a visit to Sardar Sherindil Khan and obtained from him permission to buy grain in Khost, the export of grain from that district having been previously prohibited. Further, Mangul and Din Muhammad state that, while they were with Sadda Khan on the 2nd instant, the latter received a letter from Sardar Sherindil Khan, the contents of which he did not communicate to them. The purport of these messages from Sardar Sherindil Khan I can only guess at, but it seems not improbable, that they were to the effect that the Afridis, Orakzais and other tribes are giving us trouble, and that, if the Madda Khels can wait for a short time, they may find us willing to give them easier terms in order to bring an end to our operations against them.

4. The only villages which were directly concerned in the attack on our troops on the 10th June are Maizar and Sheranni with their numerous outlying hamlets, and it is to these villages that the men whose surrender we have demanded belong. Other villages of the Upper Shawal (above the Khina nulla) and of the Upper Tochi (above its junction with the Shawal), which are not so deeply implicated, have sent in representatives to sue for pardon. With reference to your telegram of to-day's date, I have sent these men back to their homes and told them that I cannot deal with the Ger Madda Khels except as a whole. I have at the same time warned them not to show any hostility to our troops. I have also accepted the submission of the Kazha Madda Khels conditional on the surrender of Nur Shah and Peyall Nur. I now propose to move troops about the Kazha Valley, Dotoi and the neighbourhood of Charmina to ensure that the Ger Madda Khels are not harboured in any of these villages. I have warned the Kazha Maliks that on my next visit to their country I shall require a definite answer in regard to the surrender of the two Kazha outlaws. I think also that we may hope with some confidence that the

movements of strong bodies of troops about the Madda Khel country will tend to dispel any illusions which they may entertain that the misconduct of tribes elsewhere will make the terms offered to them any easier.

Sub-enclosure A.

*Translation of a letter from the Madda Khel Maliks, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force.*

We inform you that our non-attendance before the Government is due to distrust, as the Government injures and causes loss even on trust. However, if the Government wants us to present ourselves, it should send to us its men and officers, so that we may be satisfied and we will then present ourselves before Government willingly and without hesitation. Secondly, we inform the Government that we are subject and obedient to the Government; we will never oppose the Government wherever we may encamp. Further, that the matter on our part rests with the Government.

Sub-enclosure B.

*Translation of a letter from Malik Sadda Khan, Madda Khel, dated 4th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. (corresponding to the 2nd September 1897.)*

Maliks Din Muhammad, Imangul, Mani Khan, Nakkar Khan and Rezan Shah, sent by you, reached here, and I was informed of the message that the Government wishes my presence. The reason of my non-attendance and distrust is that during the demarcation of the boundary between the Government of India and the King of Khorasan, the Amir (the pride of Islam), I applied for certain terms from Mr. Anderson, the Commissioner, for the satisfaction of my tribe; the tribe as well demanded the terms from the said officer. But the officers in charge of the Tochi Valley did not allow me to make those demands, and discredited me before my tribe. When the British troops came to Maizar for the realization of the fine in Honda Ram's case, I gave a notice to Mr. Gee and Gholam Muhammad Khan that they should not go to Maizar as the Madda Khels would not pay the fine, because the Ali Khan Khel section only was charged with the offence; the murderer of the Hindu (mohurrir) was also an Ali Khan Khel. The rest of the Madda Khel tribe would not in any case pay the fine, and a fight would surely ensue between the Government and the Madda Khels. Mr. Gee and Gholam Muhammad Khan replied that they will see; and if the Madda Khels are true sons of their mothers, they will fight against Government for a moment. I took Gholam Muhammad Khan's beard and begged him to grant six day's grace so that I may present the tribe at Datta Khel. Gholam Muhammad Khan said that he intended to try the Madda Khels, and that, if they wished to fight against Government, he would give them a chance, and therefore a fine is to be realized from them without any proof. Hearing this I became silent. When the fight between the British troops and the Madda Khels commenced, I with my three brothers, Shadam Khan, son of Adam Khan, and two nephews, named Mozammil Khan and Zerin Khan, accompanied Gholam Muhammad Khan and several other Government servants to a hamlet of Sheranni and remained with them till the fight ceased. Gholam Muhammad Khan forbade me from going towards the troops, saying that the troops will injure me. I therefore did not go towards the troops. My two horses were killed in the fight. The Government officers have charged me with a treacherous invitation of the Government, and discredited and distrusted me on the ground that I had knowledge of the proposal made by the tribe for fight. I was discredited (ru siyah) before the Government. When the General intended to come to our country I sent him my petitions at Bannu praying that the General may not cause me injury without proof of my guilt, but the General did not consider my case, and treated me like the offenders and the enemies of Government. Therefore I have lost my hope and trust upon the Government officers as they trust each other's words and do not believe the words of a foreigner. At the time when General Bird paid his first visit\* to Datta Khel, I informed him verbally that the Government officers do not believe my words and acts, but

\* In March 1897.



believe the words or other men. At the same time I requested him to report this matter to Government, that if ever Government are displeased with the Madda Khels I may not be injured for it. I paid from my own pocket Rs. 400 fine in order that the Government may not come in contact with the Madda Khels. I inform you that I have not presented myself for want of trust. If you are true to your word, please give me hope and trust so that I may believe it and come in. You should trust on your part the Miran Shah Maliks, so that peace may be effected.

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Enclosure No. 24.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 10th September 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 7th instant in which you ask that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will submit, for the information of the Government of India, his opinion as to the action to be taken in dealing with the Madda Khel who have not accepted the terms offered to them. In reply, I am to request that His Honour may be favoured, as early as possible, with a perusal of any communications received from General Bird in regard to the attitude of the tribe beyond those contained in his telegrams which have been regularly repeated to this Government, especially any letters addressed to him by the leading Maliks. Sir Mackworth Young would also deem it a favour if he might at the same time be informed whether General Bird has sent any reports regarding the origin of the outbreak and complicity of individuals and especially regarding the extent to which Sadda Khan and Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad were respectively aware of the attitude of the Maizarwals and of the probability of their breaking out; further whether General Bird has arrived at any conclusion regarding the distribution of the fine, in respect of which it was suggested that he should make enquiry in paragraph 4 of Government of India, Foreign Department, letter dated 17th July to his address. I am also to point out that in his telegram, dated 4th August 1897, General Bird intimated that he had demanded the surrender of 17 persons, but the Lieutenant-Governor has not received a list of these persons nor the reasons for demanding their surrender. If any reports on these subjects have been received, it will assist His Honour in forming the opinion desired by the Government of India, if he can be favoured with a perusal of them. If no such information is available it will, he fears, be difficult for him without communicating with General Bird to give an opinion of any value. He would then, however, be in a better position to advise the Government how to promote the chances of a settlement, or in default of submission by the tribe, how to proceed further against them.

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Enclosure No. 25.

*Letter from E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 15th September 1897.*

In reply to your letter dated the 10th September 1897, I am directed to

\* Dated the 6th September 1897.

forward a copy of a letter\* from the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, regarding the attitude of the Madda Khels. Previous communications on the subject were forwarded under the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 10th September 1897.

2. The names of the seventeen persons, whose surrender has been demanded are noted in paragraph 7 of Major-General Corrie Bird's letter, dated the 19th August 1897. No report has, however, been received from him regarding the origin of the outbreak, and the complicity of individuals, or the extent to which Sadda Khan and Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad may have been respectively, aware of the attitude of the Maizarwals, and of the probability of their breaking out. It will be seen from paragraph 5 of the letter above cited

that it is not proposed to take any steps in the way of redistributing the fine due on account of the murder of Honda Ram unless the Madda Khels themselves ask for assistance in the matter.

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Enclosure No. 26.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Pirakui (through Datta Khel), 13th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

AN early visit was paid this morning to Dadam village at head of Sortoi valley with object of capturing Ger Madda Khels, who are understood to resort there, and their property. No prisoners were taken at Dadam except two youths, who were let go. The premises of a blacksmith, who appears to be a gunsmith, were searched and his tools removed, and as, according to information received, Dadam harboured Nur Shah, Kazhawal, and his son after the Maizar affair, all arms found in the village and fields round it were taken away. A committee will report as to the disposal of these arms. At a village close below Dadam a shot is alleged to have been fired at the troops during their advance; the offender was not caught, but some villagers and cattle near the spot were taken into custody. Military commission will investigate the case.

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Enclosure No. 27.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 14th September 1897.*

IN continuation of my letter dated the 10th instant, regarding the action to be taken against the Madda Khel who have not accepted the terms offered to them, I am directed to enquire whether the Government of India have received any reports regarding the property of the Madda Khel still left in the country in the shape of villages, live-stock, stores of grain, or standing crops, and if so, whether the Lieutenant-Governor may be allowed to see them. I am also to ask if the opinion of the Chief Political Officer (Mr. Younghusband) has been obtained on the situation or if any of his diaries have been received, and if so, to say that Sir Mackworth Young would be glad to see them.

2. The list of persons to be surrendered asked for in my letter of the 10th instant has been supplied with your endorsement of the same date, but not the reasons for their surrender, and these should, His Honour thinks, be asked for from the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force.

3. As General Bird has been unsuccessful hitherto in getting a representative jirga of the Madda Khels to attend upon him to hear the Government terms, and has asked for further instructions, it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor absolutely necessary to have the further information indicated in this letter and in my previous letter of the 10th instant before deciding on the precise method by which we should proceed to enforce their attendance or to punish them for their recusancy.

4. Sir Mackworth Young would also suggest that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should be referred to as to the redistribution, after peace is restored, of the Tochi garrison as finally sanctioned after the boundary delimitation in such manner as to occupy the Madda Khel territory without unduly increasing the force required for garrisoning the valley. If it is determined that this object can be attained without a large increase in the permanent expenditure, we might, His Honour thinks, proceed to establish a fort in some healthy position above Sheranni or Maizar, and the commencement of such a project would, he believes, be likely to bring the Madda Khel in.

5. Whether the conduct of the Afghan Governor of Khost should be brought to the notice of His Highness the Amir with a view to his being instructed to refrain from allotting lands in Khost to the Madda Khel or otherwise instigating them to refuse the terms held out to them by the British Government is a matter for the Government of India to determine. Sir Mackworth Young is disposed to think that General Bird should, at any rate, be called upon to carefully verify the information he has received on this head.



## Enclosure No. 28.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Ismail Khel (through Datta Khel), 22nd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Madda Khel, as reports go to show, are feeling pressure of banishment from their country, and have asked Kabul Khels to intercede for them with Government and to give them shelter for winter. Kabul Khels are now considering this request.

## No. 34.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

We have decided to retain force in the Tochi for the present. Little progress has been made in settlement with Madda Khel, and we have authorised Bird, if Madda Khel still hold out against unconditional surrender of men demanded, to announce that they will not be punished with death or transportation, but he will let them know that unless their submission is made within a reasonable time, we will take possession of their land and property required for posts without compensation and adopt whatever other punitive measures as may be decided on by Government.

## No. 35.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Sadda Khan and his brother have surrendered unconditionally to General Bird, on promise that former will not be executed or transported. Other Madda Khel Maliks have come in.

## No. 36.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 4th November 1897. (Received 22nd November 1897.)*

MY LORD,

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 30th September 1897, we have the honour to forward copies of further correspondence regarding affairs in Waziristan.

2. Practically no progress was made towards a settlement with the Madda Khel during the past few weeks. Sadda Khan and the other Maliks did not come in; they sent in letters, giving a statement of what happened both before and at the Maizwar fight, which differs from the statements previously made; but they neither offered to submit to the punishment awarded, nor asked for an interview, though they appeared anxious to make their peace with Government before the approach of winter. General Bird believed that the attitude of the Madda Khel was due to the fact that the surrender of the ring-leaders was a condition which the tribesmen found it impossible to comply with, to the encouragement given to them by the Afghan officials, and to their belief that it was their best policy to play a waiting game in the hope that something might transpire to induce us to offer more favourable terms. General Bird accordingly recommended that no steps should be taken to open negotiations with the Madda Khel, until they had shown some sign of submission, had sued for pardon and had asked to be allowed to return to their country, and that no relaxation of the terms should be allowed until they had made submission and expressed a desire to do all in their power to carry out the orders of Government.



3. The position is admittedly a difficult one. It is now generally considered that the attack at Maizar was the outcome of tribal quarrels in connection with the fine imposed for the murder of the Mohurrir of the Sheranni Post, and that there was no deliberate treachery on the part of Sadda Khan and his party, or any preconceived plan on the part of the Maizarwals to entrap the escort. We accordingly accepted General Bird's recommendation and decided to await further developments. We left it to his discretion—if the Madda Khel still held out against the unconditional surrender of the men demanded—to announce that they or any selected individuals would not be punished with death or transportation. He is to let the Madda Khel clearly understand that their submission cannot be indefinitely postponed, and that if it is not made within a reasonable time, the British Government will take possession of such land and property as may be required for posts, without entertaining any claim or appeal for compensation, and will adopt such other punitive measures as may appear desirable.

4. General Egerton started on the 3rd October from Sheranni with a column to visit Dotoi and the slopes of Charmina and Bizha, and to work his way round to the Khina Algad. On the 4th October, the survey party with the column was fired on by a small body from the hills near Charmina and one sepoy was wounded. On the 7th the column marched up the Sindh Nulla and crossed into the Zowe Algad. The baggage guard was fired on near Gurbaz on the Shawal river on the 10th October, but there were no casualties. A reconnoitring party returning to camp on the 13th October was fired at by a party of 12 or 15 men led by a proclaimed Madda Khel outlaw: a sowar of the escort was wounded, and Lieutenant Hingston, R.E., had his horse shot under him and was himself grazed by a bullet. Some shots were afterwards fired into camp and two followers wounded.

5. On the 20th October, a party was sent out to Momirogha and succeeded in arresting Guri, Madda Khel of Sheranni, suspected of being implicated in the Maizar affair, and one Karm Shah, who was harbouring him. On the 23rd, three columns were sent out from Sheranni to reconnoitre Shawal Tangi. A detachment of the 33rd Punjab Infantry, on the high hills west of Gorwashta, was fired on and returned the fire, killing two Madda Khel and one Saifali *hamsaya*. The column in the bed of the nulla penetrated to Tangai, but found no outlaws or Government property. On the 28th October a column left Miran Shah on a ten days' tour to survey the unmapped Mohmit Khel and Turi Khel country, by the Gorwashta river and Spinwam. Several outrages of recent occurrence have been settled by the payment of fine.

6. Notwithstanding the Amir's long silence regarding the demarcated but unratified Waziristan boundary, the Afghans maintain their contention that the line is incorrect and refuse to recognize it. In September, Khalifa Nur Muhammad Khan wrote to General Bird complaining of transgression into Afghan territory near Char Khel. General Bird replied that none of his men had crossed the frontier demarcated by Mr. Anderson. The Khalifa answered (25th September) that no Afghan Commissioner was present at the time the boundary was demarcated, that the British Commissioner had erected wrong pillars and had overlooked the map signed by the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand, and that His Highness had suggested that a joint Commission should be appointed to re-demarcate the line.

7. Several of the boundary pillars between Laram and Char Khel, and between Char Khel and Dotoi, are reported to have been knocked down. The correctness of the boundary between Laram and Char Khel has never been disputed by the Afghan authorities, so the destruction of the pillars on this section of the line may probably be ascribed to mere mischief. General Bird has been authorised to undertake the reconstruction of the pillars, after informing Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan of his intention, and a column started for the Kazha valley on the 25th October to rebuild the pillars between No. 6 north of the Mastoi river and No. 10 or 12 east of Char Khel. The rebuilding of the pillars south of Dotoi is now hardly possible, owing to the lateness of the season and forage difficulties.



8. Latest telegraphic\* reports from General Bird, announce that Sadda Khan and his brother have come in to surrender unconditionally, on a promise that Sadda Khan shall not be

\* Dated the 31st October 1897.  
put to death or transported. Other Málíks have also come in and have promised compliance with the orders of Government as far as lays in their power. We reserve for a future despatch any comment on the development of affairs which these surrenders may bring about.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN.  
G. S. WHITE.  
J. WESTLAND.  
M. D. CHALMERS.  
E. H. H. COLLEN.  
A. C. TREVOR.  
C. M. RIVAZ.

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Enclosure No. 1.

*Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ismail Khel, the 22nd September 1897.*

I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translation of a letter received from Khalifa Nur Muhammad of Murgha with a translation of my reply. It will be seen that the Khalifa tries to revive the claim to a boundary line running down from Char Khel in a south-south-easterly direction, striking the Kazha river to the east of Bibi and then turning slightly to the west and making for Dotoi. The Government of India have informed the Amir that they cannot recognize any boundary line other than that laid down by Mr. Anderson, and I presume that I can move my troops about freely so long as I do not cross that line or do anything which could be construed into a hostile demonstration.

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Sub-Enclosure A.

*Translation of a letter from Khalifa Nur Muhammad of Birmal, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated the 20th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 II. (18th September 1897).*

*After compliments.*—I inform you that I have heard that some of your subordinates move about this side of Char Khel hill, Mandrak Khulla and Domandi (where the Murgha and Urgun rivers join). My friend, according to the agreement map, which was prepared by the two Governments and signed by His Highness the Amir and His Excellency the Viceroy and which is still in existence, the above-mentioned places and others where Zowe Saidgis live on this side belonged to the God-granted kingdom of Afghanistan, and the country on that side of the places mentioned above belonged to the British Government. I inform you, my friend, that before the outbreak of the Madda Khels and the punitive expedition against them, two years or more ago His Highness the Amir addressed friendly letters to His Excellency the Viceroy of India, and the Sardar and myself sent letters to Messrs. Anderson and Gee to the effect that, until the question raised about these villages is settled, any movement of your officials would not be becoming according to the rules of friendship. May it not happen that we being neighbours and friendship existing between the two Governments, any improper act take place contrary to the orders of our sovereigns, and that you and I who are the frontier officers incur their displeasure and wrath. Therefore, according to the rules of friendship, I write for your information that, in accordance with the friendship which exists between the two Governments, I trust that the movements of your officials, if this is true, may be deferred till the decision is arrived at about the said places—it would be a good thing. I am waiting for a reply from you.

All is well in every respect.

## Sub-Enclosure B.

*Translation of a letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to Khalifa Nur Muhammad of Birmal, dated the 22nd September 1897.*

My friend, I have received your letter of the 20th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., in which you state that you have heard that my subordinates have moved about on the Afghan side of the Afghan boundary. In reply, I write to say that the information given you is incorrect, and that none of my subordinates have moved about on the Afghan side of the boundary line as marked by the pillars erected by Mr. Anderson, the Commissioner of the British Government, nor have I any intention to visit with my troops any place or land which would be infringing on the agreement you refer to made between His Excellency the Viceroy and His Highness the Amir.

## Enclosure No. 2.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Bibi (through Datta Khel), 26th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

From information received I am induced to believe Sadda Khan is now sending letter saying if I guarantee that his life be spared and that he will not be transported out of India, he will come in and stand his trial and bring all Madda Khel with him unconditionally. If I receive this letter and may give him this assurance I advocate doing so, and would send Mani Khan and one or two Darwesh Khel Maliks to bring him in. He says nothing of men demanded by name by Government.

## Enclosure No. 3.

*Letter from Captain H. Daly, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 28th September 1897.*

With reference to the correspondence ending with the letter marked in the margin, regarding the Madda Khel tribe, I am directed to forward a copy of a

From the Government of India, telegram\* from the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, and to request that the Government of India may be favoured, Foreign Department, dated the 20th September 1897.

\*Dated the 26th September 1897. as soon as possible, with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion as to the expediency of giving Sadda Khan the assurance suggested in the event of his applying for it.

## Enclosure No. 4.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated 3rd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

If Sadda Khan writes in terms indicated in your telegram of September 26th, you may certainly give him assurance that, if he comes in to stand trial, and brings all Madda Khels unconditionally, his life will be spared, and he will not be transported out of India.

## Enclosure No. 5.

*Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ismail Khel, 25th September 1897.*

I have the honour to submit the following report on the present state of our dealings with the Madda Khels, and to solicit the instructions of the Government of India as to the course of action which they wish me to take.



As Government is aware, the Ger Madda Khels (with the exception of the Machas of the Shawal Tangi, and of Dotoi and the villages to the west of Dotoi) have taken refuge in Afghan territory; and have, up to date, in no way expressed their willingness to submit, or to accept the terms offered them by Government; and the question is whether we are to take any steps to induce their submission, or whether we should wait for them to make the next move. If we are to wait for them to make the next move, the negotiations may be protracted for some considerable time, and it, therefore, seems to me right to explain my view of the matter for the information and orders of the Government.

2. The reasons why so little progress has been made up to date appear to me to be two. In the first place, compliance with the conditions as to the surrender of the ringleaders is to the tribe a practical impossibility, involving as it does the surrender of so many of the most influential men that the remainder of the tribe can hardly be supposed to command the moral and physical force required to arrest them, and hand them over for trial and punishment.

Secondly, it is obvious that the Madda Khels believe that it is their best policy to play a waiting game, in the hope that something or other may turn up to induce us to offer them more favourable terms; and they are encouraged in this belief by the help and assistance given them by the Afghan officials.

3. Looking at the question from the point of view of our dealings with the Madda Khels, and with the whole Waziri tribe, I am strongly of opinion that our present policy should be one of waiting, and that we should take no steps to open negotiations with the Madda Khels, until they show some signs of submission and sue for pardon, and ask to be allowed to return to their country. To open negotiations with them now, by offering them more lenient terms, would be taken as a sign of weakness, and would not only induce the Madda Khels to think that further delay and hanging back on their part might induce further concessions on ours, but would also involve a loss of prestige throughout Waziristan, which would weaken our hold over the whole of the Waziri race.

I have full confidence that the policy which I advocate must, if steadily followed, be successful in the end, and I think that there is good reason to hope that the Madda Khels will show some sign of submission and make some attempt to be allowed to return to their lands, before the time for sowing the spring crops is over, that is to say, before the end of November. Not only will they be anxious to return to their homes and sow their crops, but they must be well aware that they cannot count on enjoying the hospitality of Afghan officials and subjects indefinitely.

I may add that, in my opinion, the firmer attitude we take up, the more likely they are to offer to submit.

I have already stated that I think that it is practically impossible for the tribe to comply with the order for the surrender of their ringleaders, and I will indicate below the way in which I think this order may eventually be modified; but I would reiterate here my opinion that any relaxation or modification of the terms must be preceded by the submission of the tribe, and the expression of their desire to do all that lies in their power to carry out the orders of Government.

4. If the policy I advocate is followed, it may take some time before Madda Khel affairs are settled up. I certainly believe that they will offer to submit before the time for sowing their spring crops is past; but I may be wrong in that belief, and if so, it would certainly take several months before a final settlement can be made with them on these lines.

It may be that Government is anxious for a more speedy settlement of the case, and if this is so, I will state what can, in my opinion, be done to carry out their wishes.

The real difficulty lies in the order for the surrender of the ringleaders. After full consideration, I am inclined to recommend that this term should be modified, and that the tribe should be required to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000 (in addition to all other penalties) for each of the persons whose surrender has been demanded, whom it is unable to give up for trial; these persons

being outlawed until such time as they choose to come in and stand their trial. If the Government of India accepts this suggestion, the total fine on the tribe (assuming that *none* of the persons demanded surrender to their trial) will amount to Rs. 27,000, in addition to the Rs. 900 (=Rs. 1,200 Kabuli) payable to Honda Ram's heirs, and to the compensation payable for Government property not restored; but rich villages like Sheranni and Maizar have large credits which enable them to borrow, and the Madda Khels would no doubt be assisted by surrounding clans. Some portion of the fine might also be accepted in kind, that is to say, in arms, or labour, or materials for building posts. My own view is that the terms might be modified in this way after the Madda Khels proffer submission and sue for pardon. But if, for any reason, Government consider it necessary to bring matters to a settlement as early as possible, it might be thought desirable to open negotiations with the Madda Khels at once on this basis.

5. Malik Sadda Khan's own personality is one which cannot be left out of consideration in discussing the management of the negotiations. The opinion has been frequently expressed by Maliks of different tribes that if Sadda Khan were to accept our terms and come in, the tribe would assuredly follow him; but that he is afraid to do so, because he does not know what punishment is in store for him. Without wishing to attach undue importance to this opinion, I think that there can be no doubt that our treatment of Sadda Khan is a very important factor in the attitude of the tribe towards us; and that it is well worth the while of Government at this stage to consider how they propose to treat him.

Three alternative courses appear to be open to us:—

- (1) The first alternative is to throw on him, as chief of the tribe, the whole responsibility for the attack on our troops at Maizar, and say that he should never again return to his old position.
- (2) A second alternative is to require him to stand his trial unconditionally, and then, if he is exonerated, allow him to resume his old position. Should Government decide in favour of the first of these alternative proposals, or (if the second alternative is adopted) should Sadda Khan fail to clear himself, the Darwesh Khel tribe would then be called upon to assist the Madda Khel Maliks in selecting a successor, who would be called upon to set up the section again.
- (3) With reference to the accompanying statement of Malik Sadda Khan's services in the past, in the management of his section since we came to the Tochi, and his complicity in the Maizar outrage, I would suggest, for the consideration of Government, as a third alternative, whether they will let him take his old position at once, inflicting on him such punishment as may seem appropriate for his share in the Maizar affair.

6. I have already reported to Government that it is, in my opinion, impossible to hold the Kazha branch of the Madda Khels responsible as a section for the Maizar outrage. At the same time there is no doubt that individuals from the Kazha were present at Maizar, and took part in the fight: and the surrender of two of these, namely, Shekh Nur and Pyall Nur, has been demanded, and the Kazha Maliks were informed that unless these two men were surrendered, they could not be exonerated from the offence. The Kazha Khel Maliks have now represented—and I believe with perfect truth—that it is impossible for them to arrest these two men who are living in Afghan territory under the protection of Afghan officials.

I propose to treat the Kazhawals on the lines suggested in paragraph 4 of this letter, that is to say, I would require them to pay up at once a fine of Rs. 2,000 in default of the surrender of these two men, who should be treated as outlaws, and not allowed to return to the country until they consent to surrender and stand their trial; and I would also inform the Kazhawals that they will be required to pay any share of the fine of Rs. 10,000, and of the value of the property lost at Maizar, to which they may hereafter be held liable by tribal custom.

7. In conclusion, I would reiterate my opinion that the policy, recommended in paragraph 3 of this letter, of keeping the Ger Madda Khels out of



their country until they submit, and express their readiness to comply, as far as in them lies, with the orders of Government, is the right one to follow, even though it may take a long time to carry it to a successful issue.

Except that the object for which the force, at its present strength, was sent, namely, to overawe the Waziris, and to prevent the possibility of a combined fanatical rising still exists, it might be reduced; but I consider that, until the Tirah expedition is over, the present force will be useful in the Tochi; and therefore, until that time, it will be no extra expense to continue the occupation of the Tochi at present strength.

#### Sub-Enclosure.

*An account of Malik Sadda Khan's attitude towards Government, and management of his tribe, during the years 1895—1897, so far as can be gathered from the diaries of Political Officers, and other available records.*

Sadda Khan is the most influential Malik in the Upper Tochi, and has steadily kept on good terms not only with the Maliks of other sections of the Darwesh Khel tribe, but also with the Governors of the adjoining Afghan districts. In his own section he had a rival in his cousin, Ayub Khan, but since Ayub Khan's death, in March 1896, Sadda Khan has certainly been the most influential man in his own tribe as well as in this part of the country.

The following notices of Sadda Khan are taken from the diaries for 1895:—

After completing his delimitation of the Afghan boundary in March 1895, Mr. Anderson recorded that the Maliks had co-operated in the most friendly way, and that Sadda Khan, in particular, had "exerted the influence which he has over his tribe to render our way as smooth as possible."

On the 6th April 1895, the Madda Khel Maliks joined in a petition, expressing their willingness that Government should occupy the Tochi valley.

On the 18th May 1895, Sadda Khan and other Madda Khel Maliks petitioned that they did not want us up the Tochi, and could not provide supplies, &c.

[There was a good deal of uneasiness all down the valley at this time owing to the delay in granting the allowances.]

On the 30th May 1895, the chief Madda Khel Maliks promised the Political Officer to keep order in the tribe, and prevent hostile action against Government.

The diary of 13th August 1895 contains a report that Sadda Khan and the leading Madda Khel Maliks had openly refused to have anything to do with certain intrigues against Government.

In November–December 1895, Sadda Khan and a few Madda Khels joined a jirga which assembled to ask for increased allowances and for sanads to the tribes.

At the end of December 1895, the Political Officer writes that Sadda Khan and other Maliks are anxious for us to move on to the Upper Tochi: also that "Sadda Khan is working very well, and appears to be a sincere well-wisher of Government;" but feels "want of support from within in upholding his own authority and the interests of Government." Mr. Bruce in a marginal note also speaks of the influence of such men as Sadda Khan as being of the utmost value to Government.

The diary of the 8th January 1896 shows that Sadda Khan was doing his best to settle old pending murder cases in his tribe and to maintain order.

We now come to the Madda Khel agitation in February and March 1896. In submitting his report on this agitation, Mr. Anderson came to the conclusion that the real motive of it was the desire of the Maliks (including Sadda Khan) and tribesmen to bring pressure to bear upon Government to make a substantial increase to their allowances. He considered that the Madda Khels had no just cause of complaint as to the share allotted to the tribe, which was more than they were entitled to receive by tribal custom, but he found fault with Sadda Khan and Ayub Khan for not having distributed among the minor Maliks, for whom no provision had otherwise been made, the Silladari of 23 footmen, which had been assigned to them on the distinct understanding that this would be done.



Mr. Anderson added—"Although . . . . Malik Sadda Khan and other leading Malikhs were engaged in the intrigue which caused agitation and other objectionable demonstrations, I do not for a moment question their loyalty, as a body and individually, to their promises made to Government. I do not doubt that Sadda Khan, in asking for troops, really wishes the support of troops to strengthen his authority over his section . . . . He showed his good will by recommending that a post should be built at Dotoi, pointing out that the further west we had our post the better control we should have over the Maizarwals and other sub-sections who took a prominent part in the demonstrations of the past." The Commissioner, Mr. Bruce, expressed his full concurrence in these remarks.

In the diary for the period ending the 31st March 1896, it is stated that Sadda Khan renewed his promise to distribute his Silladari allowance among those Malikhs who had received none.

The diaries of April and June 1897 show that Sadda Khan was using his influence with the Khidder Khel Malikhs and tribesmen in the preservation of order.

On the 9th June 1896, Honda Ram, the Muharrir of the Sheranni levy post, was murdered by an Ali Khan Khel (Madda Khel), named Waris; the only motive for the murder apparently being that Waris had a grudge against Sadda Khan, who was primarily responsible for the Muharrir's safety. Sadda Khan and the other Malikhs again pressed for the advance of our troops up the valley, and it was eventually decided to move a large military force to Datta Khel.

In July 1896, some of the principal Madda Khel Malikhs, including Sadda Khan, went to Urgan, and were well received by Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan.

In October 1896, the fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed on the Madda Khels and Khidder Khels for the agitation in the previous March was promptly realized. The Madda Khels were still petitioning about allowances. Mr. Gee recorded that some Malikhs had been left out who ought to receive allowances, but that he had refused to consider the matter until all cases against the tribe were settled.

A fine of Rs. 2,000 was at first imposed on the whole Madda Khel section as a punishment for the murder of Honda Ram and for their having allowed the actual murderer to escape. Subsequently the Malikhs brought in Mulla Ghain-ud-din and certain others, who were suspected of complicity in the murder. These men were tried and acquitted, and the fine on the tribe was then reduced to Rs. 900 (=Rs. 1,200 Kabuli).

[Mr. Gee considered that Sadda Khan did not do his best to bring these men in in the first instance, hoping that his plea of inability to fully control his tribe would be taken as an additional reason for bringing troops up the valley.]

Sadda Khan's conduct is unfavourably noticed in regard to the shooting of a thief outside the Datta Khel camps on the 7th February 1897. He seems to have tried to prevent our officers from identifying the body, and discovering the true facts of the case.

About this time we first hear of Alambe as heading a faction of the Madda Khels opposed to Sadda Khan. There had been numerous acts of lawlessness on the part of Madda Khels and Manzar Khels during the winter; and the diaries seem to indicate that the opposition to Sadda Khan was due to his attempts to keep his tribe in order, and control the turbulent members of it.

In March 1897, it is noted that the Madda Khels (apparently the Madda Khels of the Kazha are especially referred to) were sulky about the fines recently inflicted upon them, and partly in consequence of this, Mr. Gee, Political Officer, visited the Kazha valley, early in April, with a strong escort.

Sadda Khan's action in promptly bringing in for trial eight Madda Khels of the Kazha, who were accused of the murder of Niaz Muhammad, Shutur sowar of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, deserves notice. These men appear to have been wrongly accused, and were afterwards released by the Political Officer. Sadda Khan certainly appears to have neither discovered nor arrested the real offenders.

The exact part taken by Sadda Khan in the discussions regarding the apportionment of the fine on the tribe in Honda Ram's case, which preceded the attack at Maizar, is difficult to ascertain exactly, but there can be no doubt that he must have taken a very prominent part in them, because he was not

only the chief of the tribe, but he also had a considerable personal interest in the settlement of the case of Honda Ram, who was in a special sense under Sadda Khan's protection, and who was murdered in order to spite Sadda Khan.

Mr. Gee reported that the Malikhs had accepted the fine of Rs. 2,000 originally proposed in this case, and had prepared a distribution list. Subsequently, when proposals were made for the reduction of the fine to Rs. 1,200 Kabuli, a fresh distribution list was prepared. To this second list also Mr. Gee records that the Malikhs made no objection, and if the evidence of the Khidder Khel Malikhs (recorded by Mr. Gee) is to be believed, the responsible Madda Khel Malikhs definitely agreed to it. Both of these distribution lists were prepared strictly according to the customary tribal shares, according to which the fine was divided equally between the four main sub-divisions—Ali Khan Khels, Dreplaries, Khoji Khels and Machas.

The Nazr Khels and Khizr Khels (the sub-section to which Sadda Khan belongs) are both branches of the Ali Khan Khels, and pay a fixed proportion of the Ali Khan Khel share; though when Ali Khan Khels are spoken of, the word usually refers only to the sub-sections other than the Nazr Khels and Khizr Khels. In an ordinary case, the distribution of the fine according to the customary shares would no doubt have been accepted without more grumbling than is natural in a case where we have to enforce tribal responsibility.

In this case there were various causes at work to stimulate dissatisfaction and to suggest a different distribution. The name of the actual murderer (who had escaped to Afghanistan) was known, and it was urged that his relatives should be required to pay a substantial share of the fine: this suggestion was resisted by his section, the Ali Khan Khels, who were angry with Sadda Khan, on account of a personal quarrel between one of their Malikhs, Shekh Nur, and a member of Sadda Khan's family; then again, the Dreplaris, Khoji Khels and Machas, very few of whom live in Sheranni, urged that they were not responsible for any part of the blood-money in this case; and lastly, it would seem that Alambe Khan was ready to take any side in opposition to Sadda Khan.

As pressure was put on the Madda Khels for the payment of the fine these disputes grew hotter. In the discussions which took place on the 8th, 9th, and 10th June 1897, Sadda Khan threatened the other Malikhs with the intervention of our troops, and kept up the impression in their minds that the visit of our troops to Maizar was undertaken in order to enforce the payment of the fine.

While thus misrepresenting the action of our officials to the other Malikhs, he apparently made no report to our officers of the excited state of mind into which those Malikhs had worked themselves. Sadda Khan must, therefore, be held responsible for all that happened eventually. At the same time, there seems little doubt that no one was more taken aback at the attack than he was; he certainly took no part in it, and would have stopped it could he have done so.

The general conclusion to be drawn from these records seems to be that Sadda Khan was really sincere in his professions of loyalty to Government. He was, of course, actuated by self-interest; but he was wise enough to see that it was to his interest to support us, and he did so. He certainly allowed himself to be drawn into an agitation for increased allowances in the end of 1895, and he at first joined in, or instigated, the Madda Khel agitation of February 1896. It must, however, be remembered that even the strongest of these frontier Malikhs must, to some extent, yield to pressure from his tribe. Sadda Khan has constantly invited us to build levy posts in his country and to strengthen our hold upon his tribesmen. The whole of the Madda Khel section live beyond our most advanced posts, and this is no doubt the reason why they have not received the supervision and control, without which it is impossible to expect these wild tribesmen to go straight.

Sadda Khan has been constantly blamed for not distributing his large Silladari allowances among the Malikhs who had received none; but if you expect an independent Malik to carry out orders of the kind, you must see that he does it, and not be content with accepting his assurances that he will do it.



Lastly, in regard to the Maizar outrage, Sadda must be acquitted of anything like deliberate treachery, but he must (so far as he can be judged without having been heard in his defence) be held guilty of having, on the one hand, misrepresented the intentions of Government to his fellow-tribesmen, and, on the other hand, of having concealed from our officers the strong excitement prevailing in his tribe.

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Enclosure No. 6.

*Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ismail Khel, 27th September 1897.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt (to-day) of your letter, dated the 20th instant, and to say that I will send in a day or two a full reply to the questions asked. My letter, which was written before the receipt of your letter and is being despatched to-day, states my views (and those of the Chief Political Officer) on the present political situation.

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Enclosure No. 7.

*Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Detta Khel, 28th September 1897.*

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a subsequent letter received from Khalifa Nur Muhammad on the subject of the British-Afghan boundary and of my reply.

2. In connection with this subject, I would invite the attention of Government to paragraph 12 of the Tochi Diary for the week ending the 22nd September 1897, in which it was reported that several pillars on the Char Khel-Laram line had been thrown down. On the Char Khel-Khwaja Khider line pillar No. 7 is standing, but some (if not all) of the pillars between pillar No. 7 (near Dotoi) and No. 1 have been knocked down. The Maliks say that they reported to the Political Officer in March last that the pillars had been injured, but there is nothing in the office to show whether their statement is correct or not.

3. I find that last year the Government of India suggested that arrangements should be made for the periodical repair of these pillars. It now appears that in the case of some at all events of these pillars reconstruction rather than repair is required. I have the honour to enquire whether the Government of India wish to take the opportunity of the presence of a large force in the Tochi to have these pillars systematically examined and repaired or where necessary reconstructed; in particular, whether in view of the Amir's objection to the boundary line as demarcated between Char Khel and Khwaja Khider, they wish the pillars on this line to be reconstructed, and, if so, whether Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan should be informed of the intention to reconstruct them. When the pillars have been once reconstructed, I would suggest that they should be put in charge of the local Maliks, who should be given a fixed allowance for repairs, and held responsible for the maintenance of the pillars in good order.

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Sub-Enclosure A.

*Translation of a letter from Khalifa Nur Muhammad, Ruler of Birmal, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated the 27th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 Hijri (corresponding to 25th September 1897).*

AFTER due compliments.—I inform you that I have received your letter in which you have written to say that none of your officials have reconnoitred and crossed the line of boundary pillars erected by Mr. Anderson into Afghan territory, and that you have no intention of taking troops to lands and places on this side, as it would be against the friendly agreement of the two Governments.



I came to know the contents of your letter, and I write to inform you that no Afghan Commissioner was present at the time of the demarcation of the boundary line from Laram and Char Khel to Domandi, Gumal and Kunder. The British Commission Officer erected wrong boundary pillars and overlooked the map prepared and signed by His Highness the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary, and which we have still with us. The Malik and subjects were dissatisfied with it at the time, and they complained about it to the Amir. The Amir referred the matter to the Government of India, and suggested that Commissions should be appointed by the two Governments, so that pillars be erected according to the map, and the claims of the subjects of the two Governments be considered. With respects. Waiting for a reply.

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Sub-Enclosure B.

*Translation of a letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to Khalifa Nur Muhammad, Ruler of Birmal, dated 26th September 1897.*

AFTER due compliments.—I inform you that I have received your letter and read it. In reply I inform you that, at the time of my starting on this expedition, the Government of India gave me a map showing the boundary line between the two countries, and the boundary pillars are all marked on it. I have not crossed the line of boundary pillars into Afghan territory, and I have no intention of doing so. My troops are encamped on this side of the boundary pillars. As regards the suggestion for a fresh demarcation of the boundary, I write to say that I have submitted a report on this matter to the Government of India. His Excellency the Viceroy will doubtless write to His Highness the Amir about the matter, and I have no doubt you will receive orders from the Amir in due course.

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Enclosure No. 8.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd October 1897.*

IN reply to your letters, dated 7th and 28th ultimo, in which the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in regard to affairs in the Tochi is called for, I am desired to intimate that Sir Mackworth Young considers that it is established that the reason for the Madda Khel holding out lies simply in the demand for unconditional surrender of the 17 persons mentioned in paragraph 7 of Major-General Bird's letter, dated 19th August 1897.

2. The formulation of such a demand must have appeared to be significant to the tribe, as the utmost we have ordinarily demanded in similar cases has been the surrender of leading men as hostages. The reason for making the demand for unconditional surrender in the present case was simply that the attack on the escort at Maizar on the 10th June was regarded as an act of pure treachery. This was the view taken by Mr. Gee in his telegrams of 10th June and 11th June, and by Mr. Anderson in his telegram, dated 16th June. Unconditional surrender of the ringleaders appeared therefore to be absolutely necessary, and accordingly this was one of the terms recommended in this office letter, dated 1st July, and practically accepted by the Government of India in Foreign Department letter, dated 17th July.

3. Mr. Gee's detailed report of the occurrence, however, which was forwarded with this office letter, dated 2nd July, put a somewhat different complexion on the matter. Instead of the attack being, as was at first supposed, a deliberate plot devised under the semblance of hospitality, it appeared doubtful whether it was premeditated at all. Mr. Gee indeed held that it was, but the only explanation he was able to suggest, though he considered it quite inadequate, was that it was planned in resistance to the treatment of the tribe by Sadda Khan, against whom Mr. Gee held that the charge of direct complicity was not proved. In reviewing this report His Honour observed that the occurrence

appeared to be mainly and immediately due to the bitter feeling engendered between several of the Maliks and sections of the Madda Khel by the distribution of the fine leviable from them on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir ; and he intimated that further and fuller enquiry would be necessary before the causes were completely established and the share of responsibility for the attack duly apportioned. From the Foreign Department letter, dated 15th September, it appears that no report has been received from Major-General Bird on this subject, though the Lieutenant-Governor's views, as above explained, were communicated to him with paragraph 4 of your letter, dated 17th July, and the Government of India there pointed out that there was reason to believe that the Maizarwals considered that they had a real grievance in regard to the terms of Sadda Khan's distribution of the fine of Rs. 1,200 on account of the murder of Honda Ram. Nor can the Lieutenant-Governor find any expression of opinion by Mr. Younghusband on this subject. In fact Mr. Younghusband appears to have submitted no diaries and expressed no views of his own throughout the campaign, which Sir Mackworth Young thinks is much to be regretted, and contrary, as he understands, to the intentions of the Government of India, by whom the relations between the General Officer invested with supreme political control and the Chief Political Officer were explained to this Government in 1894, while the recent orders contained in your letter of 15th September regarding the Orakzai and Afridi expedition furnish an instance of those intentions.

4. But in default of full information His Honour thinks it safe to conclude from the reports of Mr. Gee above referred to, as well as the report furnished by him with regard to the conduct of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan and forwarded with this office letter, dated 29th July 1897, that the attack of 10th June was the outcome of tribal quarrels relating to the fine, and that there was no deliberate treachery on the part of Sadda Khan and his party and no plan to entrap the escort on the part of the Maizarwals. He is inclined to think that, if the circumstances had been fully known when the terms were announced, it would have been sufficient to have demanded hostages in lieu of requiring the surrender for trial of the 17 persons demanded by Major-General Bird, under the first head of the terms.

5. Sir Mackworth Young has now to reply to the two enquiries made by the Government of India in the letters under reply.

The Lieutenant-Governor has no hesitation in recommending that if Sadda Khan sends the letter to which Major-General Bird alludes in his telegram, dated 26th September, he should be given the assurance he asks for, on the conditions named. He does not apprehend that in view of the aspect of the case, which has been above described, there will be any question of taking Sadda Khan's life or deporting him out of India. And holding, as Sir Mackworth Young does, that the worst fault of which he was guilty was not informing the Political Officers of the attitude of the Madda Khel, he sees no impropriety in treating him as an intermediary for inducing the tribe to comply with the demands of Government. But His Honour is not sanguine of his sending such a letter or of his being able to give effect to his promises, if he does.

6. Assuming that even after the assurance Sadda Khan will be unable or unwilling to ensure compliance with the terms, I am now to submit for the orders of the Government of India, the views of the Lieutenant-Governor as to the further action to be taken in regard to the Madda Khel.

7. His Honour considers that except in the matter above discussed,—viz., of giving an assurance to Sadda Khan that he will not be hanged or deported out of India—there should be no relaxation of the terms announced by Government, but rather that, as proposed by Mr. Anderson, the surrender of a certain number of arms should be demanded in addition ; and that it should be announced that in default of the Madda Khel coming in and complying with all the terms as thus enhanced the British Government will proceed to confiscate the lands of all whom it believes to have been implicated in the outbreak who will thenceforth be regarded as criminals and outlaws. When this has been decided individuals not included in the above number might be allowed to return to their lands, and the confiscated lands might be made over to such persons as Government may appoint on such terms as may seem most desirable.

8. Sir Mackworth Young also thinks that unless Sadda Khan brings in the Madda Khel on getting the assurance above mentioned, the Government of India will be well advised to entrust further negotiations in this matter to Mr. Anderson, and to restore to him the political control of the Tochi Valley whether under the Punjab Government or for the present directly under the Government of India. His confidence in his power to bring in the Maliks is probably well founded, and so long as the troops are not withdrawn before a final settlement has been arrived at, there is no reason to anticipate any evil results from the reintroduction of the Commissioner's political control.

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Enclosure No. 9.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department dated Simla, 14th October 1897.*

In continuation of the letter from this office, dated the 2nd October 1897, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the telegram noted in the margin, regarding the question of the submission of the Madda Khels.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated the 12th October 1897.

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Sub-Enclosure.

*From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, dated 12th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter, dated 2nd instant, to India and General's telegram, dated 26th ultimo, received yesterday. Even if Sadda Khan wrote letter, his object, so far as I can form opinion, would be to throw out a feeler to ascertain what action we contemplate taking now that six weeks have elapsed since he definitely declined to comply with terms. If my surmise be correct, Sadda Khan finding that his non-compliance has brought no additional punishment on him or tribe, but on contrary has secured an assurance, might be encouraged to hope for further concessions and modification of terms, and the General's reply will do more harm than good. I need hardly add that it will make future settlement more difficult. Darwesh Khel sections have now commenced moving to their winter quarters; if Sadda Khan has not written the letter, and it is decided to entrust the case to me, I trust early orders will be obtained to enable me to take advantage of the movement which both isolates Madda Khels and brings other sections within our reach and affords favourable opportunity, if taken at once, of influencing Madda Khels.

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Enclosure No. 10.

*Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Miran Shah, 13th October 1897.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 20th ultimo, with which you forwarded a copy of certain correspondence with the Government of the Punjab, and asked for further information regarding certain points raised in that correspondence.

2. The matters regarding which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor asks for further information appear to be the following :—

- (i) The origin of the outbreak at Maizar.
- (ii) The complicity of individuals in the outbreak.
- (iii) and (iv) The extent to which (iii) Sadda Khan and (iv) Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammed Khan were aware of the attitude of the Maizarwals and the probability of their breaking out.



- (v) The distribution of the fine of Rs. 1,200 in Honda Ram's case.
- (vi) The reason for the selection of the 17 persons whose surrender has been demanded.
- (vii) The property of the Madda Khels left in the country.
- (viii) The Diaries of the Chief Political Officer and his opinion on the situation.
- (ix) The allegation that the Afghan Governor of Khost is offering lands in Khost to the Madda Khels and in other ways instigating them to refuse the terms held out to them by Government.

3. I will now supply what additional information I can on these points.

Points (i) and (iii).—In the memorandum appended to my letter dated the 25th September 1897, a full statement was given of the share taken by Sadda Khan in the discussions which preceded the outbreak at Maizar, and the question of his responsibility for that outbreak was discussed. The reasons for the general dissatisfaction prevailing among the Madda Khels, both of Sheranni and Maizar, were also examined. To the general discontent prevailing was added the annoyance felt by the tribe at the story told them by Sadda Khan that the visit of our troops to Maizar was undertaken in order to enforce payment of the fine, and it seems pretty certain from the evidence recorded by Mr. Gee that it had been decided by the Maliks at the "Marakka" held on the 9th June that, if any attempt was made by our troops to enforce payment by force, they would resist by force. There is, it seems to me, no reason to suppose that they went further than this, and, in fact, everything points to the absence of deliberate treachery on the part of the Maliks. If there had been a deliberate intention to commit a treacherous attack on our troops, it is impossible to believe Sadda Khan and all his own immediate relations (to say nothing of the Khidder Khel Maliks and intelligent men like the Levy Havildar Alam Shah) would not have had some warning of it, and in that case would have conveyed a warning to the Political Officer; again, if they had meant treachery, they could have easily shot down Mr. Gee and his escort of six cavalry sowars on the way to or from Dotoi; thirdly, the inhabitants of remote villages, instead of being ready on the spot to join in the fight, did not come up till they heard the sound of firing; fourthly, the women and children do not appear to have been sent away, as is the custom with Pathan tribes when a fight is coming off; mention is made in the evidence of Pyall's daughter, Mr. Gee speaks of the women joining in the fight and throwing stones, and 4 women are said to have been killed at Maizar, and nine women and children at Sheranni; lastly, it is difficult to believe that, if deliberate treachery had been intended, such experienced officers as Colonel Bunny and Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan would have failed to see some indication of it. At the meeting which was held on the 10th under the mulberry trees, it would appear that after a hot discussion Sadda Khan went off to the Assistant Political Officer (who had retired to a terrace below to perform his ablutions) to ask for five days' grace within which to pay the fine. Apparently a similar request had been preferred an hour previously, and (according to the Assistant Political Officer himself) he replied that he would lay the matter before the Political Officer after he had eaten his food. While Sadda Khan was away the second time, there was a general movement of the Maliks to the village marked on the plan as the Drepilare Kot, a shot (or two shots) were fired, the excitement then became uncontrollable and every one joined in the fray. By whom or for what reason the first shot was fired will probably ever remain a mystery; several explanations are given in the papers submitted by Mr. Gee; these differ widely from each other, and are apparently only guesses if not intentionally false suggestions. As probable an explanation as any other seems to me to be that it was fired by some ruffian, who wanted to commit his tribe to the attack at the height of their excitement, and knew that this was the surest way to do it. This is only a guess, but it may be nearer the truth than some of the other explanations offered.

4. Points (ii) and (vi).—The case of Sadda Khan has already been sufficiently discussed. The reasons for the selection of the other 16 men whose surrender has been demanded are briefly as follows:—Dande has been selected both because of his position in the tribe, and because of the assertions made that it was notorious that he used against our troops the Winchester rifle which

had been given for good service to Sadda Khan ; these assertions are to some extent supported by the evidence of Surgeon-Captain Cassidy (since dead) and Surgeon-Captain Ozzard ; if Dande joined in the fight, he must have left it very soon after the commencement ; I think the case against him should be placed before a court. Alambe is the rival and opponent of Sadda Khan in the tribe ; he was partly responsible for the agitation which ended in the attack on our troops ; though he took no part in the fight itself, he appears to have failed to prevent his own village of Sheranni from attacking our troops, even if he did not (as Mr. Gee suggests) encourage it to do so ; his nephew Zer Makhmad is said to have remained at Maizar and joined in the fight. Shekh Nur is the chief Malik of the Ali Khan Khels proper ; he and his brother Saiyad Wali took a prominent part in fomenting the agitation against the payment of the fine ; they had previously sheltered Honda Ram's murderer and assisted him to escape ; they were present at Maizar and almost certainly took part in the fight ; it is said that Saiyad Wali began the fight by firing the first shot, but the evidence on this point is not to be relied on. Khanijan is another leading Ali Khan Khel, who was suspected of complicity in the murder of Honda Ram ; he took a leading part in the Maizar fight, and is said to have been one of the first to fire. Modai is the chief Malik of the Drepilare village adjoining the ground where our troops were encamped, and from which the first deadly attack on them was made ; he took a prominent part in the agitation, and it is said that the question of fighting was first discussed in his house. Namwar, Azun and Ware Khan are the chief Maliks of the Khoji Khel, Ali Khan Khel and Macha sub-sections in Maizar ; they were present on the 10th June, and doubtless took part in the fight. They appear to have joined in the agitation, though not (except perhaps Azun) to have taken so prominent a part in it as some of the other Maliks. All three are said to have been engaged in the fight. Loot taken at Maizar was found in the hamlets of Azun and Ware Khan. Marghat presumably took an active part in the fight, as two rifles are said to be his share of the spoil ; he is mentioned as one of the ringleaders. Mir Badshah is the brother of Ware Khan, the Macha Malik, and is mentioned as one of the ringleaders ; ten discharged Martini-Henry cartridge cases were found in his house.

Bohtan, Salo and Muhabbat are notorious ruffians who are said to have been in the fight. Salo has a rifle and is said to have been one of the first to fire. Bohtan has (since the Maizar attack) been surprised by a small party of our troops with some stolen donkeys and was wounded by a shot fired at him, but got away. Nur Shah is one of the most important Maliks of the Kazha. It seems to be perfectly clear that he and his son Pyall Nur were present at Maizar and took an active part in the fight.

5. Point (iv).—There is nothing in Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan's own statement or in the other papers on record to suggest that he had any idea of the excited feelings prevailing among the Madda Khels. He does not appear to have been questioned on this point. It seems to me desirable that some inquiry of the kind should now be made from him, as, though the Khidder Khel Maliks will not admit that they had any knowledge of the matter, both the Levy Havildar Alam Shah and Sheikh Jamal of Ipi knew all about it, and it is certainly not to Ghulam Muhammad Khan's credit that he should have been so ignorant of the feelings of the section. Further, Sadda Khan in his petitions directly accuses the Assistant Political Officer of refusing to listen to his warnings both before and on the 10th that there would be trouble if the few days' grace asked for was not granted. I propose going into this matter also, and will submit a separate report before the termination of the expedition.

6. Point (v).—As already stated in paragraph 5 of my letter dated the 19th August 1897, it does not seem to me desirable to re-open the question of the distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's case except on the application of the Madda Khels themselves ; at all events, it is impossible to do so until they are here to discuss it.

7. Point (vii).—The Madda Khels of Sheranni and Maizar with their outlying hamlets (which spread over a distance of some 3 or 4 miles along the Tochi and Shawal rivers, respectively) have no property left in the valley except bare houses, and even these have in many cases suffered a good deal of injury from



the destruction of the towers and walled defences. What was possible has been done to leave some shelter for the women and children during the severe cold of the winter in case the Madda Khels should think fit to submit before the cold weather comes on, but there is no property left of which we can deprive them. The search parties found the houses stripped of everything except a few odds and ends, and a certain quantity of bhoosa which the Madda Khels had not been able to carry away in the interval of 40 days which elapsed between the outrage on the 10th June and the arrival of our troops on 20th July. This was taken possession of and used by the Commissariat. Their flocks and herds were all driven off before our arrival, and the Commissariat mules have eaten down the standing crops, which even if they had been left alone could not have ripened without irrigation and attention. This applies to the hamlets as far west as Landi Khel (or Landi Bahadur Khel) and Kundian, and as far south as Gurgwashta. Beyond these are a few hamlets which have not been molested in any way. On the west there are Dotoi and a few hamlets on the Mastoi and Murgha streams, reported to contain 108 houses in all: on the south there are the Machas and a few Janbi Khels (or Janbeg Khels) of the Shawal Tangi. The crops of all these villages put together would not amount to much. None of these hamlets were in any way concerned in the attack on our troops by the Maizar and Sheranni people. Representative deputations from all these hamlets came in to Sheranni to sue for peace and make their submission, but in view of the orders contained in your telegram of the 6th ultimo to refrain from dealing with the Madda Khels otherwise than as a whole, and not to treat separately with the Machas until I should receive instructions on the line to be taken with the Madda Khels generally, they were dismissed to their homes (as reported in paragraph 4 of my letter, dated the 6th September 1897).

8. Point (viii).—With reference to the request of the Lieutenant-Governor for the opinion of the Chief Political Officer and for a copy of his diaries, I should explain that all my letters to the Government of India are drafted by the Chief Political Officer after consultation, either verbal or on paper, with myself, and may be taken to represent his views as well as my own. If he should at any time find it impossible to agree in the views expressed in any of my letters, or should for any reason desire to record a separate opinion, opportunity will be given to him to do so, and the opinion will be forwarded for the information of Government. Similarly the weekly diaries have all (except on one occasion during the Chief Political Officer's absence on tour) been drafted by Mr. Younghusband. Of course I make such modifications as I consider necessary, but the diaries are practically the Chief Political Officer's work, accepted and approved by myself. I trust that this explanation will be satisfactory to the Government of India.

9. Point (ix).—I have no definite information which would justify me in asserting that an offer of lands has been made to the Madda Khels either in Khost or elsewhere, and I think it improbable that any such offer has been made. Our reports go to show that the Amir, while not refusing a refuge to the Madda Khels, has gone no further than this, and has caused them to be informed that the refuge is conditional on their good behaviour. On the other hand, the facts stated in paragraph 3 of my letter, dated the 6th September 1897, to your address, appear to me to justify the conviction that Sardar Sherindil Khan and Babrak Khan have encouraged the Madda Khels to persevere in their present attitude of passive resistance.

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Enclosure No. 11.

*Letter from Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated Simla, the 23rd October 1897.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters regarding the present situation in the Madda Khel country.

2. You report that little progress towards a settlement with the Madda Khels has been effected up to date, and you attribute this, in the first place, to the fact that the surrender of the ringleaders of the attack at Maizar is a



condition which the tribesmen find it practically impossible to comply with, and, secondly, to the encouragement given to the Madda Khels by the Afghan officials and to the tribesmen's belief that it is their best policy to play a waiting game, in the hope that something may transpire to induce us to offer more favourable terms. You accordingly recommend that no steps should be taken to open negotiations with the Madda Khels, until they show some signs of submission and sue for pardon, and ask to be allowed to return to their country; and you consider that no relaxation or modifications of terms should be allowed, until the Madda Khel have made submission and expressed a desire to do all that lies in their power to carry out the orders of Government.

3. The Governor-General in Council accepts your recommendation, and will await further developments. He would be unable, however, to agree to the alternative which you suggest, in view to a more speedy settlement, that a sum of money might be demanded in lieu of the ringleaders whose surrender you have required. If you find that the Madda Khel still hold out against the unconditional surrender of the men demanded, it is left to your discretion to announce that they or any selected individuals of them will not be punished with death or transportation. You should let the Madda Khel clearly understand that their submission cannot be indefinitely postponed, and that if it is not made within a reasonable time, the British Government will take possession of such land and property as may be required for posts, without entertaining any claim or appeal for compensation, and will adopt such other punitive measures as may appear desirable.

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Enclosure No. 12.

*Letter from Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 23rd October 1897.*

THE Governor-General in Council has had under consideration the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion regarding the present situation in the Madda Khel country, as expressed in your letter, dated the 2nd October 1897, a copy of which has, it is understood, been furnished by the Punjab Government to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force.

2. His Honour has come to the conclusion that the attack on the British troops at Maizar on the 10th June 1897 was the outcome of tribal quarrels relating to the fine imposed for the murder of Honda Ram, that there was no deliberate treachery on the part of Sadda Khan and his party, and no plan to entrap the escort on the part of the Maizarwals. The Lieutenant-Governor is not sanguine of Sadda Khan sending in a letter, offering to come in and stand his trial, and to bring in the Madda Khel unconditionally if guaranteed against punishment by death or transportation, as General Bird reported in his telegram, dated the 26th September 1897, that he was likely to do; and, as a matter of fact, no such letter has yet been received. Had Sadda Khan written, as General Corrie Bird has reason to think it possible he might, the Lieutenant Governor would have had no hesitation in recommending that Sadda Khan should be given an assurance that he would not be hanged, or sent out of India. If, even after receiving this assurance, Sadda Khan still failed to bring in the Madda Khel, His Honour thinks the Government of India would be well advised to entrust further negotiations to Mr. Anderson, and to restore to him political control in the Tochi valley.

The Governor-General in Council considers that, so far as the direct object of the expedition is concerned, it might be held that the time had come to reduce the Tochi force, but that it is preferable not to do much in this direction until General Sir William Lockhart is established in Tirah. The force now in the Tochi will accordingly be retained for the present, and the chief political control will remain in the hands of Major-General Corrie Bird. A copy of my letter furnishing instructions for his guidance is enclosed.

Dated the 23rd October 1897.

## Enclosure No. 13.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Camp Datta Khel, dated 23rd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Correspondence ending with your letter September 28th. You may undertake reconstruction of boundary pillars between Char Khel and Laram, and also those south of Char Khel, informing Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan of your intention. If expenditure for which there is no provision will be involved, please report probable amount and how you propose meeting it. About proposal to grant allowances to Malikis for maintenance further instructions will be sent to you.

## Enclosure No. 14.

*From Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 24th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Owing to lateness of season and forage difficulties, reconstruction of boundary pillars south of Dotoi hardly possible now, but will send out to ascertain condition of pillars. A column starts for Kazha valley to-morrow, which will reconstruct from pillar No. 6 west, past Char Khel, along Mazdak ridge, to pillar No. 10 or 12 east. Rest of pillars to Laram can, if injured, be reconstructed later by column from Miran Shah. In addition to Sardar Gul Muhammad, am informing Sardar Sherindil Khan of my intentions. Will address you later regarding cost.

## Enclosure No. 15.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Inzar Kach (through Datta Khel), 31st October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday five Malikis of Tarmor hamlet, representing sixty houses, came in and proffered submission of Tarmor people and promised compliance with orders of Government as far as lay in their power. This morning Khan Habib, cousin of Alambe, and three other influential men of Sheranni, said to represent thirty houses, have come in and wish to make their peace; these have not been interviewed yet. This afternoon Sadda Khan and his brother Shadam have come in to surrender unconditionally on promise that Sadda Khan shall not be put to death or transported. I will see them now and report further to-morrow. Sadda Khan showed much resolution in coming, as women and children turned out of all the villages along his road and besought him not to go on as he would certainly be hanged. I consider this a most important step towards the settlement of the whole Madda Khel question.

## No. 37.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 17th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Bird received submission of Madda Khel jirga on 14th November; they agree to his terms, and gave hostages for their fulfilment.

## No. 38.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

A settlement with Madda Khel has been arrived at by General Bird. They agree to pay fines demanded, and restore, or pay for, Government property. He has five of the Malikis whose surrender is required, and expects to get all of them; hostages for fulfilment of terms are meanwhile retained.

## PART II.

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### CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE DUTY ON KOHAT SALT.

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No. 1.

*Letter from the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George Francis Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 30th September, 1897. (Received 25th October, 1897.)*

MY LORD,

WE have the honour to report, for your Lordship's approval and sanction, that we have, under the circumstances explained in this despatch, accorded provisional sanction to an increase of the preventive and supervising establishments employed at the Kohat salt mines, involving an increase of expenditure amounting to Rs. 33,038 a year. The necessity for the entertainment of this additional establishment has arisen in consequence of the increase of the duties hitherto levied upon Kohat salt. The correspondence connected with the subject is very voluminous, but the papers appended to the despatch and the following brief recapitulation of the facts will, we trust, sufficiently explain the circumstances under which the additional establishment has been appointed.

2. As your Lordship is aware, political considerations have hitherto necessitated the imposition of a light duty upon the salt produced at certain mines or quarries in the Kohat district. Prior to 1883 the duty upon this salt ranged from 2 to 4 annas per Lahori or Kohat maund (102½ lbs.) at the five mines in use, but in that year it was increased to a uniform rate of eight annas per Kohat maund. In consequence of this low rate of duty we have been obliged to prohibit the transit of Kohat salt from the right to the left bank of the Indus, and to maintain a preventive line costing approximately Rs. 47,000 a year from the northern extremity of the Hazara district to the junction of the Indus with the Sutlej, in order to prevent the salt from passing across the Indus and competing in the Cis-Indus districts with fully taxed salt produced from other sources. The restrictions upon traffic imposed by the preventive line are necessarily vexatious, and the expenditure which it entails is considerable; while there is not, in our opinion, any sufficient reason for taxing the consumption of salt more lightly in the Trans-Indus than in the Cis-Indus districts of the Punjab. The enhancement therefore of the duty on Kohat salt to a rate approximating so nearly to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt as to admit of the abolition of the Indus line, and of the realisation of an increased revenue from salt in the Trans-Indus districts is a measure which has long been recognised as desirable, and which was at one time, in August 1879, actually ordered.

3. In a report submitted in February 1892 by Major Deane, then Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, on the subject of tribal service arrangements on the Kohat border, an opinion was expressed to the effect that there was no longer any valid ground for foregoing the revenue that might be realised by raising the duty on Kohat salt to the rate obtaining for Cis-Indus salt. We consulted the Government of the Punjab regarding the suggestion, and on the 1st July 1892, an exhaustive memorandum on the subject was submitted by Major Deane containing definite recommendations for the enhancement of the Kohat salt



duty and the removal of the preventive line. This memorandum remained for more than 2 years under consideration by the officers of the Punjab Government, but Major Deane's proposals with certain modifications of detail, were submitted in December 1894 to the Punjab Government with Mr., now Sir Richard, Udny's support. Mr. Udny did not anticipate any disturbance on the frontier in consequence of the enhancement of the duty; while as regards our Trans-Indus subjects he agreed with Major Deane that although the increase of taxation was not likely to be popular, there was no reason why they should any longer pay less for their salt than the people in other parts of India, as they are, comparatively speaking, well to do and the land revenue assessment in the frontier districts is light. The political effect of the enhancement of duty would, Major Deane considered, be excellent.

4. Mr. Rivaz, the Financial Commissioner, and the Punjab Government concurred in recommending an increase of the duty, and the proposals were submitted for the orders of the Government of India in the letter from the Government of the Punjab dated 12th July 1895. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, it was said, agreed that it was highly desirable to raise the duty to an extent which would be to some extent comparable with that fixed for Cis-Indus salt and which would admit of the preventive line being abolished, and that this would be a perfectly fair and just measure which would not after a little time press hardly on any of those concerned, whether as traders or consumers. In a subsequent letter, dated 13th September 1895, the Punjab Government forwarded opinions on the proposed enhancement of the duty by Mr. Cunningham, then Commissioner of Peshawar, by Major Leigh who succeeded Major Deane as Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, and by Mr. King, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. These officers also were all agreed that there was no objection on political grounds to the increase of the duty.

5. After careful consideration we decided that the time had arrived to enhance the duty. The subject however required detailed examination. The unanimity of opinion that political considerations need no longer delay the introduction of the measure was complete, but the officers consulted differed considerably in their views as to the manner in which the enhancement should be made, some being in favour of an increase to the necessary extent per saltum, while others considered that it should be effected by degrees. The exact rate of duty which should be adopted was also a difficult matter to determine. The difficulties of the country and of transport, and also a possible difference in the mining arrangements in the Kohat and Cis-Indus mines, had to be taken into consideration, and the rate proposed by the local officers, *viz.*, rupees 2 annas 8 a Kohat maund, involved a very large increase in the existing duty. It appeared to us that the exact rate that would suffice to prevent Kohat salt from invading the Cis-Indus region could only be satisfactorily determined by experience, and we were anxious to avoid increasing the duty any further than might be necessary to render possible the abolition of the preventive line. A protracted correspondence accordingly ensued between the Government of the Punjab and the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab and the local officers in regard to these points, and in regard to the date from which the enhancement was to be made, the concessions to be allowed to the carrying traders so as to reconcile them to the change, the payment of increased Inams to the Khan of Teri and the landowners of villages adjacent to the mines in the Kohat district, the future management of the mines, and the additional establishments required for the collection of the increased revenue and for prevention of the smuggling which the enhancement of the duty would tend to encourage.

6. In the meantime the intention of Government to increase the duty became known, and large quantities of salt were removed from the mines. We agreed with the Government of the Punjab in thinking that it was not a matter of regret that the carriers and others ordinarily engaged in the Kohat salt trade should have had an opportunity of making some profit from the increase on the duty, and in fact it was, to a certain extent, our intention so to manage matters as to give them this opportunity. But the accumulation of stocks was proceeding so rapidly that we were compelled to give immediate effect to our intention of enhancing the duty; and we decided accordingly in June 1896 to raise it

from eight annas to two rupees a Kohat maund, that is approximately Re. 1 annas 8 a British maund, with effect from the 13th July 1896. The Punjab Government at the same time was authorised to increase the yearly Inams paid to the Khan of Teri and other landowners to Rs. 50,000 on the understanding that the increased Inams were to be paid in full satisfaction of all claims, and to entertain provisionally and tentatively, for the management of the mines and the prevention of smuggling, the establishment shown in the statement\* which accompanies this despatch. It was, however, requested that the scale of establishment thus temporarily sanctioned might be revised after the expiration of 3 months from the date of the increase of the duty, when, it was presumed, some practical experience would have been acquired of the working of the mines and of the preventive staff required under the new order of things.

7. This anticipation, however, has unfortunately not been realised. The stocks that were accumulated in anticipation of the increase of the duty were so large that the trade was almost entirely suspended during the 12 months following the enhancement, the total quantity of salt removed between the 16th July 1896 and the 15th July 1897 having been 4,468 Kohat maunds only as compared with 967,531 maunds in the corresponding period of 1895-96 and 488,566 maunds the average quantity removed in the corresponding periods of the five preceding years. The trade has now begun to revive, 5,608 maunds having been removed from the mines during the last fortnight of July and the month of August, but sufficient experience has not yet been acquired to enable the Local Government to say what establishment is likely to be permanently required. Several questions regarding the future working of the mines and the number of mines which should be kept open for the supply of salt are still under consideration; and until these questions have been settled, the scale of establishment required cannot be satisfactorily determined. In these circumstances we have the honour to request that the provisional sanction which we accorded to the entertainment of the additional establishment specified in the statement accompanying the despatch may be confirmed. The increased expenditure involved amounts, as already stated, to Rs. 33,038 per annum.

8. It is possible that the scale of establishment provisionally sanctioned may admit of some reduction if it be found practicable to concentrate the mining operations and close some of the outlying and less used mines; but the salt region in the Kohat district is so extensive and the outcrops of salt are so numerous that a strong preventive establishment will certainly be required to prevent smuggling. It is unlikely therefore that it will be possible to effect any material reduction in the scale which has been provisionally sanctioned, and it is possible that the supervising revenue staff may have to be further strengthened. Our final proposals in regard to the establishment will be reported for Your Lordship's sanction when the questions now under consideration have been disposed of.

9. The cessation of the trade in this salt which has followed the enhancement of the duty is to be regretted; but, in our opinion, it is due mainly, if not entirely, to the large accumulation of stocks which took place in the year preceding the announcement of our intentions. It is, however, not improbable that the increase in the price of salt has been utilised by mullahs and other persons desirous of creating disturbances as a means for exciting discontent and disaffection among the tribes across the border; and at the present time the Khyber Afridis and some of the Orakzai clans have included the enhancement of the salt duty with the occupation of the Samana and the Malakand as one of their grievances against the British Government. The enhancement of the salt duty has, however, in our opinion, only been put forward as a pretext after the tribes had committed themselves to hostilities, and the Swat and Mohmand tribes, which were first to rise and which are as much affected as consumers as the Khyber Afridis and the Orakzais, have made no mention of the subject. The tribes most affected by the increase of duty are the Adam Khel and Jowaki Afridis in and near the Kohat Pass, as they are the principal carrier traders in

the salt ; and although one section of the Adam Khels made a verbal representation to the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat on the subject of the increase, these tribes have up to the present time behaved well and have made no attempt to close the Pass.

10. The instructions communicated in paragraph 4 of Lord Kimberley's despatch, Revenue, dated the 31st October 1883, requiring us to communicate with Your Lordship before taking any steps to further enhance the duty on Kohat salt were unfortunately overlooked when we arrived at our decision on the subject. We can only express our regret that they were not earlier brought to our notice and that we omitted, in consequence, to apply for Your Lordship's previous approval of our proceedings before issuing orders giving effect to the enhancement.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
J. WOODBURN,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR.

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Enclosure 1.

*Letter from W. J. Cuninghame, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, dated 19th May 1892.*

Among the enclosures of Mr. Fanshaw's letter, dated 8th March 1892, regarding the extension of tribal service arrangements on the Kohat border, Dated 15th February. was a report by Captain Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, in the last paragraph of which he expressed an opinion that the price of salt in the Kohat District might now be raised to the rate obtaining for Cis-Indus salt. I am directed to refer to this proposal ; and as the price of salt in Kohat has hitherto been kept down for political reasons, I am to request an expression of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's views upon Captain Deane's proposal.

2. I am to remind you that the statement of present and proposed tribal service expenditure in the Kohat District, which was asked for in this office telegram, dated 2nd April last, is awaited.

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Enclosure 2.

*Extract from Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 12th July 1895.*

With reference to paragraph 1 of your letter, dated 19th May 1892, I am directed to forward a copy of the papers marginally noted containing the proposals of Major Deane for an enhancement of duty on the grey salt which is obtained from the Trans-Indus Mines of the Kohat District and the views of Mr. Udny and the Financial Commissioners thereon, and to convey the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor in connection with this subject.

Letter dated 9th December 1894, and enclosures, from R. Udny, Esq., C.S.I.

Letter, dated 14th March 1895, from the Junior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab.

His Honour entirely agrees that with a view to obtaining the large additional revenue which may be expected and to getting rid of the preventive line it is highly desirable to raise the duty on Kohat salt to a figure which would be to some extent comparable with that fixed for the Cis-Indus salt, and which would admit of the preventive line being abolished. He further agrees that this would be a perfectly fair and just measure, and that after a little time



it would not press hardly on any of those concerned whether as traders or consumers ; but he fears there can be no doubt that if the duty were enhanced *per saltum* from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8 per maund on an article that at the place of production costs less than one anna per maund, the change would be severely felt both by the consumers within and beyond our frontier, and by the traders and carriers, mostly rough tribesmen, within and beyond the frontier, whose business would for a time be to a considerable extent dislocated by such a measure.

Hence, putting aside for the moment all question of the danger of actual disturbance or of trouble such as arose about the small enhancement made in the year 1882, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick is disposed to think that whenever the duty is raised it should be raised to the requisite pitch, not *per saltum*, but by degrees. He quite admits that there is some force in the argument urged in favour of raising the duty *per saltum*, that if we are to introduce an unpopular measure it is better to introduce it straight off at once in its entirety than to break it up into instalments and thus spread the irritation arising from it over a considerable period, but with the choice of evils before him he thinks it is on the whole wiser to elect for the gradual increase. His Honour would be inclined to announce at starting what we meant ultimately to do, and to say that as raising the duty to the full figure at once would be apt to interfere with existing arrangements we had determined to raise it by degrees.

Regarding the many points of detail discussed in these papers, the Lieutenant-Governor does not propose to say anything at this moment, as it seems to him that it would be highly inadvisable to take any step towards raising the duty between this and next October, which month is said to be the most convenient for bringing any enhancement of duty into force.

It will be observed that the letter from Captain Deane, who (*see* paragraph 8 of his memorandum) was for putting aside the susceptibilities and clamourings of the frontier people with somewhat of a high hand, was written so far back as the year 1892, when except for the signs of trouble in the Waziri country of which he knew but little, and in the neighbourhood of the Black Mountain with which we are scarcely concerned in this connection, everything along our frontier was going smoothly enough. Mr. Udny, who kept back Captain Deane's memorandum for nearly 2½ years wrote in December last, when the punitive expedition against the Waziris was about to start, and when the work of delimitation elsewhere was in progress or about to begin, and he (*see* paragraph 17 of his letter) advised that no announcement should be made regarding this enhancement of duty until the work of delimitation was finished. Since then a great deal has happened. At this moment we have, besides the very large force still encamped between the Peshawar border and Chitral, a Military force in Waziristan and another in the Tochi Valley. We have in all three places difficult and complicated settlements to effect, which it will take some months to carry out, and there are in several directions emissaries out who are anxious to seize on everything they can to set the tribes against us, and who would at once hail as something to be turned to account a measure so unpopular as this enhancement of duty. In short, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks if we were to start the preliminaries of this enhancement just now or within the next few months, we should, to use a homely expression, be having "too many irons in the fire," and he would therefore abandon the idea of doing anything about it this year beyond sending the papers confidentially to the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue (as he ventures to suggest should now be done) for the consideration of the detailed measures proposed.

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Sub-Enclosure A.

*Extract from a letter from R. Udny, Esq., on Special Duty, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government, Punjab, dated 9th December 1894.*

In reply to your endorsement, dated 9th June 1892, to the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, forwarding an extract from paragraph 1 of a letter, dated 19th May 1892, from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India

in the Foreign Department, I have the honour to submit a printed copy of a memorandum, dated the 1st July 1892, drawn up by Captain (now Major) Deane who was at that time Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, proposing an enhancement of duty on the grey salt which is obtained from the Trans-Indus mines of the Kohat District. Before stating my own views on the subject I must express my regret at the delay which has occurred in disposing of this reference, owing to the extreme pressure of other work until I made over charge of the Commissionership of the Peshawar Division last April.

The present price of salt at the Kohat mines is 8 annas per *Kohati* maund of  $102\frac{1}{2}$  lb. avoirdupois, and this, without changing the weight of the maund, Major Deane would increase to Rs. 2-8-0, which is the price charged at the Khewra mines Cis-Indus for a *British* maund of  $82\frac{2}{3}$  lb. Taking, therefore, the proportion between the standards of weight in use approximately 4 to 5, a British maund of grey salt would cost at the Kohat mines Rs. 2 *plus* 8 pies for excavation, total Rs. 2-0-8 as compared with Rs. 2-8-9 (including the excavation fee, Rs. 2-9-3 if we also include the fee for consignment by railway on what is called the through-traffic system) either at Khewra or at the Kalabagh quarry on the right bank of the Indus, which is an offshoot of the Khewra mines and produces the same red variety of the mineral. In dealing, however, with ignorant Afghans, like the bulk of the traders in Kohat salt, I agree with Major Deane that it would be unwise to lower the standard of weight to which they have been accustomed simultaneously with a five-fold rise in price, and I think that, if we took certain precautions, to which I shall presently refer, the new rate proposed would be sufficiently high to enable us to do away with the existing legal prohibition against possession of the cheaper grey salt Cis-Indus. The Indus preventive line, which has its *raison d'être* the enforcement of this prohibition, could then be abolished.

For the purposes of a Cis-Indus trade in Kohat salt the only mine we need consider is the one at Malgin, the others being at some distance from the river; and we may assume pretty safely that Khushalgarh, with its boat-bridge and railway station on the left bank of the Indus, and a fairly good road from Malgin, would be the *entrepôt* for the distribution of this salt whether by land or by boat down the river.

As regards traffic by land, Major Deane shows that salt from Malgin could be placed at the Khushalgarh Railway Station for Rs. 2-13-8 per *Kohati* or Rs. 2-4-6 per British maund, and could be delivered even at Lahore for three or four annas a British maund cheaper than Khewra salt. Unless therefore special measures were taken to prevent it, not only the Northern Punjab, but all the country South of Lahore which at present gets its salt from Khewra, would be flooded with Kohat salt paying a duty of 8 annas per British maund less than the red salt now consumed in this area; and the precaution which Major Deane proposes, to obviate so large a loss of revenue, is that the railway rates for the carriage of grey salt should be regulated so that it could not compete successfully with Khewra salt in the Punjab market. I would rather suggest that State Railways Cis-Indus should refuse to accept Kohat salt for carriage on any terms whatever, and that at Trans-Indus stations no grey salt should be booked for stations across the river.

Let us now see what the effect of such a restriction would be. With the completion of the Railway in course of construction from Attock to Mari the red salt of the Kalabagh quarry, which is on the right bank of the Indus immediately opposite to Mari, could be landed at Khushalgarh for about Rs. 2-10-3, and at Attock for Rs. 2-11-3 per British maund. This would give the Malgin salt an advantage of  $5\frac{3}{4}$  annas a maund at Khushalgarh which even it were debarred

\*Assuming railway carriage to be at the rate of  $\frac{1}{4}$  pie per maund per mile, and animal carriage to be 1 pie for the same weight and distance.

from the railway, would enable it to undersell the railway-borne Kalabagh salt for a distance of 92 miles\* from Khushalgarh, *i.e.*, along the whole length (79 miles) of the line running east-ward to Rawalpindi, and even to penetrate into the country beyond; but considering the precarious nature of traffic confined to camels and other pack animals as compared with a trade in the same article which can rely upon

railway carriage, I doubt whether the grey salt would cross the main North-Western line in this direction, though it would certainly be found in the bazars at Rawalpindi itself.

At Attock the grey salt, either by road all the way from Malgin, or by road from the Jatta mine through the Kohat Pass to Peshawar and thence by rail to Khairabad, could be delivered for Rs. 2-8 per maund, or 3 annas 3 pies cheaper than Kalabagh salt. Along the Grand Trunk Road therefore between Attock and Rawalpindi Kohat salt could be transported on pack cattle for 52 miles (or within 6 miles of Rawalpindi) before it became as dear as Kalabagh salt travelling on the parallel line of railway.

Southward again from Khushalgarh towards Mari the grey salt would extend for 60 miles, or about 10 miles beyond Mari; and lastly, taking the road which runs south-eastward from Khushalgarh to the Mayo mines at Khewra 110 miles distant, the two kinds of salt, being both alike restricted on this line to animal carriage, would meet on equal terms 80 miles from Khushalgarh and 30 miles from Khewra.

From these approximate data it will be seen that northward of the North-Western Railway from Attock to Rawalpindi grey salt would spread throughout the Hazara district, and perhaps the western part of Kashmir, while southward it would displace the red salt in the greater part of the triangular wedge of country bounded by the river Indus, the North-Western Railway from Attock to Lala Musa, and the Sind Sagar Branch of the same line from Lala Musa to Kundiyan, but that red salt would continue to hold its own in the extreme Southern and South-Eastern portions of this wedge.

As regards the river-borne traffic, Kohat salt, leaving Khushalgarh at Rs. 2-4-6 per British maund, would be very little dearer by the time it reached Kalabagh, 70 miles further down the Indus. From Kalabagh, therefore, grey salt would start down-stream with an advantage of at least 4 annas a maund in price over the local red salt, and, if equal facilities were permitted for the transport of both varieties by boat, this advantage would always be maintained, with the result that the present trade by river in red salt, which extends from Kalabagh as far as the Sind frontier, would be entirely usurped by the grey. It is possible, indeed, that the cheapness of the latter might enable it to penetrate still further south, since I understand that the Government price of Sind (Maurypur) salt at the Sukkur depôt is as much as Rs. 3-1-0 per British maund, and Kohat salt even with the enhanced duty could probably be delivered at Sukkur by river for a lower rate. Moreover, as the railway from Mari through Mahmud Kot, Sher Shah and Bahawalpur to Sukkur for the most part runs parallel to the Indus and at no great distance from it, the river-borne grey salt could be placed on any point of this line at a cheaper price than the red salt carried by railway either from Kalabagh or Khewra.

From this it follows that grey salt would cross the railway and find its way into all the country eastward and southward, viz., the western plains of the Punjab, Bahawalpur, and, perhaps, northern Sind and Rajputana, until it was stopped by coming into competition with the red salt brought down by the North-Western Railway towards Lahore and Mooltan, or with Maurypur (Sind) salt brought up from Karachi by the same line, or with Sambhar and Pachpadra salt carried across the Rajputana desert on camels. How far the grey salt would penetrate in these various directions it is impossible to predict exactly; but where, as along the line between Lahore and Sher Shah, red salt from Khewra would have the railway as a means of conveyance, while grey salt travelling across country from the nearest point of the river would be confined to animal carriage; the latter would be stopped much sooner than in other directions where there are no railways extending from the interior to the Indus, and where the other salts with which the Kohat article would have to compete would, therefore, be more or less equally restricted to carts and pack cattle.

From the foregoing it will be seen that, as far as traffic by *land* is concerned, the Indus preventive line might be safely removed below a point about ten miles south of Mari, but the abolition of the salt customs posts along the river above this point would entail a loss of revenue at the rate of 8 annas a



maund (British) on all salt consumed within the area indicated in paragraph 5 *supra*. What this loss would be it is difficult to estimate without more accurate data than I have by me at present; but, taking the population affected as one million, and the annual consumption at 8 seers, which is probably a good deal in excess of the actual fact, it would amount to a lakh of rupees. Against this we must set off the saving effected by the abolition of the preventive line northward of the point mentioned above, which costs, I understand, something like Rs. 20,000 a year. The net balance of loss would, therefore, be only Rs. 80,000 per annum, and, considering the largely increased income which Government may expect to derive from the enhancement of the duty Trans-Indus, I think this trifling sacrifice of revenue Cis-Indus might well be tolerated for the sake of doing away with the evils which must always attend the existence of a protective customs line.

On the other hand, the results of a free *river* traffic as described in paragraph 6 *supra* would, it seems to me, be far more serious, and we could not permit grey salt to travel down the Indus without risking a considerable dislocation of the existing trade in red salt and a heavy loss of duty to Government. Fortunately the remedy is a very simple one, viz., to maintain the present prohibition against grey salt leaving the right bank of the Indus or being carried down by boat, but to relax it at Khushalgarh for the purposes of allowing Kohat salt to be taken across either by the boat-bridge, or by the ferry which replaces the boat-bridge for a few months during the hot weather when the river is in flood. In practice the knowledge that this modified prohibition still existed would probably be sufficient without further precautions to prevent any river trade in the grey salt springing up; but, if necessary, the order could easily be enforced by establishing a small customs post on the Indus bank with power to search all boats passing down the stream. Such a post might be located at Kalabagh, where the river flows between rocky banks in a single well-defined channel of no great breadth; and if, as is possible though not very likely, traders attempted to evade the Kalabagh post by embarking their salt below it, a second similar post might be placed on the river lower down at such a distance from the nearest Kohat mines at Narri and Karrak that the expense of land carriage to cut in below it would leave no margin of profit on grey salt as compared with the river-borne red salt from Kalabagh itself.

In the preceding paragraphs I have assumed that the Kohat salt is equal in quality to the red variety, and I believe that chemical analysis shows this to be the fact, the percentage of chloride of sodium being about the same in both. There can, however, be no doubt that in popular native opinion five chittaks of the Kohat salt go no farther for seasoning purposes than four of the Khewra or Kalabagh product. So long, therefore, as this idea continues to prevail the grey salt paying a duty of Rs. 2 per British maund would be considered no cheaper than the red assessed at Rs. 2-8-0, and the Indus preventive line might be safely removed without any fear that the former would displace the latter either by land or river except, perhaps, for the consumption of cattle.

As regards the salt "inams," which are calculated at a percentage on the receipts of each mine, and which are paid partly to the Khan of Teri (in the case of the Bahadur Khel and Nari Mines) and partly to the landowners of certain adjoining villages for the assistance they are supposed to afford the salt administration, I agree with Major Deane (paragraph 20) that their amount, instead of varying as hitherto with the briskness of trade, should now be stereotyped once for all at a fixed sum; but since the recipients are sure to consider it a grievance that they are not permitted to share the income of the mines with Government in the same proportion as formerly, I would treat them in a very liberal spirit. For the three years immediately preceding the date of Major Deane's memorandum the villagers had received an average of Rs. 26,484 per annum, and the Khan an average of Rs. 4,592. These amounts Major Deane would apparently increase by making the Khan's fixed allowance up to the even sum of Rs. 8,000 per annum, and by giving Rs. 10,000 more to the villagers (*i.e.*, a fixed total of Rs. 36,484), of which about half would be reckoned as compensation for the restriction of their grazing and wood-cutting rights on the salt hills. I should prefer to recommend a fixed total of Rs. 50,000 for the villagers, to be divided in the proportion received by each village for the last

five years, and a fixed allowance of Rs. 10,000 (or perhaps even Rs. 15,000 for the Khan) which would give the Khan rather more than double, and the villagers a little less than double, what they enjoyed before; but, unless absolutely necessary—which I can hardly suppose—I would abstain entirely from interference with grazing and wood-cutting rights which, in spite of any pecuniary compensation we might allow, could not fail to irritate the people we are most interested in conciliating.

I now come to the question whether the enhancement of duty proposed could be made with safety from a political point of view. The arguments against an enhancement are stated categorically in paragraph 2 (b) of Major Deane's memorandum, but only two of them viz., (ii), the risk of its giving rise to disturbances on the part of trans-border tribes, and (v) the danger of its throwing out of work present carriers and traders for want of sufficient capital—are worthy of serious consideration. The other objections may be dismissed very briefly.

With regard to (i) and (iv), no doubt increase of taxation in any form must always be unpopular, but I agree with Major Deane (paragraph 10) that our Trans-Indus subjects are in better circumstances than the people in many parts of India who consume the dearer salt, and with their very light land revenue I see no reason why they should continue to pay less for their salt, though it may have been politic to allow them to do so during the early years of annexation, when our position on the frontier was comparatively insecure.

The same answer applies to objection (vii), which is disposed of by Major Deane.

As noted in paragraph 6 of the memorandum, the people who would most resent an enhancement are the Khattaks, who live in the vicinity of the mines, but this I have provided for by recommending (*supra* paragraphs 12 and 13) that they should continue to get their salt on exactly the same terms as before, and that they should also receive largely increased inams, so that the change would be entirely for their benefit.

As regards objection (iii), it has already been shown that enhancement of the duty, instead of curtailing the trade in grey salt, would if anything have the effect of expanding it; and if we found that red salt on account of its reputed superiority showed any tendency to cross the Indus into the Peshawar District, this might be checked by prohibiting its carriage by railway beyond Attock, in the same way as we have proposed that grey salt should be debarred from the railway Cis-Indus.

With regard to objection (vi), Colonel Holdich, R.E., tells me there is an extensive outcrop of rock salt between Panjdeh and Sarrahks, north of Herat, which now lies within the Russian border, and that there are also lakes of brine in the desert about 140 miles west south-west of Herat; but both these sources are probably too distant to be of much consequence to us, and I am inclined to believe with Major Deane that there are no sources of salt in Central Asia sufficiently near to interfere very seriously with the Kohat mines. It is possible of course that the enhancement of the duty may lead to the extended manufacture of earth-salt in Kandahar, and to the opening up of other sources hitherto unknown because they could not be worked at a profit while cheap Kohat salt was available; but, as Major Deane remarks, even admitting that on this account Kohat salt may no longer penetrate to the most distant points it now reaches, the loss of revenue due to the consequent decrease in the exports from the Kohat District will be small compared with the increased income from the higher tax, and, since salt is a necessary of life, the trade in other directions will soon re-establish itself, though there may be a temporary falling-off at first.

Objection (v), as Major Deane shows, is not applicable in the case of Ghilza<sup>i</sup> and Powindah traders, and I agree with him that the Afridi carriers—Adam Khel of the Kohat Pass and Jawakis—are so well off that there is no fear of their being unable to raise the required capital. The Bangash traders, who are British subjects, and the Wazirs, who live partly within and partly without our border, are also in fairly easy circumstances; but the Khattaks, who are entirely a cis-border tribe—especially those who reside in the north-east corner of the Kohat District and round Akora in Peshawar—are undoubtedly poor, and,

though Major Deane believes their credit to be good, there is some reason, I think, to fear that with carriers of the class a good many pack animals will be thrown out of work at first for want of money to buy salt enough to load them.

This is one of the reasons (*infra*) why I am opposed to raising the duty, as Major Deane proposes, at a single bound ; but with a gradual enhancement I hope we may find that the Khattaks will also be able to adapt themselves to the new arrangements, and eventually of course the increased value of the commodity they trade in will lead to a proportionate increase of their own profits.

Objection (ii), which is discussed by Major Deane, has hitherto been regarded as the principal obstacle to an enhancement of the salt duty, but times have greatly changed during the last 11 years since the last enhancement, and I do not think any disturbance need be apprehended from tribes who are not carriers, but merely consumers. Of the carrying tribes, again, the Ghilzais and Powindahs are not conterminous with our frontier, and we can well afford to disregard their sentiments whether favourable or unfavourable ; while the Wazirs, both trans—and cis-border, are not likely to give trouble after the punitive expedition against the Mahsud branch of the tribe which seems at this moment to be inevitable. The Afridis of the Kohat Pass are the only other trans-border carriers who adjoin British territory, and this was the only tribe that showed resentment when the duty was raised in 1883 to the uniform rate of 8 annas per Kohati maund for all the mines ; but, apart from the fact that they are becoming more amenable to our influence every year, their carrying trade has, I believe, greatly diminished since then, and they have probably learned by the failure of their agitation on that occasion that it is useless to attempt to turn Government from a measure once decided upon. I do not therefore anticipate any disturbance of the frontier from the enhancement we are now proposing, and the only point I would insist upon is that it should not be announced till we have finished the work of demarcating our new political boundary with Afghanistan all along the line from Chandak to the Persian border, which ought to be completed in the spring or summer of 1895.

It only remains to consider how the enhancement should be introduced, and Major Deane recommends

- (i) That the duty should be increased from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8-0 per Kohati maund at once, without any intermediate gradations.
- (ii) That this enhancement should take effect from the 1st October next following upon the decision to make it.
- (iii) That only one month's notice should be given beforehand.

As regards (i), I cannot agree. The increase is far too large to be made so abruptly, and the inconvenience to traders with small capital would be greatly intensified. At the same time I fully recognise the evils noted by Major Deane of raising the duty by gradual increments when each is popularly supposed to be the last. Undoubtedly such a course would lead to suspicion of our ultimate intentions, besides creating an impression that we were proceeding tentatively for fear of political consequences, and thus encouraging active opposition under the idea that a show of irritation might have the effect of intimidating Government.

The *total* amount of the enhancement should therefore be announced once for all, but it does not follow that we need enforce it at a single blow, and I would proclaim the raising of the duty by one rupee per maund Kohati from a certain date, coupled with a distinct intimation that another rupee will be added from the same date a year later, and that the rate of duty, viz., Rs. 2-8-0 per maund, reached by the second increment, will be final.

The increase of the salt inams and the limits of the new protected area should be announced at the same time, and it should be clearly explained that the change will entail no enhancement in the price of the salt required by Khattaks of the protected area for their own consumption. If this is done we may expect no opposition locally, but I am aware, of course, that my proposal is open to the objection that it would allow a whole year to malcontents in other directions—either beyond or within the border—to stir up agitation and to foster



disturbances in the hope of inducing Government to reconsider the question of the further increase. This, however, cannot be helped, and, as I have said already, I do not apprehend any serious trouble, provided we stand firm and show no signs of vacillation.

Another objection might be brought forward similar to the one urged by Major Deane against giving too long a notice of the enhancement beforehand, viz., that during the first year there would be a rush of traders on the mines to obtain salt at Rs. 1-8-0 per maund which could be sold at a large profit during the second year, when the duty at the mines would be Rs. 2-8-0, and that the consequent glut in the markets would enable any opposition to the measure to be prolonged. On the other hand, it may be said that the eagerness of traders to avail themselves of this opportunity would leave no room in their minds for ideas of resistance to the first increase, and the hardship which I apprehend in the case of the poorer Khattak carriers (*supra*) would be greatly mitigated by the chance afforded them of amassing capital against the day when the full enhancement will take effect. Moreover, with large stocks on the market, the sudden rise in the bazaar price of salt at the end of the first year would probably be much more moderate than the simultaneous enhancement of duty at the mines, which is a decided advantage, and, then, after the first upward jump, the market rate would only increase gradually till it reached its maximum when the stocks bought at Rs. 1-8-0 a maund had all become exhausted.

No doubt the profits which we should thus allow to fall into the hands of traders would mean a corresponding loss to Government, but this loss would be a transient one, which, in view of the greatly increased revenue, we could well afford to put up with, and the only precaution I have to recommend is that the prohibition against the use of grey salt Cis-Indus should be maintained till the end of the second year, by which time the higher rate of duty would have been in force for one year, and we may assume that the stocks purchased during the first year of the enhancement would have been expended. Meanwhile nothing should be said about the abolition of the Indus preventive line, which can always be removed at a moment's notice. Otherwise we should find traders during the first year buying up salt at Rs. 1-8-0 a maund for exportation Cis-Indus as well as for Trans-Indus consumption, and the loss to Government would be all the larger.

As regards (iii) (*supra*), I have already referred in the preceding paragraph to the reasons urged by Major Deane against giving a long warning of the enhancement. In support of this view he quotes the opinion of Mr. Tucker, who was Deputy Commissioner of Kohat at the time of the last enhancement in 1883, that it was a mistake to proclaim the proposed increase of the duty three months beforehand, and that one month's notice would have been enough; but even admitting that a shorter notice might have sufficed on that occasion, the increase of Rs. 1 per maund, which I have now recommended as a preliminary step to the imposition of another rupee a year later, is a very different thing to the small increment of a few annas which was made in 1883, and, with due regard to our own interests as well as those of the traders, they must be allowed a reasonable time to provide the additional capital which will be required for the purchase of their salt.

I think therefore that the changes proposed on the present occasion should be announced three months before the first rise from 8 annas to Rs. 1-8-0 per maund comes into force, which would be 15 months before the further increase to the final rate of Rs. 2-8-0 would take effect.

As regards (ii), viz., the date from which the preliminary enhancement should be introduced, I agree with Major Deane that the 1st October is a good time of year, for the reason explained in his 15th paragraph, viz., that it "would give the best chance of any ill-feeling created by the change subsiding during the winter months when the trans-border people are most dependent on British territory." Another reason in favour of this date is that the three months' notice proclaiming it would issue on the 1st July, when the salt traffic is slackest. Ghilzai and Powinda caravans from beyond the frontier do not come down till the autumn, and during the hot weather the more well-to-do traders among our own subjects and the Kohat Pass Afridis, who employ camels, are in the habit

of giving their animals a rest and putting them out to graze. The rush on the mines to forestall the first increment would thus be principally confined to poorer traders like the Khattaks, who use bullocks, and, as these are just the people that I fear might suffer from want of capital to meet the rise in price, we need not grudge them the opportunity of earning a few extra rupees beforehand. If, therefore, the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary is completed next spring, the enhancement might be announced on the 1st July and carried into effect from the 1st October 1895.

In conclusion, a rough estimate may be given of the profit which Government would realize from an enhancement of the salt tax by Rs. 2 per Kohati maund.

During the ten years 1883—1893 the amount of salt paying duty at the Kohat mines has averaged 596,030 maunds (Kohati) per annum, and, if we assume that this would be reduced by one-fourth on account of the extended use in Afghanistan of inferior salt from other sources (*supra* paragraph 15), we should still have a yearly out-turn of 447,000 maunds. From this, again, we must deduct the salt required for their own wants by the Khattaks of the protected area, who, if my recommendation is sanctioned, would continue to get it at the old rate of 8 annas a maund. What the population of this area may be it is difficult to say, but, taking it as 80,000, or nearly half the whole population of the Kohat District, which is probably an excessive estimate, the amount of salt they would consume at 8 seers a head per annum would be 16,000 maunds, leaving a balance of 431,000 maunds liable to an increase of duty by Rs. 2 per maund.

The account would thus stand as follows :—

<i>Profit.</i>					Rs.
(i)	By increase of duty at Rs. 2 per maund on 431,000 maunds (Kohati)	...	...	...	8,62,000
(ii)	By abolition of the Indus preventive line ( <i>supra</i> paragraph 7)	...	...	...	41,600
Total profit					9,03,000
<i>Loss.</i>					
(i)	By the consumption of grey salt at Rs. 2 per <i>standard</i> maund instead of red salt at Rs. 2-8-0 per <i>standard</i> maund throughout the area described in paragraph 5 ( <i>supra</i> paragraph 7)	...	...	...	1,00,000
(ii)	By increased cost of the Kohat salt establishment ( <i>supra</i> paragraph 10)	...	...	...	36,684
Total loss					1,36,684
Net annual gain to Government					7,66,916

#### Annexure.

*Extract from Memorandum by Captain H. A. Deane, Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, dated 1st July 1892.*

Reference to the previous enhancement of the salt duty. The question of increasing the excise duty on Kohat salt was raised by the Government of India in 1873.

A variety of opinions were then given for and against it; but it was not until July 1883, after the question had been dropped and re-opened several times, that any special action was taken in regard to the matter.

The reasons appear to have been that at one time the tribes on the border were quiet, and it was not considered advisable to disturb them. At another

time certain of the tribes were refractory, and action in regard to the salt was postponed from fear of its bringing about a coalition of the tribes against Government.

In 1883 the duty on salt, which had varied at the different mines from two to six annas a maund, was raised to a uniform rate of eight annas at all the mines.

I may here refer to the report by Mr. Johnson, Superintendent of Salt, forwarded under this office letter of 25th July 1890, for full particulars regarding the Kohat Salt Mines and the method of working them.

The various opinions in favour of bringing up the price of Kohat salt by

Opinions in favour of equalizing price of Kohat salt with that of Cis-Indus salt summarised as follows :—

- (a) That it would enable the Preventive Customs line on the Indus to be removed and produce an increase of revenue ;  
that there is no valid reason why Government supply Trans-Indus subjects and trans-border tribes with salt at a rate far lower than that at which it is supplied to our Cis-Indus subjects.

Arguments advanced against the above measure.

(b) And the arguments advanced against the measure have been—

- (i) That such a measure would be unpopular with our Trans-Indus subjects ;  
(ii) That it would be unpopular amongst the trans-border tribes and might give rise to disturbances on the border ;  
(iii) That it would dislocate the existing trade in salt, and that it would throw out of employment the majority of men and animals engaged in the trade ;  
(iv) It would be an additional heavy tax on our Trans-Indus subjects.  
(v) The present carriers and traders would not be able to furnish the necessary working capital ;  
(vi) It might drive some of the trade to supposed but unspecified mines in independent territory ;  
(vii) The salt being much used for cattle, Government would incur much odium should disease break out amongst the cattle owing to their being deprived of salt by the increased price of it.

The question has eventually resolved itself into one of (a) whether the price of salt should be increased once for all or be gradually raised so as to be brought on a par with Cis-Indus salt.

(b) Whether the time at which proposals have been made was a good one for action to be taken.

And in dealing with the matter now these are the questions which will require consideration.

Eight years have now nearly elapsed since the last small increase was made, and the question has not since then been raised.

At the present time Government expenditure on the North-West Frontier is great, and, apart from the question of the advantages of abolishing the Indus Preventive line, it may be well to consider whether Government should any longer consent to forego the increase which it may fairly expect and is entitled to from a valuable possession such as these mines.

I am of opinion that the time has come when Government should do away with the existing anomaly once and for all, and I therefore submit this memorandum with a view to the matter being considered.

Time for doing away with the existing anomaly has come.



As my proposal is that Government should raise the duty to the full amount and not by gradual increments, I submit my views on the objections which have hitherto been put forward against this course.

Views on objections against bringing price of Kohat salt on a par with Cis-Indus salt.

On objection *re* unpopularity of the measure amongst Trans-Indus subjects. It has not been considered strong. I will take the arguments against the increase in the order in which I have put them above.

\*(i) The first referring to the unpopularity of the measure amongst our Trans-Indus subjects, has not apparently been considered a strong one by those who used it. The people that would be most affected would be the Khattaks within whose lands the mines are situated, and a small increase to the allowance given them from the Salt Revenue would be all that would be necessary.

\*(ii) The second, that the measure would be unpopular with the trans-border tribes and might give rise to disturbances on the border, is not an argument that I consider is in the present day of much weight.

On objection, *i.e.*, the measure would be unpopular with the trans-border tribes. This argument is not of very much weight.

The measure would be unpopular as any measure undertaken by Government, in regard to which trans-border people can put forward pretentious claims and complaints, however preposterous, would be, and it is a matter of principle with them to put them forward.

Possibly the Pass Afridis and Daulatzais and Tirah Afridis would come forward with complaints, though I see no reason to suppose that any beyond the Pass Afridis, who resented the last increase, would do so.

There does not seem any reason to believe that any of the other tribes would concern themselves in the matter, as individuals would not be much affected.

The consumption of salt by individuals may be taken at four seers per head† per annum, and as consumers for the most part obtain salt for consumption by barter, the increase would be very little felt, and any little feeling of irritation that might be engendered would soon subside.

† Allowing for cattle as well as human beings, I should prefer to put it at 8 seers per head, though this is probably in excess of the actual fact—R. U.

It will probably be admitted that the condition of the border of late years has undergone a change for the better, and the tribes as a rule understand better than they have ever done before the power of Government.

The amount of opposition and trouble to be encountered may be calculated mostly according to the extent to which Government is likely to make concessions to the tribes. Any show of indecision or hesitation in persisting with the measure on account of pretentious claims brought forward by the tribes would meet with a corresponding increase of opposition and trouble.

Against every measure that is proposed there will always be, both within and beyond the border, a certain class ready to try and stir up agitation in the hopes of obtaining something by clamouring, and in a case like this now under consideration, I submit that if Government quietly remains firm, little or no trouble would be encountered.

This treatment produced its natural results with the Pass Afridis in 1883, and there is no reason to suppose it would not be equally efficacious now. It should be noted that through all their opposition in 1883, the Pass Afridis showed very plainly that they did not intend to bring about the forfeiture of their Pass allowances, and it may be safely asserted that they will do nothing now that will bring about their final forfeiture, more especially as they have realised by this time that an increase in price of salt benefits them as traders.

\* These figures refer to the objections as I have numbered them in paragraph (2) (b).—R. U.

In regard to this point of political effect the opposite view as to whether the effect, if any, would be good does not appear to have been considered. And why should it not be asserted that the effect of our trans-border neighbours seeing that Government will do as they consider best in regard to their own property, regardless of the clamourings of the trans-border tribes who have no just cause of complaint, would be excellent, and that it would do much towards impressing on them that British rule is firmly established?

After all, the assertion that disturbances would be created on the border has been apparently based only on a fear that this might be the case.

The subject, too, bears on the question of departure from the hitherto purely conciliatory policy that has been practised on the frontier. I am of opinion that the eventual result of firm action in regard to the salt, whether it caused at first a certain amount of disturbance or not, would be good as impressing on our neighbours that the days of Government setting aside all other considerations in deference to their fanciful susceptibilities are a thing of the past.

And further, with the possibility of Government having sooner or later to deal with more important frontier questions, it would seem to be preferable that a question like this should be settled now instead of having to be brought up at a time when Government might find it inconvenient to consider it.

(iii). The third argument that enhancement of duty would dislocate the

On argument that enhancement of duty would dislocate trade and throw out of employment men and animals engaged. A certain amount of dislocation would take place; but no reason for supposing that any men or animals would be thrown out of employment.

trade and throw out of employment the men and animals engaged in it calls for consideration.

I would point out that since the last rise in duty, the profits of the traders and carriers have increased, and there has also been a large increase in the

\* Appendix A. trade, as reference to the annexed state-ment\* will show.

It may be assumed that the trade would, with such an increase in price as is further recommended, be affected for a time and a certain amount of dislocation would take place, and to estimate its extent we should first consider the present destination of the trade and those who are employed in it.

Reference to the statement attached† will show the present sales from the mines and a rough estimate of the destination of the trade.

† Appendix B.

During the year 1891-92 the following classes are shown as having been engaged in the trade :—

Khattaks	...	...	...	...	...	...	35,214
Ghilzais	...	...	...	...	...	...	13,231
Waziris	...	...	...	...	...	...	7,076
Powindahs	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,355
Bangashes	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,272
Afridis	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,060
Miscellaneous	...	...	...	...	...	...	809

And the carriage employed was :—

85,675 camels.  
94,346 bullocks.  
49,577 donkeys.

carrying 589,066 maunds of salt, the average load being—

5 maunds per camel.  
 $2\frac{1}{2}$  maunds per bullock.  
1 maund per donkey.

The numbers given represent repeated transactions by a certain lot of men.

The majority of the carriers are, as seen, Khattaks, our own subjects.

The trans-border trade taken to Peshawar goes to Swat, Bajaur and the Yusufzai hills, Kashkar and Ningrahar, and is said to find its way as far as Badakhshan and by the Kurram route to Kabul and Hazara.

As already said, a certain amount of dislocation of the present trade is to be expected. Kohat salt will displace Cis-Indus salt in Kashmir, especially should railway communication with Kashmir *via* Abbottabad be opened. It will have the monopoly, even allowing for animal carriage alone, of a track extending some 60 miles from the river bank and diminishing as the distance of the river from the mines increases, till stopped by being brought into competition with Cis-Indus salt, and, with railway and river carriage open to Kohat salt, a large portion of the trade carried on at Kalabagh will be displaced. Hence, so far as the traders and carriers are concerned, they will not be losers, and there does not seem to be any valid reason for supposing that any number of men and animals would be thrown out of employment. Any animals that the poorer families might not at once be able to employ in the salt trade would readily find employment in carrying wood, etc.

(iv). In regard to the fourth objection that the enhancement of duty

On objection, *i.e.*, enhancement of duty would be additional heavy tax on Trans-Indus subjects.

No reason why Trans-Indus subjects should escape a tax paid by Cis-Indus subjects.

would be additional heavy tax on our Trans-Indus subjects, I can only say that there is no obvious reasons why our Trans-Indus subjects should escape a tax which is paid by all Cis-Indus subjects.

It will possibly be admitted that our Trans-Indus subjects and trans-border neighbours are generally in much better circumstances than the people in many parts of India who consumes salt at the rates prevailing Cis-Indus.

In support of this view it may be considered whether Government has, since taking over the Punjab, spent a rupee on relief works Trans-Indus, and during the same time has there been anything approaching a famine heard of amongst our trans-border neighbours.

It must also be borne in mind that at present about Rs. 23,000 is paid to Khattak villages as "inam" from Salt Revenue, and that the enhancement of the duty will largely increase the income earned by this clan as carriers, hence the argument that the said increase would mean an additional tax on their district is not one of much weight.

On objection as to inability of furnishing capital. There need be no apprehension on this score.

(v). With reference to the fifth objection, that the present carriers and traders would not be able to furnish the necessary capital.

This argument is one which cannot be fairly applied to Ghilzais and Powindahs. The large herds of camels owned by them is a sufficient answer to such an argument, and, if further be necessary, the loads which they bring down on their camels may be considered—rice, tobacco, fruit, nuts, etc., which may fairly be taken as selling at Rs. 15 per maund brought down (and this average is a low estimate). It will be seen that they realize sufficient capital to pay for six consignments of salt at Rs. 2-8-0 per maund.

This refers to carriers who are traders as well, as the class under notice in fact are.

It may safely be assumed that as long as they have a market open to them these men will continue the trade, and that, excepting perhaps in some of the furthest points now reached by the salt, the trade will not be affected. Their present market is, as shown, *via* Kurram to Kabul and Hazara and Western Afghanistan as far as Kandahar.

These markets must remain open to them unless some nearer source of supply is opened.



As regards the Afridis, which includes the Pass Afridis and Jowakis, I think we are apt to consider them much worse off than they really are. They are an untaxed people; they have large herds and flocks, and they always have money for the purchase of arms of all descriptions.

Stolen Government rifles always find ready purchasers at Rs. 250 each, and stolen ammunition at 4 rounds for the rupee.

I cannot trace one single case in the Civil Courts in regard to such dealings, and it would seem therefore that the credit of the Khattaks is good.

Salt is a necessary, and when the demand for a necessary exists capital will come forward, and apprehensions on this ground seemed to be based on ignorance of ordinary trade maxims.

The markets to which these people carry would also remain open to them; for Kohat salt, as shown later on, would retain the Peshawar market and compete successfully with Khewra salt.

The poorest of the carriers are the Khattaks and Waziris. The Khattaks employ bullocks in the trade and work on their own capital, except the very poorest who work on borrowed capital, settling up their accounts after each trip or annually, as the case may be.

(vi). With reference to the trade being possibly driven to other unused mines or sources, I have made very

On objection that the trade would be driven to unused mines or sources.

There are no sources Trans-Indus which could interfere with the trade of the Kohat Salt Mines.

careful enquiries, and I believe I am right in stating that neither in the Waziri Hills nor in the Kurram do any such mines exist or sources exist, though by Wynne's Memoir of Geo-

logical Survey of India, XI., page 72, it is apparently possible that salt may exist trans-border below the surface.

The only salt deposits that I can hear of are said to exist somewhere in Balkh. The information was obtained from a Ghilzai trader, who stated that when the price of Kohat salt was previously raised a few Ghilzais tried these mines, but gave them up after the first trip as impracticable.

The salt is besides said to be very impure.

These mines, I am informed, furnish a certain supply of salt to Kabul itself and to Chitral.

In the former, however, Kohat salt taken by Ghilzais by the Kurram Valley competes successfully with it.

Were these mines a practicable source, it might be assumed that His Highness the Amir would have taken the matter up ere this.

Kohat salt is said to find its way as far as Badakhshan.

An increase in the price of Kohat salt as proposed might force the opening up of mines in that direction, but the distance is too great for any apprehension to exist that such salt could be smuggled into British territory, though the opening of them successfully would displace a certain amount of our most distant trade.

It is not unlikely, too, that in certain parts where Kohat salt now sells, such as Kandahar, the people may take to manufacturing earth salt (the practice already exists there to a certain extent) so that a certain diminution from the Kohat Salt Mines might be expected; but this would be very trifling, and I am of opinion that it may be accepted as a fact that there are no sources trans-border which could interfere in any material degree with the regular trade of Kohat Salt Mines.

(vii). The last objection regarding the odium which would be incurred should disease break out amongst the cattle owing to their being deprived of salt by the increased price, I have replied to in some measure, where I have pointed out that all our Cis-Indus subjects pay the higher rate of duty, though in poorer circumstances than our Trans-Indus subjects and trans-border neighbours,

and it is quite certain that notwithstanding their poorer circumstances our Cis-Indus subjects contrive to give their cattle sufficient salt to keep them in health. There is hence no reason why the population Trans-Indus should be considered as having a claim to any special concession in regard to this question.

In the Kohat District and in Yusafzai the people do not give their cattle salt, the cattle getting such as they want at salt licks.

A free allowance to men working in the mines and the establishment might well be given, as is done Cis-Indus, and this would save smuggling by those who have the best opportunities for practising it.

Extent to which enhancement is necessary to place Kohat salt on an equal footing with the Cis-Indus salt.

The next point for consideration is the extent to which enhancement is necessary to place Kohat salt on an equal footing with the salt Cis-Indus.

Kohat salt is admittedly inferior to the Cis-Indus and Kalabagh salt, and in previous correspondence this difference has been put forward as being in the proportion of 2 to 3, though by Wynne's Memoir above referred to, page 24, the difference is apparently only 3 per cent.

This report refers only to what is surface salt, and it may be questioned whether when it comes to mining even this difference will not disappear, but consumers put the difference down as much greater than shown, and claim that it is as much as 4 to 5.

The duty on Cis-Indus and Kalabagh salt is calculated on a maund of  $82\frac{2}{7}$  lbs. avoirdupois and on Kohat Salt on a maund of  $102\frac{1}{8}$  lbs. There is therefore a difference of  $\frac{1}{8}$ th in weight in favour of Kohat salt.

I would propose that this weight should be maintained and the duty be fixed at Rs. 2-8-0 per maund of  $102\frac{1}{8}$  lbs. for Kohat salt as against Rs. 2-8-0 per maund of  $82\frac{2}{7}$  lbs. on Cis-Indus and Kalabagh salt.

I would remark that no natives with whom I have talked the matter over consider that there would eventually be any falling-off whatever in the trade, and in that case the income would be at least Rs. 14,00,000.

Duty should be raised to Rs. 2-8-0 per maund now and once for all.

The next point for consideration is whether the duty on Kohat salt should be raised to Rs. 2-8-0 per maund

now and once for all, or gradually.

An important point in connection with this question is that the last rise having taken place eight years ago and no further mention of the subject having been made, is it not possible that an idea may exist that the last rise was a final one, and that each gradual rise may be regarded as such, a feeling consequently being engendered that Government is not acting fairly in the matter? There is nothing in the correspondence to show that a further rise was not contemplated, and I think that, in order to avoid such misapprehension as to the intentions of Government (which I clearly understand to be that the Kohat salt shall eventually be put on a par with the Cis-Indus salt so as to render the abolition of the Indus preventive line practicable), it would be most advisable to dispose of the matter finally.

Nineteen years have elapsed since the question was first mooted in 1873, and only one small step has been taken towards the object then, and presumably now, in view.

Such misapprehension as to the intentions of Government, raised by gradual increments in the price of salt, seems far more likely to create ill-feeling and disturbances than a definite declaration by Government as to its intentions and definite action in carrying them out.

Each gradual increase will give rise to the belief that it is the last, and possibly call forth opposition with the idea of preventing further increases being made.

I am, therefore, of opinion, as already stated in paragraph 4, that the duty should be raised to the full extent (of Rs. 2-8-0 per maund) once for all.

When the price was last raised three months' notice of the increase in duty was given, and Mr. Tucker, then Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, remarked in his No 436, dated 14th September 1883, to the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, that he thought the three months' notice was a mistake, and that one month's notice would have been sufficient. With so long a notice as three months' there would necessarily be a rush on the mines and the markets would be glutted, and this fact in itself would enable any opposition to the measure to be prolonged.

As my proposals include the simultaneous removal of the Indus line, any long notice that would enable a large stock to be got in hand would be inadvisable. There would be no means of preventing such stock being disposed of at profitable rates across the Indus to the detriment of the Cis-Indus salt trade.

The preventive line I propose should be removed from the date on which the enhanced duty on Kohat salt, if sanctioned, be notified to take effect. This would remove all doubts as to the intention of Government.

Removal of preventive line from date of notification of enhanced duty proposed. Also suggests that one month's notice of the change would be sufficient.

I consider that one month's notice, if any at all be given, of the change in price would be sufficient.

I would suggest that the date from which the enhancement should take effect should be 1st October. This would give the best chance of any ill-feeling created by the change subsiding during the winter months, when the trans-border people are most dependent on British territory.

The late Miranzai expeditions and their result are fresh in the minds of the tribes, and may be expected to act as a healthy warning to those who might be disposed to give us trouble.

So far as this border is concerned, I am of opinion that the present time is an opportune one for introducing the change recommended.

As regards the Waziris, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu will know to what extent they are likely to be affected, but, as on the former occasion no disturbance by them was apprehended if the price of the salt had been raised higher than was done, it does not seem likely that they would be disturbed now by a rise in price.

Statement D\* shows the allotment of "inams" paid from Salt Revenue, and if the duty on salt be enhanced, I am of opinion that these "inams" should be fixed instead of being calculated by percentages on income.

Fixed "inams" instead of percentages with certain increases proposed.

The average amount paid in inams during the past three years is Rs. 26,484-7-11, and I would propose to make them up to a fixed amount of Rs. 35,000.

The Khan of Teri, who has in previous correspondence been held to be entitled to participate in any increase of Salt Revenue, has received an average of Rs. 4,592 per annum for the last three years made up by Rs. 10 per cent. and Rs. 3 per cent. from the income of the Bahadur Khel and Nari depôts respectively.

I would recommend a fixed allowance of Rs. 8,000 being given him, which is an increase of Rs. 3,408 on his above average.

And I would recommend an increase of Rs. 5,180 to the average paid as village "inams," making up the total of Rs. 35,000. The village "inams" to be increased in proportion to the scale at present awarded, but only those villages to benefit by the increase in whose lands the quarries are situated. If an area round the quarries be protected, this allowance might be increased perhaps to Rs. 10,000, as already suggested in paragraph 16, as compensation for loss of grazing and wood cutting rights within that area.



## APPENDIX A.

(Enclosures of Deputy Commissioner, Kohat's No. 56-C, dated 1st July 1892.)

*Statement showing amount of trade in Salt in 1882-83 (i.e., before the last increase of salt duty) as compared with 1891-92.*

YEAR.	JATTA.		MALGIN.		NAEL.		KARRAK.		BAHADAR KHEL.		TOTAL.	
	Salt in maunds.	Duty.	Salt in maunds.	Duty.	Salt in maunds.	Duty.	Salt in maunds.	Duty.	Salt in maunds.	Duty.	Salt in maunds.	Duty.
1882-83...	...	Rs. 36,243	...	Rs. 27,163	...	Rs. 1,627	...	Rs. 6,506	...	Rs. 8,782	...	Rs. 80,321
1891-92...	...	144,972	...	108,653	...	6,507	...	54,700	...	70,257	...	2,94,533
Difference	...	217,212	...	152,416	...	26,330	...	95,716	...	97,390	...	+2,14,212
	...	+72,240	...	+43,763	...	+19,823	...	+61,016	...	+27,133	...	+223,977

## APPENDIX B.

*Statement showing the destination of the Trade from the Kohat Salt Mines for the years 1890-91 and 1891-92.*

Name of depôt and year.	Kohat.		Peshawar.		Kabul.		Swat Boner.		Bajaur.		Darband.		Tirah.		Bannu.		Daman Derajat.		Local consumption in salt region.		TOTAL.	
	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.
Jatta ... { 1890-91 ...	...	...	157,668	15	6,262	35	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,290	5	...	...	...	...	69	30	169,291	5
... { 1891-92 ...	...	...	200,112	5	15,621	0	...	...	...	...	...	...	290	15	...	...	...	...	1,188	25	217,212	5
Malgin ... { 1890-91 ...	6,644	35	51,709	15	2,649	20	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	307	20	103,781	30
... { 1891-92 ...	22,027	10	27,399	15	...	...	30,499	15	1,560	...	10,389	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	443	30	152,416	35
Nari ... { 1890-91 ...	275	80	8,832	0	14,844	35	...	...	...	...	...	...	546	20	541	15	...	...	419	0	25,459	20
... { 1891-92 ...	157	0	2,839	35	20,079	20	...	...	...	...	...	...	549	25	1,815	35	...	...	888	25	26,330	20
Karrak ... { 1890-91 ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	14,671	35	60,360	25	1,970	25	77,003	5
... { 1891-92 ...	...	...	...	...	46,868	10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	11,380	15	79,066	5	5,270	5	95,716	25
Bahadar Khel ... { 1890-91 ...	...	...	...	...	63,691	0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	23,293	30	...	...	129	30	70,291	30
... { 1891-92 ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	33,555	10	...	...	144	10	97,390	20
Total ... { 1890-91 ...	6,920	25	218,209	30	70,625	20	30,499	15	1,560	...	10,389	0	5,836	25	35,529	5	60,360	25	2,896	25	445,827	10
... { 1891-92 ...	22,184	10	280,351	15	99,391	20	102,502	15	...	...	...	...	840	0	46,795	25	79,066	5	7,935	15	589,066	25
Increase or decrease in 1891-92	+15,263	25	+12,141	25	+28,766	0	+72,003	0	-1,560	...	-10,389	0	-4,996	25	+8,266	20	+18,705	20	+5,038	30	+143,239	15

KOHAT :

*The 1st July 1892.*H. A. DEANE, CAPTAIN,  
Deputy Commissioner.

## Sub-Enclosure B.

*Letter from Pandit Hari Kishan Kaul, M.A., Officiating Junior Secretary to Financial Commissioner, Punjab, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 14th March 1895.*

I am directed to return the papers which were received unofficially from your office under your endorsement dated the 23rd January last, regarding an enhancement of the present excise duty on Kohat salt and to convey the following remarks of the Financial Commissioner.

2. Mr. Rivaz has found this important case awaiting him on his recent return from furlough, and sees that the report due to the Government of India in the matter was called for nearly three years ago, and that several requisitions have been made for its speedy submission. The case is quite new to him, and he would have liked to give it fuller consideration than circumstances admit, but as matters stand, he thinks it best to pass on the reports of the local officers without further delay.

3. The first point to be considered is whether the time has now come when, from a political point of view, the price of Kohat salt may safely be increased to that of Cis-Indus salt. This question has been fully discussed in all its bearings by the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner, and as such experienced frontier officers as Major Deane and Mr. Udny express a confident opinion in favour of the measure, the Financial Commissioner thinks that their views may safely be accepted.

4. It will be seen, however, that the enhancement now proposed by Major Deane and supported by Mr. Udny does not amount to an equalization of the price of Kohat with Cis-Indus salt, as appears to have been contemplated in the Government of India letter which has directed the re-opening of the question, for, although the new duty recommended is Rs. 2-8-0 per maund, the same as that in force Cis-Indus, it is proposed to retain the local standard of weight, according to which four *Kohati* maunds are approximately equal to five British maunds. The new duty on Kohat salt would, therefore, come to about Rs. 2 per British maund. Thus, as is shown in the Deputy Commissioner's and Commissioner's reports, it would still be necessary, after removing the Indus preventive line, to take some special measures for preventing Kohat salt from competing unduly with Cis-Indus salt in the Cis-Indus portions of the Province. It seems desirable, for the reasons given by Major Deane and Mr. Udny, to retain the local standard of weight at the Kohat mines, and, if the new duty is limited to the rate proposed, the measures suggested by Mr. Udny for the prevention of the encroachment of Kohat salt on the Cis-Indus tracts at present served by Cis-Indus salt appear as good as can be devised. All such preventive measures are, however, more or less objectionable and to be avoided, if possible, and the Financial Commissioner is inclined to think that perhaps a solution of the difficulty may be found in fixing the new duty on Kohat salt at Rs. 2-12-0 per *Kohati* maund. With this duty the price of Kohat salt at the mines would still be appreciably below that of Cis-Indus salt at Khewra or Kalabagh, and some difference in price is justified by the fact that, in native opinion, the Kohat salt is of somewhat inferior quality to the product of the Cis-Indus mines, while the enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt to this extent would, judging from the figures on the subject which are given by Major Deane and Mr. Udny, prove sufficient of itself to prevent the Kohat salt from under-selling the Cis-Indus salt in the Cis-Indus country. At the same time, the advantage in favour of Kohat salt over Cis-Indus salt at a duty of Rs. 2-12-0 per local maund on the former would seem sufficient to enable it to retain its present hold Trans-Indus.

5. As regards the three points noticed in paragraph 18 of Mr. Udny's letter, it will be observed, that, while he is in agreement with Major Deane as to the date from which any enhancement that is decided upon should take effect, he is in favour of giving a longer notice than Major Deane advocates, and would take only half the proposed increase for the first year. On both these points there is much to be said on either side, but on the whole Mr. Rivaz agrees in Mr. Udny's views.

6. It seems also to Mr. Rivaz that Mr. Udny is right in recommending that the Kohat mines should continue to be administered by the Deputy Commissioner.

7. As regards the remaining questions which are discussed by Mr. Udny in paragraphs 10 to 31 of his report, connected with the revision of establishment and future administrative arrangements consequent on the proposed enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt, the increase to Mr. Johnson's salary, the supply of free salt to the inhabitants of the protected area, and the future regulation of the *inams* which are allowed to the Khan of Teri and certain land-owners, I am to say that Mr. Udny's proposals on all these points appear to the Financial Commissioner to be carefully considered and suitable.

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Enclosure 3.

*Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 13th September 1895.*

In continuation of the letter from this office, dated the 12th July 1895, regarding the proposed enhancement of the duty on the grey salt obtained from the Trans-Indus Mines of the Kohat District, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter dated 28th August 1895 (and enclosure), from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, and to convey the following remarks.

2. It will be seen that in these letters Mr. Cunningham and Major Leigh agree with Mr. Udny and Mr. Rivaz in thinking that it is on the whole best to raise the duty by two steps, allowing an interval of a year between them, and this is in accordance with the view which Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick has already expressed ; but from a communication since received it appears that a rumour that the duty will be raised has been spread, and that the traders are accumulating salt in anticipation of the rise of price. In these circumstances, it becomes a question whether it would not be better to raise the duty to the full extent proposed *per saltum* next year.

3. As regards the point mentioned in paragraph 4 of Mr. King's letter, the Commissioner will be asked to institute enquiries regarding it, and to consider whether, in the event of the new duty being found to have the effect of restricting the export trade at any particular part of our frontier, it might not be possible to meet that by allowing a drawback of part of the duty on salt exported there.

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Sub-Enclosure.

*Letter from F. D. Cunningham, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 28th August 1895.*

In compliance with your No. 330 of the 17th July, I have the honour to forward copies of \* letters from the Deputy Commissioners of Kohat and Peshawar, giving their opinions on certain questions connected with the proposal to raise the duty on Kohat salt and abolish the Indus preventive line.

Both officers agree that on political grounds there is no objection to the increase of the tax. Mr. King is in favour of raising it to the maximum at one step, but would defer this till next year. Major Leigh recommends that to meet the requirements of Khattak traders the increase be made by two instalments of one rupee each with an interval of one year.

I am inclined to believe that the duty could be raised at a bound without fear of disturbance or of political complications, and that if there were now time to make the executive or departmental arrangements necessary to work the new



system, the change could be carried out this autumn ; but to prevent hardship to the Khattaks and because the question of the requisite increase of establishment has to be settled, action must be deferred till next year.

The bulk of the Chitral Field Force will have returned in a month, without actual annexation of independent territory, the stories by which Mullahs and emissaries from Afghanistan have sought to alarm and excite the trans-border clans will have been disproved, and the lesson of the fighting in Swat will be fresh in the memory of every tribe. The Afridis of the Kohat Pass, who are most interested in the matter, are quieter and more under control than ten years ago. On the other hand, the interests of our own subjects deserve consideration, and as the Khattaks, who live by the salt trade, are as a class very poor, a more gradual increase of the duty will give them time to accommodate themselves to the change. As pointed out by Mr. Tucker in 1883, there are obvious objections to long notice of enhancement ; but as the announcement of the first increase can be timed to the season when camels are usually kept out of work, the loss to Government will be lessened, and if the Khattaks rush to drive a brisker trade in anticipation of the rise in duty, there is no reason to grudge them the advantage they may reap.

The whole subject has been so exhaustively treated that I need not attempt to repeat arguments one way or the other. On the whole, the opinion which I venture to give is—

- (1.) The duty may safely be raised to Rs. 2-8 per local maund, or to such figure as the Department concerned may desire, in order to prevent interference with the trade of the Khewra Mines.
- (2.) The rise in duty should be effected by two instalments of one rupee each, three months' notice being given of the first increase, the second to come into force after the lapse of one year more.
- (3.) The enhancement of duty and consequent large increase of revenue, with the abolition of the preventive line, will of course necessitate an increase of establishment to manage these mines. So far as I can judge, the proposals of Mr. Johnson in his report for the year 1891-92, seem appropriate. Of this point the Commissioner, North India Salt Revenue, will be the best judge.

Until the duty has reached its full limit, it will not be possible to abolish the Preventive Service.

- (4.) Simultaneously with the increase of duty the "inams" must be raised. They may, however, be fixed, and need not continue to bear a ratio to revenue. The average paid in the years 1889-90 to 1891-92 to villages was Rs. 26,484, and the share of the Khan of Teri has been Rs. 4,592.

Major Deane recommended that the payment to the Khan be fixed at Rs. 8,000 and the village inams at Rs. 35,000.

Mr. Udny is in favour of more liberal grants, raising the village "inams" to Rs. 50,000 and the Khan's to Rs. 10,000.

It does not appear that the villagers will have any new service laid on them, but it is well to treat them liberally, and the Khan has been held entitled to share the increase of revenue. I would give Rs. 40,000 to the villages as "inams" and Rs. 10,000 to the Khan.

#### Enclosure No. 4.

*Letter from R. M. Dane, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 23rd December 1895.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated 12th July 1895, and 13th September 1895, regarding the enhancement of the duty on salt from the Kohat Salt Mines.

2. The enhancement of the duty on this salt to a rate which will approximate so nearly to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt as to admit of the abolition of the Indus

preventive line, is a measure which has long been contemplated, and which was once, as far back as 1879, actually ordered. The Government of India observe with satisfaction that there appears to be now complete unanimity of opinion among the officers best acquainted with this portion of the North-Western Frontier that political considerations need no longer delay the introduction of the measure. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, it is said, "entirely agrees that, with a view to obtaining the large additional revenue which may be expected and to getting rid of the preventive line, it is highly desirable to raise the duty on Kohat salt to a figure which would be to some extent comparable with that fixed for the Cis-Indus salt, and which would admit of the preventive line being abolished. He further agrees that this would be a perfectly fair and just measure, and that after a little time it would not press hardly on any of those concerned whether as traders or consumers."

3. As to the manner in which the enhancement should be effected, and the rate which should be adopted, there is, however, some difference of opinion. Major Deane, writing as Deputy Commissioner of Kohat in July 1892, proposed that the duty should be raised at once from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund. Mr. Udney, the Commissioner of Peshawar, supported Major Deane's proposal as to the rate, but recommended that the duty should be raised first to Re. 1-8 annas a maund only, and that a year later it should be raised by a second enhancement to the full amount proposed, viz., Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund. Both Major Deane and Mr. Udney considered that with a rate of Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund it would be necessary to maintain some restrictions on the traffic in Kohat salt to prevent it from competing with salt from Khewra and Kalabagh in the Cis-Indus districts; and to avoid the necessity for such restrictions Mr. Rivaz, the Financial Commissioner, suggests that the duty may be raised to Rs. 2-12 annas a Lahori maund. Mr. Cunningham, the Officiating Commissioner of Peshawar, considers that "the duty may safely be raised to Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund or to such figure as the Department concerned may desire in order to prevent interference with the trade of the Khewra Mines." The Lieutenant-Governor, it is understood, is in general accord with the views expressed by Mr. Cunningham, and is willing to agree to any enhancement that may be found to be necessary to place Kohat and Cis-Indus salt upon equal terms. Mr. Patterson, the Commissioner of the Northern India Salt Department, who has been consulted, thinks that a duty of Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund will permit of the abolition of the preventive line and of the withdrawal of the prohibition against the possession of Kohat salt Cis-Indus without danger to the revenue from Cis-Indus salt, if the existing prohibition against the carriage of Kohat salt by railway across the Indus be maintained and the booking of Kohat salt by rail Cis-Indus be also forbidden. Mr. Udney's view that the enhancement of the duty should be effected by instalments is shared by the Financial Commissioner, Mr. Cunningham, and Major Leigh, the present Deputy Commissioner of Kohat. In your letter of the 12th July 1895, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick expressed himself in favour of an increase in the duty by degrees, but from your letter of September it would seem that he has now modified this view, and thinks that it will be better to raise the duty to the full extent proposed by one bound if the traders continue to accumulate stocks, as they are now doing, in anticipation of a rise in the duty.

4. The question is one of considerable difficulty, and His Excellency the Governor General in Council is disposed to think that the officers who have recommended an increase of the duty from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund, have hardly made sufficient allowance for the inferiority in quality of the grey Kohat salt to the salt obtainable at the Cis-Indus Mines. It is important that the duty shall not be raised any higher than may be necessary to permit of the abolition of the Indus preventive line and so do away with the vexatious restrictions on trade which the line necessarily imposes. Sir Robert Egerton in 1882 considered that a duty on Kohat salt of Rs. 2 a British maund of 82½ lbs. would be perhaps higher than was absolutely necessary to prevent the Kohat salt from competing with the product of the Cis-Indus Mines, and that a duty of Re. 1-8 annas would probably be sufficient if the carriage of the salt by railway from Khushalgarh and Attock or by boat down the Indus were temporarily prohibited. An increase in the duty now levied on Kohat salt of 400 per cent.

may be severely felt in outlying tracts across the border, and it is important to avoid, if possible, any unnecessary enhancement. From paragraph 3 of your letter of September 1895 it appears that the Commissioner of Peshawar has been asked to consider whether, in the event of the enhanced duty being found to have the effect of restricting the export trade to any particular part of the frontier, it may be possible to allow a drawback of part of the duty on the salt exported there. A system of this kind would, however, inevitably give rise to serious difficulties and complications, and the Government of India are not satisfied as to the necessity for its adoption especially if the rate of the duty be not pitched too high.

5. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council therefore, after careful consideration, has decided to fix the duty for the present at Rs. 2 a Lahori or Kohat maund. This rate may be regarded a compromise between the rate of Re. 1-8 annas a Kohat maund, to which it has been proposed to raise the duty temporarily for one year, and the rate of Rs. 2-8 annas which has been recommended for ultimate adoption; and by lowering somewhat the proposed rate of enhancement, the difficulties as to an increase by instalments and the adoption of a differential rate of duty for a portion of the trans-border trade will, it is hoped, be obviated. It is, in the opinion of the Government of India, very desirable that instalments should, if possible, be avoided, and that the enhancement should be effected once for all by a single operation. The Government of India in short agree with what is understood to be now the view of the Lieutenant-Governor "that, if we are to introduce an unpopular measure, it is better to introduce it straight off at once in its entirety than to break it up into instalments and thus spread the irritation arising from it over a considerable period." There seems to be fair reason to believe that a rate of Rs. 2 a Lahori maund will permit of the abolition of the Indus Preventive Line, or at least of its reduction to an establishment sufficient to guard the railways and the Indus ferries only. Should experience show that the rate is insufficient, the question of a further enhancement can be considered; but it is hoped that the necessity for this will not arise. It may be necessary to retain the existing prohibition of the carriage of Kohat salt across and down the Indus and of its possession cis-Indus, and on this point I am directed to ask for an early expression of the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. The duty, it will be observed, is to be Rs. 2 a Lahori or Kohat maund. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council concurs in thinking that the local unit of weight should be retained. The Government has practically nothing to gain by a change, and the prejudices of the local traders and others in such a matter may rightly be respected.

6. The next point for consideration is the date from which the enhancement of duty should be effected, and the notice which should be given of the intention of the Government to make it. The date generally recommended is 1st October on the ground that the salt trade is inactive during the three monsoon months, and that any ill-feeling created by the change would have a better chance of subsiding during the winter, as the trans-border tribesmen are at that time more dependent on British territory. Major Deane, it is observed, recommended that one month's notice only should be given. Mr. Udny, Mr. Cunningham and the Financial Commissioner consider that three months' notice is desirable. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick on this point has expressed no opinion. In the opinion of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council it is unnecessary and undesirable to give any notice of the intention of the Government to raise the duty. To do so means only that a number of capitalists will have an opportunity of making a large profit out of the transaction, and the interests of these men may safely be disregarded. The small traders and carriers have neither the capital nor the means of information to enable them to take advantage of the opportunity and accumulate stocks. The view, therefore, of the Government of India is that, unless the intention to increase the duty leaks out, the enhancement should be made on the 1st September next without any previous notice, and that widespread intimation of the enhancement should then be given. Traders will in this way have practically a month's warning to provide themselves with the requisite funds when they go to the mines for salt in October, but they will not be able to take advantage of an interval of low rate, after publication of notice,



to make money out of the public by speculation. Should, however, it appear that the traders have received information as to the intentions of the Government, and that they are obtaining salt from the mines in specially large quantities in anticipation of a rise of duty, action should, in the opinion of the Government of India, be taken to enhance the duty at once. It is undesirable that the Government should be forestalled in the matter for the benefit of speculative traders.

7. In introducing the new rate it may be necessary to make some concessions at the outset to men in the petty carrying trade and to accept bonds from them in part payment of the enhanced duty. Details of this kind should be worked out by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat in consultation with the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue. The farther, it may be observed, that a carrier has to carry his salt, the less is the proportion he will have to add to his price. It is only to the consumers in the immediate vicinity of the mines or quarries that the price of salt will be raised by the enhancement of the duty nearly four-fold; and to many of these men the sting of the enhancement will be largely taken away by the additional allowances they will receive.

8. When the enhanced rate of duty has been established and affairs at the mines have been placed on the new footing, the management of the mines should, in the opinion of the Government of India, be transferred to the Northern India Salt department. The introduction of the new rate of duty had better be carried out by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, as he is in the best position to watch its effects, explain matters to the traders and take any precautionary measures that may be found to be necessary; and he should be instructed to consult and obtain the co-operation of the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue. After the new rate has been introduced and an equilibrium between Kohat salt and cis-Indus salt has been established to a practically sufficient extent, the management of the mines will cease to possess any political importance, and will become a purely revenue business, and should then be transferred, like the management of the other salt sources, to the Salt Department to be worked with the special skill and knowledge that that Department necessarily possesses.

9. Upon the question of the payment of increased inams to the Nawab of Teri and to the landowners of certain villages adjoining the salt mines, the proposals of Mr. Cunningham, the Officiating Commissioner of Peshawar, which it is understood, are accepted by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, appear to the Government of India to be appropriate, but upon this point, as also upon the question of the establishments which should be entertained at the mines when the duty is enhanced, the Government of India will, I am to say, await a further report. The proposals for the additional establishments required, which were submitted by Major Deane, should be revised carefully by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat in consultation with the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue.

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Enclosure No. 5.

*Extract from letter from R. M. Dane, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, to the Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Revenue Department, dated 12th June 1896.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters\* dated 18th May and 26th May 1896, regarding the enhancement of the duty on salt from the Kohat Mines.

The Governor-General in Council agrees with the opinion expressed by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick that no sufficient cause has been shown for modifying the decision which was arrived at in December last in regard to the extent to which the duty should be enhanced. An increase from eight annas to two rupees per Kohat maund is considerable, and any further increase would probably be severely felt across the border and in our own trans-Indus districts. It is observed that, in the opinion of the local officers, it will be necessary, with a rate of Rs. 2 per Kohat maund, to maintain the Indus preventive line and the existing prohibition of the passage of Kohat salt on and across the Indus. The opinions

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\* Not printed.

of the local officers are of course entitled to much weight, and it is possible that, as was contemplated when the decision to fix the duty at Rs. 2 per Kohat maund was arrived at, it may be necessary hereafter to make a further enhancement of the duty. The exact rate that will prevent the Kohat salt from invading the Cis-Indus region can, however, only be satisfactorily determined by experience, and the Government of India are anxious to avoid increasing the duty any further than may be necessary to render possible the abolition of the Indus line. Mr. Bruce, in his memorandum of the 30th January 1896, says that the wealthier classes in the Derajat have, even under present circumstances, been in the habit of using Kalabagh salt, though its market price is  $11\frac{1}{4}$  seers the rupee, equivalent to Rs. 3-8-11 a maund, as compared with  $10\frac{1}{2}$  annas a maund for Kohat salt at Bannu and  $16\frac{1}{2}$  annas at Dera Ismail Khan; and if these facts are correct, it is not impossible that the rate of duty now adopted may be sufficient to prevent the Kohat salt from crossing the Indus, at any rate, in large quantities. The movements of this salt can easily be watched, and if, when the preventive line has been abolished and other restrictions have been withdrawn, it be found that the Kohat salt is displacing Khewra and Kalabagh salt in the Cis-Indus region, the duty can then be further enhanced. For the present the preventive line will be maintained on its existing footing. When effect has been given to the enhancement of the duty and prices have settled down after disposal of the accumulated stocks of Kohat salt, the question of its removal or of its maintenance at a reduced strength will be taken into consideration.

From the facts now reported, it is clear that the traders have received information of the intention of Government to enhance the duty. The sales from the mines in 1895-96 were 616,055 Kohat maunds as compared with 463,918 maunds in 1894-95 and 589,066 in 1891-92, the year in which the sales were largest on record, and the sales in the current year up to the end of the third week in May amounted to 218,145 Kohat maunds as compared with 29,235 and 98,874 maunds in the corresponding periods of 1895-96 and 1891-92. The Government of India agree with the Lieutenant-Governor that it is not a matter of regret that the carriers and traders ordinarily engaged in the Kohat salt trade should have had an opportunity of accumulating stocks which will enable them to make some profit from the change in the rate of duty, as this will help to reconcile them to the enhancement and will diminish the danger of any trouble arising in connection with it. Large stocks of salt have, however, now been accumulated, and, as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick observes, it is certain that before final arrangements for raising the duty can be made, these men will have secured to themselves quite as large a profit as is necessary or desirable.

The Governor-General in Council has therefore decided to give effect to the enhancement with as little delay as possible. In my letter dated 23rd December 1895, it was observed that, unless the intention of Government to increase the duty leaked out the enhancement should, in the opinion of the Government of India, be made on the 1st September next without any previous notice. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, while still of opinion that some notice of the enhancement should be given, is in favour of reducing the notice to the minimum required to prevent the possibility of traders resorting to the mines in the expectation of purchasing salt at the old rates and there finding that the duty has been raised, and considers that for this purpose one month's notice will suffice. During the period of the notice Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick inclines to the opinion that salt should be issued as usual to the carrier-traders ordinarily engaged in this traffic, but that salt should not be supplied to speculating capitalists embarking in the trade with the intention merely of securing a profit out of the enhancement of the duty. The Government of India accept the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion that a month's notice of the enhancement should be given. It appears from paragraph 2 of his letter to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 13 February 1896, that Major Leigh, as Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, informed trans-border and other enquirers that if an enhancement of the duty were contemplated, due notice would be given; and it is certainly desirable to prevent, as far as possible, the disappointment of legitimate expectations in the case of traders resorting to the mines from a distance. The enhancement of the duty will be effected by a notification under section 7 of

Act XII. of 1882, and a copy of the notification which will appear in the *Gazette of India* of the 13th instant, increasing the duty from eight annas to two rupees per Lahori or Kohat maund, with effect from the 13th July 1896, is appended to this letter. I am directed to request that the Commissioners of Peshawar and the Derajat may be instructed to at once announce the intention of Government to enhance the duty from that date throughout their divisions.

The publication of this notification will stimulate the activity of the traders, and to prevent the possibility of speculation on a large scale, it will, in the opinion of the Government of India, be necessary to limit the output at the mines during the period of the notice to a maximum of 150,000 Kohat maunds. The sales during the month of April in the current year, which were abnormally large, amounted to 121,383 maunds, and the sales during the first three weeks in May amounted to 96,762 maunds and the limit of the output to 150,000 maunds will certainly not therefore involve any real hardship to the salt-traders. The details of the arrangements for limiting the output may, if the Punjab Government has no objection, suitably be left to the Deputy Commissioner's discretion. Carrier-traders *bonâ fide* engaged in the salt traffic should be allowed to take what salt they may require for their own stock in trade, but capitalists, who have not before the past few months taken any part in the traffic, should not be allowed to remove as a speculation large quantities of salt.

The profits which the carrier-traders have made, and may be expected to make during the period of the notice, will sufficiently compensate them for any temporary inconvenience they may sustain in consequence of the enhancement of the duty, and it will not be necessary to allow them any further concessions. The proposal to accept bonds from them in part payment of the increased duty is apparently unworkable from the reasons given in paragraph 14 of the letter from the Junior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 9th April 1896, and this proposal may therefore be dropped. The Government of India also agree with the Lieutenant-Governor that Mr. Udny's proposal to allow free salt, or salt at reduced duty, to all people in the vicinity to the mines is impracticable, and that a monthly free issue of salt to the quarrymen, weighment coolies and preventive establishment will be a sufficient concession. Any proposals which the Lieutenant-Governor may submit to save the people living in the salt tract from unnecessary harassment for petty breaches of the salt law will, I am to say, receive the careful consideration of the Government of India.

The Government of India agree with Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick that the increases which are to be made to the salt inams now received by the Khan of Teri and the landowners of certain villages in the vicinity of the mines should be announced at the time when notice is given of the enhancement of the duty. The Government of India understand that the grant of these inams is a matter in which the discretion of Government is entirely unfettered, though it is both equitable and expedient to treat the Khan and landowners interested with consideration and liberality. I am directed therefore to say that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is authorised, when giving notice of the enhancement of the duty, to announce the intention of the Government to sanction the annual payment of fixed sums of Rs. 10,000 to the Khan of Teri and of Rs. 40,000 to the village landowners and to the Khan of Shakdarra, the Naibs of Gumbat and any other persons who may be found to be interested, in full satisfaction of all claims. The conditions upon which these grants should be held, and the manner in which the Rs. 40,000 should be distributed, may be left over for subsequent settlement.

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Enclosure 6.

*Notification by the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, dated 12th June 1896.*

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Indian Salt Act, XII. of 1882, and in supersession of the Notification by the Government of India in the Finance and Commerce Department, No. 1931, dated



6th July 1883, the Governor-General in Council imposes a duty of Rs. 2 per Lahori or Kohat maund of 102 $\frac{17}{28}$  lbs. avoirdupois on salt manufactured

Jatta.  
Malgin.  
Narri.

Karrak.  
Bahadur Khel.

in the mines in the district of Kohat,  
noted in the margin, with effect from the  
13th July 1896.

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No. 2.

*Despatch from Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, to His Excellency The Right Honourable The Governor-General of India in Council, dated 25th November 1897.*

MY LORD,

I have considered in Council the Financial Letter of your Government dated 30th September last, in which you report, for my information and approval, that you have accorded provisional sanction to an increased establishment at the Kohat salt mines (involving additional expenditure of Rs. 33,038 a year), rendered necessary by an enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt to Rs. 2 per Kohati maund. At the same time you express your regret that this enhancement was not, according to the instructions contained in Lord Kimberley's Revenue Despatch, dated 31st October 1883, communicated to me before it was enforced.

2. When the duty on Kohat salt was raised in 1883 to 8 annas, it was understood that the enhancement was not intended to be final, but that further enhancements would be made until trans-Indus salt was put on the same footing with cis-Indus salt, and the Indus customs preventive line thus rendered unnecessary. And I gather from the correspondence enclosed with your letter under reply that the present step is also to be regarded as lacking in finality. For experience is required to show whether, with a duty of Rs. 2 per Kohati maund, the price of salt on either side of the Indus will be so far equalized as to render possible the abolition of the Indus line.

3. I observe that, although the enhancement has recently been utilized as a means for exciting disaffection, you are of opinion that this was only put forward as a pretext after the commencement of hostilities. I shall await a report on the new system when trade is resumed; and, with reference to the 10 paragraph of your letter, I request that the instructions conveyed by Lord Kimberley's despatch of the 31st October 1883 may be understood to be still in force. In the meantime your proceedings are approved.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE HAMILTON.

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